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ABSTRACT	  
This	   thesis	   is	  about	   family	   law	  under	   the	  Ben	  Ali	  dictatorship	  where	   the	  women’s	  rights	  embodied	   in	   these	   laws	   constituted	   a	   cornerstone	   of	   the	   state’s	   legitimacy.	   In	   1956,	  Tunisia	  became	  the	  first	  Muslim	  country	  to	  reform	  Islamic	  family	  law	  radically,	  abolishing	  polygamy	  and	  granting	  women	  and	  men	  equal	  rights	  in	  divorce.	  Whether	  these	  laws	  have	  supported	  gender	  equality	  or	  not	  has	  been	  hotly	  contested.	  	  
Based	  on	  fieldwork	   in	  a	  suburb	  of	  Greater	  Tunis	  and	   in	  a	  court	  (2007-­‐2008),	   the	  thesis	   provides	   an	   ethnographic	   account	   of	   the	   practice	   of	  marriage	   and	   divorce.	   From	  these	  dual	  perspectives,	  it	  argues	  that	  ordinary	  ethics	  are	  an	  essential	  part	  of	  the	  practice	  of	  the	  law.	  	  
The	   thesis	   begins	   by	   exploring	   the	   uncertainties	   that	   surround	   marriage	   in	   a	  lower-­‐middle	   class	   neighbourhood.	   It	   then	   analyses	   some	   of	   the	   mechanisms	   through	  which	   the	   law	   is	   intimately	   intertwined	   with	   ordinary	   ethics,	   notably	   through	   an	  examination	  of	  the	  documentary	  practices	  of	  divorce	  files.	  
This	   thesis	   argues	   that	   the	   connections	   between	   law	   and	   ethics	   generate	   radical	  uncertainties	  and	  anxieties.	  	  
First,	  there	  is	  uncertainty	  as	  to	  whether	  a	  litigant	  can	  access	  justice	  in	  divorce.	  To	  access	  rights	   in	  divorce	  a	   litigant	  must	  strive	  to	  display	  highly	  gendered	  forms	  of	  ethical	  personhood.	  Rather	  than	  supporting	  gender	  equality,	  the	  legal	  processes	  contribute	  to	  the	  homogenization	  of	  moral	  values	  at	  a	  national	  level,	  as	  particular	  gender	  roles	  are	  debated	  and	  reinforced	  via	  legal	  practice.	  	  
Second,	   there	   is	  uncertainty	  as	   to	   the	   state’s	  moral	   legitimacy	  as	   it	   is	   exposed	   to	  the	  moral	  scrutiny	  of	  its	  citizens	  through	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  law.	  The	  thesis	  argues	  that	  the	  politically	  charged	  setting	  of	  the	  court	  is	  the	  scene	  for	  a	  kind	  of	  extraordinary	  ethics,	  as	  divorce	  cases	  are	  a	  site	  where	  the	  morality	  of	  marriage	  and	  the	  morality	  of	  the	  state	  are	  simultaneously	  at	  stake.	  









	   ‘L’égalité	  n’est	  pas	  un	  mirage,	  c’est	  un	  ‘chantier’	  permanent.’	  Lofti	  Chedly1	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  My	  translation:	  ‘Equality	  is	  not	  a	  mirage,	  it	  is	  a	  continuous	  construction	  site.’	  Chedly	  2007:593.	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INTRODUCTION	  
	  
‘In	  summer,	  in	  the	  party	  hall	  
in	  winter,	  in	  the	  palace	  of	  justice.’	  
Tunisian	  saying.	  
	  
	  Besma2	  was	  a	  housewife	  living	  in	  an	  urban	  neighbourhood	  in	  greater	  Tunis.	  3	  Her	  reaction	  was	   typical	   of	   the	  majority	   of	   Tunisians	   to	   whom	   I	   explained	  my	   intention	   to	   research	  divorce:	   ‘Tunisia	   should	   be	   in	   the	   Guinness	   Book	   of	   Records	   for	   divorce,’	   she	   told	   me,	  before	   adding	   the	  Tunisian	   saying	   above	   that	  was	  becoming	   rapidly	   familiar	   to	  me.	  The	  proverb	   she	   and	   many	   others	   cited	   and	   the	   perception	   that	   the	   divorce	   rate	   was	  worryingly	  high,	  express	  wide-­‐felt	  moral	  concerns	  about	  what	  was	  seen	  as	  the	  scourge	  of	  divorce;	  couples	  who	  move	  all	  too	  quickly	  from	  their	  summer	  wedding	  celebration	  to	  the	  divorce	  courts.	  The	  laws	  relating	  to	  divorce	  were	  a	  controversial	  part	  of	  Tunisia’s	  Personal	  Status	  Code	  (PSC),	  a	   founding	   text	  of	   the	  newly	   independent	  state,	  promulgated	   in	  1956	  before	   even	   its	   first	   constitution	   (Chedly	   2007:572).	   This	   revolutionary	   law	   sought	   to	  extend	   gender	   equality,	   notably	   by	   banning	   polygamy	   and	   extending	   equal	   rights	   in	  divorce	  to	  women.4	  Tunisia	  remains	  the	  only	  Muslim	  country	  to	  have	  made	  these	  moves	  that	  continue	  to	  be	  perceived	  by	  some	  of	   its	  religious	  opponents	  (Amnesty	   International	  2012)	  as	  contrary	  to	  Islamic	  law.5	  Through	  these	  discussions	  and	  debates	  about	  women’s	  rights	  –	  including	  a	  woman’s	  right	  to	  divorce	  –	  morality	  in	  general	  and,	  more	  specifically,	  the	  morality	  of	  the	  state	  that	  ratified	  and	  enacted	  this	  law,	  was	  at	  stake.	  
Having	   been	  made	   a	   cornerstone	   of	   the	   Tunisian	   state’s	   legitimacy	   at	   home	   and	  abroad,	  the	  PSC	  has	  been	  enveloped	  in	  controversy	  since	  its	  creation.	  Some	  analysts	  have	  celebrated	   Tunisia’s	   progressive	   status	   on	   women’s	   rights	   as	   embodied	   by	   the	   PSC,	  ‘providing	   equality	   of	   the	   sexes	   in	   virtually	   all	   spheres’	   (Emma	   Murphy	   1996:	   138).	  Simultaneously,	   Ben	   Ali’s	   regime	   was	   accused	   of	   using	   his	   image	   as	   a	   supporter	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  All	  names	  and	  other	  identifying	  details	  have	  been	  changed	  when	  deemed	  necessary	  to	  respect	  confidentiality	  to	  
the	  extent	  that	  this	  is	  possible.	  
3	  We	  shall	  meet	  Besma	  in	  chapter	  1.	  
4	  For	  a	  comparative	  perspective,	  a	  woman’s	  unilateral	  right	  to	  divorce	  her	  husband	  was	  introduced	  in	  Egypt	  in	  2000.	  
See	  Sonneveld,	  2010.	  	  
5	  The	  Tunisian	  code	  has	  been	  used	  as	  inspiration	  for	  reforms	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  region	  including	  by	  the	  UN	  (cf	  Gafsia	  
2008)	  and	  has	  inspired	  the	  Moroccan	  and	  Algerian	  reforms	  (2004	  and	  2005	  respectively;	  cf	  Chedly	  2007:572).	  
Polygamy	  remains	  legal	  (albeit	  with	  limitations)	  and	  a	  woman’s	  right	  to	  divorce	  remains	  limited	  compared	  to	  her	  
husband’s	  in	  both	  those	  countries.	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women’s	   rights	   as	   a	   cover	   up	   for	   human	   rights	   abuses	   (Labidi	   2010).	   In	   2008,	   Human	  Rights	  Watch	  reported	   that	  opponents	  of	   the	  regime	  were	  subject	   to	  heavy	  surveillance,	  physical	  assaults,	  harassment	  of	   relatives	  and	  slander	  campaigns	   in	   the	  press,	  as	  well	  as	  torture	   and	   ill-­‐treatment	   if	   interrogated	   by	   the	   police	   or	   imprisoned;	   both	   men	   and	  women	  have	  endured	  these	  human	  rights	  abuses.	  In	  addition,	  freedom	  of	  expression	  and	  of	  the	  press	  was	  strongly	  curtailed	  to	  rule	  out	  any	  criticism	  of	  the	  regime	  (Human	  Rights	  Watch	   2008).	   This	   has	   lead	   to	   seemingly	   paradoxical	   depictions	   of	   Tunisia	   as	   ‘the	  most	  modernized	   and	   westernised	   country	   in	   the	   Maghrib’	   as	   ‘women’s	   participation	   in	   all	  aspects	  of	  public	   life	   is	  the	  most	  important	  in	  the	  Arab	  world,’	  (Layachi	  2000:	  32)	  whilst	  ‘Tunisia	  has	  regressed	  to	  a	  level	  of	  political	  and	  police	  control	  unknown	  even	  in	  the	  worse	  times	  of	  the	  post-­‐independence	  period’	  (ibid:	  37).	  
In	   this	   oppressive	   context,	   when	   I	   arrived	   in	   Tunisia	   to	   study	   Arabic	   before	  beginning	   my	   PhD	   course	   (2004-­‐5),6	   I	   quickly	   ruled	   out	   the	   possibility	   of	   conducting	  research	  on	  any	  overtly	  political	  topic.	  It	  was	  unsafe	  to	  talk	  openly	  in	  a	  way	  that	  could	  be	  perceived	  as	  being	  critical	  of	  Ben	  Ali	  or	  his	  regime,	  let	  alone	  to	  a	  foreign	  researcher.	  I	  was	  told	   more	   than	   once	   that	   it	   was	   likely	   that	   I	   was	   being	   followed.	   Even	   close	   friends	  questioned	   me	   as	   to	   the	   difference	   between	   an	   anthropologist	   and	   a	   spy	   and	   rumours	  circulated	   about	   the	   American	   Research	   Centre	   I	   attended	   being	   a	   cover	   for	   activity	   by	  American	  Secret	  Services.	  Consequently,	  I	  strove	  to	  be	  as	  transparent	  as	  possible	  in	  all	  of	  my	  activities.	  I	  applied	  for	  a	  research	  visa7	  and	  framed	  my	  research	  project	  in	  a	  way	  that	  allowed	  people	   to	   talk	   to	  me	  as	   comfortably	  as	  possible,	   even	   if	  our	   conversations	  were	  overheard.	  	  
What	  people	  did	  talk	  to	  me	  about,	  to	  an	  extent	  that	  surprised	  me	  at	  first,	  was	  their	  intimate	  lives.	  Although	  I	  never	  solicited	  information	  on	  the	  topic,	  a	  surprising	  number	  of	  people	  shared	  their	  views	  on	  sex	  and	  sexuality,	  notably	  in	  light	  of	  their	  concerns	  about	  the	  moral	   decadence	   of	   Tunisian	   society.	   These	   fears	   of	   increasing	   immorality	   were	   linked	  with	   the	   changing	   status	   of	   Tunisian	  women,	   and	  were	  made	   a	   political	   symbol	   by	   the	  creation	  of	  the	  PSC	  (Al	  Ali	  &	  Pratt	  2009;	  Rabo	  1996).	  In	  the	  apparently	  intimate	  space	  of	  marriage	   and	   divorce,	   as	   this	   facilitated	   conversations	   about	   peoples’	   personal	   lives,	  together	  with	  the	  legal	  framework	  that	  had	  sought	  to	  reorganise	  them,	  an	  avenue	  opened	  up	  through	  which	  the	  state	  could,	  however	  indirectly,	  be	  addressed	  or	  even	  criticised.	  In	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  The	  main	  period	  of	  fieldwork	  took	  place	  between	  May	  2007	  and	  December	  2008.	  
7	  This	  was	  eventually	  granted	  to	  me	  after	  9	  months	  of	  waiting	  and	  numerous	  visits	  in	  person	  to	  the	  Ministry	  of	  
Education.	  I	  subsequently	  obtained	  permission	  from	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Justice	  to	  conduct	  fieldwork	  in	  the	  Court	  of	  First	  
Instance	  in	  Ben	  Arous.	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ways	  that	  will	  be	  explored	  below,	   the	  state	  of	  marriage	  was	  articulated	  with	  the	  state	  of	  the	  state.	  
Debates	   surrounding	   the	  morality	   of	   the	   PSC	   –	   and	   the	   state’s	   ability	   to	   uphold	  values	   associated	   with	   gender	   equality	   -­‐	   have	   also	   marked	   Tunisian	   legal	   doctrine.	  Tunisian	   legal	  scholars	  have	  questioned	  which	  values	  are	  upheld	  by	  the	  PSC,	  both	   in	  the	  legal	   text	   and	   in	   legal	   practice	   (Yadh	  Ben	  Achour	  1992;	   Sana	  Ben	  Achour	  2004,	   2005	  &	  2007;	   Chedly	   2007;	   Meziou	   1992;	   Chekir	   1996;	   Ben	   Jemia	   2006,	   Gafsia	   2008).	   Chedly	  notes	   that,	  whilst	   the	   PSC	  was	   revolutionary	   in	   some	   areas	   (polygamy,	   divorce),	   ‘it	  was	  traditional	  and	  conservative	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  marital	  relationship’	  (2007:	  	  560).	  This	  has	  lead	   renowned	   feminist	   legal	   scholar	   and	   women’s	   rights	   activist,	   Sana	   Ben	   Achour,	   to	  argue	  that	  ‘the	  PSC	  carried	  with	  it	  a	  tension	  between	  the	  spirit	  of	  tradition	  and	  the	  spirit	  of	  innovation’	   (2005).	   Ethnographically	   very	   little	   is	   known	   about	   Tunisia	   in	   general	   and	  about	  how	  Tunisians	  have	  experienced	  these	  reforms	  in	  particular.	  Until	  now,	  the	  limited	  academic	  work	  has	  privileged	  either	  official	  discourses	  or	  public	  discourses	  of	  opposition,	  (Bessis	  1999;	  Ferchiou	  1985;	  Gilman	  2000)	  and	   the	  voices	  of	  ordinary	  Tunisian	  women,	  and	  indeed	  men,	  have	  largely	  remained	  silent.8	  	  
Following	   actors	   both	   inside	   and	   outside	   the	   courthouse,	   this	   thesis	   explores	  peoples’	  experiences	  of	  the	  revolutionary	  personal	  status	  laws	  and	  addresses	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  the	  laws	  live	  up	  to	  their	  claim	  to	  extend	  ‘women’s	  rights’	  in	  practice.	  Does	  the	  PSC	  support	  ‘gender	  equality’?	  Or	  does	  it	  lead	  to	  a	  reinforcement	  of	  ‘patriarchal’	  values?	  
Anthropological	   work	   on	   the	   law	   has	   explored	   extensively	   the	   complex	  articulations	  between	  the	  law	  and	  society,	  culture	  or	  ‘normative	  orders’	  (Just	  1992;	  Fuller	  1994;	  Goodale	  2005;	  Griffiths	  2002;	  Mundy	  &	  Kelly	  2002;	  WT	  Murphy	  1997;	  Riles	  2002).	  However,	   in	  order	   to	   explore	   these	  questions	  of	  women’s	   rights	   and	   the	   law,	   this	   thesis	  delves	  deeper	  into	  the	  articulations	  between	  law	  and	  ethics.	  I	  build	  on	  Goodale’s	  approach	  to	  the	  study	  of	  human	  rights	  through	  ‘the	  anthropology	  of	  ethical	  theory	  as	  social	  practice,’	  as	   ‘part	   of	   a	   broader	   anthropological	   framework	   that	   bridges	   the	   legal	   and	   political,’	  (2006:	   34).	   What	   happens	   when	   ethical	   theory	   becomes	   legal	   practice	   in	   the	   divorce	  court?	   If,	   as	   Goodale	   argues	   in	   relation	   to	   human	   rights,	   women’s	   rights	   in	   Tunisia	   are	  never	  separate	  from	  the	  ‘swirl	  of	  other	  sources	  of	  normative	  inspiration’	  (ibid:	  34),	  what	  is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  See	  Voorhoeve	  2011	  for	  a	  recent	  study	  of	  the	  practice	  of	  family	  law	  in	  Tunis	  that	  focuses	  on	  the	  judges	  rather	  than	  
the	  litigants.	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the	  nature	  of	  this	  connection?	  How	  is	  the	  law	  –	  via	  its	  specific	  dispositions	  and	  procedures	  –	  articulated	  with	  ordinary	  ethics?	  	  
By	  depicting	  the	  particular	  swirl	  of	  norms	  and	  ideals	  that	  surround	  women’s	  rights	  in	   practice,	   as	   read	   through	   the	   ethnographic	   study	   of	   the	   processes	   relating	   to	   divorce	  law	  and	  those	  relating	  to	  the	  practice	  of	  marriage	  in	  an	  urban	  neighbourhood	  in	  the	  final	  years	  of	  Ben	  Ali’s	  dictatorship,	  we	  shall	  see	  how	  ordinary	  ethics	  become	  what	  I	  shall	  call	  extraordinary	   ethics.	   In	   the	   process,	   this	   thesis	   contributes	   to	   an	   understanding	   of	   the	  moral	  landscape	  that	  shapes,	  and	  is	  shaped,	  by	  individuals’	  experiences	  of	  these	  laws	  that	  purport	   to	   extend	  women’s	   rights	   and	   of	   the	  ways	   in	  which	   the	   laws	  may	   (or	  may	  not)	  support	  ‘gender	  equality’.	  
	  
THE	  ORIGINS	  OF	  THE	  PERSONAL	  STATUS	  CODE	  
The	  contours	  of	  the	  moral	  landscape	  I	  am	  to	  describe	  were	  shaped	  by	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  PSC	  emerged	  historically	  against	  a	  backdrop	  of	  ideological	  tension	  and	  civil	  war.	  
From	   the	  mid-­‐19th	   century	  onwards,	  Tunisia	   experienced	  a	  wave	  of	  political	   and	  legal	  reforms.	  As	  other	  domains	  of	  law	  (civil	  and	  penal)	  were	  codified,	  brought	  under	  the	  control	   of	   the	   Bey9	   and	   administered	   by	   non-­‐religious	   courts,10	   personal	   status	   law	  remained	  under	  the	  direct	  control	  of	   the	  religious	  courts	  until	  Tunisian	   independence	   in	  1956	  (Voorhoeve	  2011:	  55).	  
The	   PSC	   was	   one	   of	   the	   earliest	   reforms	   to	   be	   enacted	   after	   Tunisia	   gained	  independence,	   initiating	   a	   series	   of	   reforms	   in	   favour	   of	   women’s	   rights.	   The	   religious	  courts	  were	  abolished	  and	  personal	  status	  cases	  were	  brought	  into	  the	  newly	  unified	  state	  court	  system.	  11	  In	  1957,	  women	  over	  20	  were	  awarded	  the	  vote	  and	  literacy	  classes	  and	  health	  clinics	  were	  established	  to	  boost	  literacy	  and	  decrease	  fertility	  rates	  (Perkins	  2004:	  38).	  The	  Tunisian	  Constitution	  (1	   June	  1959)	  enshrined	   the	  equality	  of	  men	  and	  women	  stating	  that	  women	  are	  ‘full	  citizens	  with	  complete	  legal	  equality	  and	  civic	  duties,	  with	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  Tunisia	  was	  part	  of	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire	  but	  retained	  considerable	  autonomy;	  consequently,	  the	  Ottoman	  reforms	  
of	  this	  period	  had	  little	  impact	  in	  Tunisia.	  Tunisia	  subsequently	  became	  a	  French	  protectorate	  in	  1883.	  Voorhoeve	  
2011:52.	  
10	  See	  Voorhoeve	  2011,	  for	  a	  more	  detailed	  account	  of	  this	  history	  of	  legal	  reform.	  	  
11	  Sharia	  courts	  (Maliki	  or	  Hanafi)	  applied	  fiqh,	  Jewish	  courts	  administered	  Mosaic	  law,	  and	  French	  courts	  applied	  
French	  family	  law	  in	  cases	  involving	  a	  French	  citizen.	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full	   right	   to	   exercise	   their	   complete	   economic	   and	   social	   rights’	   (Emma	   Murphy	   1996:	  141).	  	  
Previous	  attempts	  had	  been	  made	  to	  reform	  and	  codify	  family	  law	  in	  Tunisia.	  Khair	  al-­‐Din’s12	  attempt	  to	  unify	  family	  law	  in	  the	  1870s	  failed	  due	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  religious	  support,	  as	   the	  ulama	   felt	   their	   authority	  was	   being	   challenged.	   Tunisian	   religious	   scholar	   Tahar	  Haddad	   had	   proposed	   radical	   reforms	   to	   the	   position	   of	   women	   in	   Islamic	   law	   in	   the	  1930s.	   Although	   arguing	   from	   a	   position	   of	   ijtihad	   (juristic	   innovation),13	   his	  work	  was	  perceived	  as	  an	  attack	  against	  Islam.	  He	  lost	  his	  job	  at	  the	  Zaytouna14	  where	  his	  colleagues	  considered	  his	  work	  blasphemous	  and	  it	  was	  subsequently	  banned	  by	  the	  government.	  
During	  the	  period	  between	  Haddad’s	  rejection	   from	  the	  Zaytouna	  School	  and	  the	  ratification	   of	   the	   PSC,	   Tunisia	   experienced	   a	   struggle	   between	   Bourguiba	   and	   his	   rival	  Ben	   Youssef.	   Bourguiba	   and	   his	   reformist,	   nationalist	   Neo-­‐Destour	   (constitution)	   Party,	  backed	   by	   those	   in	   urban	   areas	   and	   trade	   unionists,	   defeated	   Ben	   Youssef	   who	  represented	   more	   conservative	   forces	   supported	   by	   tribal	   areas	   and	   the	   religious	  establishment	   (Charrad	   2001:	   202).	   The	   bloody	   conflict	   that	   took	   place	   was	   as	   much	  between	   these	   two	   groups	   as	   against	   the	   French	   who,	   realising	   they	   faced	   defeat,	  intervened	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  French-­‐educated	  jurist,	  Bourguiba,15	  rather	  than	  the	  pan-­‐Arab	  and	  pan-­‐Islamist	  Ben	  Youssef.	  The	  crushing	  of	  this	  internal,	  ideological	  opposition	  opened	  the	  door	  to	  the	  reform	  of	  personal	  status	  law	  that	  was	  to	  follow.	  	  
Bourguiba’s	   revolutionary	   reforms	  went	   hand	   in	   hand	  with	   the	   rearticulation	   of	  the	   state	   and	   religion,	   enabling	   him	   to	   dismantle	   or	   avoid	   criticism	   from	   the	   religious	  elites	   who	   had	   scuppered	   previous	   attempts	   at	   reform.	   Bourguiba	   appointed	   a	   liberal	  
shaykh	   at	   the	   head	   of	   the	   Zaytouna	  mosque,	   the	  most	   important	   religious	   figure	   in	   the	  country,	  to	  help	  the	  code’s	  smooth	  introduction	  (Voorhoeve	  2011:	  74).	  Ben	  Youssef	  could	  only	  articulate	  his	  objections	  to	  this	  law,	  that	  it	  had	  ‘prohibited	  what	  God	  had	  authorized	  and	  authorized	  what	  God	  had	  forbidden’	   from	  his	  exile	   in	  Egypt	  (Perkins	  2004:	  137);	  by	  banning	   polygamy	   (seen	   by	  many	   as	   legitimate	   in	   Islam),	   the	   PSC	   allegedly	   encourages	  adultery	  (if	  a	  man	  cannot	  take	  a	  second	  wife	  to	  fulfil	  his	  needs,	  I	  was	  told,	  he	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  resort	   to	  adultery).	   I	  rapidly	  became	  familiar	  with	  this	  phrase	  cited	  to	  me	  by	  many	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  Prime	  Minister	  and	  reformer.	  
13	  	  For	  an	  explanation	  of	  ijtihad:	  a	  process	  of	  interpretation	  of	  religious	  law	  in	  order	  to	  apply	  to	  new	  situations	  in	  an	  
exercise	  of	  reason	  see	  Hourani	  1991:	  68.	  
14	  A	  traditional	  seat	  of	  religious	  knowledge.	  
15	  Bourguiba	  studied	  law,	  political	  science	  and	  French	  literature	  in	  France.	  He	  married	  a	  Frenchwoman	  and	  his	  first	  
son	  was	  born	  in	  France	  (Micaud	  1964:	  41).	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my	  informants	  as	  they	  expressed	  their	  own	  moral-­‐religious	  concern	  about	  the	  absence	  of	  polygamy.	  	  
Although	   Bourguiba	   was	   careful	   not	   to	   introduce	   his	   reform	   of	   family	   law	   by	  ‘force’,	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   Asad’s	   definition	   of	   force	   as	   ‘the	   dislocation	   of	   the	   moral	   world	  people	   inhabit,’	   (Asad	   2003:	   185)	   some	   historical	   data	   suggest	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   the	  values	   incorporated	   in	   the	   PSC	   represented	   a	   departure	   from	   the	   situation	   prior	   to	  independence.16	  
First,	  the	  PSC	  could	  be	  seen	  to	  entail	  a	  break	  with	  classical	  Islamic	  law,	  the	  Maliki	  or	  Hanafi	  schools	  of	  which	  were	  applied	  by	   the	  sharia	   courts	  who	  ruled	  on	   the	  personal	  status	  issues	  of	  Tunisian	  Muslims	  prior	  to	  independence.17	  	  	  
The	  significance	  of	  family	  law	  lies	  in	  both	  the	  important	  role	  that	  family	  law	  plays	  in	  society	  as	  a	  whole,	  constituting	  or	  reproducing,	  ‘a	  normative	  model	  of	  individual,	  family	  and	  society	  and	  the	  relationship	  between	  them’	  (Charrad	  2001:	  5),	  but	  also	  as	  several	  of	  the	   few	   direct	   commandments	   contained	   in	   the	   Koran	   relate	   to	   family	   law,	   and	   in	  particular	   to	   marriage.	   The	   sharia	   model	   of	   the	   family,	   in	   particular	   in	   the	   Sunni	   legal	  schools,	   strengthens	   the	   patrilineage	   and	   leaves	   the	   conjugal	   bond	   fragile,	   as	   links	  with	  natal	   kin	   continue	   to	  hold	   the	  most	   significance	   for	   an	   individual	   after	  marriage.	  This	   is	  reflected	  in	  patterns	  of	  inheritance	  and	  by	  the	  facility	  with	  which	  a	  man	  can	  repudiate	  his	  wife,	  whilst	  a	  woman	  may	  only	  appeal	  to	  a	  qadi	  (religious	  judge)	  for	  a	  divorce	  in	  specific	  circumstances	   such	   as	   abuse	   or	   neglect.	   Polygamy,	   of	   up	   to	   four	   wives,	   is	   permitted.	   A	  male	  guardian	  has	  the	  power	  to	  choose	  a	  marriage	  partner	   for	  a	  woman	  and	  there	   is	  no	  legal	   age	   for	   marriage,	   although	   marriage	   may	   not	   be	   consummated	   prior	   to	   the	   girl’s	  puberty	  (Anderson	  1976:	  103).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  This	  attempt	  by	  Bourguiba	  to	  present	  these	  reforms	  of	  marriage	  and	  divorce	  as	  being	  an	  innovative	  interpretation	  
of	  Islam,	  and	  hence	  promote	  their	  acceptance	  with	  Tunisia’s	  predominantly	  Muslim	  population	  could	  be	  read	  as	  an	  
instance	  of	  vernacularization	  or	  hybridization,	  as	  defined	  by	  Engle	  Merry,	  ‘a	  process	  that	  merges	  imported	  
institutions	  and	  symbols	  with	  local	  ones,	  sometimes	  uneasily.’	  (Engle	  Merry,	  2006:	  44)	  Although	  at	  least	  in	  part	  the	  
produce	  of	  ijtihad,	  given	  that	  Bourguiba	  studied	  law,	  lived	  and	  married	  in	  France,	  his	  ideas	  had	  the	  potential	  to	  be	  
perceived	  as	  imported	  and,	  as	  going	  against	  Tunisia’s	  Islamic	  tradition.	  This	  was	  also	  a	  reaction	  to	  observation	  of	  the	  
situation	  in	  Turkey,	  where	  Attaturk	  had	  broken	  with	  Islamic	  law,	  introducing	  a	  personal	  status	  code	  based	  on	  Swiss	  
law,	  that	  had	  been	  poorly	  received	  by	  the	  population.	  (Hafsia,	  2005:	  79)	  
17	  Tunisian	  Jews	  went	  to	  Mosaic	  courts,	  whilst	  the	  family	  law	  issues	  of	  Christians	  or	  any	  case	  involving	  a	  foreign	  
citizen	  (such	  as	  mixed	  marriages	  between	  French	  and	  Tunisians)	  were	  dealt	  with	  in	  the	  French	  civil	  courts	  of	  the	  
protectorate.	  Cf	  Ben	  Achour	  2008	  for	  historical	  information	  on	  cases	  involving	  mixed	  marriages.	  Consequently,	  the	  
situation	  of	  Tunisian	  Jews	  changed	  radically	  post-­‐independence	  as	  they	  became	  subjected	  to	  a	  codified	  version	  of	  
Islamic	  family	  law.	  Political	  tensions	  lead	  many	  of	  Tunisia’s	  Jews	  to	  leave	  the	  country	  in	  the	  late	  1960s.	  None	  of	  my	  
informants	  were	  Jewish;	  in	  this	  thesis,	  I	  write	  about	  the	  Muslim	  majority	  and	  do	  not	  discuss	  the	  implications	  of	  this	  
change	  for	  religious	  minorities.	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The	  PSC	  departed	   from	   this	  definition	  by	  outlawing	  polygamy18	  and	  repudiation,	  setting	   a	   minimum	   age	   for	   marriage19,	   and	   founding	   marriage	   on	   the	   consent	   of	   both	  spouses.20	   In	   this	   respect,	   the	   PSC	   departs	   from	   Maliki	   fiqh	   that	   requires	   a	   guardian’s	  consent	   for	   a	   woman’s	   marriage.	   Whilst	   the	   PSC	   requires	   the	   payment	   of	   a	   bride	   gift	  (mahr,	   article	   3),	   the	   amount	   was	   limited	   to	   the	   symbolic	   sum	   of	   1	   dinar.21	   Marriage	  registration	  was	  made	   compulsory:	   an	   unregistered	  marriage	   (‘customary	  marriage’)	   is	  considered	  null	   and	  void	   and	   sanctioned	  by	   three	  months	   imprisonment.22	   	   The	   logic	   of	  this	   reform	   (the	   registration	   of	   marriage	   not	   being	   required	   in	   the	   Maliki	   fiqh)	   was	   to	  prevent	  people	  entering	  into	  prohibited	  polygamous	  marriages.	  	  
By	   banning	   polygamy,	   the	   PSC	   in	   fact	   did	   not	   change	   marriage	   practice	  significantly.	  Historical	  work	  on	  Tunisia	  shows	  that	  polygamy	  was	  rare	  both	  in	  urban	  and	  rural	  settings	  (Blili	  1999;	  Hafsia	  2005;	  Micaud	  1964).23	  Tunisian	  historian	  Blili	  found	  that	  only	  8%	  of	  marriages	  she	  studied	  were	  polygamous	  and	  in	  the	  majority	  of	  cases	  this	  was	  due	  to	   infertility.24	  The	  practice	  of	  writing	  a	  clause	  in	  the	  marriage	  contract	  allowing	  the	  wife	  a	  divorce	   if	   the	  husband	  took	  a	  second	  wife	  (known	  as	   the	   ‘contrat	  Kairouani’)	  was	  used	   in	   the	   cities	   of	   Tunis,	   Kairouan	   and	   Beja,	   in	   effect	   discouraging	   polygamy	   (Hafsia	  2005:	  55).	  Although	  the	  PSC’s	  detractors	  viewed	  the	  banning	  of	  polygamy	  as	  a	  departure	  from	  a	  clear	  Koranic	  precept,	  the	  PSC	  was	  coherent	  with	  the	  practice	  of	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  population	  who	  did	  not	  enter	  polygamous	  marriages.	  	  
The	   PSC	   did,	   however,	   entail	   a	   break	   compared	   with	   the	   historical	   practice	   of	  divorce.	   Before	   independence,	   ‘it	   was	   the	  man	  who	   divorced’	   (Blilli	   1999:	   187).	   A	  man	  could	  repudiate	  his	  wife	  without	  any	  justification	  or	  recourse	  to	  a	  court;	  the	  wife	  may	  not	  even	   have	   been	   informed	   of	   the	   divorce	   beforehand.	   Her	   only	   entitlement	   was	   to	  maintenance	  (nafaqa)	  during	  the	  three-­‐month	  waiting	  period	  (‘idda)	  after	   the	  divorce.	  A	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  PSC,	  Article	  18.	  
19	  The	  legal	  marriage	  age	  was	  set	  at	  20	  for	  men	  and	  17	  for	  women.	  Under	  this	  age,	  the	  marriage	  must	  be	  passed	  by	  
a	  judge	  (PSC,	  Article	  5).	  In	  2007,	  the	  marriage	  age	  was	  unified	  at	  18	  years	  for	  men	  and	  women.	  
20	  Article	  3.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  marriage	  of	  a	  minor,	  the	  consent	  of	  both	  the	  legal	  guardian	  (usually	  the	  father)	  and	  
the	  mother	  is	  required	  (article	  6).	  
21	  The	  limitation	  of	  mahr	  is	  significant,	  as	  these	  marriage	  payments	  traditionally	  served	  as	  insurance	  for	  a	  wife	  in	  the	  
event	  of	  a	  divorce.	  The	  limitation	  to	  one	  dinar	  was	  subsequently	  removed	  from	  the	  PSC.	  However,	  no	  one	  I	  spoke	  to	  
–	  including	  thea	  graduate	  student	  of	  law	  who	  did	  not	  believe	  me	  when	  I	  told	  him–	  was	  aware	  that	  the	  value	  of	  mahr	  
was	  no	  longer	  limited	  by	  law.	  
22	  Article	  31.	  Summarised	  from	  Voorhoeve	  2011:56-­‐57.	  See	  Voorhoeve	  for	  more	  detail	  about	  how	  the	  content	  of	  
the	  PSC	  pertaining	  to	  marriage	  and	  divorce	  contrasts	  with	  Maliki	  fiqh.	  
23	  According	  to	  Micaud,	  ‘true’	  polygamy	  (as	  opposed	  to	  what	  he	  termed	  ‘successive’	  polygamy)	  was	  prevalent	  only	  
among	  the	  Bedhouins	  where	  it	  brought	  an	  economic	  advantage.	  Micaud	  1964:145.	  
24	  Either	  infertility	  of	  the	  wife,	  or	  of	  the	  husband	  when	  he	  did	  not	  suspect	  he	  was	  to	  blame,	  or	  as	  the	  husband	  had	  
only	  daughters	  and	  wanted	  a	  son.	  Blili	  1999:101.	  Hafsia	  found	  infrequent	  bigamy	  linked	  with	  sterility	  or	  lack	  of	  
daughters.	  Hafsia	  2005:13	  &	  58.	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wife	  was	  more	  constrained	  if	  she	  wished	  to	  end	  her	  marriage;	  in	  no	  circumstances	  could	  she	   pronounce	   a	   divorce	   herself.	   She	   could	   either	   appeal	   to	   a	   (male,	   religious)	   judge	   or	  could	  seek	  a	  divorce	  by	  mutual	  agreement	  (khul’)	  that	  contained	  the	  notion	  of	  ‘harm’	  and	  required	   her	   to	   pay	   her	   husband	   compensation.	   She	   would	   also	   lose	   all	   rights	   to	  maintenance	  payments	   (nafaqa)	   and	  her	   remaining	  mahr	   (Hafsia,	   2005:	  66).	   If	   she	   filed	  for	  a	  divorce	  for	  ‘harm’	  in	  front	  of	  a	  judge,	  the	  judge	  carried	  out	  an	  investigation	  and	  called	  upon	  witnesses.	   If	   successful,	   the	  wife	  would	  be	  paid	   the	  remainder	  of	  her	  mahr	  (Hafsia	  2005:	   66-­‐70).	   Tunisian	   historian	   Largueche	   points	   to	   the	   difficulties	   for	   women	   who	  wished	  to	  file	  for	  a	  divorce.	  Merely	  for	  daring	  to	  ask	  for	  a	  divorce,	  a	  wife	  would	  be	  sent	  to	  a	  place	  she	  calls	  the	  ‘prison	  for	  crimes	  of	  the	  heart’,	  where	  she	  would	  be	  observed	  by	  moral	  guardians,	   who	   acted	   as	   witnesses	   and	   were	   to	   assess	   the	   causes	   of	   the	   marital	  breakdown.	  Historically,25	  these	  dar	  joued	  (reform	  homes	  for	  recalcitrant	  wives)	  had	  been	  seen	   as	   something	   of	   a	   sanctuary	   for	   women	   where	   a	   wife	   could	   prove	   her	   husband’s	  violence	  towards	  her;	  couples	  would	  be	  sent	  there	  together	  to	  be	  observed	  by	  individuals	  of	  good	  moral	   standing	  who	  were	  wont	   to	   report	   to	   the	   judge	  about	   the	  reasons	   for	   the	  divorce.	   Subsequently,	   the	   place	   became	   a	   kind	   of	   prison,	  where	  women	   lived	   in	   abject	  conditions	  and	  were	  placed	  under	  scrutiny	  alone.	  Many	  women	  renounced	  their	  desire	  to	  divorce	  to	  avoid	  this	  ordeal	  (Largueche	  1992:	  95).	  
The	   PSC	   made	   divorce	   available	   to	   both	   men	   and	   women	   on	   an	   equal	   basis	  requiring	   both	   spouses	   to	   file	   for	   a	   divorce	   in	   court	   (article	   31).	   The	   husband	   loses	   his	  right	  to	  extrajudicial	  repudiation	  and	  must	  also	  be	  accountable	  in	  front	  of	  a	  judge	  (who	  is	  now	  a	  state	  official	  and	  may	  be	  male	  or	  female).	  Either	  spouse	  can	  file	  for	  divorce	  for	  harm	  or	   for	   a	   divorce	   without	   grounds;	   alternatively,	   both	   spouses	  may	   file	   for	   a	   divorce	   by	  mutual	  consent.	  In	  the	  first	  two	  cases,	  the	  injured	  party	  receives	  compensation	  payments.	  Previously,	   as	  we	  saw,	  a	  wife	   could	  bargain	  using	  her	  mahr	   if	   she	  wanted	  a	  divorce	  and	  could	  keep	  this	  money	  if	  her	  husband	  decided	  to	  divorce	  her;	  the	  amount	  of	  mahr	  would	  have	  been	  negotiated	  between	  the	  two	  families	  prior	  to	  the	  marriage.	  The	  PSC	  ended	  this	  practice	  by	  limiting	  the	  mahr	  to	  one	  dinar.	  In	  the	  new	  system,	  compensation	  payments	  are	  decided	  upon	  by	  the	  Family	  Judge,	  based	  on	  an	  appreciation	  of	  who	  has	  suffered	  the	  most	  ‘harm’	  due	  to	  the	  divorce.	  The	  changes	  in	  the	  financial	  structure	  of	  divorce	  lead	  to	  a	  focus	  on	  the	  legal	  concept	  of	  ‘harm’,	  the	  (lack	  of	  a)	  definition	  of	  which	  we	  shall	  return	  to	  below.	  	  
Given	   the	   low	  prevalence	   of	   polygamy	   in	  Tunisia,	   divorce	   –	   and,	   specifically,	   the	  ability	   of	   women	   to	   file	   for	   a	   divorce	   unilaterally	   without	   justification	   and	   without	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  The	  institution	  of	  dar	  joued	  existed	  from	  the	  16th	  century	  onwards.	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possibility	  of	  the	  judge	  refusing	  their	  request26	  –	  emerges	  as	  the	  more	  ‘forceful’	  reform.	  All	  of	   these	   changes	   have	   significant	   implications	   for	   the	   practice	   of	   divorce	   explored	  ethnographically	  in	  this	  thesis	  and	  its	  relationship	  with	  ethics.	  
	  	  
REFORMING	  THE	  MORAL	  
Echoing	  the	  moral	  framing	  of	  public	  debates	  and	  discussions	  in	  Tunisian	  legal	  scholarship	  about	   the	   PSC,	   the	   ethnographic	   material	   presented	   in	   this	   thesis	   emphasizes	   the	  connections	  between	  the	  law	  and	  ethics.	  To	  a	  limited	  extent,	  therefore,	  I	  follow	  Latour	  by	  viewing	  the	  ‘moral’,	  as	  opposed	  to	  an	  a	  priori	  category,	  as	  that	  which	  is	  in	  the	  process	  of	  being	   reassembled	  via	   these	   circulating	   legal	   and	   ethical	   references27;	   rather	   than	  being	  the	  explanation,	  the	  moral	  is	  what	  needs	  to	  be	  explained	  (Latour	  2005).	  
As	   I	   avidly	   read	   the	  divorce	   files	   to	  understand	  how	  a	  controversial	   reference	   to	  ‘custom’	   in	   the	  PSC	  (that	  we	  shall	   learn	  about	   in	  detail	   further	  below)	  was	   interpreted	  –	  hoping	  to	  read	  more	  details	  that	  could	  elucidate	  something	  about	  its	  meaning	  in	  practice	  –	  I	  quickly	  found	  that	  any	  such	  detail	  was	  missing.	  I	  realised	  that	  the	  meaning	  did	  not	  need	  to	   be	  made	   explicit;	   the	   intended	   audience	   and	   interpreter	   of	   the	   files	   (the	   judge)	   was	  assumed	   to	   understand	   the	   implicit	   reference	   to,	   as	   one	   judge	   put	   it,	   ‘things	   everybody	  knows’.	  The	  boundaries	  between	  ethics,	  understood	  as	  modes	  of	  life,	  and	  morality,	  read	  as	  explicit	   normative	   rules,	   did	   not	   seem	   so	   clear.28	   Consequently,	   I	   draw	   inspiration	   from	  Lambek’s	  approach	  to	  studying	  ordinary	  ethics	  as	  being	  inherent	  in	  all	  domains	  of	  life	  and	  follow	  him	   in	  using	   these	   terms	   interchangeably	   (Lambek	  2010:	  9).	   It	   is	  by	  attending	   to	  the	  details	  of	  the	  legal	  code	  and	  its	  procedures29	  	  -­‐	  like	  the	  creation	  of	  divorce	  files	  and	  the	  judgement	   process	   mentioned	   above	   -­‐	   that	   I	   show	   some	   of	   the	   precise	   means	   and	  mechanisms	  through	  which	  the	  law	  is	  intimately	  intertwined	  with	  ordinary	  ethics30	  in	  the	  extraordinary	  setting	  of	  the	  court	  (Lambek	  2010;	  Caton	  2010).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  The	  judge	  may	  refuse	  the	  divorce	  on	  procedural	  grounds.	  Of	  course,	  in	  this	  case	  the	  litigant	  may	  start	  proceedings	  
again	  to	  be	  granted	  a	  divorce.	  
27	  Paraphrasing	  Goodale	  (2005:	  506),	  citing	  Latour,	  who	  follows	  Mundy	  and	  Pottage	  (2004)	  in	  emphasizing	  the	  
constitutive	  nature	  of	  the	  law.	  
28	  See,	  for	  instance,	  Laidlaw	  2002.	  
29	  See	  Riles	  on	  the	  importance	  of	  bringing	  the	  technical	  dimension	  of	  law	  into	  view,	  in	  particular	  given	  the	  role	  these	  
tools	  play	  in	  the	  production	  of	  knowledge	  (2005:986).	  
30	  Within	  the	  anthropology	  of	  ethics	  or	  morality,	  anthropologists	  are	  divided	  between	  those	  who	  seek	  to	  define	  a	  
specific	  domain	  of	  morality	  that	  is	  apt	  for	  ethnographic	  study	  (Zigon	  2007,	  2009;	  Robbins	  2007)	  and	  those	  who	  view	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As	   WT	   Murphy	   found,	   albeit	   in	   a	   very	   different	   historical	   and	   legal	   setting,	   an	  ethical	  space	  opens	  up	  in	  the	  law	  that	  is	  de-­‐contextualized,	  cut	  off	  from	  the	  scene	  of	  action,	  but	  that	  nonetheless	  constitutes	  ‘an	  institutionalized	  systemic	  form	  for	  debating	  what	  are	  by	  definition	  largely	  matters	  of	  public	  morality’	  (1997:199)	  and	  potentially	  becoming	  the	  ‘conscience	  of	  society’	  (ibid:	  209).	  Part	  of	  the	  premise	  of	  this	  particular	  ethical	  space	  that	  is	  opened	  up	  in	  Murphy’s	  analysis,	   is	  the	  critical	  potential	  and	  possibility	  for	  scrutinizing	  prejudices	  that	  emerge	  as	  the	  law	  is	  detached	  from	  politics	  and	  ethically	  engaged	  lawyers	  and	  judges	  are	  responsible	  only	  to	  the	  law	  itself	  (ibid:	  206-­‐210).	  
In	   the	   Tunisian	   family	   court,	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   the	   state’s	   attempts	   to	   reinforce	   a	  particular	   version	   of	   gendered,	   public	  morality,	   and	   operating	   in	   the	  midst	   of	   Ben	   Ali’s	  dictatorship,	  the	  illusion	  of	  detachment	  is	  very	  finely	  veiled	  at	  best;	  the	  law	  is	  seen	  as	  the	  conscience	  of	  the	  state	  and	  is	  key	  to	  its	  moral	   legitimacy.	  It	   is	  precisely	  the	  distancing	  or	  dislocation	   of	   the	   court	   from	   the	   scene	   of	   action	   that	   requires	   the	   judge	   to	   engage	   in	   a	  process	   of	   re-­‐contextualisation;31	   as	   the	   law	   requires	   him	   to	   interpret	  what	   happens	   in	  marital	  disputes	  in	  this	  dislocated	  setting,	  the	  judge	  must	  use	  his	  moral	  judgment.32	  This	  is	  a	  central	  way	  in	  which	  ordinary	  ethics	  is	  part	  of	  –	  and	  is	  essential	  to	  -­‐	  the	  practice	  of	  the	  law	  as,	  in	  Asad’s	  words,	  the	  state	  intervenes	  in	  this	  private	  domain	  (2001:	  8).	  
REFORMING	  THE	  FAMILY	  
As	  Bowen	  found	  elsewhere,	  debates	  over	  family	  law	  point	  to	  broader	  issues	  of	  social	  and	  moral	  order.	  33	  The	  connections	  between	  the	  law	  and	  ethics	  (Kelly	  2011)	  and,	  specifically,	  family	   law	   and	   ethics,	   have	   been	  well	   documented,	   in	   particular	   in	   relation	   to	   personal	  status	  laws	  in	  Muslim	  contexts	  (Asad	  2001;	  Joseph	  1997,	  2000;	  Bowen	  1998,	  2001;	  Dupret	  2006).	   Asad	   has	   argued,	   in	   relation	   to	   personal	   status	   laws	   in	   Egypt,	   that	   ‘when	   sharia	  comes	  to	  be	  equated	  with	  justiciable	  rules,	  the	  consequence	  is	  not	  simply	  abridgement	  but	  a	   re-­‐articulation	   of	   the	   concepts	   of	   law	   and	   morality’	   (2001:	   13).	   He	   highlights	   the	  transformations	  that	   take	  place	  when	  the	  sharia	   is	   transformed	  and	  confined	  to	  defining	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
ethics	  as	  ‘basic	  to	  the	  human	  condition’30	  (Lambek	  2010;	  Caton	  2010).	  (Robbins	  argued	  that	  the	  anthropology	  of	  
morality	  has	  been	  stunted	  by	  ‘treating	  all	  of	  culture	  as	  morally	  charged.’)	  To	  Zigon,	  this	  would	  make	  the	  practice	  of	  
family	  law	  in	  Tunisia	  an	  ideal	  case	  study	  for	  what	  he	  calls	  an	  anthropology	  of	  morals.	  Drawing	  on	  Heidegger,	  Zigon	  
argues	  that	  anthropologists	  should	  focus	  on	  key	  moments	  of	  moral	  breakdown,	  which	  require	  actors	  to	  engage	  in	  
the	  conscious	  work	  of	  ethics	  that	  he	  distinguishes	  from	  non-­‐conscious	  morality	  (2009:263).	  He	  suggests	  that	  this	  
focus	  is	  a	  way	  in	  which	  we	  might	  distinguish	  the	  anthropology	  of	  morality	  from	  that	  of	  religion	  or	  law	  (2007:146).	  
However,	  I	  provide	  an	  ethnographic	  account	  of	  the	  connections,	  in	  my	  case	  the	  connections	  that	  link	  law	  and	  ethics,	  	  
rather	  than	  seeing	  these	  as	  separate	  domains,	  or	  constraining	  ethics	  to	  particular	  moments.	  	  
31	  Building	  on	  WT	  Murphy	  (1997)	  on	  ‘de-­‐contextualisation’.	  
32	  Cf	  Goodale	  (2005)	  and	  Mundy	  &	  Saumarez	  Smith	  (2007:	  4-­‐6)	  on	  the	  centrality	  of	  intepretation	  in	  legal	  practice.	  
33	  Paraphrasing	  Bowen	  2001:2.	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personal	  status	  law,	  placing	  an	  emphasis	  on	  the	  modern	  state’s	  intervention	  in	  this	  private	  domain	  (ibid:	  7).	  	  
As	   the	   family	   emerges	   as	   both	   a	   legal	   and	   a	  moral	   category,	   kinship	   provides	   a	  perspective	   through	  which	   to	  consider	   the	  operation	  of	   the	   law	  and	   its	   interconnections	  with	  ethics	  as	  part	  of	  broader	  political	  processes.	  Anthropological	  work	  has	  stressed	  the	  embeddedness	   of	   the	   house	   as	   the	   first	   level	   of	   political	   control	   (Mundy	   1995,	   2003;	  Singerman	   1995):	   ‘government	   does	   not	   begin	   at	   the	   higher-­‐level	   boundaries	   between	  groups,	  but	  at	  home;	  it	  is	  the	  family	  that	  contains	  the	  seeds	  of	  everyday	  legal	  domination’	  (Mundy	   1995:	   53).	   Furthermore,	   given	   the	   question	   as	   to	   whether	   the	   PSC	   promotes	  gender	   inequality,	   feminist	   scholarship34	   has	   stressed	   the	   implications	   of	   the	   ‘direct	  linkages	  between	  the	  enclosed,	  private	  world	  of	   the	   family,	  and	  the	  outside	  world	  of	   the	  state’s	  legislative	  apparatus	  and	  the	  project	  of	  nation-­‐making’	  in	  terms	  of	  gender	  (Carsten	  2004:	  6).	  	  
How	  has	  anthropological	  work	  on	  the	   family	   in	   the	  Middle	  East	  and	  North	  Africa	  region	  explored	  the	  links	  between	  kinship	  and	  the	  law	  and	  kinship	  and	  ethics?	  
Work	  that	  focuses	  on	  the	  links	  between	  kinship	  and	  the	  economy	  –	  examining	  the	  household	  as	  an	  economic	  unit	  –	  also	   frequently	  draws	   in	   the	  moral,	  either	   implicitly	  or	  explicitly,	   in	  the	  form	  of	  attitudes	  towards	  working	  wives	  and	  changes	  in	  gender	  roles	  in	  the	  household	  (Moore	  1988).	  In	  terms	  of	  the	  regional	  literature,	  this	  is	  often	  articulated	  in	  the	   form	   of	   discourses	   on	   ‘honour’,	   underpinned	   by	   female	   sexual	   propriety	   and	   the	  control	  of	  female	  sexuality.	  Whilst	  connections	  are	  traced	  between	  kinship,	  economy	  and	  morality,	   often	   the	   law	   is	   only	   given	   a	   token	   presence	   as	   part	   of	   the	   political	   setting	   in	  these	  ethnographies	  based	  in	  the	  household	  or	  village.	  I	  seek	  to	  unite	  these	  approaches	  by	  tracing	  how	  ordinary	  ethics	  permeates	  both	  the	  practice	  of	  kinship	  and	  the	  practice	  of	  the	  law.	   How	  marriages	   are	   formed	   and	   how	   gender	   roles	   are	   changing	   in	   the	   household35	  (chapters	   1	   &	   2)	   forms	   an	   essential	   backdrop	   required	   to	   understand	   the	   arguments	  presented	   in	   the	   divorce	   court	   (chapters	   3-­‐7);	   it	   is	   in	   the	   neighbourhood	   that	  we	   learn	  about	  the	  shared	  assumptions	  (Bowen	  1998)	  that	  underpin	  the	  practice	  of	  the	  law.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34	  For	  instance,	  see	  Carsten	  charting	  the	  links	  between	  gender	  and	  the	  house	  and	  the	  links	  between	  houses	  and	  ‘the	  
wider	  polities	  of	  which	  they	  are	  part.’	  (2004:61)	  Also	  Stoler	  on	  sexual	  control	  and	  marriage	  as	  a	  political	  issue	  linked	  
with	  the	  authority	  and	  legitimacy	  of	  colonial	  rule	  (2010).	  	  
35	  cf	  Moore	  on	  the	  impact	  that	  household	  composition	  	  -­‐	  as	  well	  as	  extra-­‐household	  relations	  	  -­‐	  has	  on	  women’s	  
lives.	  (1988:55-­‐59).	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The	  question	  of	  which	  form	  of	  family	  is	  advanced	  by	  the	  PSC	  in	  practice	  and	  which	  reform	  of	  the	  family	  it	  entailed	  remains	  hotly	  disputed.	  	  
After	  he	  came	  to	  power	  in	  a	  ‘constitutional	  coup’	  replacing	  Bourguiba	  as	  President	  in	  1987,	  Ben	  Ali	  was	  quick	  to	  confirm	  that	  he	  would	  not	  threaten	  the	  advances	  made	  in	  the	  PSC.36	  Following	  in	  Bourguiba’s	  footsteps,	  Ben	  Ali	  undertook	  the	  most	  significant	  series	  of	  reforms	  to	  the	  PSC	  (1993)	  whilst	  pursuing	  the	  project	  of	  reforming	  the	  family	  to	  be	  more	  focussed	   on	   the	   conjugal	   couple.37	   Bourguiba	   was	   explicit	   in	   his	   desire	   to	   intervene	   in	  family	   relations,	   striving	   to	   dismantle	   the	   patriarchal	   family	   in	   order	   to	   emancipate	  women	  from	  male	  domination,	  whilst	  enhancing	  citizens’	  dependence	  on	  the	  state	  rather	  than	   the	   kin	   group	   in	   order	   to	   build	   a	   homogenous,	   national	   identity	   (Platt	   1987:	   287;	  Zussman	   1992:	   1;	   Abu	   Zahra	   1992:	   41).	   As	   Bourguiba	   argued,	   ‘how	   can	   we	   leave	   the	  family	   unit,	   which	   are	   states	   in	   miniature	   ruled	   by	   autonomous	   chieftains,	   to	   fend	   for	  themselves?	  The	  state,	  which	  sees	  beyond	   the	   individual,	  must	   intervene	   for	   the	   sake	  of	  national	  solidarity.’38	  	  
The	  1993	  reforms	  touched	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  marital	  relationship,	  amending	  article	  23	  of	  the	  PSC	  that,	  albeit	  ambiguously,	  provides	  the	  law’s	  only	  definition	  of	  marital	  duties.	  Previously,	   this	   article	   had	   maintained	   the	   wife’s	   duty	   of	   obedience	   to	   her	   husband	   in	  respect	   of	   his	   role	   as	   head	   of	   the	   household.	  Whilst	   the	   husband	   remained	   head	   of	   the	  household,	  the	  wife’s	  duty	  of	  obedience	  was	  removed	  and	  replaced	  with	  reference	  to	  the	  reciprocal	  duty	  of	  both	  spouses	   to	   respect	   their	   ‘marital	  duties	  according	   to	  custom	  and	  habit’.	   As	   we	   shall	   see,	   the	   way	   that	   this	   subjective	   reference	   to	   ‘custom	   and	   habit’	   is	  interpreted	   in	   legal	   practice	   is	   a	   central	   question	   posed	   in	   this	   thesis.	   In	   addition,	   the	  financial	  relationship	  between	  spouses	  was	  reformed,	  diluting	  the	  male	  duty	  to	  maintain	  his	  wife	  by	  stating	  that	  the	  wife	  must	  also	  contribute	  to	  the	  household	  and	  introducing	  the	  option	  of	  a	  shared	  property	  regime.39	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36	  In	  the	  National	  Pact	  (November	  1988),	  Ben	  Ali	  reaffirmed	  the	  importance	  of	  working	  towards	  the	  full	  
emancipation	  of	  women	  and	  echoed	  the	  constitution	  in	  underlining	  ‘equality	  among	  citizens,	  without	  discrimination	  
between	  men	  and	  women.	  Cited	  in	  Emma	  Murphy	  1996	  :143.	  	  
37	  In	  this	  spirit,	  in	  1992	  Ben	  Ali	  created	  a	  Minister	  of	  Women’s	  and	  Family	  Affairs	  and	  in	  1993	  he	  undertook	  the	  most	  
substantial	  series	  of	  reforms	  to	  the	  PSC	  since	  is	  was	  created.	  Among	  other	  reforms,	  domestic	  violence	  was	  made	  
punishable	  and	  mothers	  were	  given	  the	  right	  to	  veto	  the	  marriage	  of	  daughters	  still	  considered	  as	  minors.	  A	  fund	  
was	  established	  to	  provide	  alimony	  for	  divorced	  women	  and	  their	  children.	  Equally,	  the	  reforms	  enabled	  women	  to	  
pass	  nationality	  on	  to	  their	  children	  if	  married	  to	  non-­‐nationals.	  A	  1998	  reform	  extended	  rights	  to	  children	  born	  out	  
of	  wedlock,	  enabling	  them	  to	  bear	  their	  father’s	  name	  and	  to	  be	  entitled	  to	  maintenance	  payments	  from	  their	  
father.	  In	  2007,	  the	  minimum	  marriage	  age	  was	  aligned	  to	  18	  for	  both	  men	  and	  women.	  A	  2008	  law	  enabled	  a	  
mother	  who	  has	  custody	  of	  the	  children	  to	  stay	  in	  the	  marital	  home	  after	  a	  divorce.	  
38	  Bourguiba	  1961	  cited	  in	  Zussman	  1992	  :11.	  	  
39	  Reform	  of	  1998.	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The	  PSC	  and	  its	  1993	  reforms	  entail	  a	  significant	  change	  in	  the	  legal	  definition	  of	  the	   family	  and	  of	  marital	   roles	  within	   it	  when	  compared	  with	   the	   standard	  definition	  of	  the	   martial	   relationship	   as	   understood	   in	   the	   Maliki	   and	   Hanifi	   schools	   of	   Islamic	  jurisprudence	  that	  had	  prevailed	  before	   independence	  (Mir	  Hosseini	  1993:	   ix).	  The	   legal	  patriarchal	  family	  was,	  prior	  to	  the	  PSC,	  a	  system	  based	  on	  the	   ‘absolute	  authority	  of	  the	  father,’	   that	   allowed	   him	   to	   arrange	   a	   daughter’s	  marriage,	   after	   which	   she	  was	   ‘at	   the	  mercy	   of	   her	   husband’	  who	   could	   ‘repudiate	   her	   for	   no	   other	   reason	   than	   his	   desire	   to	  marry	   a	  more	   attractive	   woman	   and	   his	   inability	   to	   support	   two	  wives’	   (Micaud	   1964:	  145)	   The	   PSC	   encouraged	   ‘the	   modern	   idea	   that	   marriage	   was	   more	   a	   relationship	  between	  a	  man	  and	  a	  woman	  than	  between	  two	  families,’	  (ibid:	  51)	  by	  making	  the	  consent	  of	   both	   spouses	   the	   first	   condition	   of	   marriage.40	   	   Bourguiba	   condemned	   arranged	  marriage	   saying	   ‘it	   is	   incomprehensible	   that	   a	   young	   girl	   should	   be	   forced	   to	   found	   a	  family	  with	  a	  man	  she	  does	  not	  love.	  Money	  alone	  is	  not	  enough	  to	  base	  a	  marriage	  on.’41	  	  
The	   data	   available	   on	   Tunisia	   suggest	   that	   the	   forms	   of	   relatedness	   have	  undergone	   radical	   change	   since	   the	   country	   gained	   independence.	   The	   limited	  ethnographic	   work	   on	   Tunisia	   (Abu	   Zahra	   1982;	   Holmes-­‐Eber	   2003;	   Ferchiou	   1985;	  Zussman	   1992)	   follows	  work	   elsewhere	   in	   the	   Arab	  world	   (Maher	   1974;	  Mundy	   1995;	  Kapchan	   1996)	   in	   showing	   a	   range	   of	   co-­‐existent	  marriage	   patterns,	   as	   opposed	   to	   the	  culturally	   dominant	   ideal	   of	   FBD	   marriage	   (Tapper	   and	   Tapper	   1992/3:	   10).	   Recalling	  Goody’s	  argument	  about	  the	  relationship	  between	  production	  and	  reproduction	  (1976),42	  anthropologists	  have	  discussed	  the	  relationship	  between	  female	  education	  (Holmes-­‐Eber	  2003;	  Abu	   Zahra	   1992)	   and	   employment	   (Singerman	  1995;	   Inhorn	   1996)	   and	   changing	  marriage	   practice,	   especially	   in	   urban	   areas.43	   	   Since	   these	   studies	   were	   completed,	  Tunisian	   population	   statistics44	   indicate	   that	   there	   has	   been	   a	   significant	   change	   in	   the	  place	  of	  women	  in	  economic	  life.45	  In	  addition,	  female	  literacy	  and	  school	  attendance	  rates	  are	  high	  in	  Tunisia46;	  in	  2001,	  97%	  of	  girls	  aged	  six	  or	  over	  were	  enrolled	  in	  school	  (Harris	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40	  This	  contrasts	  with	  ‘the	  fact	  that	  the	  classical	  doctrine	  of	  all	  schools	  of	  Islamic	  law	  allows	  a	  marriage	  guardian	  to	  
contract	  his	  minor	  ward	  in	  compulsory	  marriage	  and	  that	  Malikis,	  Shafi’is	  and	  Hanbalis	  also	  insist	  that	  the	  marriage	  
of	  even	  an	  adult	  woman	  can	  be	  contracted	  only	  by	  her	  guardian’	  (Anderson	  1976:102).	  	  
41	  Bourguiba	  cited	  in	  Marshall	  &	  Stokes	  1981:637.	  
42	  Ethnographic	  work	  on	  Tunisia	  (mostly	  in	  rural	  settings	  in	  the	  1960	  -­‐1980s)	  suggests	  that	  changes	  both	  in	  the	  
mode	  of	  economic	  production	  and	  in	  the	  types	  of	  property	  being	  transferred	  via	  inheritance	  are	  articulated	  with	  
changing	  marriage	  strategies	  (Ferchiou	  1985;	  Larson	  1983;	  Zussman	  1992;	  Abu	  Zahra	  1982).	  43	  See	  also	  Moore	  1998.	  
44	  In	  1999,	  24.6%	  of	  the	  economically	  active	  population	  (over	  age	  15)	  was	  female,	  compared	  to	  only	  6%	  in	  1966	  
(UNDP:	  74).	  	  
45	  cf	  Goody	  1976	  on	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  gendered	  division	  of	  labour	  in	  a	  different	  context.	  
46	  Educating	  girls	  also	  formed	  part	  of	  Bourguiba’s	  reforms	  to	  emancipate	  women.	  ‘At	  independence	  in	  1956,	  less	  
than	  5	  percent	  of	  children	  were	  enrolled	  in	  primary	  school;	  by	  2003	  this	  share	  had	  increased	  to	  98	  percent,	  with	  
essentially	  no	  gender	  differences	  in	  participation.’(Lockheed	  &	  Mete	  2007:	  207)	  ‘In	  1991	  a	  second	  education	  reform	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&	  Koser	   2004:	   61).	   Other	   anthropologists	   (Singerman	   1995;	   Inhorn	   1996;	  Holmes-­‐Eber	  2003;	  Rugh	  1984)	  have	  pointed	  to	  the	  implications	  of	  working	  wives	  and	  the	  tensions	  this	  may	  lead	  to	  in	  the	  conjugal	  couple.	  
Singerman,	  in	  her	  ethnographic	  study	  of	  urban	  Cairo	  where	  she	  traces	  families	  and	  informal	  networks,	  analyzes	   the	   family	  as	  a	  site	  of	  power	  with	   its	  own	  form	  of	  morality.	  She	  goes	  so	  far	  as	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  debates	  on	  morality	  surrounding	  the	  family,	  what	  she	  calls	   the	   ‘familial	   ethos’,	   constitute	   a	   form	  of	   legal	   pluralism	   (2006:14).	   In	   this	  way,	   she	  traces	   a	   link	   between	   law	   and	   morality.	   She	   also	   suggests	   that	   this	   familial	   ethos,	   an	  alternative	  way	   of	   ‘ordering	   or	   determining	   truth	   and	   justice’	  may	   be	   used	   by	   the	   state	  (ibid:	   16).	   Whilst	   tracing	   the	   connections	   between	   the	   economic	   difficulties	   in	   forming	  marriages	   in	  contemporary	  Egypt	  and	   the	  politicisation	  of	   the	   family	   that	  ensues	   (1995:	  15),	   she	   does	   not	   address	   how	   the	   familial	   ethos	   or	   economic	   tensions	   surrounding	  marriage	   and	   the	   family	   inform,	   or	   are	   informed	   by,	   legal	   practice.	   These	   economic	  tensions	  are	  central	  to	  the	  practice	  of	  divorce	  as	  studied	  in	  Morocco	  (Mir	  Hosseini	  1993:	  121)	   and	   Yemen	   (Wuerth	   1998:	   178),	   where	   the	   legal	   obligation	   and	   ideal	   role	   of	   the	  husband	   as	   sole	   material	   provider	   clash	   with	   the	   economic	   reality	   in	   which	   women’s	  employment	  is	  vital	  to	  the	  household’s	  survival,	  particularly	  amongst	  the	  poor.	  How,	  then,	  do	   these	   tensions	   appear	   in	   the	   Tunisian	   divorce	   court	   given	   the	   attempt	   of	   the	   PSC	   to	  redefine	  marital	  duties	  and	  the	  ambiguous	  phrasing	  of	  the	  legal	  code?	  
Equally,	   literature	  on	  the	  family	   in	  the	  Middle	  East	   frequently	  discusses	  the	  issue	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  ‘gap’	  between	  an	  ideal	  moral	  discourse	  of	  kinship	  and	  the	  economic	  reality	  in	  which	   this	   ideal	   has	   become	   impossible.	   Gilman,	   for	   instance,	   attributes	   the	   ‘gap’	   that	  persists	   in	   Tunisia	   between	   law	   and	   practice	   concerning	   women’s	   rights	   to	   ‘a	   family	  structure	  that	  continues	  to	  view	  women	  as	  inferior	  and	  unequal’	  (2000:	  95)	  The	  terms	  of	  this	  argument,	  however,	  ignore	  the	  connectedness	  between	  ‘law’	  and	  ‘society’,	  as	  if	  the	  law	  played	   no	   role	   in	   shaping	   social	   relations	   or	   as	   if	   the	   operation	   of	   the	   law	   occurred	   in	  isolation	  from	  contemporary	  forms	  of	  sociality	  and	  kinship.47	  	  
My	  approach	  differs	  slightly.	  Lambek’s	  reading	  of	  Arendt	  reminds	  us	  that	  if	  kinship	  is	  an	  ethical	  realm,	  it	  is	  also	  due	  to	  the	  feminist	  concept	  of	  ‘care’,	  ‘looking	  after	  or	  looking	  out	  for	  the	  wellbeing	  of	  others’	  (2010:	  15)	  Whilst	  in	  Singerman’s	  work,	  the	  familial	  ethos	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
made	  basic	  education	  compulsory	  for	  both	  boys	  and	  girls	  6–16,	  with	  parental	  penalties	  for	  noncompliance.’	  
(Lockheed	  &	  Mete	  2007:210).	  
47	  See	  Griffiths	  on	  how	  a	  consideration	  of	  the	  dynamic	  interaction	  between	  semi-­‐autonomous	  fields	  can	  contribute	  
to	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  gendered	  nature	  of	  the	  law	  (2002:	  304).	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appears	  to	  designate	  a	  form	  of	  moral	  discourse,	  to	  be	  distinguished	  from	  	  -­‐	  and	  that	  often	  enters	  into	  conflict	  with	  –	  every	  day	  ethical	  practice,	  Lambek	  suggests	  how	  ordinary	  ethics	  are	  inherent	  in	  the	  everyday	  practice	  of	  kinship	  and	  the	  duties	  carried	  out	  by	  each	  spouse	  within	  the	  family.	  By	  reading	  these	  practices,	  we	  can	  understand	  ordinary	  ethics,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  discourses	  on	  marriage,	  as	  integral	  to	  the	  formation	  of	  legal	  ethics.	  
SPACE,	  RESIDENCE	  
Whilst	  the	  above	  analyses	  have	  explored	  marriage	  strategies	  in	  terms	  of	  economic	  change,	  viewing	   the	   household	   as	   an	   economic	   unit,	   ethnographic	   work	   on	   cities	   that	   have	  experienced	  rapid	  urbanisation48	  –	  such	  as	  has	  been	  the	  case	  in	  Tunis	  –	  have	  stressed	  the	  impact	  of	  changing	  residence	  patterns	  on	  marriage	  and	  gender	  roles.	  In	  their	  ethnographic	  work	   on	   Tunisia,	   Larson	   (1983)	   and	   Holmes-­‐Eber	   (2003)	   both	   follow	   networks	   to	  highlight	  the	  relationships	  that	  are	  of	  significance	  to	  their	   informants,	  stressing	  the	  lived	  practice	  of	  kinship	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  dominant	  model	  of	  patrilineage.	  Holmes-­‐Eber,	  in	  the	  most	  recent	  ethnographic	  study	  in	  an	  urban	  setting	  (1980s)	  discussed	  the	  significance	  of	  non-­‐kin	   networks	   as	   a	   mechanism	   for	   coping	   with	   life	   in	   a	   setting	   marked	   by	   rapid	  urbanization.	   She	   found	   that	  marriage	   practices	   varied	   and	   that	   due	   to	   patterns	   of	   neo-­‐local	  residence,	  ‘the	  extended	  household	  of	  old	  has	  been	  replaced	  by	  the	  extended	  street’	  (2003:	  70).	  
Whilst	  Holmes-­‐Eber	  pays	  attention	  to	  residence	  patterns,	  she	  does	  not	  pay	  explicit	  attention	  to	  the	  changing	  structure	  of	  the	  city	  and	  of	  the	  house	  that	  lead	  to	  her	  following	  a	  network	  based	  research	  methodology.	  In	  contrast,	  I	  follow	  Carsten	  in	  looking	  at	  patterns	  of	   relatedness	   from	   and	   through	   the	   vantage	   point	   of	   the	   house.	   This	   entails	   paying	  attention	  to	  the	  structure	  and	  materiality	  of	  the	  house	  itself.	  
Anthropological	   literature	   on	   the	  MENA	   region	   has	   traced	   connections	   between	  the	  house	  and	  ethics	  through	  debates	  about	  the	  gendered	  use	  of	  space.	  Public	  and	  private	  spaces	   become	   metaphors	   for	   gendered	   ideologies	   concerning	   the	   appropriate	   roles	   of	  men	  and	  women	  in	  society	  and	  are	  articulated	  with	  essential	  qualities	  attributed	  to	  men	  and	   women,	   notably	   in	   discourses	   of	   ‘honour’	   (Kapchan	   1996;	   Jansen	   1987;	   Bourdieu	  1990).	   The	   house	   is	   a	   site	   in	   which	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   trace	   economic	   relationships,	   in	  particular	  that	  between	  husband	  and	  wife,	  and	  a	  site	  in	  which	  ordinary	  ethics	  are	  enacted.	  As	   Lynch	   &	   Bogen	   have	   argued	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   law,	   the	   house	   ‘shapes	   but	   does	   not	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48	  See	  Hoodfar	  1997;	  Inhorn	  1996;	  Singerman	  1995;	  Jenny	  White	  1994	  and	  also	  Vatuk	  1972	  (on	  a	  comparable	  
situation	  in	  India).	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determine’	   (1996:	  121)	  what	  happens	  within	   its	  walls.	  What	  can	   the	  house	   tell	  us	  about	  contemporary	  patterns	  of	  sociality	  in	  the	  newly	  constructed	  neighbourhood?	  (Chapter	  1)	  In	  an	  approach	  that	  examines	  how	  ordinary	  ethics	  permeate	  the	  work	  of	  the	  law,	  I	  strive	  to	   treat	   the	   house	   and	   courthouse	   in	   comparable	   terms	   to	   bring	   out	   their	   inherent	  similarities	  and	  differences.	  Indeed,	  what	  happens	  when	  we	  look	  at	  the	  courthouse	  like	  a	  house	  (chapter	  3)?	  Can	  this	  help	  us	  understand	  how	  ordinary	  ethics	  enters	  the	  practice	  of	  the	   law?	   In	   this	  way,	   by	   following	  ordinary	   ethics	   in	   the	  house	   and	   court	   house,	   I	   show	  both	  the	  continuities	  between	  these	  two	  sites	  and	  the	  peculiarities	  that	  distinguish	  them;	  similarly,	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  in	  the	  court,	  as	  a	  site	  imbued	  with	  the	  power	  of	  the	  oppressive	  state,	  ordinary	  ethics	  become	  extraordinary	  ethics.	  
In	  order	  to	  study	  the	  contemporary	  Tunisian	  family	  ethnographically,	  I	  spent	  time	  living	   with,49	   and	   later	   visiting,	   a	   family	   in	   a	   place	   called	   Morouj50	   in	   the	   outer	   urban	  suburbs	  of	  Greater	  Tunis	  to	  the	  South	  and	  East	  of	  the	  capital	  in	  the	  district	  of	  Ben	  Arous.	  The	  growth	  of	   the	  Morouj	   is	  part	  of	   the	   strong	  phenomenon	  of	  urban	  migration51	  of	   the	  Tunisian	  population.	   In	   the	  1930s,	  only	  a	   third	  of	   the	  population	   lived	   in	  urban	  settings,	  compared	   with	   nearly	   two	   thirds	   by	   1989	   (Ben	   Jafaar	   1992).	   According	   to	   the	   2004	  census,	   444	   000	  people	  migrated	  within	  Tunisia52	   between	  1999-­‐2004,	  most	   frequently	  due	  to	  work	  or	  to	  join	  family	  (INS	  2013).	  Greater	  Tunis	  is	  the	  most	  popular	  destination	  for	  this	  migration.	  The	  Morouj	  form	  part	  of	  Ben	  Arous	  –	  a	  district	  of	  Greater	  Tunis	  –	  and	  of	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  First	  Instance	  of	  Ben	  Arous	  where	  I	  read	  and	  observed	  divorce	  cases.	  	  
Best	   characterized	   by	   their	   mixity,	   being	   the	   fruit	   of	   internal	   migration,53	   the	  Morouj	  –	  meaning	   ‘fields’	   in	  Arabic	  –	  were	   literally	   just	   that	  before	  the	   land	  was	  sold	  off	  and	   people	   began	   to	   build	   homes	   there	   in	   the	   mid-­‐1980s.	   Fields	   could	   be	   seen	   in	   the	  distance	   from	  the	  main	  road,	  stretching	  away	   from	  these	  neighbourhoods	  that	  were	  still	  very	  much	  under	  construction.	  How	  can	  ethics	  be	  understood,	  in	  spatial	  terms,	  in	  this	  new	  neighbourhood	   that	   is	  a	   radically	  different	  kind	  of	  place	   to	   the	  rural	  villages	   (Abu	  Zahra	  1982;	  Zussman,	  1992)	  from	  where	  the	  residents	  of	  Morouj	  mostly	  originate?	  (Chapter	  1)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49	  I	  spent	  3	  months	  living	  in	  Morouj	  in	  2007	  and	  a	  further	  3	  months	  in	  2008.	  In	  the	  mean	  time	  I	  lived	  in	  Tunisia	  with	  
my	  husband	  in	  one	  of	  the	  more	  affluent	  suburbs	  to	  the	  North	  of	  the	  city,	  yet	  I	  returned	  to	  Morouj	  frequently	  to	  visit	  
my	  host	  family	  and	  her	  neighbours	  and	  to	  conduct	  interviews.	  
50	  The	  Morouj	  are	  known	  and	  identified	  by	  number.	  I	  have	  excluded	  references	  to	  numbers	  here	  to	  protect	  the	  
confidentiality	  of	  my	  informants.	  	  
51	  Tunisia’s	  urban	  population	  grew	  from	  40%	  in	  1966	  to	  61%	  in	  1994	  (UNDP:	  35).	  
52	  To	  put	  this	  in	  perspective,	  the	  Tunisian	  population	  was	  9.9M	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  most	  recent	  census	  (2004).	  
53	  Often	  whole	  families	  moved	  from	  one	  region	  to	  another	  (UNDP:	  35).	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Kinship	   has	   been	   understood	   from	   a	   spatial	   perspective	   in	   terms	   of	   residence	  patterns	  and	  changing	  relationships	  between	  a	  married	  couple	  and	  their	  natal	  and	  affinal	  kin	  (Vatuk	  1972;	  Singerman	  1995;	  Inhorn	  1996;	  Hoodfar	  1997;	  Jansen	  1987;	  Jenny	  White	  1994).	   	   Ethnographic	  work	   on	   Cairo	   suggests	   that	   changes	   in	   residence	   pattern	  may	   be	  related	   to	   a	   shift	   in	   the	   way	   marriages	   are	   formed.	   As	   Inhorn	   writes	   of	   the	   politics	   of	  marriage	  following	  ‘the	  increasing	  nuclearization	  and	  separation	  of	  marital	  partners	  from	  their	  extended	  families’,	  ‘under	  one	  roof,	  young	  Egyptian	  couples	  …	  have	  come	  to	  see	  their	  marital	   relationship	   as	   primary’	   (1996:	   148)	   She	   suggests	   that	   this	   has	   strengthened	  conjugal	   connectivity	  at	   the	  expense	  of	  patriarchy	   (ibid:	  149).	   In	   Istanbul,	   Jenny	  White’s	  study	   on	   rural	   peasants	  who	  migrated	   to	   Istanbul,	   found	   that	   extended	   family	   retained	  significance,	  even	  when	  people	  lived	  in	  nuclear	  households	  (1984:	  43).	  Singerman	  (1995)	  and	   Inhorn’s	   (1996)	   approach	   to	   studying	   an	   urban	   centre	   in	   rapid	   expansion	   raises	  important	   questions	   about	   how	   the	   family	   and	   informal	   networks	   may	   be	   evolving	   in	  urban	  Tunis.	  	  
Anthropological	   work	   on	   Tunisia	   in	   past	   decades	   hints	   at	   the	   significance	   of	  migration	   to	  marriage	   patterns	   (Abu	   Zahra	   1970;	   Zussman	   1992).	   Abu	   Zahra	   described	  how	   traditional	   Tunisian	   kinship	   ‘is	   expressed	   in	   terms	   of	   space’	   and	   ‘the	   greatest	  humiliation	   that	  could	  befall	  a	  person	   [is]	   that	  he	  should	   leave	  his	  place	  of	  origin	   to	   live	  elsewhere’	  (1970:	  1096).	  If,	  as	  Abu	  Zahra	  suggests,	  place	  of	  origin	  is	  significant	  to	  people,	  how	  does	   this	   affect	   the	  webs	   of	   sociality	   in	   the	   new	  neighbourhoods	   of	  Morouj,	  where	  people	  are	  necessarily	  distanced	  from	  their	  roots?	  What	  are	  the	  implications	  of	  changing	  residence	  patterns	  and	  forms	  of	  relatedness	  on	  the	  way	  marriages	  are	  formed	  and	  the	  way	  they	  break	  down?	  What	  are	  the	  moral	  implications	  of	  place	  and	  space	  and	  of	  the	  changing	  relationships	  between	  people	  and	  places	  as	  they	  are	  distanced	  from	  their	  places	  of	  origin?	  
Residence	  patterns	  have	  also	  been	  implicated	  in	  facilitating	  or	  constraining	  access	  to	  divorce.	  In	  her	  study	  on	  divorce	  in	  Yemen,	  Wuerth	  found	  that	  a	  woman	  wanting	  to	  take	  her	  husband	   to	   court	   is	  unlikely	   to	  do	   so	  whilst	   living	  with	  him,	  particularly	   if	  he	   is	  not	  paying	  maintenance;	   therefore,	  only	  a	  woman	  with	   family	  to	  support	  her	  can	  proceed	  to	  make	  a	  legal	  claim	  (1998:	  163).	  Divorce	  is	  often	  discussed	  in	  ethnographic	  work	  based	  in	  the	  household	  or	  neighbourhood	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  stigma	  associated	  with	  divorce	  that	  may	  deter	  women,	   in	  particular,	   from	  divorcing	  (Inhorn	  1996;	  Abu	  Lughod	  1986).	  This	  could	  be	   seen	   as	   one	   way	   in	   which	   anthropologists	   writing	   on	   divorce	   in	   Arab	   or	   Muslim	  societies	  have	  traced	  the	   link	  between	  the	   law	  and	  ethics	  ethnographically,	  as	  objections	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to	  divorce	  and	  the	  refusal	  of	  some	  to	  access	  their	  legal	  rights	  are	  couched	  in	  moral	  terms	  (frequently	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  ‘discourse	  of	  honour’	  (Tapper	  &	  Tapper	  1992/3:	  11-­‐13)).	  	  
If	  I	  decided	  to	  study	  divorce	  in	  the	  neighbourhood	  alongside	  the	  courthouse,	  it	  was	  also	  to	  gain	  insight	  into	  those	  who	  do	  not	  divorce.	  I	  did	  not	  want	  to	  be	  limited	  to	  meeting	  only	  those	  who	  made	  it	  as	  far	  as	  the	  divorce	  court.	  
How,	   then,	   does	   the	   structure	   of	   the	   new	   neighbourhood	   and	   the	   forms	   of	  relationship	  built	  within	  it,	  encourage	  or	  limit	  peoples’	  access	  to	  legal	  rights	  in	  marriage?	  Who	  are	  those	  who,	  for	  various	  reasons,	  are	  unable	  to	  instigate	  a	  divorce	  or	  who	  decline	  to	  access	  their	  legal	  rights?	  
FAMILY	  AND	  ETHICS	  
Literature	  on	  kinship	  and	  marriage	   traces	   relationships	  between	  morality	  and	  economic	  change	  (in	  particular	  the	  changing	  role	  of	  women)	  and	  the	  (often	  related)	  changing	  use	  of	  space	   and	  morality.	  My	   approach	   seeks	   to	   combine	   these	  perspectives	   and	   to	   link	   them	  with	  the	  law	  through	  a	  detailed	  ethnographic	  study	  of	  marriage	  and	  legal	  practice	  (Mundy	  1988).	  
Joseph	  connects	  moral	  discourses	  on	  kinship	  and	  patterns	  of	  relatedness	  with	  the	  practice	   of	   the	   law	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   ability	   of	   citizens	   to	   access	   their	   rights.	   Writing	   on	  Lebanon,	   she	  demonstrates	   that	   rights	   are	   relational	   and	  experienced	   through	  what	   she	  calls	   ‘patriarchal	  connectivity’	  (1997).	  As	  suggested	  in	  the	  ethnographic	  work	  on	  divorce	  cited	  above,	  citizenship	  rights,	   in	  particular	   those	  pertaining	  to	  personal	  status	   laws,	  are	  mediated	  by	   the	  webs	  of	   relationships	   in	  which	  an	   individual	   is	   suspended	  and	   through	  which	   he	   or	   she	   is	   connected	   with	   the	   wider	   polity	   (Mundy	   1995;	   Strathern	   2004).	  Consequently,	   an	  understanding	  of	   the	  PSC	   and	   its	   reform	  of	  marriage	   and	  divorce,	   and	  how	   this	   laws	   translates	   into	   practice,	   requires	   an	   exploration	   of	   the	   ‘small	   everyday	  processes	  of	  relatedness	  (that	  over	  time)	  have	  a	  larger	  scale	  political	  importance’	  (Carsten	  2004:	  4).	  Do	  these	  factors	  structure	  the	  ability	  of	  Tunisian	  citizens	  to	  access	  their	  rights	  in	  divorce?	  	  
Tracing	   the	   connections	   between	   law	   and	   ethics	   will	   make	   it	   possible	   to	  comprehend	  peoples’	  experiences	  of	  the	  law	  and	  to	  gain	  a	  sense	  of	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  law	  may,	  or	  may	  not,	  promote	  a	  changed	  status	  for	  women	  or	  for	  men.	  By	  extension,	  the	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operation	  of	  the	  law	  cannot	  be	  understood	  apart	  from	  these	  webs	  of	  sociality	  and	  patterns	  of	  relatedness	  in	  which	  its	  operation	  is	  suspended.	  	  
	  
REFORMING	  THE	  LAW	  
Family	   law	  most	   frequently	   enters	   ethnographic	  work	   on	   the	   family	   in	   the	  Middle	   East	  implicitly	  as	  part	  of	  the	  political	  context	  that	  shapes	  the	  practice	  of	  kinship	  and	  marriage	  (Singerman	  1995;	   Inhorn	  1996;	  Hoodfar	  1997;	   Jenny	  White	  1994,	  Hoodfar	  1994).	   From	  the	  vantage	  point	  of	  the	  house,	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  law	  is	  scarcely	  addressed.	  In	  contrast,	  court-­‐based	  ethnographies	  focus	  predominantly	  on	  the	  law	  in	  practice	  (Osanloo	  2009;	  Mir	  Hosseini	  1993).	  Following	  work	  on	  gender	  and	  citizenship	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  centred	  on	   questions	   about	   women’s	   rights	   in	   practice,	   these	   works	   often	   focus	   on	   women’s	  experiences	  of	  personal	  status	  laws	  (Osanloo	  200954;	  Hill	  1979).	  Accounts	  that,	  at	  least	  to	  some	  extent,	   combine	   legal	   and	   social	   perspectives	   (Wuerth	  1998;	  Bowen	  1998;	  Mundy	  1995;	   Bear	   2007a)	   are	   less	   common	   but	   more	   telling.	   I	   aim	   to	   make	   explicit	   the	  embeddedness	  of	  the	  court	  and	  its	  work	  in	  broader	  social	  processes.	  At	   issue	   is	  how	  the	  law	  is	  involved	  in	  the	  continual	  process	  of	  reassembling	  the	  moral,	  or	  to	  borrow	  Sana	  Ben	  Achour’s	  image,	  how	  both	  the	  court	  and	  the	  neighbourhood	  are	  sites	  in	  which	  the	  moral	  is	  in	  continual	  construction	  (2004).	  
In	   the	   case	  of	  Tunisian	  personal	   status	   law,	   this	   construction	  occurs	   through	   the	  categories	  and	  procedures	  (Riles	  2005)	  that	  make	  the	  practice	  of	  ordinary	  ethics	  integral	  to	   the	   operation	   of	   the	   law.	   The	   situation	   differs	   from	   that	   described	   by	   Dahlgren,	   for	  instance,	  who,	   in	  her	  work	  on	  mahr55	   in	  Yemen,	  discusses	   conflicting	   representations	  of	  gender	   roles	   and	   rights	   by	   examining	   conflicts	   between	   customary	   practices	   and	   the	  prevailing	  legislation	  (2005).	  In	  Tunisia,	  moral	  conflicts	  are	  present	  within	  the	  law	  itself.	  
Voorhoeve	  points	  out	  that	  innovation	  of	  the	  PSC	  lies	  as	  much	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  was	  codified	  as	  in	  its	  content	  (2012).	  The	  codification	  of	  personal	  status	  law	  has	  been	  said	  to	  lead	   to	  greater	   fixity	   in	  areas	  where	   the	   sharia	  was	  more	   flexible	  and	  adaptable	   to	   local	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54	  Osanloo	  also	  describes	  women’s	  koranic	  classes	  but	  does	  not	  specifically	  address	  the	  house	  or	  neighbourhood	  
ethnographically.	  
55	  Payments	  made	  to	  the	  bride	  by	  her	  husband	  as	  part	  of	  the	  marriage	  agreement.	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circumstances.56	   As	   we	   shall	   see,	   however,	   the	   strongest	   controversies	   surrounding	  Tunisia’s	  PSC,	  stem	  from	  areas	  of	  the	  code	  that	  leave	  space	  for	  ambiguity.	  We	  shall	  see	  that	  the	   PSC	   leaves	   flexibility	   and	   space	   for	   interpretation	   in	   some	   areas	   regarding	   the	  way	  marital	  duties	  are	  understood	  in	  legal	  practice,	  whilst	  remaining	  more	  rigid	  in	  others.	  
OPEN	  NORMS,	  INTERPRETATIVE	  SPACES	  
The	  PSC	  made	  three	  types	  of	  divorce	  (divorce	  for	  harm,	  divorce	  without	  grounds,	  divorce	  by	  mutual	  consent)	  available	  to	  both	  men	  and	  women.	  In	  the	  first	  two	  cases,	  whenever	  the	  divorce	  is	  contentious,	  the	  family	  judge	  must	  rule	  on	  who	  has	  suffered	  the	  most	  ‘harm’	  due	  to	  the	  marital	  breakdown,	  either	  to	  validate	  a	  divorce	  for	  harm	  or	  to	  establish	  the	  level	  of	  compensation	   payments	   due	   in	   a	   divorce	   without	   grounds.	   57	   ‘Harm’	   is	   established	  according	  to	  whether	  each	  litigant	  has	  fulfilled,	  or	  failed	  to	  fulfil,	  their	  ‘marital	  duties.’	  The	  judge	  must	  also	  rule	  on	  the	  custody	  of	  any	  children	  according	  to	  the	   ‘best	   interest	  of	  the	  child’.58	   In	   this	  way,	   the	   legal	  categories	   ‘marital	  duties’	  and	   ‘harm’	  play	  a	  central	   role	   in	  shaping	  the	  divorce	  settlement.	  
The	   PSC,	   however,	   fails	   to	   define	   these	   essential	   legal	   categories.	   As	   Voorhoeve	  states,	  based	  on	  her	  research	  on	   judicial	  decision	  making	   in	  personal	   status	  cases	   in	   the	  court	  of	  Tunis,	  ‘the	  law	  does	  not	  define	  the	  term	  ‘harm’	  (darar)	  in	  any	  way.	  Its	  meaning	  is	  left	  vague	  and	  judges	  are	  free	  to	  interpret	  this	  term’	  (2012:	  204).	  Equally,	  ‘marital	  duties’	  were	  redefined	   in	   the	  1993	  reform	  of	  article	  23	  of	   the	  PSC,	  yet	   this	  only	  served	  to	  make	  their	   definition	  more	   ambiguous	   (Chedly	   2007);	   since	   this	   time,	   each	   spouse	  must	   fulfil	  their	   ‘marital	  duties	  according	  to	  custom	  and	  habit.’	  This	   leads,	   ‘to	  a	   law	  that	   is	   illegible,	  difficult	  to	  interpret	  and	  strongly	  incoherent’	  (ibid:	  559).	  Sana	  Ben	  Achour	  emphasises	  the	  difficult	   position	   of	   the	   family	   judge	   as	   interpreter,	   caught	   ‘in	   a	   permanent	   tension	  between	  conservatism	  and	  innovation’	  (2005).	  
How	   do	   judges	   interpret	   these	   ambiguous	   legal	   terms	   in	   divorce	   cases?	   Which	  version	  of	  marital	  duties	  and	  which	  form	  or	  forms	  of	  family	  are	  reinforced	  via	  the	  practice	  of	  the	  law?	  	  
WT	  Murphy	  has	  argued	  that	  if	  the	  law	  is	  an	  ethical	  space,	  it	  is	  because:	  	   ‘the	  legal	  subject	   as	   a	   surface	   on	  which	   variations	  will	   be	   effected	   .…	   brings	   into	   play	   an	   array	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56	  The	  codification	  of	  Islamic	  family	  law	  lead	  to	  a	  loss	  of	  flexibility	  and	  a	  reduction	  of	  the	  judge’s	  discretion	  (cf	  
Osanloo	  (2009	  :203);	  Tucker	  (1998)	  read	  in	  Sonneveld	  (2010:109)).	  	  
57	  See	  chapter	  6.	  
58	  See	  chapter	  7.	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predisposition	   and	   prejudices	   on	   the	   part	   of	   judges	   and	   juries,	   preprogrammed	  interpretative	   schemes	   for	   interiorizing	   the	   driving	   forces	   of	   human	   behaviour,	   forces	  which	  are	  not	  visible	  and	   require	   interpretation’	   (1997:	  95).	  Consequently,	   it	   is	   through	  this	   practice	   of	   judgement,	   that	   is	   simultaneously	   legal	   and	  moral,	   that	   legal	   practice	   is	  intertwined	  with	  ordinary	  ethics.59	  	  
Anthropologists	   (Al	  Ali	  &	  Pratt	  2009;60	  Messick	  1993;	   Starr	  1978;	  Wuerth	  2003)	  have	  written	   of	   the	   authority	   vested	   in	   those	  whose	  work	   it	   is	   to	   interpret	   the	  written	  laws;	   the	   realisation	   of	  women’s	   rights	   lies	   in	   the	   hands	   of	   the	   interpreters	   of	   personal	  status	   laws	   as	  much	   (or	  more	   than)	   in	   the	   law	   itself.	   Equally,	   a	   litigant’s	   experience	   of	  accessing	   rights	   is	   shaped	   by	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   legal	   outcomes	   depend	   on	   judicial	  discretion.61	  Wuerth,	   in	   her	   study	   on	   divorce	   in	   Yemen,	   found	   that	   much	   hangs	   on	   the	  character	   of	   the	   judge	   (1998:	   6).62	   I	   will	   argue	   that	   the	   fluidity	   of	   the	   law	   and	   its	  ambiguities	  generate	  considerable	  uncertainty	  and	  anxiety,	  not	  only	  for	  feminist	  activists	  who	  are	  concerned	  about	  the	  morality	  of	  the	  law,	  but	  for	  litigants	  who	  experience	  it	  first	  hand	   and	   for	   the	   judges	  who	   interpret	   the	   law.	  What	   is	   the	   nature	   of	   this	   uncertainty?	  What	   happens	   in	   these	   interpretative	   spaces?	   What	   are	   the	   implications	   of	   these	  ambiguities	  of	  the	  legal	  system	  for	  the	  state’s	  perceived	  legitimacy	  and	  understandings	  of	  justice?	  
Feminist	   legal	   scholars	   in	  Tunisia	  have	  expressed	   their	   fears	  and	  concerns	  about	  how	   the	   PSC	   may	   be	   interpreted	   in	   ways	   that	   go	   against	   ‘women’s	   rights’.63	   Sana	   Ben	  Achour	   feared	   that	   the	  PSC’s	   ambiguities	  weaken	   its	   emancipatory	  potential:	   ‘Exploiting	  the	   silences,	   contradictions	   and	   ambiguities	   of	   the	   (legal)	   text,	   the	   judge	   reintroduces	  Islamic	  law’	  (2004:	  9).64	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59	  This	  analysis	  of	  the	  law	  resonates	  with	  Lambek’s	  argument	  (2010)	  that	  places	  (moral)	  judgment	  at	  the	  fulcrum	  of	  
ordinary	  ethics.	  
60	  Writing	  on	  the	  drafting	  of	  the	  Iraqi	  constitution	  (2005)	  and	  fears	  that	  the	  arbitrary	  interpretation	  of	  the	  laws,	  
rather	  than	  Islamic	  law	  per	  se,	  would	  lead	  to	  a	  loss	  of	  women’s	  rights	  (Al	  Ali	  &	  Pratt	  2009:	  112).	  
61	  See	  Engle	  Merry	  on	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  experiences	  with	  the	  legal	  system	  are	  necessary	  to	  confirm	  an	  individual’s	  
rights-­‐bearing	  subjectivity	  (2003).	  
62	  Elsewhere,	  Caroline	  White	  (2012),	  discussing	  immigration	  law	  in	  the	  UK,	  found	  the	  experience	  of	  litigants	  fraught	  
with	  uncertainty	  as	  the	  outcome	  of	  their	  case	  hinged	  on	  whether	  they	  fell	  upon	  the	  right	  judge	  on	  the	  right	  day.	  
63	  Hafsia	  discusses	  the	  influence	  of	  cultural	  values	  and	  social	  class	  in	  guiding	  a	  judge’s	  decision	  historically	  in	  Tunis	  
(2005:	  13).	  See	  also	  Charrad	  (cited	  in	  Gilman	  2000:	  91);	  Bessis	  underlining	  the	  conservatism	  of	  the	  judiciary	  (1999:	  
4);	  and	  Chekir	  (1996).	  
64	  My	  translation	  from	  French.	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The	   opposition	   women’s	   organisation65	   denounced	   this	   ambiguity,	   together	   with	   the	  utilisation	   of	   the	   religion	   and	   a	   generalised	   reverence	   for	   patriarchal	   norms	   as	  contributing	   to	   the	  continuation	  of	   the	   ‘patriarchal	  oppression	  of	  women’	   (Bessis	  1999).	  Voorhoeve	  notes	  that	  the	  law	  does	  not	  guide	  judges	  as	  to	  how	  to	  interpret	  the	  lacunae	  in	  the	   PSC.66	   Unlike	   Moroccan	   or	   Algerian	   law,	   Tunisia’s	   PSC	   does	   not	   make	   reference	   to	  Islamic	  law	  in	  case	  of	  lacunae;	  consequently,	  Tunisian	  jurisprudence	  sometimes	  interprets	  the	  silences	  of	  the	  legal	  code	  otherwise	  (Chedly	  2007:	  555).	  Recalling	  that	  judges	  and	  their	  judgements	  may	  also	  become	  subject	   to	   judgment	  by	  their	  peers	   in	  the	  Courts	  of	  Appeal	  and	   Cassation,	   Sana	   Ben	   Achour	   noted	   that	   the	   ambivalent	   attitude	   of	   the	   government	  causes	   judges	   to	  be	   insecure	  about	  how	   they	   should	  apply	   the	   law.	  The	   role	  of	   sharia	   is	  unclear.	  Should	   they	  refer	   to	  sharia?	  Should	   they	  refer	   to	   the	  state’s	  expressed	  desire	   to	  support	  women’s	   rights?	   In	   addition,	   the	   state	  has	  declared	   the	   sharia	   to	  be	   a	   source	  of	  women’s	   rights,	   or	   is	   this	   a	   contradiction	   in	   terms?67	  Voorhoeve	  points	   out	   (2012:	   209)	  that	  judges	  have	  no	  training	  in	  sharia	  (Islamic	  law	  being	  taught	  neither	  in	  law	  school	  nor	  in	  the	  school	  for	  judges	  and	  could,	  therefore,	  not	  apply	  it	  even	  if	  they	  wanted	  to.	  In	  these	  circumstances,	  what	  would	  it	  mean	  to	  say	  that	  judges	  are	  ‘applying	  sharia’?	  What	  does	  this	  suggest	  about	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  state	  and	  Islam?	  	  
Based	  on	  an	  ethnomethodological	  study	  of	  judicial	  decision	  making	  in	  the	  Court	  of	  First	   Instance	  of	  Tunis,68	  Voorhoeve	  considers	  the	  factors	  that	  curtail	   freedom	  in	   judicial	  interpretation	  in	  light	  of	  the	  judge’s	  own	  accounts	  of	  this	  activity	  (2012:	  201).	  Voorhoeve	  lists	   the	   factors	   which	   lead	   both	   to	   uniformity	   and	   to	   diversity	   in	   judicial	   decision	   in	  personal	   status	   cases.	   ‘Custom	   and	   habit’,	   ‘good	  morals’	   and	   ‘sharia’	   are	   all	   factors	   that	  lead	  to	  uniformity’.	   ‘Custom	  and	  habit’	  is	  referred	  to	  as	  justification	  for	  the	  wife’s	  duty	  to	  cohabit	  with	  her	  husband,	  a	  marital	  duty	  that	  is	  not	  specified	  in	  the	  PSC.	  	  
Tunisian	  jurist	  Chedly	  has	  echoed	  Sana	  Ben	  Achour	  in	  describing	   ‘equality	  …	  as	  a	  continual	   construction	  site.’	  These	  perspectives	  point	   to	   the	  continual	   labour	  of	  defining	  what	  the	  PSC	  means	  via	  the	  practice	  of	  the	  law.	  Like	  Voorhoeve	  (2011),	  rather	  than	  asking	  whether	  ‘sharia’	  is	  being	  applied	  or	  not,	  I	  explore	  ethnographically	  what	  happens	  in	  these	  interpretative	  spaces.	  How	  are	  these	  ambiguous	  legal	  terms	  interpreted	  in	  divorce	  cases?	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65	  ATFD	  (Association	  Tunisienne	  des	  Femmes	  Démocrates).	  Sana	  Ben	  Achour	  was	  a	  leading	  member	  of	  this	  
association,	  together	  with	  Hafidha	  Chekir,	  another	  renowned	  feminist	  legal	  scholar.	  
66	  Meziou	  (1992)	  cited	  in	  Voorhoeve	  (2011:76).	  
67	  Ben	  Achour	  (2007)	  cited	  in	  Voorhoeve	  (2011:	  86).	  
68	  Fieldwork	  was	  carried	  out	  in	  2008	  at	  the	  same	  time	  as	  research	  for	  this	  thesis.	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How	  can	  we	  understand	  the	  judgement	  process	  involved	  in	  divorce	  cases	  in	  which	  these	  categories	  play	  a	  central	  part?	  
Anthropologists	   discussing	   the	   law	  have	   pointed	   to	   the	   problematic	   relationship	  between	  legal	  and	  social	  categories	  (Riles	  2002).	  Pottage	  has	  argued	  that	  legal	  categories	  are	   ‘resources	   from	   which	   persons	   and	   things	   are	   fabricated’	   (2004:	   25)	   and	   as	   such	  produced	  entities	  that	  are	  more	  than	  artefacts	  of	  the	  legal	  procedure.	  WT	  Murphy	  pursues	  the	  problematic	  and	  dynamic	  relationship	  that	  exists	  between	  legal	  and	  social	  categories	  and	  finds	  a	   ‘special	  affinity’	  that	  exists	  between	  law	  and	  society	  as	   ‘legal	  categories	  were	  social	  categories’	  and	  there	  is	  ‘no	  problem	  of	  translation’	  (1997:	  187).	  	  
This	  point	  resonates	  with	  Lambek’s	  argument	  surrounding	  the	  place	  of	  criteria	  in	  ordinary	   ethics.	   He	   writes	   that	   ‘criteria	   for	   practical	   judgement	   are	   established	   and	  acknowledged	   in	   performative	   acts,	   whilst	   acts	   emerge	   from	   the	   stream	   of	   practice.	  Performance	  draws	  on	  previously	  established	  criteria.’	   (2010:	  39)	  According	   to	  Lambek,	  then,	   ‘we	  may	   find	  wellsprings	  of	   ethical	   insight	  deeply	  embedded	   in	   the	   categories	  and	  functions	   or	   language	   and	   ways	   of	   speaking,	   in	   the	   commonsense	   ways	   we	   distinguish	  among	  various	  kinds	  of	  actors	  or	  characters	  …	  Thus	  in	  the	  shared	  criteria	  we	  use	  to	  make	  ourselves	  intelligible	  to	  one	  another’	  (ibid:	  3).	  
It	   is	   through	   these	   shared	   criteria,	   or	   assumptions,	   that	   Bowen	   suggests	   norms	  enter	  the	  work	  of	  the	  law	  (1998).69	  	  This	  insight	  raises	  questions	  about	  the	  moral	  criteria	  that	   are	   brought	   into	   play	   as	  marriages	   are	   formed	   and	   break	   down	   in	   Tunisia.	  Which	  criteria	   are	   set	   up	  by	   the	   act	   of	  marrying	   in	  Tunisia?	  How	  are	   these	   criteria	   transposed	  into	   the	  work	   of	   the	   law	   as	   people	   divorce?	  What	   are	   the	   implications	   of	   these	   criteria	  being	  brought	  into	  legal	  practice?	  
Bowen’s	   insight	   that	   much	   can	   be	   learned	   from	   paying	   attention	   to	   the	  assumptions	  that	  underlie	  the	  arguments	  used	  in	  court	  judgements	  also	  highlights	  the	  role	  played	   by	   lawyers	   and	   litigants	   in	   interpreting	   the	   law	   via	   the	   performances	   and	  narratives	   they	   present	   in	   court.	   Legal	   practice	   can	   be	   examined	   from	   the	   differing	  perspectives	   of	   the	   judges,	   litigants	   and	   lawyers	   who	   are	   involved	   in	   creating	   and	  interpreting	  the	  arguments	  used	  in	  divorce	  cases	  that	  are	  shaped	  but	  not	  determined	  by	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69	  Fuller	  made	  a	  similar	  point:	  ‘the	  authoritative	  legal	  discourse	  of	  the	  professionals	  is	  …	  a	  complex	  and	  counter-­‐
intuitive	  transformation	  of	  everyday	  relational	  or	  moral	  understandings.’	  (1994:	  11).	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the	   legal	   code	   (Lynch	   &	   Bogen	   1996).70	   Which	   arguments	   are	   put	   forward	   in	   the	  interpretative	  spaces	  allowed	  by	  the	  law’s	  failure	  to	  clearly	  define	  marital	  duties?	  Or,	  more	  simply,	  how	  do	  litigants	  and	  their	  lawyers	  try	  to	  persuade	  the	  judge?	  (chapters	  4,	  5	  &	  6)	  
JUDGE	  AND	  COMMUNITY	  
Inspired	  by	  Rosen’s	  work	  on	  judicial	  reasoning	  in	  the	  context	  of	  Islamic	  law,71	  the	  judge	  as	  interpreter	   has	   been	   discussed	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   nature	   of	   his	   connection	   with	   the	  community	  served	  by	  the	  court	  (Wuerth	  1998;	  Sonneveld	  2010;	  Rosen	  2000).	  Sonneveld,	  writing	  on	  personal	  status	  law	  in	  Egypt,	  notes	  a	  key	  difference	  between	  the	  judges	  of	  the	  Ottoman	   era	   and	   the	   contemporary	   judges,	   ‘the	   former	   having	   roots	   in	   the	   community	  where	   they	   practiced,	   possessed	   a	   profound	   knowledge	   of	   the	   region	   and	   its	   people’	  (2010:	   106-­‐9).	   Tunisia	   (like	   Egypt	   as	   described	   by	   Sonneveld)	   now	   follows	   a	   system	   of	  rotating	  judges	  every	  four	  years.	  Equally,	  ‘judges	  working	  in	  major	  urban	  centres,	  such	  as	  Cairo	  …	  are	  very	  unlikely	  to	  form	  any	  connection	  to	  the	  communities	  where	  their	  litigants	  are	  coming	  from.’	  She	  argues	  that	  this	  can	  lead	  to	  a	  rupture	  between	  judge’s	  perceptions	  and	  litigants’	  experiences	  of	  social	  reality	  (ibid:	  109).	  
Unlike	  the	  other	  contexts	  studied	  in	  the	  literature	  on	  Muslim	  family	  law,	  Tunisian	  judges	   may	   be	   either	   male	   or	   female.	   Since	   independence	   and	   the	   closure	   of	   religious	  courts,	  all	  the	  judges	  are	  state	  officials72	  who,	  as	  mentioned	  above,	  are	  trained	  in	  secular	  law	   rather	   than	   the	   sharia.	   Required	   to	   rotate	   every	   four	   years,	   Tunisian	   judges	   do	   not	  specialise	  in	  one	  area	  of	  law.	  When	  I	  began	  fieldwork	  in	  2007,	  the	  chamber	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  First	  Instance	  of	  Ben	  Arous,	  dedicated	  to	  personal	  status	  issues	  and	  where	  I	  studied,	  was	  presided	  over	  by	  a	  female	  judge.	  She	  was	  replaced	  by	  a	  male	  judge	  in	  2008	  who	  had	  never	  before	  worked	  on	  personal	  status	  issues.	  Consequently,	  fieldwork	  took	  place	  under	  both	  a	  female	  and	  a	  male	  family	  judge.	  In	  addition,	  I	  spent	  time	  with	  the	  male	  cantonal	  judge	  of	  Ben	  Arous	  who	  was	  responsible	  for	  the	  maintenance	  cases	  brought	  by	  wives	  against	  their	  husbands	  and	  that	  are	  frequently	  cited	  in	  divorce	  cases.	  	  
Messick’s	   analysis	   of	   the	   relations	   of	   interpretation	   and	   the	   conceptual	   contrast	  between	  muftis	   and	   judges,	  whilst	  without	  parallels	   in	   the	  Tunisian	  context,	   raises	  some	  fundamental	   questions	   about	   the	   interpretative	   role	   of	   the	   Tunisian	   family	   judge.	   In	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70	  Also	  see	  Engle	  Merry	  who	  highlights	  the	  role	  of	  ‘intermediaries’	  (in	  her	  case	  NGO	  participants	  and	  community	  
leaders)	  in	  ‘translating	  ideas’	  (in	  her	  case	  transnational	  human	  rights	  approaches)	  to	  ‘make	  them	  meaningful	  in	  local	  
settings’	  (2006:	  38).	  
71	  See	  Mundy	  (1991)	  for	  a	  critique	  of	  Rosen’s	  approach.	  
72	  cf	  Gobe	  (2010)	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  lawyers	  and	  the	  Tunisian	  government.	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Yemen,	   muftis	   acted	   as	   arbiters	   and	   delivered	   opinions	   (fatwas),	   commonly	   connected	  with	  marital	   disputes	   (1993:	   136-­‐8).	   Their	   purview	  was	   ‘locally	   generated	   questions	   …	  related	  to	  locally	  interpreted	  jurisprudence,’	  making	  muftis,	  ‘the	  creative	  mediators	  of	  the	  ideal	  and	  the	  real	  of	  the	  sharia’	  (ibid:	  151).	  In	  addition,	  ‘as	  jurists	  and	  moral	  beings,	  muftis	  traditionally	   distanced	   themselves	   from	   the	   considerable	   ambivalence	   surrounding	   the	  judgeship	   itself,	   and	   the	   court,	  which	  many	   considered	   an	   arena	  of	   corruption,	   coercion	  and	  error’	   (ibid:	  142)	  The	   form	  of	   interpretation	   in	  which	  each	  engages	   is	  related	  to	   the	  context	   in	   which	   each	   practices	   judgement:	   ‘the	   judge’s	   mahkama,	   or	   court,	   is	   …	   the	  quintessential	  public	  forum,	  a	  locus	  for	  the	  coercive	  exercise	  of	  state	  power’	  (ibid:	  144).	  	  
In	  Tunisia,	  we	  shall	  see	  how	  these	  functions	  become	  merged	  in	  complex	  ways.	  As	  well	  as	  reaching	  judgement	  on	  the	  divorce	  case	  (based	  on	  the	  divorce	  file)	  the	  family	  judge	  must	  also	  try	  to	  reconcile	  the	  couple	  in	  person	  (article	  32).73	  What	  are	  the	  implications	  of	  these	   intimate	   disputes	   being	   drawn	   into	   the	   institutionalised	   space	   of	   the	   court?	   On	  which	  basis	  or	  bases	  does	  the	  family	  judge	  reach	  his	  judgement?	  	  
WT	   Murphy,	   in	   a	   very	   different	   context,	   speaks	   of	   the	   distancing	   that	   occurs	  between	  the	  judge	  and	  litigants	  as	  the	  ‘law	  is	  a	  decontextualised	  space	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  is	  cut	  off	  from	  the	  contexts	  of	  application	  or	  implementation’	  (1997:	  206).	  	  In	  this	  light,	  the	  Yemini	   court	   is	   a	   very	   different	   kind	   of	   ‘ethical	   space’	   (ibid:	   195),	   if	   we	   take	   the	  relationship	  between	  the	  judge	  and	  mufti	  and	  the	  communities	  in	  which	  they	  work	  as	  well	  as	  the	  politicised	  nature	  of	  the	  mahkama,	   into	  account.	  How	  is	  the	  Tunisian	  family	   judge	  connected	  with	  the	  community	  served	  by	  the	  court?	  What	  are	  the	  implications	  of	  this	  for	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  law	  is	  enacted?	  	  
THE	  SUBJECT	  OF	  JUDGEMENT:	  PERSONHOOD74	  
Although,	  theoretically,	  the	  divorce	  judgement	  is	  based	  on	  the	  written	  divorce	  file	  alone,	  75	  the	  PSC	  requires	  the	  couple	  to	  encounter	  the	  judge	  at	  least	  once	  before	  they	  may	  divorce	  for	   a	   reconciliation	   session	   (article	   32).	   Although,	   due	   to	   the	   heavy	   workload,	   these	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73	  Traditionally,	  the	  families	  of	  both	  couples	  would	  be	  involved	  in	  trying	  to	  reconcile	  the	  couple	  in	  the	  event	  of	  
marital	  dispute.	  Comparatively,	  in	  Iran	  (as	  seen	  in	  Longinotto	  &	  Mir	  Hosseini’s	  film,	  Divorce	  Iranian	  Style	  (1998)),	  
reconciliation	  takes	  place	  outside	  the	  court	  by	  mediators	  appointed	  (often	  within	  the	  families)	  who	  subsequently	  
report	  back	  to	  the	  judge.	  
74	  Concepts	  of	  personhood	  have	  been	  central	  in	  work	  on	  the	  anthropology	  of	  the	  law	  (Pottage	  &	  Mundy	  2004;	  
Douglas	  1995),	  in	  the	  anthropology	  of	  ethics	  or	  morality	  (Mahmood	  2005;	  Zigon	  2007	  &	  2009;	  Heintz	  &	  
Rasanayagam,	  2005)74	  and	  in	  anthropological	  work	  on	  gender	  (Moore	  1988;	  Butler	  2004;	  Busby	  2000).	  This	  
discussion	  will	  focus	  on	  the	  intersection	  of	  legal	  practice	  with	  ethical	  personhood	  that	  is	  most	  relevant	  to	  the	  
ethnographic	  material	  that	  follows.	  
75	  We	  shall	  talk	  about	  these	  files	  in	  detail	  below,	  and	  in	  chapters	  5-­‐7.	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sessions	  could	  be	  divided	  between	  the	  judge’s	  colleagues,	  the	  male	  family	  judge	  decided	  to	  hold	  them	  all	  himself.	  He	  felt	  a	  strong	  sense	  of	  responsibility	  for	  his	  work	  and	  did	  not	  want	  to	  ‘divorce’	  a	  couple	  he	  had	  never	  met.	  ‘It	  is	  not	  the	  same	  as	  just	  seeing	  the	  papers,’	  he	  told	  me.	  ‘It	  is	  personal	  status	  law.	  You	  need	  to	  see	  the	  person.’	  Consequently,	  as	  we	  shall	  see,	  a	  first	   moment	   of	   judgment	   occurs	   when	   couples	   meet	   the	   judge	   in	   these	   reconciliation	  sessions	  (chapter	  4).	  	  
In	   her	   work	   on	   women’s	   human	   rights,	   Engle	   Merry	   has	   argued	   that	   such	  ‘experiences	   with	   the	   legal	   system,’	   are	   integral	   in	   enabling	   individuals	   to	   generate	  particular	   forms	   of	   subjectivity	   and	   to	   adopt	   a	   ‘rights	   consciousness	   (2003:	   342).’	   Her	  work	  emphasises	  the	  important	  role	  of	  institutions	  and	  their	  agents	  in	  supporting	  litigants	  as	   they	   generate	   this	   form	   of	   subjectivity	   by	   taking	   ‘these	   rights	   seriously	   when	   being	  claimed	  by	   individuals	   (ibid:	   379).’76	  Women’s	   rights,	   or	  more	   specifically,	   the	   ability	   of	  victims	  to	  take	  on	  a	  ‘rights	  consciousness’,	  therefore,	  are	  generated	  through	  legal	  practice	  as	  individual	  litigants	  and	  legal	  personae77	  interact	  in	  the	  institutional	  setting	  of	  the	  court.	  	  
Literature	  on	   family	   law	   in	   the	  Middle	  East	  often	  centres	  on	  women’s	   rights	  and	  experiences	   and	  discusses	   the	  operation	  of	   the	   law	   in	   terms	  of	  women’s	   empowerment,	  sometimes	   suggesting	   that	   women	   have	   found	   empowerment	   in	   unlikely	   places	   (Mir-­‐Hosseini	   1993;	   Osanloo	   2009).	   Whilst	   Wuerth	   holds	   the	   law	   responsible	   for	   validating	  gender	  inequality	  (1998:	  254),	  according	  to	  Osanloo,	  it	  is	  precisely	  this	  inequality	  of	  rights	  that	   has	   lead	   women	   to	   engage	   more	   actively	   with	   the	   law	   in	   Iran	   (2009:	   195).	   Mir-­‐Hosseini	  argues	  how	  women	  felt	  empowered	  by	  the	  ‘embedded	  contradictions’	  (1998:	  xiv)	  which	   result	   from	   the	   ‘clash	   between	   the	   ideal	   and	   the	   possible’	   (1993:	   121),	   actively	  manipulating	  official	  discourse	  to	  show	  the	  husband’s	  failure	  to	  fulfil	  his	  juridico-­‐religious	  obligations	  (ibid:	  106).78	  
Their	   interpretations	   reflect	   a	   structure	  of	   the	   law	   that	   requires	  women	  and	  not	  men	   to	   file	   for	   a	   judicial	   divorce.	   But	   in	   Tunisia	   both	   men	   and	   women	   must	   file	   for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76	  Also	  see	  Engle	  Merry	  2006.	  
77	  Following	  Mundy	  &	  Saumarez	  Smith	  (quoting	  Thomas	  1998):	  ‘the	  term	  ‘personae’	  is	  used	  for	  legal	  institutional	  
agents	  notably	  of	  government.	  These	  personae	  are	  central	  to	  the	  social	  relations	  of	  property	  and	  are	  not	  reducible	  
to	  the	  sentient	  human	  persons	  who	  may	  act	  as	  legal	  personae.’	  (2007:	  257).	  
78	  Also	  see	  Osanloo	  2009:192.	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divorce.79	   Since	   losing	   their	   right	   to	  unilaterally	   repudiate	   their	  wives	  outside	   court,	   the	  majority	  of	  litigants	  filing	  for	  divorce	  in	  court	  are	  men.80	  	  
How	   do	  men	   experience	   these	   laws	   that	   aspired	   to	   promote	   women’s	   rights?	   If	  empowerment	  and	  ‘agency’	  have	  provided	  anthropologists	  (and	  others)	  with	  an	  analytical	  vocabulary	   through	   which	   to	   understand	   women’s	   experiences	   of	   women’s	   rights,	   how	  can	  we	  apply	  these	  categories	  to	  men’s	  experiences?	  (Engle	  Merry	  2003:	  2)	  
Building	  on	  critiques	  of	   feminist	   theory,	   in	  particular	   its	   treatment	  of	   freedom	  or	  individual	   autonomy,	   Mahmood	   elaborated	   her	   theory	   of	   agency	   by	   attending	   to	   the	  practice	   of	   ethics	   and	   ethical	   personhood	   (2005:2).	   This	   allowed	   her	   to	   unveil	   diverse	  modalities	   of	   agency	   that	   better	   help	   to	   comprehend	   the	   situation	   of	  women	   living	   in	   a	  patriarchal	   system	   based	   on	   gender	   inequality.	   Whilst	   she	   traces	   the	   ways	   in	   which	  ‘ethical	  practices	  of	  self-­‐formation	  take	  on	  a	  new,	  distinctly	  political	  relevance,’	  (ibid:	  34)	  she	  does	  not	  discuss	  the	  implications	  of	  the	  law	  being	  one	  set	  of	   ‘procedures,	  techniques	  and	  discourses	   through	  which	  highly	   specific	   ethical-­‐moral	   subjects	   come	   to	   be	   formed’	  (ibid:	   28).	   Which	   modalities	   of	   agency	   emerge	   when	   we	   pay	   attention	   to	   the	   nexus	  between	  law	  and	  ethics?	  How	  do	  the	  ethical	  dimensions	  of	  legal	  practice	  shape	  the	  ways	  in	  which	   litigants	  and	   legal	  agents	  experience	   the	   law	  as	  promoting	  (or	   failing	   to	  promote)	  women’s	  rights?	  
Writing	   within	   the	   anthropology	   of	   ethics,	   Laidlaw	   developed	   his	   critique	   and	  alternative	   conception	   of	   agency	   by	   attending	   to	   the	   role	   played	   by	   responsibility.	   He	  consequently	   defines	   agency	   as:	   ‘the	   ways	   in	   which	   responsibility	   or	   accountability	   for	  actions	  and	  their	  effects	  are	  attributed	  to	  persons	  and	  things’	  (2010:	  148).	  In	  his	  reading,	  ethical	  practice,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  moral	  judgement,	  shapes	  modalities	  of	  agency.	  Although	  he	  does	  not	  explicitly	   link	  his	  analysis	  with	   the	   law,	  how	  does	   legal	  practice,	   in	   the	   form	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79	  The	  PSC	  also	  changed	  the	  basis	  upon	  which	  the	  divorce	  judgement	  is	  made.	  Historically,	  the	  Muslim	  family	  judge	  
had	  a	  significant	  interpretative	  role.	  According	  to	  Tunisian	  historian	  Hafsia,	  he	  (at	  the	  time	  it	  was	  always	  a	  male	  
judge)	  ‘rules	  on	  the	  husband’s	  behaviour	  …	  according	  to	  social	  status	  and	  the	  custom	  of	  the	  place,’	  (Hafsia	  2005:	  58)	  
leading	  her	  to	  argue	  that	  family	  law	  was	  in	  fact	  a	  kind	  of	  ‘customary	  law’.	  She	  also	  suggests	  that	  that	  this	  system	  
worked	  in	  the	  wife’s	  favour	  as	  the	  judge	  aimed	  to	  make	  a	  harmonious	  marriage	  and	  tended	  to	  accept	  the	  wife’s	  
assertions	  about	  the	  husband’s	  bad	  conduct	  without	  asking	  her	  for	  proof.	  (Hafsia	  2005:	  58)	  This	  contrasts	  strongly	  
with	  the	  picture	  painted	  by	  Largueche	  above,	  in	  which	  women	  were	  effectively	  punished	  and	  imprisoned	  for	  asking	  
for	  a	  divorce.	  In	  both	  cases,	  however,	  the	  divorce	  judgement	  is	  reached	  by	  careful	  witnessing	  by	  witnesses	  who	  are	  
known	  to	  be	  honourable	  and	  who	  report	  directly	  to	  the	  judge.	  In	  both	  cases,	  women	  are	  required	  to	  justify	  their	  
actions	  and	  are	  placed	  under	  a	  form	  of	  scrutiny	  that	  men	  are	  not	  subject	  to	  in	  order	  to	  obtain	  a	  divorce.	  	  
80	  70%	  of	  divorce	  cases	  in	  Tunisia	  between	  1987	  and	  2000	  were	  brought	  by	  men	  (CREDIF	  2001).	  In	  the	  sample	  of	  
196	  divorce	  files	  I	  examined,	  63%	  were	  initiated	  by	  men.	  Notably,	  a	  majority	  (68%)	  of	  the	  cases	  of	  divorce	  without	  
grounds	  were	  initiated	  by	  men	  rather	  than	  women.	  Prior	  to	  the	  reforms,	  Largueche	  found	  that	  of	  the	  120	  divorce	  
cases	  she	  studied	  between	  1878-­‐1940,	  55%	  represented	  divorce	  by	  repudiation	  (1983).	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legal	   judgement	   –	   that	   I	   argue	   is	   intimately	   intertwined	   with	  moral	   judgement	   -­‐	   shape	  modalities	   of	   agency?	  What	   can	   be	   learned	   about	   agency	  when	   seen	   in	   the	   light	   of	   the	  practice	   of	   divorce	   law,	   read	   as	   one	   such	   mechanism	   for	   attributing	   responsibility	   to	  persons?	  How	   can	   this	   enhance	   our	   understanding	   of	   the	   experiences	   of	   both	  male	   and	  female	  litigants	  as	  they	  strive	  to	  access	  their	  rights	  in	  the	  divorce	  court?	  
THE	  SUBJECT	  OF	  JUDGMENT:	  DOCUMENTS	  
Documents	  play	  a	  central	  role	  in	  Tunisian	  divorce	  law	  in	  determining	  the	  responsibility	  of	  persons	   in	   divorce	   cases.	   During	   the	   time	   I	   spent	   in	   the	   Court	   of	   First	   Instance	   of	   Ben	  Arous	  in	  the	  chamber	  dealing	  with	  personal	  status	  issues,	  81	  alongside	  observing	  daily	  life	  in	   the	  office	   and	   the	   reconciliation	   session,	  my	  main	   activity	  was	   to	   copy	   the	   content	   of	  divorce	   files	  by	  hand.	  As	   I	  wrote,	   I	   became	   intimately	   acquainted	  with	   the	  nature	  of	   the	  documents	  and	  the	  kinds	  of	  arguments	  found	  within	  them.	  	  
Laidlaw’s	   alternative	   conception	   of	   agency	   (discussed	   above)	   is	   of	   additional	  interest	  as	  it	  encompasses	  the	  role	  played	  by	  non-­‐human	  actors,	  to	  use	  Latour’s	  terms	  that	  partially	  inspired	  his	  approach,	  in	  the	  attribution	  of	  responsibility.	  Viewing	  documents	  as	  such,	  what	   role	   do	   they	   play	   in	  making	   husbands	   and	  wives	   accountable	   in	   the	   divorce	  court?	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  ordinary	  ethics	  is	  intertwined	  with	  legal	  practice	  as	  litigants	  (and	  the	  judge)	  attempt	  to	  establish	  truth	  in	  court.	  How	  is	  truth	  established	  in	  court?	  What	  are	  the	  consequences	  of	  Tunisia	  being	  a	  documentary	  based	  legal	  regime	  (chapters	  5	  &	  6)?	  	  
My	   approach	   to	   these	  documents	   is	   not	   dissimilar	   to	  my	   approach	   to	   the	  house.	  Whilst	   taking	   their	   materiality	   seriously,	   I	   read	   documents	   as	   a	   nexus	   through	   which	  relationships	  can	  be	  traced.	  In	  this	  way,	  I	  draw	  inspiration	  from	  Riles	  (2006)	  whose	  focus	  on	  documentary	  practices	  allows	  for	  a	  deeper	  understanding	  of	  the	  dynamic	  relationships	  that	   exist	   between	   the	   judge’s	   interpretative	   power,	   the	   ‘agency’	   of	   litigants	   (both	  male	  and	   female)	   and	   lawyers	  who	   are	   involved	   in	   creating	   those	   documents,	   along	  with	   the	  authority	  of	  the	  documents	  present	  in	  the	  divorce	  file.	  
The	  emphasis	  on	  documents	  departs	  from	  the	  traditional	  use	  of	  witnessing	  as	  the	  main	   form	  of	  evidence	   in	  divorce	  cases.	  Hafsia	  writes	   that	   the	   judge	   in	  Tunisian	  divorce	  cases	  prior	   to	   independence	  could	  conduct	  an	   investigation	  or	  appeal	   to	  eyewitnesses	   if	  required	  (2005	  :60).	  Witnessing	  remains	  a	  key	  form	  of	  evidence	  in	  contexts	  with	  Islamic	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81	  I	  attended	  the	  court	  regularly	  between	  May	  2007	  and	  December	  2008.	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family	   law	   (Wuerth	   1998;	   Rosen	   2000;	   Mir-­‐Hosseini	   199382).	  Wuerth,	   in	   Yemen,	   found	  that	  the	  community	  is	  literally	  present	  in	  the	  divorce	  court,	  as	  its	  members	  must	  be	  relied	  on	  as	  witnesses.	  The	  nature	  of	  evidence,	  notably	  the	  use	  of	  written	  rather	  than	  oral	  forms	  of	  evidence,	  can,	  therefore,	  be	  seen	  to	  influence	  the	  mechanisms	  via	  which	  ‘society’	  enters	  the	   ‘law’.	   Wuerth	   discusses	   patterns	   of	   sociality,	   addressing	   the	   ability	   of	   litigants	   to	  produce	   witnesses	   in	   personal	   status	   cases	   and	   the	   relations	   of	   dependency	   that	   this	  creates	  between	  people.	  She	  also	  refers	  to	  the	  judge’s	  relationship	  with	  those	  in	  the	  court’s	  jurisdiction;	  in	  Yemen,	  her	  judge	  lived	  in	  the	  community	  and	  may	  have	  known	  the	  litigants	  personally.	   Apparently	   some	   of	   them	   came	   to	   visit	   him	   in	   his	   house,	   and	   it	   was	   not	  unknown	  for	  them	  to	  bribe	  him.	  
Elsewhere,	   anthropologists	   have	   explored	   the	   anxieties	   of	   those	   who	   need	   to	  interpret	   official	   documents,	   given	   the	   distance	   between	   the	   documents	   and	   the	   people	  they	   represent	   (Kelly	  2006;	  Bear	  2007b).	  The	  potential	   constraints	  on	   the	   judge’s	   scope	  for	  interpretation	  are	  not	  fully	  contextualized	  in	  literature	  discussing	  the	  role	  of	  the	  judge	  in	  family	  law	  (as	  discussed	  above),	  in	  particular	  the	  role	  of	  documentary	  evidence	  and	  the	  judge’s	  attitudes	  to	  that	  evidence.	  Voorhoeve	  found	  that	  the	  case	  file	  and	  the	  presence	  of	  particular	  documents	  was	  one	  factor	  leading	  to	  uniformity	  in	  judicial	  decisions	  on	  divorce	  (2012:	  213).	  However,	   she	  also	   found	  diversity	   in	   the	  assessment	  of	   evidence;	   the	   same	  evidence	  could	  lead	  to	  different	  interpretations	  and	  outcomes	  when	  evaluated	  by	  different	  judges	  (ibid:	  217).	  	  
This	   raises	   questions	   about	   the	   position	   of	   the	   Tunisian	   family	   judge,	   someone	  who,	   as	   we	   shall	   see,	   experiences	   his	   own	   share	   of	   anxiety	   about	   the	   documents	   upon	  which	  he	  must	  base	  his	   judgement.	  How	   is	  he	  related	   to	   the	  community	  he	  serves	  given	  that	   the	   jurisdiction	  of	  his	  court	   is	  around	  500,000	  people?	   In	   this	  context,	  how	  does	  he	  ascertain	  whom,	  or	  which	  pieces	  of	  evidence,	  to	  trust?	  
	  
METHODOLOGY	  
The	  literature	  explored	  above	  on	  personal	  status	  law	  in	  the	  Muslim	  world	  can	  be	  crudely	  divided	  into	  two	  categories	  according	  to	  the	  methodological	  approach	  taken	  and	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  study.	  Primarily	  court-­‐based	  studies	  focussed	  on	  the	   law	  in	  practice	  (Mir-­‐Hosseini	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82	  Although	  this	  appears	  more	  the	  case	  in	  Iran	  than	  in	  Morocco.	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1993;	  Osanloo	  2009;	  Voorhoeve	  2011)	  contrast	  with	  neighbourhood	  or	  household	  based	  studies	  focussed	  on	  kinship,	  household	  economics	  and	  the	  social	  practice	  of	  marriage	  and	  divorce	   (Inhorn	   1996;	   Singerman	   1995;	   Hoodfar	   1997;	   Abu	   Zahra	   1982;	   Holmes-­‐Eber	  2003).	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  the	  former	  studies	  do	  not	  touch	  upon	  the	  social	  dynamics	  of	  divorce,	  or	   that	   the	   latter	  do	  not	  acknowledge	   the	   impact	  of	   the	   legal	   framework	  on	   the	  practice	  of	  marriage	  and	  divorce,	  to	  varying	  extents.	  
My	  research	  project	  began	  with	  a	  methodological	  commitment	  to	  bridge	  between	  these	   approaches	   in	   order	   to	   see	  marriage	   and	   its	   breakdown	   from	  both	  perspectives.	   I	  wanted	  to	  get	  a	  sense	  of	  those	  who	  do	  not	  divorce	  in	  spite	  of	  marital	  difficulties	  and	  who	  never	   enter	   the	   legal	   system,	   as	   well	   as	   what	   happens	   in	   successful	   marriages	   as	   a	  backdrop	  against	  which	  to	  understand	  marital	  breakdown	  in	  the	  court.	  Most	  significantly,	  I	  wanted	   to	  show	  the	   interconnectedness	  of	   law	  and	  ethics	  by	   tracing	   these	  connections	  ethnographically.	  
Having	   carried	   out	   undergraduate	   studies	   in	   French	   and	   German	   and	  married	   a	  Frenchman,	  I	  spoke	  fluent	  French	  before	  starting	  fieldwork.	  I	  found	  that	  people	  frequently	  assumed	   that	   I	   was	   French	   and,	   by	   extension,	   that	   I	   was	   Christian	   or	   Catholic.	   	   I	   did,	  however,	  need	  to	  learn	  Arabic,	  both	  modern	  standard	  (the	  language	  of	  the	  court	  files	  and	  the	   legal	   code)83	   and	   Tunisian	   (the	   language	   spoken	   by	   Tunisians	   of	   all	   social	   classes).	  Consequently,	  the	  research	  material	  was	  gathered	  in	  a	  mixture	  of	  all	  these	  languages.	  I	  had	  not	  wanted	  to	  use	  a	  translator	  to	  collect	  data	  on	  such	  an	  intimate	  domain	  of	   life.	   I	   found	  that	  my	  sometimes	  shaky	  grasp	  of	  Tunisian	  Arabic	  acted	  as	  a	  great	   ice-­‐breaker,	  yet	  was	  sufficient	  to	  conduct	  all	  the	  interviews	  myself.	  
As	  research	  took	  place	  between	  2004	  and	  2008,	  it	  was	  necessary	  to	  grapple	  with	  the	   difficulties	   of	   conducting	   research	   in	   Ben	   Ali’s	   dictatorship	   and	   the	   general	   air	   of	  mistrust	  and	  unease	  that	  prevailed	  during	  this	  time.	  I	  was	  conscious	  of	  wanting	  to	  put	  my	  informants	  at	  ease	  and,	  still	  more	  importantly,	  to	  avoid	  putting	  anyone	  in	  a	  compromising	  situation	  with	  the	  state.	  	  	  
As	   I	  wanted	   to	   conduct	  participant	  observation	   in	   a	   family	  home,	   to	  observe	   the	  dynamics	  of	  married	  life,	  I	  had	  to	  search	  for	  a	  family	  who	  were	  willing	  for	  me	  to	  live	  with	  them.	  This	  was	  not	  an	  easy	   task.	  My	  ethical	   concerns	   lead	  me	   to	  delay	  my	  stay	  with	  my	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83	  I	  studied	  Modern	  Standard	  Arabic	  at	  the	  Bourguiba	  Institute	  for	  Modern	  Languages	  for	  two	  academic	  years	  and	  
for	  two	  summers.	  	  In	  addition,	  I	  took	  classes	  in	  Tunisian	  Arabic	  at	  the	  Bourguiba	  Institute	  and	  with	  the	  Soeurs	  
Blanches,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  number	  of	  private	  classes	  in	  Arabic.	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host	   family	   until	   I	   had	   gone	   through	   the	   lengthy	   process	   of	   obtaining	   official	   research	  permission	  from	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Education.	  	  
My	   choice	   of	   host	   family	   could	   not	   have	   been	   more	   fortuitous	   as	   they	   rapidly	  introduced	  me	   to	  one	  of	   the	  clerks,	  Karima,	  who	  worked	   in	   the	  court	  of	   first	   instance	  of	  Ben	  Arous,	   and	  who	   in	   turn	   introduced	  me	   to	   the	  wonderful	   female	   Family	   Judge.	  With	  support	   from	   this	   judge,	   it	   was	  much	   easier	   to	   obtain	   permission	   from	   the	   Ministry	   of	  Justice	  to	  study	  in	  the	  court.	  I	  spent	  many	  days	  at	  court	  in	  the	  period	  between	  May	  2007	  and	  December	  2008.	  Meeting	  Karima	  was	  crucial	  to	  my	  fieldwork	  as	  I	  got	  to	  know	  her	  well	  and	  literally	  followed	  her	  between	  the	  court	  and	  the	  neighbourhood.84	  
This	  dual	  perspective	  allowed	  me	  to	  gather	  data	  from	  diverse	  sources.	  	  
In	  Morouj,	   I	  spent	  6	  months	  living	  with	  Besma	  and	  her	  family	  (3	  months	  in	  2007	  and	   3	  months	   in	   2008).	   Between	   these	   times,	   I	   visited	   the	   family	   regularly,	   conducting	  interviews,	   joining	  Besma	  on	  visits	  to	  her	  extended	  family	  and	  neighbours	  and	  attending	  wedding	  celebrations.	  I	  also	  drew	  the	  family	  trees	  of	  four	  households	  I	  knew	  well,	  tracing	  marriage	   and	   later	   education,	   employment	   and	  place	   of	   residence	   to	   the	   extent	   that	  my	  informants’	   patience	   and	   generosity	   allowed	  me	   to	   do	   this.	   The	   air	   of	  mistrust	   and	  my	  desire	  to	  be	  respectful	  of	  my	  hosts	  strongly	  constrained	  my	  movements,	  restricting	  me	  to	  only	   working	   with	   those	   families	   known	   to	   Besma	   and	   her	   family.	   By	   good	   fortune,	   a	  friend	   I	   had	   met	   via	   my	   husband,	   who	   worked	   in	   Tunisia	   as	   a	   diplomat	   during	   my	  fieldwork,	   also	   lived	   close	   by	   and	   provided	   a	   further,	   acceptable	   contact	   in	   the	  neighbourhood.	  
In	   the	   court,	   other	   than	   my	   general	   observations	   of	   daily	   life	   in	   the	   office,	   I	  attended	  a	  number	  of	  public	  hearings	  related	  to	  divorce.	  Although	  ‘public’,	  these	  sessions	  were	  not	  open	  to	  the	  general	  public,	  but	  limited	  to	  those	  whose	  divorce	  cases	  were	  being	  heard	   during	   that	   session	   (as	   I	   discovered	  when,	  much	   to	   the	   amusement	   of	   the	   clerks	  who	  knew	  me,	  a	  police	  officer	  asked	  me	  to	  leave	  the	  first	  session	  I	  attended).	  
I	  was	   fortunate	   to	   have	   the	   opportunity	   to	   carry	   out	   research	   under	   two	   family	  judges.	   The	   first,	   female	   judge,	   a	   wife	   and	  mother	   in	   her	   forties,	   was	   rotated	   to	   a	   new	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84	  See	  chapter	  3.	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position85	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  2008	  and	  I	  completed	  my	  fieldwork	  under	  her	  replacement,	  a	  male	  judge,	  also	  married	  and	  a	  father,	  in	  his	  forties	  who	  had	  never	  worked	  on	  family	  law	  before.	   I	   also	   got	   to	   know	   the	   Cantonal	   Judge	   responsible	   for	   cases	   related	   to	   nafaqa	  (maintenance	  allowance).	  The	  male	  Family	  Judge	  gave	  me	  the	  opportunity	  to	  observe	  the	  reconciliation	   sessions	   that	   are	   compulsory	   before	   a	   divorce	   is	   granted	   and	  which	   take	  place	   in	   the	   privacy	   of	   the	   judge’s	   office.	   I	   was	   also	   permitted	   to	   observe	   a	   couple	   of	  confidential	   sessions	   between	   the	   Family	   Judge	   and	   the	   person	   in	   court	   responsible	   for	  protecting	  children	  in	  danger.	  I	  interviewed	  two	  judges	  who	  did	  not	  work	  at	  the	  Court	  of	  Ben	  Arous	  (one	  female	  judge	  who	  worked	  at	  the	  Court	  of	  Tunis	  on	  Personal	  Status	  matters	  and	  one	  senior	  judge,	  who	  had	  had	  a	  varied	  career	  and	  taught	  law	  at	  a	  university).	  	  
In	  addition	  to	  this,	  I	  had	  the	  opportunity	  to	  interview	  Hafidha	  Chekir,	  the	  Tunisian	  feminist	  legal	  scholar	  mentioned	  further	  above	  and	  to	  meet	  Souhayama	  Ben	  Achour,86	  who	  generously	  provided	  a	  wealth	  of	  documentation	  on	   the	  Tunisian	  doctrine	  relating	   to	   the	  PSC.	  To	  help	  me	  understand	  the	  legal	  Arabic	  and	  terminology	  I	  found	  in	  the	  files,	  I	  worked	  with	  a	  graduate	   law	  student,	  who	  himself	   aspired	   to	  become	  a	   judge,	  who	   furthered	  my	  understanding	   of	   the	   PSC	   and	   provided	   insight	   into	   the	   way	   he	   had	   been	   taught	   this	  subject.	  
One	   of	   my	   key	   sources	   of	   data	   in	   court	   was	   the	   divorce	   files	   that	   filled	   every	  imaginable	   space	   in	   the	   court	   office.	   For	   reasons	   of	   confidentiality,	   I	   was	   unable	   (and	  never	  asked)	  to	  photocopy	  the	  files.	  Conscious	  of	  the	  trust	   invested	  in	  me	  by	  the	  court,	   I	  spent	  considerable	  time	  copying	  out	  the	  various	  documents	  by	  hand	  in	  Arabic,	  rendering	  my	  notes	  anonymous	  by	  omitting	  personal	  data.	  I	  made	  it	  a	  rule	  never	  to	  examine	  the	  file	  of	  someone	  I	  knew	  or	  had	   interviewed.	   It	  would	  have	  seemed	  unfair	   to	  have	  not	   left	  my	  informants	   in	   control	   of	   the	   information	   they	   gave	   me,	   once	   they	   were	   no	   longer	  anonymous	  to	  me.	  
To	  my	  surprise,	  I	  came	  to	  know	  as	  many	  lawyers	  as	  litigants.	  I	  was	  able	  to	  talk	  at	  length	   with	   both	   male	   and	   female	   lawyers	   working	   on	   divorce	   cases	   about	   their	  experiences	  of	   the	   law	   in	  practice.	  One	  of	   the	  key	  difficulties	  of	  my	  research	  was	   finding	  people	  willing	  to	  talk	  to	  me	  about	  their	  divorce.	  I	  found	  that	  my	  status	  as	  a	  young,	  female	  foreigner	  helped	  in	  this	  to	  some	  extent	  (although	  this	  created	  its	  own	  problems	  as	  far	  as	  talking	  to	  divorcing	  men	  was	  concerned).	  Those	  who	  did	  generously	  share	  these	  intimate	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85	  Judges	  in	  Tunisia	  are	  not	  specialized	  in	  a	  particular	  area	  of	  law	  and	  rotate	  between	  different	  courts	  every	  few	  
years.	  
86	  Professor	  of	  law	  and	  niece	  of	  famous	  feminist	  Sana	  Ben	  Achour	  (cited	  further	  above).	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details	   of	   their	   lives	  with	  me	   often	   commented	   that	   they	   felt	   able	   to	   do	   so	   as	   I	   was	   an	  outsider	   and	   sensed	   that	   I	   would	   not	   judge	   them.	   I	   instantly	   dropped	   any	   illusions	   of	  talking	   to	   the	   litigants	   coming	   into	   the	   office	   to	   deal	   with	   paperwork	   or	   for	   their	  reconciliation	   sessions.	   Mariam,	   a	   lawyer	   who	   became	   a	   friend,	   offered	   to	   help	   me	  approach	  litigants	  who	  were	  waiting	  in	  the	  corridors.	  We	  rapidly	  concurred	  that	  it	  simply	  did	  not	  feel	  appropriate	  to	  solicit	  people	  who	  were	  often	  anxious	  about	  their	  divorce	  and	  ill	  at	  ease	  at	  having	  to	  come	  into	  contact	  with	  state	  officials.	  Of	  those	  I	  did	  speak	  to,	  some	  I	  found	  were	  relieved	  to	  find	  a	  sympathetic	  ear	  and	  someone	  willing	  to	  listen	  to	  them.	  Some,	  like	  Saida,	  who	  lived	  in	  the	  neighbourhood	  or	  Leila,	  whose	  sister	  happened	  to	  be	  a	  lawyer,	  I	   came	   to	   know	   well.	   Others,	   I	   met	   only	   once	   or	   twice,	   like	   ships	   passing	   in	   the	   night,	  sometimes	  through	  a	  mutual	  acquaintance	  or	  by	  chance	  in	  the	  court	  office	  on	  a	  quiet	  day.	  Others	  still	  were	  close	  personal	  friends	  who	  were	  divorcing	  or	  divorced	  and	  whose	  wishes	  not	   to	   be	   mentioned	   in	   this	   thesis	   I	   respect,	   much	   as	   their	   experiences	   nonetheless	  informed	  my	  understanding	  of	  divorce.	  	  
My	   status	   as	   an	   engaged	   and	   then	   married	   woman	   played	   a	   role	   in	   how	   I	   was	  perceived	  by	  my	   informants	  and	  also	   in	  opening	  up	  different	  social	   circles	   to	  me.	   It	  also	  provided	  a	  degree	  of	  amusement	  to	  the	  many	  people	  in	  court	  who	  asked	  me	  if	  I	  was	  there	  to	  get	  a	  divorce,	  when	  I	  replied	  that	  I	  was	  about	  to	  get	  married.	  Through	  my	  husband	  and	  his	   colleagues,	   I	  was	  able	   to	  meet	  Tunisians	  belonging	   to	  higher	  social	   classes,	   including	  the	  Tunisian	  elite,	  living	  in	  different	  areas	  of	  Tunis	  and	  who	  expressed	  a	  diverse	  array	  of	  political	  opinions,	  some	  of	  them	  belonging	  to	  the	  political	  opposition.	  My	  own	  activities	  –	  notably	   joining	   a	   gym	   in	   the	   city	   centre	   	   -­‐	   also	   opened	   up	   different	   social	   spaces	   and	  allowed	  me	  to	  meet	  the	  two	  people	  who	  became	  my	  closest	   friends.	  One	  of	   these	  people	  was	  in	  the	  process	  of	  divorcing	  as	  I	  left	  the	  field	  and	  his	  experiences	  too	  implicitly	  inform	  this	  work.	  
Overall,	   I	   was	   able	   to	   observe	  marriage	   and	   divorce	   in	   a	   variety	   of	   settings	   and	  gather	   data	   from	   a	   range	   of	   sources.	   It	   is	   these	   multiple	   perspectives	   that	   opened	  questions	   about	   how	   the	   morality	   and	   the	   law	   are	   connected	   in	   multitudinous	   and	  complex	  ways.	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OVERVIEW	  
Chapter	   1	   introduces	   the	   neighbourhood	   in	   Morouj	   and	   its	   recent	   formation.	   Reading	  relationships	   via	   the	   house	   (Carsten	   2004;	   Carsten	   &	   Hugh-­‐Jones	   1995),	   I	   trace	   the	  relationships	  that	  are	  important	  to	  my	  informants	  (whether	  kinship	  or	  friendship)	  and	  the	  way	   these	   relationships	   are	   formed	   in	   relation	   to	   changes	   in	   the	   structure	  of	   the	  house.	  The	  issue	  of	  how	  to	  know	  whom	  to	  trust,	  or,	  in	  other	  words,	  how	  people	  judge	  the	  ethical	  personhood	   of	   others,	   and	   the	   sense	   of	   uncertainty	   and	   anxiety	   that	   results	   from	   this	  moral	  dilemma	  allows	  one	   to	  explore	   the	   concepts	  of	   ethical	  personhood,	  moral	   criteria	  and	  dislocation	  that	  will	  prove	  central	  in	  this	  dissertation.	  	  
Chapter	  2	   continues	   to	  pursue	   these	   themes	  whilst	   exploring	  how	  marriages	  are	  made.	   Ordinary	   ethics	   and	   moral	   judgement	   are	   pivotal	   to	   ‘consent’	   in	   marriage,	   the	  selection	  of	  a	  spouse	  and	  the	  decision	  to	  terminate	  a	  marriage.	  Marriage	  is	  a	  context	  where	  the	   gendered	   criteria	   for	   ethical	   personhood	   are	   central:	   what	   constitutes	   an	   ideal	  husband	  or	   ideal	  wife?	  How	  are	   ‘marital	  duties’	  –	   the	  key	   legal	   category	  used	   in	  divorce	  cases	  –	  understood	  in	  practice	   in	  the	  neighbourhood?	  Tensions	  surrounding	  the	  practice	  of	   marriage	   intersect	   with	   moral	   questions	   surrounding	   sexuality	   (female	   sexuality	   in	  particular)	   and	   practical	   difficulties	   and	   economic	   realities	   that	   oblige	  many	   women	   to	  leave	  the	  house	  for	  study	  or	  for	  work.	  	  
Chapter	  3	  traces	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  court	  both	  appears	   ‘separate’	   from	  and	  is	  connected	   with	   society,	   in	   respect	   of	   the	   moralities	   of	   the	   neighbourhood.	   The	   legal	  processes	  involved	  in	  initiating	  a	  divorce	  case,	  the	  interactions	  between	  staff	  and	  litigants	  and	  daily	  life	  in	  the	  office	  all	  reveal	  the	  court	  as	  an	  ethical	  space	  (WT	  Murphy	  1997).	  After	  a	   first	   moment	   of	   decontextualisation	   (ibid),	   the	   law	   demands	   a	   further	   moment	   of	  
recontextualisation:	   legal	   professionals	   create	   a	   bridge	   between	   the	   neighbourhood	   and	  the	   practice	   of	   the	   law.	   The	  morality	   of	   the	   law	   –	   as	   perceived	   through	   the	   interactions	  between	  state	  officials	  and	  its	  citizens	  in	  the	  court	  office	  -­‐	  is	  necessarily	  bound	  up	  with	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  state.	  
Chapter	  4	  focuses	  on	  the	  reconciliation	  sessions	  and	  the	  role	  of	  the	  judge	  as	  legal	  interpreter	  who	  engages	  in	  the	  labour	  of	  recontextualisation.	  Through	  a	  description	  of	  the	  reconciliation	   sessions,	   looking	   at	   both	   the	   judges	   and	   litigants	   strategies,	   this	   chapter	  raises	   questions	   about	   how	   the	   legal	   categories	   of	   ‘harm’	   and	   ‘marital	   duties’	   are	  interpreted	  and	  used	  in	  legal	  practice.	  The	  moral	  criteria	  that	  define	  an	  ideal	  husband	  and	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wife	   are	   given	   legitimacy	   in	   legal	   practice	   and	   are	   strongly	   gendered.	   As	   litigants	   are	  judged	  by	  the	  family	  judge,	  the	  state	  is	  simultaneously	  under	  trial	  itself,	  as	  litigants	  judge	  the	  state’s	  legitimacy	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  ability	  to	  uphold	  moral	  ideals.	  
Following	   a	   documentary	   practice	   approach,	   chapters	   5	   and	   6	   discuss	   the	  implications	  of	  the	  PSC	  as	  a	  document	  based	  legal	  regime.	  Documents	  become	  the	  basis	  for	  both	  legal	  and	  moral	  judgement	  and	  this,	  I	  shall	  argue,	  entails	  a	  further	  form	  of	  dislocation	  or	  distancing.	  	  
Chapter	   5	   examines	   divorce	   files	   relating	   to	   divorce	   for	   harm	   in	   light	   of	   the	  documentary	   evidence	   used	   to	   prove	   the	   harm	   done.	  We	   shall	   see	   how	   some	   forms	   of	  evidence	   are	   more	   authoritative	   than	   others	   and	   how	   this	   leads	   to	   the	   gendering	   of	  divorce	   for	  harm.	   Inequalities	   in	   the	   law	  that	  could	  be	  seen	   to	  reinforce	  male	  power	  are	  highlighted	  by	  specific	  dispositions	   in	  the	   legal	  code	  that	   lead	  to	  the	  gendering	  of	   legally	  authoritative	   evidence	   in	   support	   of	   divorce	   for	   harm.	   In	   practice	   this	   seems	   to	   make	  divorce	   for	   harm	   easier	   for	  women	   than	   for	  men,	   leading	   to	   a	   sense	   of	   the	   divorce	   law	  unjustly	  favouring	  women.	  
Chapter	   6	   focuses	   on	   a	   different	   kind	   of	   document	   in	   the	   files:	   petitions,	   in	  particular	   those	   submitted	   in	   cases	   of	   divorce	   without	   grounds,	   and	   on	   lawyers	   as	   the	  authors	   of	   these	   narratives.	   Taking	   the	   decision	   to	   file	   for	   divorce,	   places	   the	   litigant’s	  ethical	  personhood	  on	   trial;	   a	   ‘good’	  husband	  or	  wife	  would	  not	   file	   for	  divorce	  without	  reason.	  Lawyers	  try	  to	  persuade	  the	  judge	  to	  trust	  their	  client	  and	  their	  client’s	  judgment,	  with	  arguments	   ‘customised’	   to	  appeal	   to	   the	   judge.	  At	   stake	   is	   the	  cost	  of	  divorce	  –	   the	  divorce	   settlement	  –	  perceived	  both	   in	   financial	   terms	  and	   in	   terms	  of	   the	   social	   stigma	  attached	   to	   divorce,	   felt	  more	   heavily	   by	  women	   than	   by	  men.	  Within	   the	   intimate	   and	  confidential	  pages	  of	  these	  files,	  broader	  political	  and	  moral	  debates	  are	  played	  out	  about	  the	  kind	  of	  values	  that	  the	  state	  is	  expected	  to	  uphold.	  
Chapter	  7	  looks	  at	  how	  custody	  is	  allocated	  in	  divorce	  cases	  according	  to	  ‘the	  best	  interests	  of	  the	  child’–	  another	  open	  norm	  that	  requires	  the	  judge	  to	  act	  as	  interpreter.	  In	  which	   cases	   is	   the	   child	   taken	   from	   its	   mother?	   Which	   moral	   criteria	   come	   into	   play?	  Public	   fears	   about	   the	   immorality	   of	   divorce	   are	   linked	  with	   the	   inevitable	   break	   up	   of	  families	   on	   divorce,	   as	   it	   is	   feared	   that	   broken	   families	   produce	   broken	   children	   with	  broken	  morals.	  Once	  again,	  there	  are	  implications	  for	  state	  legitimacy	  in	  the	  decisions	  the	  judge	  makes	  in	  regard	  to	  custody.	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The	  concluding	  chapter	  draws	  together	  the	  themes	  of	  ethics	  and	  law	  linking	  these	  with	   the	  state	  and	  returns	   to	   the	  question	  of	  whether	   the	   law	   in	  practice	  can	  be	  seen	   to	  support	  gender	  equality.	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CHAPTER	  1	  -­	  	  
DISLOCATED	  LIVES:	  MAKING	  MOROUJ	  
	  
Besma	  (1)	  	  
A	  safety	  pin	  appeared	  on	  my	  bedside	  table.	  I	  had	  to	  smile.	  Besma,	  the	  mother	  of	  my	  
host	  family,	  had	  clearly	  put	  it	  there	  following	  a	  conversation	  we	  had	  had	  the	  previous	  
day.	  She	  had	  been	  to	  the	  hammam	  where	  she	  had	  seen	  many	  of	  the	  neighbours	  and	  
friends	   I	   knew.	   They	   had	   told	   her	   many	   nice	   things	   about	   me.	   Her	   worried	   tone	  
indicated	   the	   implicit	   threat	   underlying	   these	   seemingly	   pleasant	   compliments.	   If	  
these	  women	  were	  jealous	  of	  me,	  there	  was	  the	  risk	  that	  they	  could	  put	  the	  evil	  eye	  on	  
me	   and	   bring	  me	   bad	   luck.	   (Black	  magic	  was	   something	  most	   people	   I	   knew	   took	  
seriously;	   its	   being	   against	   Islam	   was	   proof	   that	   black	   magic	   existed,	   as	   it	   was	  
mentioned	   in	   the	   Koran).	   As	   protection,	   Besma	   suggested	   that	   I	   wear	   a	   safety	   pin	  
hidden	  in	  my	  clothes,	  as	  she	  did	  herself.	  
	  
INTRODUCTION	  
The	  implication	  that	  I	  should	  not	  trust	  those	  people	  I	  knew	  best	  and	  should	  be	  suspicious	  of	  their	  intentions	  underlines	  the	  atmosphere	  of	  mistrust	  and	  uncertainty	  that	  marked	  life	  in	  the	  neighbourhood.	  	  
The	   ethical	   practices	   described	   in	   this	   chapter	   are	   overshadowed	   by	   the	   radical	  uncertainty	  generated	  by	  living	  in	  a	  dictatorship	  intolerant	  of	  any	  form	  of	  opposition	  and	  well	   known	   for	   its	   repression	   of	   free	   speech	   and	   human	   rights	   violations.87	   This	   threat	  formed	   part	   of	   the	   fabric	   of	   daily	   life	   and	   was	   made	   tangible	   to	   me	   on	   a	   number	   of	  occasions.	  Waiting	  for	  a	  bus	  on	  the	  main	  road	  leading	  from	  the	  airport	  to	  Carthage,	  I	  was	  by	  then	  unsurprised	  to	  note	  that	  the	  road	  had	  been	  closed	  to	  all	  traffic.	  Some	  time	  passed	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87	  See	  the	  introduction.	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before	  a	   luxurious	  black	  car	  drove	  past	  accompanied	  by	  a	  cavalcade	  of	  police	  cars	  who	  I	  guessed	  were	   escorting	   the	  French	  president,	   due	   to	   arrive	   that	   day,	   to	   the	  presidential	  palace.	   Some	  more	   time	  passed	   before	   a	   single	   unmarked	  bus	   appeared	   and	   stopped	   in	  front	  of	  me	  and	  the	  dozen	  or	  so	  others	  waiting	  at	   the	  bus	  stop.	  Around	  10	  men	  boarded	  the	  bus	  leaving	  me	  standing	  alone	  with	  a	  woman	  and	  her	  child.	  As	  we	  exchanged	  bemused	  glances,	   I	   understood	   that	  we	  had	  both	  drawn	   the	   same	   conclusion,	   that	   these	  men	  had	  been	   plain-­‐clothes	   police	   ensuring	   Sarkozy’s	   safe	   passage.	   On	   another	   occasion,	   I	   was	  interviewing	  a	  litigant	  in	  a	  café	  when	  a	  man	  came	  to	  sit	  down	  close	  behind	  us,	  apparently	  listening	   to	   our	   conversation.	   With	   a	   glance,	   my	   companion	   indicated	   that	   we	   should	  change	   topic	   and	   also	   change	   table.	   This	  was	   not	   an	   isolated	   event.	  Moments	   like	   these	  reinforced	  the	  impression	  of	  being	  under	  continual	  surveillance	  and	  did	  little	  to	  help	  the	  prevailing	  sentiment	  that	  will	  be	  discussed	  from	  a	  different	  angle	  below,	  that	  appearances	  cannot	  be	  trusted.	  	  
The	   focus	   of	   this	   chapter,	   however,	   is	   on	   everyday	   practices	   of	   kinship	   and	  relatedness	   and	   their	   intersection	   with	   the	   ethical	   as	   people	   struggled	   to	   build	  relationships	   and	   ascertain	   whom	   to	   trust.	   88	   Equally,	   whilst	   the	   sense	   of	   chronic	  uncertainty	  stemming	  from	  the	  oppressive	  nature	  of	  the	  regime	  was	  widely	  shared	  across	  classes,	  this	  chapter	  predominantly	  explores	  the	  ethical	  practice	  of	  building	  and	  exercising	  trust	   in	   the	   lower-­‐middle	   class	   neighbourhood	   where	   I	   spent	   time	   living	   with	  my	   host	  family.	  
Following	  Lambek	  (2010),	  this	  chapter	  provides	  a	  study	  of	  ordinary	  ethics89	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  neighbourhood.	  Ordinary	  ethics	  entails	  two	  key	  moments	  that	  stand	  in	   intimate	   and	   dynamic	   relationship	   to	   each	   other:	   performance	   and	   judgment.	   As	  Lambek	  writes:	   ‘if	   performance	   establishes	   the	   criteria	   by	  which	   subsequent	   practice	   is	  engaged	  and	  evaluated,	   so	   too	  practical	   judgement	  generates	  new	  performances,	   that	   is,	  relatively	   formal	   acts	   and	   utterances	   that	   recalibrate	   the	   criteria	   and	   shift	   the	   ethical	  context	  (2010:	  56).’	  
If	   judgment	   is	   the	   fulcrum	  of	   ethics,	   everyday	   life	   requires	   people	   to	   continually	  exercise	  judicious	  practice	  (wisdom,	  practical	  judgement)	  as	  they	  engage	  and	  interact	  with	  others	  and	  decide	  whom	  to	  trust	  (Lambek	  2010:	  20).	  In	  particular,	  we	  need	  to	  understand	  the	   basis	   on	   which	   this	   judgement	   is	   made.	   How	   do	   the	   inhabitants	   of	   this	   new	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  the	  political	  disappears	  from	  the	  analysis.	  (See,	  for	  instance,	  Mahmood	  2005:	  32-­‐34).	  
89	  In	  broadly	  following	  the	  anthropological	  studies	  of	  ethics	  inspired	  by	  Aristotle	  via	  Foucault,	  I	  also	  draw	  inspiration	  
from	  Mahmood	  2005.	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neighbourhood	  go	  about	  evaluating	  the	  ethics	  of	  those	  they	  encounter?	  Which	  criteria	  are	  being	  established?	  Or,	   in	  other	  words,	  how	  can	   they	   tell	  who	   is	   ‘good’	  and	  who	   is	   ‘bad’?	  This	  question	  was	  of	  key	  concern	  to	  residents	  of	  Morouj	  and	  was	  made	  significant	  by	  the	  structure	  of	   the	  house	   that	   changed	   the	  way	  women	   in	  particular	   related	   to	   each	  other.	  Given	   that	   the	   neighbourhood	   was	   made	   up	   of	   strangers,	   people	   lacked	   the	   intimate	  knowledge	  they	  would	  have	  had	  of	  each	  other	  and	  their	  families	  when	  they	  lived	  in	  village	  settings.90	  
Ethnographic	   work	   on	   Tunisia	   has	   not	   paid	   attention	   to	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   the	  structure	  of	  the	  city	  and	  of	  the	  house	  itself	  are	  changing	  (Holmes-­‐Eber	  2003).	  This	  chapter	  understands	  ordinary	  ethics	   in	  spatial	   terms.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	   I	  describe	  the	  sociality	  of	  the	   neighbourhood	   from	   the	   perspective	   of	   the	   house.	   The	   house	   provides	   a	   privileged	  vantage	  point	   from	  which	  to	  read	  the	  relationships	   that	  are	  central	   to	  peoples’	   lives	  and	  the	   ‘interrelations	  between	  buildings,	  people	  and	   ideas’	   (Carsten	  &	  Hugh-­‐Jones	  1995:	  1).	  Significant	   changes	   have	   occurred	   in	   the	   structure	   of	   the	   house	   since	   Besma’s	   parents’	  generation;	  this	  change	  reveals	  broader	  shifts	  in	  relatedness,	  not	  the	  least	  how	  marriages	  are	  made	  and	  unmade.91	  
The	   house	   forms	   both	   a	   nexus	   through	   which	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   understand	  relatedness	  (Carsten	  2004)	  and	  as	  the	  stage	  on	  which	  ordinary	  ethics	  are	  played	  out.	  The	  house	   can	   be	   seen	   as	   a	   mediating	   entity	   in	   Laidlaw’s	   sense.92	   In	   a	   sense,	   we	  may	   read	  houses	  as	  we	  read	  documents	  as	  shaping	  but	  not	  determining	  practice	  (Carsten	  and	  Hugh-­‐Jones	   1995:	   15	   &	   17).	   If	   we	   approach	   the	   house	   as	   a	   document,	   we	   can	   explore	   the	  responses	  and	  emotions	  that	  people	  express	  in	  relation	  to	  their	  homes.	  This	  allows	  one	  to	  give	   priority	   to	   the	   ‘emotional	   ties	   formed	   in	   particular	   households	   rather	   than	   some	  abstract	  moral	  duty	  of	   care	   to	  particular	   categories	  of	   relatives’	   (Bear	  2007a:	  196).	   It	   is	  these	  daily	  acts	  of	  care,	  that	  are	  inherently	  ethical,93	  which	  constitute	  the	  daily	  practices	  of	  kinship	  and	  that	  characterise	  patterns	  of	  relatedness	  in	  the	  neighbourhood.	  The	  structure	  of	  the	  house	  itself	  can	  be	  seen	  to	  make	  the	  continued	  dilemma	  of	  whom	  to	  trust	  central	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90	  Cf	  Abu	  Zahra	  1982;	  Zussman	  1992	  for	  detail	  on	  patterns	  of	  relatedness	  in	  Tunisian	  rural	  settings	  in	  the	  1960-­‐70s.	  
If	  I	  am	  comparing	  kinship	  and	  patterns	  of	  sociality	  with	  past	  anthropological	  work	  on	  rural	  settings,	  it	  is	  first	  because	  
there	  is	  very	  little	  ethnographic	  work	  on	  urban	  Tunisia	  and	  second	  because	  the	  people	  under	  study	  who	  live	  in	  
Morouj	  are	  mostly	  migrants	  who	  originate	  from	  these	  rural	  settings.	  
91	  cf	  Busby	  (2000)	  who	  pointed	  to	  the	  interrelationship	  between	  performance	  and	  materiality.	  Whilst	  her	  argument	  
relates	  specifically	  to	  the	  performance	  of	  gender,	  I	  extend	  this	  to	  relate	  to	  the	  performance	  of	  ethical	  personhood	  
that	  is	  to	  some	  extent	  structured	  by	  the	  architecture	  of	  the	  house	  and	  the	  neighbourhood.	  
92	  Agency,	  he	  writes,	  is	  ‘a	  matter	  of	  relations	  that	  reach	  both	  into	  and	  beyond	  the	  individual	  by	  means	  of	  mediating	  
entities,	  be	  they	  body	  parts,	  property,	  artworks,	  tools,	  statistical	  effect	  …’	  (Laidlaw	  2010	  :163).	  
93	  Arendt	  read	  via	  Lambek.	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social	  life.	  How,	  then,	  is	  the	  architecture	  of	  personhood	  connected	  with	  the	  architecture	  of	  the	  house	  and	  of	  the	  neighbourhood?	  	  	  
If	   historically	   Tunisian	   kinship	   is	   expressed	   in	   terms	   of	   space	   and	   as	   Abu	   Zahra	  suggested,	  it	  is	  the	  ‘greatest	  humiliation	  that	  could	  befall	  a	  person	  that	  he	  should	  leave	  his	  place	   of	   origin,’	   (1970:	   1069)	   how	   do	   people	   live	   in	   a	   context	   defined	   by	   migration	   in	  which	   all	   the	   inhabitants	   have	   left	   their	   region	   of	   origin?	   The	   new	   neighbourhood	  represents	  a	  strikingly	  different	  kind	  of	  place	  from	  the	  villages	  depicted	  in	  anthropological	  work	   on	   Tunisia,	   where	   local	   identity	   is	   of	   central	   importance	   in	   structuring	   social	  relations	   and	   marriage	   practice	   (Abu	   Zahra	   1982;	   Zussman	   1992;	   Platt	   1987).	   Both	  Zussman	   and	   Abu	   Zahra	   describe	   rural	   villages	   in	   which	   political	   power	   is	   held	   by	  traditionally	  landholding	  tribal	  groups	  of	  noble	  descent	  and	  in	  which	  subtle	  variations	  in	  marriage	   strategy	   are	   observed	   in	   different	   groups.	   94	   Ferchiou,	   in	   her	   anthropological	  study	   of	   rural	   Tunisia	   in	   the	   1980s,	   makes	   the	   links	   between	   space	   and	   identity	   more	  explicit.	   She	   states	   how	   peasants	   remain	   attached	   to	   the	   land	   not	   only	   as	   a	   source	   of	  production	  but	  as	  a	  source	  of	  identity,	  as	  it	  continues	  to	  define	  them	  as	  a	  group	  (1985:	  18).	  What	   happens	   when	   identity	   becomes	   dislocated	   from	   places	   due	   to	   the	   increased	  population	  movements	  within	  Tunisia?	  
At	   stake,	   then,	   is	  how	  ethical	  personhood	   is	   formed	  and	  perceived	   in	   this	  urban,	  heterogenous	  setting.	  Mahmood,	  in	  her	  work	  on	  piety	  in	  Cairo	  draws	  our	  attention	  to	  the	  architecture	  of	  personhood	  of	  the	  participants	  in	  the	  women’s	  mosque	  movement,	  notably	  the	   relationship	   between	   interiority	   and	   exteriority	   (2005:	   166).	   Drawing	   on	   Butler’s	  insight	   that	   ‘norms	   are	   not	   simply	   a	   social	   imposition	   on	   the	   subject	   but	   constitute	   the	  very	  substance	  of	  (an	  individual’s)	  intimate,	  valorized	  interiority,’	  (ibid:	  23)	  she	  explores	  the	  architecture	  of	  ethical	  personhood,	  in	  particular,	   ‘the	  kind	  of	  relationship	  established	  between	   the	   subject	   and	   the	   norm,	   between	   performative	   behaviour	   and	   the	   inward	  disposition’	  (ibid:	  157).	  
Equally,	  Mahmood	  suggests	  how	  personhood	   is	   related	   to	   judicious	  practice.	   She	  indicates	  how	  perceptions	  of	  ethical	  personhood	  and	  differences	  between	  interiority	  and	  exteriority	  may	  be	  evaluated	  in	  different	  ways.	  Whereas	  to	  one	  of	  her	  female	  informants	  acting	  shy	  was	  an	  essential	  part	  of	  the	  process	  of	  cultivating	  shyness	  in	  the	  self,	  Mahmood	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94	  Both	  acknowledge	  how	  the	  basis	  of	  political	  power	  was	  changing	  as	  Bourguiba	  had	  abolished	  the	  practice	  of	  
habous	  (a	  form	  of	  passing	  on	  land)	  that	  had	  the	  additional	  consequence	  of	  eroding	  the	  traditional	  basis	  of	  power	  of	  
some	  of	  these	  families.	  Noble	  families	  traditionally	  were	  considered	  to	  descend	  from	  Saints	  (typically	  the	  founding	  
saint	  of	  the	  village),	  another	  form	  of	  power	  that	  Bourguiba	  sought	  to	  erode.	  Tribal	  groups	  were	  defined	  by	  blood,	  
being	  traced	  back	  to	  a	  common	  ancestor	  (Camilleri	  1967).	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feared	  that	  the	  performance	  of	  shyness	  could	  be	  perceived	  as	  hypocrisy.	  Here,	  she	  points	  concretely	   to	   ways	   in	   which	   performance	   and	   judgment	   are	   intimately	   linked,	   both	   in	  terms	  of	  an	   individual’s	  evaluation	  of	   their	  own	  morality	  and	   in	   the	  ways	   in	  which	   their	  performance	  may	   be	   judged	   by	   others.	   As	  we	   shall	   see,	   the	   architecture	   of	   personhood	  appears	  to	  have	  changed	  along	  with	  the	  architecture	  of	  the	  city	  and	  of	  the	  house;	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  way	  this	  change	  is	  perceived	  reveals	  the	  inherent	  instability	  of	  ethical	  personhood	  and	  contributes	  to	  the	  atmosphere	  of	  distrust	  that	  permeates	  life	  in	  the	  neighbourhood.	  	  





Besma’s	  family	  was	  one	  of	  the	  first	  to	  move	  to	  Morouj	  in	  1982,	  attracted	  by	  the	  sale	  
of	  cheap	  land.	  Previously,	  the	  area	  had	  been	  nothing	  but	  fields,	  which	  stretched	  into	  
the	  distance.	  From	  the	  main	  road,	  flocks	  of	  sheep	  could	  be	  seen	  grazing	  on	  land	  that	  
awaited	  the	  next	  wave	  of	  expansion.	  	  
Hearing	  Jamila,	  Besma’s	  daughter	  (now	  21)	  talk	  about	  their	  move	  to	  Morouj	  was	  a	  
reminder	  of	  how	  recent	  the	  neighbourhood	  is	  and	  its	  ongoing	  process	  of	  construction.	  	  
Jamila	   remembers	   the	   lack	   of	   infrastructure,	   fences	   and	   sparcity	   of	   neighbours	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surrounding	   their	   new	   house	   when	   they	   first	   moved	   to	   Morouj	   when	   she	   was	   10.	  
Apart	  from	  one	  other	  house	  next	  door,	  everything	  was	  trees	  and	  soil.	  Other	  children	  
complained	  to	  their	  parents	  that	  they	  did	  not	  want	  to	  stay	  in	  this	  desolate	  place.	  	  
Morouj	   is	   located	   in	   Ben	   Arous,	   one	   of	   the	   four	   administrative	   districts	   of	   Greater	  
Tunis	   and	   part	   of	   the	   capital’s	   sprawling	   suburbs,	  which	   have	   grown	   over	   the	   last	  
few	  decades	  to	  meet	  the	  demands	  of	  internal	  migration	  towards	  the	  capital	  city.	  It	  is	  
a	   site	  of	   the	   ‘rural	   exodus’,	   as	  Besma	  would	   say,	   that	  was	  at	   its	  peak	   from	   the	  mid	  
1970s	  until	  the	  mid	  1980s.	  Ben	  Arous	  is	  an	  industrial	  heartland,	  home	  to	  one	  of	  the	  
country’s	   main	   commercial	   ports.	   Bordered	   by	   the	   capital	   city	   to	   the	   north,	   the	  
Mediterranean	  to	  the	  east	  and	  agricultural	  land	  to	  the	  south	  and	  west,	  Ben	  Arous	  is	  
home	   to	   people	   who	   live	   very	   different	   lives,	   although	   they	   may	   only	   live	   a	   few	  
kilometres	  apart.	  	  
Convenience	   is	   a	   good	  way	   of	   summing	  up	   the	   reasons	  why	   people	   come	   to	   live	   in	  
Morouj:	  cheap	  land	  and	  a	  good	  location,	  not	  far	  from	  the	  city	  and	  their	  place	  of	  work.	  
Where	  Besma	  lives	  is,	  in	  particular,	  home	  mainly	  to	  white	  collar	  workers,	  employees	  
in	   private	   companies	   or	   civil	   servants,	  who	  were	   able	   to	   afford	   a	   loan	   to	   buy	   land	  
there	   in	   the	  1980s	  and	  who	  have	  subsequently	  built	  a	  house	   for	   themselves.	  With	  a	  
monthly	  household	  income	  ranging	  from	  400-­800	  dinars,	  considerably	  more	  than	  the	  
minimum	  wage	   of	   200	   dinars,	   most	   families	   would	   consider	   themselves	   fortunate,	  
although	  rises	  in	  living	  costs	  mean	  that	  their	  financial	  situation	  is	  often	  tight.	  	  
The	  Morouj	  have	  not	  yet	  acquired	  the	  status	  of	  a	  ‘houma’	  which	  are	  neighbourhoods	  
having	   their	   own	   sense	   of	   identity	   and	   belonging,	   such	   as	   the	   old	   neighbourhoods	  
surrounding	   the	  Medina	   in	   central	   Tunis.	  Morouj	   is	   not	   somewhere	   you	   can	   ‘come	  
from’.	  One	  of	  the	  first	  things	  I	  learned	  about	  Besma	  was	  that	  she	  was	  ‘Kerkennia’,	  a	  
woman	  from	  the	  small	  island	  of	  Kerkenna,	  her	  ‘bled’,	  attached	  to	  Southern	  Tunisia.	  I	  
once	   heard	   Besma	   telling	   someone	   that	   she	   ‘came	   from’	   Kram	   (in	   the	   Northern	  
suburbs	  of	  Tunis),	  where	  she	  grew	  up,	  as	  Morouj	  is	  not	  yet	  a	  possible	  answer.	  Besma	  
explained	  that	  even	  a	  man	  of	  60,	  born	  in	  Tunis	  and	  living	  there	  all	  his	  life,	  would	  say	  
that	   he	   is	   ‘from’	   Sfax	   or	   Gabes	   or	   wherever.	   She	   said	   that	   Tunisians	   only	   identify	  
themselves	  as	  ‘Tunisian’	  when	  they	  are	  abroad;	  internally,	  it	  is	  the	  region	  of	  origin,	  or	  
‘bled’	  (literally	  ‘country’),	  that	  counts.	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The	   significance	   of	   Morouj	   being	   a	   new	   area	   born	   of	   internal	   migration	   and	  inhabited	   by	   a	  mixture	   of	   people	   of	   different	   regional	   origins	   becomes	   clear	   in	   light	   of	  previous	  ethnographic	  work	  on	  Tunisia	   cited	  above.	   	  Ancestry	   is	  one	  of	   the	   criteria	   that	  Hopkins	  identified	  in	  his	  study	  of	  a	  small	  Tunisian	  town	  in	  the	  1970s	  that	  people	  used	  in	  their	  evaluation	  of	  others,	  alongside	  social	  wealth	  (wealth	  as	  defined	  by	   local	  standards)	  and	  behaviour	  in	  public	  (1977:	  468).	  As	  we	  shall	  see,	  to	  Besma	  and	  others,	  ancestry	  or,	  in	  slightly	  different	   terms,	  place	  of	  origin	  appears	  as	  an	  essence	  and	  as	  a	  marker	  of	  ethical	  personhood;	  this	  marker	  is	  becoming	  increasingly	  illegible	  as	  more	  and	  more	  people	  live	  elsewhere.	  	  
	  
Besma	  (3)	  
Besma	  quickly	   taught	  me	   the	   importance	  of	  Kerkenna	   in	  her	   life,	  as	  well	  as	   that	  of	  
the	  small	  village	  of	  Sidi	  Bou	  Said,	  where	  she	  was	  born	  and	  of	  Kram	  (her	  ‘houma’	  -­	  a	  
suburb	  of	  Tunis),	  where	  her	  natal	  family	  and	  close	  friends	  continued	  to	  live.	  A	  shared	  
connection	   with	   Kerkenna	   was	   also	   the	   groundstone	   of	   Besma’s	   marriage	   (her	  
husband	  was	  also	  Kerkenni)	  and	  of	  the	  closest	  friendships	  she	  had	  made	  in	  Morouj.	  
Besma’s	   family	   aptly	   demonstrates	   how	   place	   of	   origin	   no	   longer	   correlates	   with	  
place	  of	  residence.	  Saying	  that	  most	  people	  in	  Besma’s	  family	  ‘come	  from	  Kerkenna’	  
conceals	   the	   spread	   of	   their	   current	   places	   of	   residence,	   which	   may	   range	   from	  
Kerkenna	   to	   Germany	   or	   Saudi	   Arabia.	   Very	   few	   people	   appear	   to	   remain	   on	   the	  
island	  of	  Kerkenna	  itself,	  although	  some	  return	  for	  their	  retirement.	  Certain	  branches	  
of	  the	  family	  tree	  moved	  to	  Sfax,	  the	  closest	  large	  city	  and	  portal	  to	  Kerkenna,	  most	  
likely	  due	  to	  improved	  employment	  opportunities,	  whilst	  others	  live	  in	  the	  capital.	  	  
	  
This	  pattern	  became	  familiar	  to	  me.	  Another	  resident	  of	  Morouj,	  Nabil,	  a	  man	  in	  his	  mid	  40s,	  spoke	  of	  how	  his	  natal	  village	  near	  the	  Algerian	  border	  had	  become	  increasingly	  empty	   and	   desolate.	  When	   I	   asked	   him	  whether	   anyone	   continues	   to	   live	   in	   the	   village	  now,	  he	  told	  me	  that	  it	  is	  a	  ‘village	  of	  migrants.’95	  At	  first,	  like	  his	  wife’s	  father	  (who	  came	  from	  the	  same	  village	  and	  was	  also	  his	  paternal	  uncle),	  just	  the	  breadwinner	  would	  leave	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95	  cf	  Latreille	  (2007)	  on	  the	  impact	  of	  migration	  in	  these	  rural	  settings	  in	  Northern	  Tunisia.	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Besma	   described	   being	   from	   Kerkenna	   as	   a	   quality	   that	   was	   ‘innate’,	   synonymous	  
with	  being	  a	  ‘good’	  person	  who	  can	  be	  trusted.	   	  People	  from	  Northern	  Tunisia	  were	  
considered	  ‘bad’	  compared	  to	  those	  in	  the	  South	  who	  were	  ‘good’	  –	  although	  this	  was	  
always	   said	   with	   the	   frequently	   used	   polite	   disclaimer	   that	   there	   are	   always	  
exceptions	  as	  ‘one	  can	  find	  good	  and	  bad	  everywhere’.	  Given	  that	  these	  people	  were	  
frequently	  second	  or	  third	  generation	  migrants,	  born	  and	  raised	  in	  the	  capital,	  their	  
identity	  was	  tied	  up	  in	  an	  essence	  as,	  like	  religion	  and	  the	  surname,	  identity	  is	  passed	  
on	   from	   father	   to	   child.97	   	   Although	   Besma’s	   mother	   was	   also	   Kerkennia,	   she	  
inherited	  her	  regional	  identity	  from	  her	  father.	  	  
	  
Living	   in	   this	   dislocated	   place	   where	   such	   essence	   or	   origin	   was,	   or	   could	   be,	  invisible,	   was	   something	   that	   unsettled	   Besma,	   the	   judge	   and	   numerous	   other	   friends.	  Origin	  could	  be	  hidden,	  if	  a	  person	  so	  desires.	  One	  aspect	  of	  regional	  identity	  that	  could	  be	  less	  readily	  concealed	  was	  regional	  accent,	  a	  person’s	  voice	  revealing	  their	  origin	  to	  those	  with	   the	   appropriate	   knowledge.	   Besma	   carefully	   schooled	   her	   daughter	   in	   the	   art	   of	  recognising	  different	  accents	  and	   Jamila	  was	  proud	  of	  her	  ability	   to	  detect	  which	  accent	  came	  from	  where.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96	  Tunisia’s	  urban	  population	  grew	  from	  40%	  in	  1966	  to	  61%	  in	  1994.	  
97	  The	  reason	  that	  it	  is	  ‘haram’	  (religiously	  forbidden)	  for	  a	  Muslim	  woman	  to	  marry	  a	  non-­‐Muslim	  man	  (but	  not	  
vice-­‐versa)	  is	  because	  her	  children	  will	  not	  be	  Muslims,	  as	  they	  automatically	  follow	  their	  father’s	  religion.	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If	  regional	   identity	  retains	  some	  significance	  as	  a	  marker	  of	  ethical	  personhood	  –	  and	   is	   still	   perceived	   as	   an	   essence	   -­‐	   how	   is	   this	   expressed	   now	   that	   people	   rarely	   live	  where	  they	  ‘come	  from’?	  	  How	  does	  Besma	  go	  about	  judging	  someone’s	  regional	  identity?	  	  
Some	   people	   did	   choose	   to	   express	   their	   regional	   identity.	   Besma	   wore	   hers	  proudly,	  not	  the	   least	  since	  she	  was	  known	  as	   ‘the	  Kerkennia’	  both	   in	  Kram	  and	  Morouj.	  Dislocated	   from	  the	  places	  of	   their	  origin,	  Besma	  and	  her	   friends	  breathed	   life	   into	   their	  regional	   origins	   in	   daily	   life	   and	   shared	   memories	   of	   visits	   to	   the	   place	   that	   was	   so	  important	  to	  them:	  
	   	  
Besma	  (5)	  
Besma’s	  mother	  came	  over	  to	  help	  her	  make	  a	  supply	  of	  ‘bchicha’	  (small	  pellets	  made	  
of	  chickpea	  flour	  cooked	  in	  soup).	  She	  also	  made	  a	  pile	  of	  ‘hlalam’	  (small	  dumplings),	  
telling	   me	   that	   she	   was	   making	   the	   coarser	   Kerkenni	   version	   to	   accompany	   fish	  
dishes,	   and	   not	   the	   finer	   ‘Tunsi’	   hlalam	   used	   with	   meat.	   When	   she	   was	   little,	   the	  
women	  used	   to	  get	   together	   to	  make	  annual	   supplies	  of	   yarn	  and	  cloth,	   taking	   the	  
wool	  to	  wash	  in	  the	  sea	  in	  Kerkenna	  and	  then	  brushing	  and	  spinning	  it.	  People	  do	  not	  
do	   this	   anymore.	   Together	   with	   a	   group	   of	   neighbours,	   she	   used	   to	   make	   annual	  
supplies	   of	   essential	   foods	   (such	   as	   dried	   peppers,	   tomatoes,	   spices,	   couscous)	   for	  
both	   her	   daughters	   when	   they	   were	   working.	   One	   day	   they	   would	   prepare	   the	  
couscous	  for	  her	  daughter	  and	  cook	  in	  her	  house	  and	  the	  next	  day	  they	  would	  go	  to	  
her	   neighbour’s	   to	   do	   the	   same	   for	   hers.	   She	   seemed	   to	   accept	   that	   the	   next	  
generation	   of	  women	   such	   as	   her	   granddaughter,	   currently	   studying	   at	   university,	  
was	   unlikely	   to	   carry	   on	   this	   tradition	   of	   preparing	   supplies	   of	   food,	   just	   as	   her	  
generation	  no	  longer	  made	  their	  own	  cloth.	  	  
	  
Different	  ways	  of	  preparing	  foods	  are	  a	  hot	  topic	  of	  conversation	  between	  women	  when	  they	  meet,	  whether	  in	  Morouj	  or,	  as	  we	  shall	  see	  in	  the	  office	  at	  the	  court	  (chapter	  3).	  Regional	  difference	  can	  be	  expressed	  in	  the	  different	  spices	  used	  to	  flavour	  traditional	  Tunisian	  dishes.	  This	  is	  why	  a	  traditional	  meat	  dish	  cooked	  the	  morning	  after	  Aïd	  el-­Kebir	  is	  red	  in	  Kerkenna,	  using	  ground	  red	  pepper,	  and	  yellow	  in	  Djerba	  where	  cumin	  is	  used.	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Being	  Kerkennia,	  therefore,	  supposes	  various	  forms	  of	  acquired	  knowledge,	  which	  help	  to	  unite	  those	  women	  who	  share	  them.	  This	  knowledge	  of	  ways	  of	  cooking,	  marrying	  and	   living	   is	   coupled	   with	   local	   knowledge,	   memories	   of	   people	   and	   places,	   familiarity	  with	  a	  place	  and	  memories	  of	  childhood	  visits	  to	  the	  island,	  which	  helps	  to	  create	  a	  bond	  between	   Besma	   and	   her	   Kerkenni	   friends.	   As	   such	   aspects	   of	   material	   culture	   are	   lost,	  what	  will	  being	  ‘Kerkennia’	  mean	  in	  a	  few	  generations	  time?	  
	  
Besma	  (6)	  
Apart	   from	   frequent	   references	   to	   ‘our	   Kerkenna’	   and	   mentions	   and	   tales	   of	  
Kerkenna	   in	   everyday	   speech,	   the	   island	   came	   alive	   to	  me	   in	   the	   family	   photos	   of	  
holidays	  and	  weddings	  there.	  Of	  Besma	  sitting	  on	  the	  beach,	  her	  hair	  tied	  back	  in	  the	  
traditional	   red	   Kerkenni	   headscarf,	   gutting	   squid	   caught	   fresh	   from	   the	   sea.	   Or	   of	  
video	  footage	  of	  traditional	  Kerkenni	  wedding	  music	  taken	  on	  her	  son’s	  new	  mobile	  
phone.	  	  
Besma	  only	  went	  to	  Kerkenna	  twice	  as	  a	  child.	  Her	  parents	  did	  not	  have	  the	  financial	  
means	   to	   fund	   annual	   trips	   for	   the	   whole	   family.	   When	   she	   was	   11,	   she	   and	   her	  
brothers	   and	   sister	  went	   for	   the	   summer	  holidays	   there	  during	   the	  harvest	   season.	  
They	  spent	  long	  days	  in	  a	  tent	  on	  the	  beach,	  guarding	  the	  newly	  harvested	  produce,	  
listening	   to	   their	   grandmother	   tell	   them	   stories,	   washing	   in	   the	   sea	   and	   drinking	  
water	  from	  a	  well.	  Besma	  insisted	  on	  spending	  the	  money	  she	  received	  in	  presents	  for	  
passing	   her	   Baccalaureat	   on	   a	   trip	   to	   the	   island,	   which	   lead	   to	   her	   marrying	   her	  
future	  husband.	  
Her	  husband	  has	  a	  more	  immediate	  relationship	  with	  Kerkenna	  as	  he	  grew	  up	  there.	  
‘You	  can	  breathe	  better	  in	  Kerkenna’,	  he	  told	  me,	  evoking	  his	  nostalgia	  for	  the	  clean	  
sea	  air.	  He	  cannot	  sleep	  well	  anywhere	  the	  air	  is	  less	  pure.	  	  
	  
Shared	  memories	   hinting	   at	   shared	   connections	   to	   a	   place	   that	   is	   trusted	   are	   of	  value	  in	  this	  place	  where	  people	  are	  unsure	  who	  to	  trust.	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Carsten	   has	   explored	   the	   broader,	   political	   significance	   of	   memories	   connected	  with	  places	  that	  hold	  great	  significance	  for	  people.	  These	  ghosts	  of	  memories	  help	  people	  understand	   continuity	  with	   the	   past	   in	   contexts	  where	   this	   seems	   complicated,	   such	   as	  where	   the	  past	  may	  have	  been	  disrupted	  by	  processes	  such	  as	  migration	   (2007:1).	   	   It	   is	  perhaps	  not	  surprising	  then	  that	  Besma	  and	  her	  friends	  make	  frequent	  references	  to	  ‘our	  Kerkenna’	  and	  enjoy	  sharing	  stories	  about	  places	  and	  people	  they	  know	  there,	  as	  well	  as	  recipes.	  	  
The	   ghosts	   of	  memory	   are	   a	   reminder	   of	   the	   omnipresent	   risk	   of	   forgetting	   and	  loss	   of	   identity.	   The	   next	   generation	   raised	   in	   Morouj	   or	   elsewhere	   in	   the	   capital	   will	  necessarily	  have	  a	  different	  relationship	  with	   their	   regional	   identity.	  Social	   relationships	  will	  have	  to	  be	  grounded	  differently	  as	  the	  moral	  is	  reassembled	  in	  this	  corner	  of	  a	  foreign	  field.	  Whilst	  proud	  of	  her	  Kerkenni	  heritage	  and	  keen	  to	   learn	  about	   the	  recipes	  and	  the	  traditions	  they	  would	  follow	  for	  her	  wedding,	  Besma’s	  daughter	  would	  probably	  have	  felt	  a	  little	  silly	  wearing	  the	  traditional	  red	  Kerkeni	  headscarf	  around	  the	  neighbourhood.	  	  
It	   is	   perhaps	   because	   being	   Kerkennia,98	   maintaining	   a	   visible	   regional	   identity,	  involves	  a	  process	  that	  is	  lived,	  that	  it	  simultaneously	  suffered	  from	  the	  threat	  of	  being	  lost	  or	   consciously	   concealed,	   something,	  which	  Besma	   frowned	  upon.	  Although	   recipes	   and	  other	  traditions	  are	  passed	  on	  from	  mother	  to	  daughter,	   the	  threat	  of	   loss	  was	  never	  far	  away;	   Besma’s	   mother	   knew	   that	   her	   granddaughter’s	   life	   (Jamila	   was	   at	   university	  studying	  to	  become	  a	  doctor)	  would	  be	  very	  different	  to	  her	  own.	  
	  
DISLOCATED	  SELVES	  
As	   Hopkins	   (1997)	   found	   in	   his	   study	   of	   a	   small	   town	   in	   rural	   Tunisia	   the	   increasing	  invisibility	  of	  ancestry	  leads	  to	  an	  emphasis	  on	  behaviour	  –	  that	  I	  refer	  to	  as	  performance.	  Even	   regional	   identity	   –	   perceived	   as	   an	   essence	   and	   a	   reliable	   marker	   of	   ethical	  personhood	  –	  is	  performed,	  if	  individuals	  choose	  to	  make	  this	  part	  of	  their	  identity	  visible	  to	   others.	   	   For	   those	   that	   did	   not	   enact	   regional	   identity,	   which	   other	   criteria	   did	   they	  perform?	   Which	   bases	   of	   assumed	   shared	   identity	   came	   to	   the	   fore	   in	   the	   absence	   of	  traditional	  markers	  of	  ethical	  personhood?	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98	  This	  discussion	  necessarily	  focuses	  on	  the	  female	  process	  of	  becoming	  Kerkennia,	  which	  I	  was	  granted	  access	  to	  
and	  excludes	  the	  male	  equivalent,	  a	  world	  from	  which	  I	  was	  largely	  excluded.	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In	   the	   absence	   of	   shared	   regional	   identity,	   as	   friendships	   are	   shaped	   by	  circumstance	   and	   shared	   experience,	   shared	   religious	   identity	   takes	   on	   increased	  significance	   as	   a	   marker	   of	   ethical	   personhood.	   (We	   shall	   see	   how	   Karima	   builds	   her	  ethical	  personhood	  by	  enacting	  piety	  in	  chapter	  3).	  	  
Besma’s	  daughter’s	  ethical	  personhood	  was	  enacted	  in	  ways	  that	  were	  different	  to	  her	  mother,	   explicitly	   linked	  with	   her	   identity	   as	   a	  Muslim,	   rather	   than	   referencing	   her	  regional	   identity	   (of	   which	   she	   was	   nonetheless	   proud).	   Jamila	   displayed	   many	   of	   the	  virtues	  associated	  with	  being	  a	  good,	  ethical	  woman,	  or,	  as	  my	  informants	  would	  have	  put	  it,	   ‘the	   daughter	   of	   a	   family’,	   a	   reputable	   girl,	   who	  would	  make	   any	  man	   a	   decent	  wife.	  Beautiful	  and	  intelligent,	  as	  well	  as	  trustworthy	  and	  modest,	  Besma	  did	  not	  worry	  in	  the	  least	  about	  her	   living	  away	  from	  home	  to	  study	  at	  university.	  She	  trusted	  her	  daughter’s	  judgement	  and	  knew	  that	  she	  would	  not	  become	  involved	  with	  boys	  or	  make	  friends	  with	  the	  wrong	  kind	  of	  people.	  	  
Whilst	   proud	   of	   her	   Kerkenni	   heritage,	   Jamila	   aspired	   to	   appear	   as	   a	   modern	  Muslim	   woman.	   She	   would	   have	   liked	   to	   wear	   the	   hijab,	   as	   some	   young	   women	   were	  increasingly	  doing.	  	  This	  differs	  from	  the	  ‘traditional’	  Tunisian	  ways	  of	  veiling.	  A	  few	  older	  women,	   like	  Habiba,	  still	  wore	  the	  sifsaree,	  a	   long,	  white	  cloth	  draped	  over	  the	  head	  and	  fastened	   by	   holding	   the	   corners	   of	   the	   fabric	   in	   one	   hand	   or	   between	   the	   teeth.	   More	  frequently,	  like	  Besma,	  women	  veiled	  Tunisian	  style,	  with	  a	  headscarf	  thrown	  around	  the	  head	  and	  usually	  knotted	  under	  the	  chin,	  often	  worn	  with	  a	  long,	  loose	  djebba	  covering	  her	  down	  to	  her	  ankles.	  Jamila’s	  father	  had	  forbidden	  her	  to	  wear	  the	  hijab	  due	  to	  his	  concerns	  for	   her	   education	   and	   safety.	   Veiled	   women	   	   -­‐	   perceived	   to	   be	   making	   a	   thinly	   veiled	  criticism	   of	   the	   regime	   -­‐	   could	   encounter	   difficulties	   entering	   state	   institutions	   like	   the	  university,	  attracting	  unwanted	  attention	  from	  the	  ubiquitous	  plain	  clothes	  police.	  Instead,	  Jamila,	  who	  sought	   to	  project	  modesty	  and	  piety	   rather	   than	  make	  a	  political	   statement,	  was	  always	  carefully	  dressed,	  ensuring	  that	  her	  knees,	  shoulders,	  cleavage	  and	  neck	  were	  covered	  at	  all	  times.	  	  
These	   discussions	   about	   the	   appropriate	   dress	   for	   women	   provide	   an	   explicit	  example	   of	   the	  way	   in	  which	   ethical	   personhood	  was	   seen	   to	   be	   increasingly	   based	   on	  appearances,	   appearances	  which	  could	  be	  deceptive.	  For	   instance,	   an	   immoral	  girl	   (who	  had	  engaged	  in	  sexual	  relations	  outside	  marriage)	  may	  strive	  to	  appear	  decent	  by	  dressing	  carefully.	   In	  contrast,	  Rachida,	  whom	  I	  met	   in	   the	  city	  centre	  and	  who	  defined	  herself	  as	  modest	  and	  pious,	  dressed	  in	  shorts	  and	  vest	  tops.	  Whilst	  these	  revealing	  clothes	  were	  less	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shocking	   in	   the	   centre	   of	   Tunis	   than	   they	   would	   have	   been	   in	   the	   more	   conservative	  setting	  of	  Morouj,	  by	  dressing	  this	  way,	  she	  nonetheless	  projected	  an	  image	  of	  immodesty	  that	  was	   far	   removed	   from	  her	   interior	  disposition.	  Firm	   in	  her	   love	  of	  her	   religion,	   she	  simply	  ignored	  the	  unwanted	  male	  attention	  she	  received.	  	  





Besma’s	   home	   in	   Mourouj	   is	   one	   white-­painted	   house	   among	   many	   in	   a	   maze	   of	  
streets	  around	  the	  main	  boulevard,	  not	  far	  from	  the	  local	  mosque,	  bus	  stop,	  hammam	  
and	  shops.	  
Built	  in	  the	  style	  of	  a	  ‘villa’99,	  the	  house	  itself	  is	  only	  partially	  visible	  from	  the	  street,	  
hidden	   behind	   a	   high,	   white	   wall	   penetrated	   via	   an	   opaque	   metal	   gate.	   Besma	  
regularly	  treats	  each	  corner	  of	  the	  property	  with	  ‘bkhor’	  (fragrant	  granules,	  similar	  
to	  incense	  burned	  in	  a	  fire)	  in	  order	  to	  protect	  the	  family	  from	  the	  evil	  eye.	  	  
A	   large,	   tiled	   terrace	   lies	   in	   front	   of	   the	   house	   and	   forms	   part	   of	   a	   garden,	   which	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99	  This	  term	  is	  used	  in	  Tunisian	  Arabic.	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surrounds	   the	   property.	   Another	   terrace,	   better	   concealed	   from	   the	   prying	   eyes	   of	  
neighbours,	  is	  used	  as	  an	  extension	  of	  the	  kitchen.	  This	  is	  where	  sheep	  are	  sacrificed	  
and	  the	  meat	  is	  prepared	  for	  celebrations.	  Besma	  cooks	  there	  all	  year	  round,	  weather	  
permitting,	  sitting	  on	  a	  sheepskin	  shielded	  by	  vines.	  Behind	  the	  house,	  there	  are	  two	  
pens	  (a	  covered	  stable	  for	  winter	  and	  an	  outside	  pen	  for	  summer),	  in	  which	  the	  Aïd	  
sheep	  are	  kept,	  awaiting	  their	  sacrifice	  for	  Aïd	  el-­Kebir.	  	  
The	  house	  itself	  is	  composed	  of	  two	  independent	  stories,	  which	  is	  a	  typical	  pattern	  in	  
the	   neighbourhood.	   Besma’s	   family	   live	   on	   the	   ground	   floor	   and	   rent	   out	   the	   first	  
floor	  to	  generate	  income.	  The	  current	  tenants	  are	  from	  the	  ‘riif’	  (countryside).	  Besma	  
has	   limited	  contact	  with	  them	  except	   for	  their	  3-­year-­old	  son,	  who	  runs	  around	  her	  
house.	  Their	  relationship	  is	  neighbourly	  rather	  than	  friendly.	  Knowing	  they	  are	  poor,	  
Besma	  gives	  the	  children	  clothes.	  	  
Besma’s	   relationship	   with	   her	   current	   house	   and	   the	   friendships	   that	   surround	   it	  
differ	  from	  those	  she	  associates	  with	  her	  childhood	  home,	  a	  home	  that	  symbolizes	  a	  
way	  of	  life	  that	  is	  fading.	  She	  grew	  up	  in	  a	  large	  traditional	  Arab	  house	  that	  housed	  
five	   families,	   each	   family	   living	   in	  a	   set	  of	   rooms	  giving	  onto	  a	   communal,	   internal	  
courtyard.	   This	   house,	   home	   to	   some	   of	   her	   most	   treasured	   memories	   created	   a	  
universe	  whose	   boundaries	  were	   permeable.	   Although	   Besma	   and	   her	   sister	  would	  
not	  have	  been	  allowed	   to	  go	   ‘out’,	  within	   the	  house,	   she	  was	  able	   to	   circulate	  with	  
ease,	   deciding	   to	   run	   across	   the	   courtyard	   and	   eat	   some	   of	   the	   delicious	   coastal	  
specialities	  prepared	  by	  the	  ‘Sahlia’	  (woman	  from	  the	  coast)	  if	  she	  did	  not	  like	  what	  
her	   mother	   had	   cooked	   that	   evening.	   Given	   the	   lack	   of	   space	   in	   her	   family	   home,	  
Besma’s	   sister	   often	  went	   to	   share	   a	   bedroom	  with	   the	   neighbour’s	   daughter.	   This	  
would	   be	   quite	   unthinkable	   today;	   this	   neighbour	   also	   had	   sons	   and	   her	   sister’s	  
reputation	  and	  that	  of	  the	  family	  would	  be	  at	  stake;	  at	  the	  time,	  there	  was	  no	  such	  
impropriety,	  as	  the	  boys	  were	  considered	  as	  her	  brothers.	  	  
Besma	  depicts	  this	  house	  as	  a	  safe	  environment	  where	  the	  families	  lived	  together.	  In	  
the	  courtyard,	  the	  women	  were	  never	  alone	  whilst	  carrying	  out	  their	  daily	  chores.	  In	  
the	  afternoon,	  someone	  would	  make	  tea.	  In	  the	  evening,	  they	  would	  chop	  vegetables	  
together	  to	  prepare	  a	  large	  couscous	  to	  be	  shared	  between	  all	  the	  families.	  Although	  
Besma’s	   mother	   stayed	   ‘at	   home’,	   as	   a	   good	   wife	   should,	   she	   was	   always	   in	   good	  
company.	  Life,	  Besma	  told	  me	  nostalgically,	  was	  less	  stressful	  then.	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These	  families,	  who	  were	  once	  linked	  by	  sharing	  a	  courtyard,	  mostly	  continue	  to	  live	  
close	   by	   in	  Kram	   today.	   Even	   Ines,	   a	  woman	  of	  Besma’s	   generation,	  who	  moved	   to	  
Libya,	  remains	  a	  virtual	  part	  of	  the	  circle;	  she	  and	  Besma	  continue	  to	  visit	  each	  other.	  
The	  ‘Sahlia’	  has	  recently	  moved	  to	  another	  suburb	  of	  Tunis,	  but	  she	  returns	  to	  Kram	  
frequently	  to	  visit,	  as	  her	  children	  live	  close	  by.	  
In	   contrast	   to	   the	   isolation	   that	   Besma	   sometimes	   feels	   in	   Morouj,	   visits	   to	   her	  
father’s	  house	  are	  full	  of	  warm	  embraces	  from	  people	  she	  has	  known	  for	  decades	  and	  
copious	  amounts	  of	   tea,	   food,	  chatter,	  catching	  up,	   laughter	  and	  occasionally	   tears.	  
As	  her	  parent’s	  first-­born	  child	  and	  the	  eldest	  sibling,	  she	  retains	  an	  active	  role	  in	  her	  
natal	   household,	   participating	   in	   the	   cooking	   and	   preparations	   for	   special	   events,	  
such	  as	  her	  brother’s	  wedding.	  Only	  15	  years	  younger	  than	  her	  mother,	  she	  described	  
their	  relationship	  as	  being	  closer	  to	  that	  of	  sisters	  or	  friends,	  rather	  than	  mother	  and	  
daughter.	  	  
Besma	  describes	  her	   father’s	   current	  house	   in	  Kram	  as	  being	   ‘like	   it	   used	   to	  be,’	   in	  
that	   two	   of	   her	  married	   brothers	   have	   set	   up	   their	   homes	   in	   identical	   apartments	  
built	  on	  the	  roof.	  All	  four	  of	  Besma’s	  siblings	  are	  married	  and	  have	  remained	  close	  to	  
their	   father’s	   house.	  Whilst	   two	   brothers	   live	   on	   the	   parental	   roof,	   a	   third	   brother	  
lives	   in	  a	  near-­by	   street,	  not	   far	   from	  his	  wife’s	  parents.	  Her	   sister	  also	   lives	  within	  
walking	  distance,	  next	  door	  to	  her	  husband’s	  parents.	  	  
Her	  father’s	  house,	  or	  ‘villa’,	   is	  built	  in	  the	  same	  format	  as	  Besma’s	  home	  in	  Morouj.	  
Entering	   from	   the	   street	   via	   a	   large,	   metal	   gate	   in	   the	   high,	   white	   wall,	   you	  
immediately	   arrive	   in	   the	   garden	   and	   terrace,	  which	   circumnavigate	   the	   property.	  
Her	  parents	  live	  in	  the	  main	  rooms	  on	  the	  ground	  floor.	  Separate	  staircases	  provide	  
independent	   entrances	   for	   each	   son.	   Up	   until	   her	   brother’s	   wedding,	   he	   had	  
continued	  to	  live	  in	  the	  main	  house	  with	  his	  parents	  and	  the	  apartment	  on	  the	  roof	  
had	  been	   rented	  out,	   a	  useful	   source	  of	   income.	  Climbing	  a	   further	   floor,	   there	   is	  a	  
large	  roof	  terrace,	  where	  his	  wedding	  party	  was	  held.	  	  
Her	  father	  refused	  to	  allow	  their	  third	  son	  to	  build	  a	  further	  apartment	  on	  their	  roof.	  
He	   felt	   that	   he	   could	   not	   sustain	   living	   with	   a	   third	   daughter-­in-­law.	   His	   son’s	  
mother-­in-­law	   had	   offered	   the	   couple	   the	   opportunity	   to	   build	   on	   the	   roof	   of	   her	  
house,	  an	  option	  that	  was	  strongly	  condemned	  by	  his	  parents	  and	  siblings.	  What	  if	  he	  
died?	  Their	  family	  would	  be	  left	  with	  the	  fruits	  of	  our	  brother’s	  labour.	  Or	  what	  if	  his	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wife	   died?	  He	   could	   hardly	   remarry	   and	   live	  with	   his	   new	  wife	   above	   his	   deceased	  
wife’s	   parents.	   This	   issue	   was	   resolved	   by	   Besma’s	   father,	   who	   ruled	   that	   his	   son	  
should	  build	  on	  the	  land	  he	  had	  bought	  in	  new	  Morouj.	  The	  couple	  have	  both	  had	  to	  
renounce	  their	  desire	  to	  remain	  close	  to	  their	  families	  and	  will	  have	  to	  confront	  the	  
isolation	  of	  neolocal	  residence	  that	  marks	  Besma’s	  experience	  of	  living	  in	  the	  Morouj.	  	  
	  
The	  relationships	  that	  were	  forged	  in	  the	  communal	  courtyard	  in	  the	  first	  house	  in	  Kram	  –	  made	  possible	  by	  the	  structure	  of	  that	  house	  and	  expressed	  through	  the	  everyday	  activities	  of	   care	  and	  exchange	  –	  are	   those	   that	  hold	   the	  greatest	   significance,	  as	  well	  as	  love	   and	   affection,	   for	   Besma.	   In	   contrast,	   the	   new	   design	   of	   houses,	   with	   their	   steep	  external	  walls	  and	  space	  which	  is	  turned	  to	  the	  inside,	  creates	  a	  barrier	  to	  the	  world,	  often	  resulting	   in	   isolation	   and	   loneliness	   in	  women,	  who	   are	   supposed	   to	   remain	  within	   the	  sanctity	  of	  their	  home.	  It	  is	  difficult	  for	  a	  woman	  to	  assert	  her	  status	  as	  a	  ‘good’	  wife,	  whilst	  making	   frequent	   outings	   to	   visit	   friends.	   The	   closeness	   of	   these	   friendships	   and	  relationships	  with	  her	  mother	  and	  sister	  are	  clearly	  lacking	  in	  Morouj,	  divided	  by	  the	  walls	  of	  the	  house	  that	  make	  it	  harder	  for	  women	  to	  visit	  each	  other	  in	  the	  first	  place	  in	  order	  to	  forge	   this	   kind	   of	   lasting	   friendship.	   Of	   course,	   it	   is	   possible	   –	   and	   Besma	   has	   made	  (carefully	  chosen)	  friends.	  But	  the	  need	  to	  trespass	  boundaries	  to	  do	  so	  makes	  the	  process	  morally	  charged	  in	  a	  way	  that	  it	  did	  not	  appear	  to	  be	  for	  her	  mother	  during	  a	  similar	  phase	  of	  her	  life.	  	  
	  
DISLOCATED	  PEOPLE	  
Unlike	   the	   relatively	   permeable	   boundaries	   in	   Besma’s	   childhood	   home,	   the	   high,	  white	  walls	   surrounding	   each	   individual	   house	   were	   a	   tangible	   reminder	   of	   separation	   and	  increased	   isolation.	   I	  arrived	  wanting	   to	  get	   to	  know	  other	  people	   in	   the	  neighbourhood	  and	  it	  was	  immediately	  apparent	  to	  me	  that	  this	  was	  going	  to	  be	  even	  harder	  than	  I	  had	  imagined.	   As	   an	   outsider,	   I	   would	   not	   make	   it	   through	   the	   door	   without	   Besma	   to	  introduce	  me.	  The	  setting	  was	  claustrophobic.	   I	  was	  warned	  not	  to	  talk	  to	  people	  on	  the	  bus	  or	  in	  the	  streets	  and	  most	  definitely	  not	  to	  give	  my	  phone	  number	  to	  anyone,	  male	  or	  female;	  again,	  I	  was	  warned,	  people	  were	  looking	  out	  for	  their	  own	  ‘interest’	  and	  would	  try	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to	   profit	   from	  me.100	   Therefore,	   most	   of	   the	   interviews	   and	   conversations	   with	   women	  took	   place	   in	   their	   own	   homes,	   Besma	   having	   introduced	  me	   as	   a	   friend	   of	   the	   family,	  which	  had	  the	  benefit	  of	  giving	  me	  an	  insight	  into	  these	  private	  spaces.	  	  
If	  Besma	  is	  faced	  with	  the	  dilemma	  of	  who	  to	  trust	  and	  associate	  herself	  with,	  it	  is	  in	   part	   because	   she	   is	   obliged	   to	   go	   out	   of	   the	   house	   to	   find	   company.	   ‘Going	   out’	   is	  something	  that	  good	  wives	  are	  not	  really	  supposed	  to	  do	  (or	  at	  least	  be	  seen	  to	  do).	  	  The	  universe	   of	   a	   good	  wife	   is	   supposed	   to	   be	   (or	   at	   least	  appear	   to	   be)	   limited	   to	   her	   own	  home,	  with	  permitted	  outings	  to	  do	  shopping	  or	  to	  do	  chores	  related	  to	  the	  children,	  such	  as	  taking	  them	  to	  school	  or	  visiting	  the	  doctor.	  Going	  to	  her	  place	  of	  work	  is	  also	  a	  valid	  activity.	   The	   question	   of	   visiting	   friends	   and	   neighbours	   is	  more	   complicated,	   as	   a	  wife	  who	  frequently	  goes	  out	  to	  visit	  is	  not	  seen	  in	  a	  good	  light,	  due	  to	  the	  dual	  implication	  that	  she	   is	  neglecting	  her	  duties	  at	  home	  and	  that	  she	  may	  be	  keeping	  bad	  company	  or	  come	  into	   ill	   repute.	  Whilst	   it	   seems	   that	  all	  women	  visit	  others	   to	  some	  extent	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  personal	  sanity,	  no-­‐one	  would	  admit	  in	  public	  that	  they	  like	  visiting	  a	  lot	  and	  it	  is	  far	  from	  a	   compliment	   to	   say	  of	   a	  woman	   that	   she	   ‘goes	  out	  a	   lot’	   or	   that	   she	   ‘is	   always	  visiting.’	  Irkam	  (50,	  a	  housewife)	  prefers	  to	  stay	  at	  home	  to	  avoid	  problems	  with	  the	  television	  and	  her	  daughters	  for	  company.	  	  
Although	   the	  mosque	  had	   a	   separate	   entrance	   and	  prayer	   area	   for	  women,	   I	   did	  not	  know	  any	  women	  who	  went	  there	  to	  pray.	  Even	  the	  most	  pious	  woman	  I	  knew,	  prayed	  at	  home,	  explaining	  that	  women	  needed	  to	  stay	  at	  home,	   for	  the	  children	  or	   if	   they	  were	  cooking	  a	  meal.	  The	  hammam	  is	  another	  acceptable	  location	  for	  a	  public	  outing	  and	  a	  place	  where	  women	  meet	  and	  socialise,	  although	  as	  more	  women	  have	  hot	  running	  water	  and	  can	  bathe	  in	  their	  own	  homes,	  a	  trip	  to	  the	  hammam	   is	  more	  an	  occasional	  treat	  or	  used	  for	  special	  occasions.	  
The	  hammam	  and	  mosque	  are	  places	  where	  men	  meet	  frequently,	  but	  the	  ultimate	  male	  meeting	   place	   is	   the	   café.	   Besma’s	   husband	  would	   sometimes	   go	   to	   pray	  with	   his	  neighbours	   at	   the	   mosque,	   and	   this	   would	   be	   followed	   by	   a	   trip	   to	   the	   café	   together	  afterwards.	  Whilst	  there	  are	  a	  number	  of	  mixed-­‐sex	  ‘tea	  rooms’,101	  to	  which	  I	  occasionally	  went,	  even	  walking	  past	  an	  all-­‐male	  café	  made	  me	  feel	  like	  a	  trespasser,	  inviting	  unwanted	  comments	  and	  stares.	  On	  the	  whole,	   there	  are	  few	  acceptable	  meeting	  places	  for	  women	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  100	  Notably,	  people	  thought	  that	  I	  might	  be	  able	  to	  help	  them	  procure	  a	  visa	  to	  go	  to	  France	  or	  the	  UK.	  Some	  were	  
looking	  for	  a	  marriage	  partner	  for	  a	  family	  member,	  marriage	  to	  a	  foreigner	  also	  being	  a	  way	  out	  of	  Tunisia	  with	  its	  
political	  and	  economic	  difficulties.	  
101	  In	  central	  Tunis	  and	  some	  of	  the	  other	  suburbs	  of	  the	  capital	  the	  situation	  differed	  slightly	  and	  it	  was	  more	  
acceptable	  for	  a	  group	  of	  young	  women	  to	  go	  out	  together	  to	  cafés	  or	  tearooms.	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outside	   the	   home,	   other	   than	   the	   spaces	   in	  which	   they	  may	   be	   found	   engaging	   in	   their	  daily	  business.	  
For	  Besma,	  who	  is	  sociable	  by	  nature	  and	  who	  had	  previously	  worked	  in	  an	  office,	  this	   isolation	   can	   take	  a	  psychological	   toll.	   It	   can	  also	   lead	   to	  marital	  disputes,	   as	   lonely	  wives	   insist	  upon	  visiting	   their	   friends	   to	   the	  disdain	  of	   their	  husbands,	   to	  whom	  this	   is	  not	   acceptable	   behaviour	   for	   a	   ‘good	   wife’.	   How	   did	   Besma	   go	   about	   forging	   new	  friendships	  in	  Morouj?	  On	  which	  criteria	  did	  she	  base	  her	  judgment	  of	  which	  people	  could	  be	  trusted?	  
	  
Besma	  (8)	  
Besma’s	   closest	   friends	   in	   Morouj,	   like	   Habiba	   and	   her	   daughter,	   were	   mostly	  
Kerkennia.	  	  
Habiba,	  a	  formidable	  old	  lady	  in	  her	  80s,	  met	  Besma	  on	  a	  bus	  journey	  about	  10	  years	  
ago,	   during	   which	   they	   realised	   that	   they	   both	   came	   from	   Kerkenna.	   Besma	  
affectionately	  and	  respectfully	  referred	  to	  her	  as	  ‘khalti’	  (literally	  my	  maternal	  aunt,	  
a	  frequently	  used	  way	  of	  addressing	  a	  woman	  of	  your	  grandmother’s	  generation),	  or	  
even	   ‘my	   mother’,	   stressing	   even	   closer	   proximity	   and	   affection.	   Habiba	   had	   been	  
divorced	  three	  times	  and	  was	  living	  in	  the	  upper	  floor	  of	  a	  house	  she	  rented	  from	  her	  
daughter,	   Yasmine,	  who	   lived	   on	   the	   first	   floor	  with	   her	   husband	   and	   children.	   To	  
Besma,	   Habiba	   is	   also	   an	   outlet	   for	   fulfilling	   her	   religious	   duties	   of	   charity;	   as	  
Besma’s	  mother	  once	  told	  me,	  Besma	  uses	  her	  to	  win	  favour	  with	  God.	  Living	  alone,	  
and	   with	   little	   income,	   Habiba	   has	   for	   many	   years	   been	   the	   chosen	   recipient	   of	  
Besma’s	  alms-­giving,	  a	  duty	  to	  be	  carried	  out	  just	  after	  Ramadan.	  Besma	  treats	  her	  
kindly,	  buying	  her	  vegetables	  and	  helping	  dye	  her	  hair	  with	  henna.	  	  
It	  was	  helpful	  in	  maintaining	  their	  friendship	  that	  Habiba	  was	  an	  older	  Kerkennia.	  I	  
felt	  that	  Besma’s	  husband	  increasingly	  tried	  to	  control	  her	  outings	  in	  the	  time	  I	  knew	  
her.	  It	  was	  difficult,	  however,	  for	  him	  to	  object	  to	  Besma	  visiting	  a	  kind,	  old	  lady,	  from	  
his	   ‘bled’.	   (Besma’s	   husband	   came	   from	   and	   grew	   up	   in	   Kerkenna	   and	   Habiba	  
reminded	   him	   of	   his	   mother).	   As	   a	   result,	   he	   tolerated	   Besma’s	   friendship	   with	  
Habiba	   far	   better	   than	   he	   did	   her	   relationship	   with	   various	   other	   women.	   The	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expression	  of	  regional	   identity,	  being	  Kerkennia,	  equated	  to	  a	  form	  of	   ‘good’	  ethical	  
personhood,	  someone	  who	  was	  in	  some	  way	  familiar	  in	  an	  unfamiliar	  environment.	  
	  
For	  Besma	  and	  her	  husband	  at	   least,	  regional	  origin	  retained	   its	  significance	  as	  a	  marker	  of	  ethical	  personhood.	  Having	  met	  Habiba	  out	  of	  the	  blue	  on	  the	  bus,	  their	  shared	  regional	   identity	   made	   it	   acceptable	   and	   possible	   for	   them	   to	   get	   to	   know	   each	   other	  further	  and	  to	  build	  a	  friendship.	  	  
In	  a	  context	  where	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  know	  whom	  to	  trust,	  Besma,	  like	  those	  around	  her,	   nonetheless	   cultivated	   a	   network	   of	   relationships.	   In	   particular	   where	   firm	  foundations	   of	   friendship	  were	  missing	   (like	   shared	   regional	   identity),	   trust	  was	   slowly	  and	   continuously	   constructed	   via	   the	   labour	   of	   daily	   life,	   via	   intrinsically	   ethical	  ‘continuous	   or	   repetitive	   life-­‐reproducing	   activities.’102	   More	   specifically,	   these	  relationships	  were	  built	  via	  the	  reciprocal	  labour	  of	  caring	  for	  one	  another,	  ‘looking	  out	  for	  or	   looking	   after	   the	   well	   being	   of	   others’	   (Lambek	   2010:	   15).	   Seeing	   care	   as	   central	   to	  ethical	   activity	   reminds	   us	   both	   of	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   individuals	   are	   inextricably	  connected	   and	   of	   the	   responsibilities	   that	   define	   personhood	   alongside	   the	   webs	   of	  relatedness	  in	  which	  an	  individual	  is	  embedded	  (see	  chapter	  2).	  
Friendships	   take	  on	   added	  meaning	   as	   those	   I	  met	   in	  Morouj	   are	   living	   far	   from	  their	  ‘homes’.	  Besma	  told	  me	  that	  ‘you	  only	  leave	  your	  father’s	  house	  when	  you	  marry	  or	  when	   you	   die.’	   ‘Darna’	   (our	   house,	  meaning	   a	   person’s	   father’s	   house)	  was	   a	   frequently	  used	  phrase	  making	  the	  house	  synonymous	  with	  a	  person’s	  natal	   family	  that	  never	  loses	  its	  significance.	  ‘Our	  house’	  is	  also	  a	  place	  of	  refuge.	  Even	  Habiba	  talked	  of	  returning	  to	  the	  sanctity	  of	  her	  father’s	  house	  in	  Kerkenna,	  now	  inhabited	  by	  her	  grandchildren.	  Tellingly,	  Irkam,	  aged	  50,	  told	  me	  that	  she	  lived	  ‘alone’;	  she	  meant	  that	  she	  lived	  with	  her	  husband	  and	  children,	  rather	  than	  with	  her	  extended	  family	  or	  husband’s	  family.	  Divorcing	  women	  (and	  men)	  would	  systematically	  take	  refuge	  in	  their	  father’s	  house.	  (Rather	  than	  asking	  a	  divorcing	   woman	   where	   she	   lived,	   the	   judge	   would	   simply	   ask	   her,	   ‘in	   your	   father’s	  house?’	   assuming	   the	   response	   in	   his	   question).103	   A	   daughter’s	   ability	   to	   take	   refuge	  there,	   however,	   is	   contingent	   on	   her	   father’s	   acceptance	   of	   their	   desire	   to	   divorce,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102	  Arendt	  read	  via	  Lambek	  2010:15.	  
103	  These	  exchanges	  occurred	  in	  the	  reconciliation	  sessions.	  cf	  chapter	  4.	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something	   not	   to	   be	   taken	   for	   granted.104	   The	   talk	   of	   ‘our	   house’,	   along	   with	   Besma’s	  frequent	  visits	  to	  her	  own	  father’s	  house,	  points	  to	  the	  continued	  significance	  of	  kinship	  as	  a	   support	   network.	   It	   is	   not	   that	   extended	   family	   has	   lost	   its	   importance	   or	   has	   been	  replaced	  by	  the	  ‘extended	  street’	  (Holmes-­‐Eber	  2003);	  the	  nature	  of	  kin	  relations	  has	  also	  changed	  as	  the	  family	  is	  now	  extended	  geographically.	  
The	   idiom	  of	  kinship105	   is	   recruited	   to	  add	  meaning	   to	  new	  forms	  of	  relatedness,	  whether	   permanent	   friendships	   or	   fleeting	   encounters.	   Besma	   introduced	  me	   to	   Tata106	  Meriam,	  another	  of	  her	  close	  friends	  who	  shared	  the	  innate	  goodness	  and	  proximity	  due	  to	  shared	  Kerkenni	   identity,	  describing	  her	  as	  a	   ‘relative’.	   She	  was	  not	   literally	   related,	  but	  Besma	  said	  that	  if	  someone	  comes	  from	  your	  ‘bled’	  (place	  of	  origin),	  then	  you	  can	  say	  they	  are	   a	   relative.	   	   Meriam,	   a	   woman	   a	   little	   older	   than	   Besma,	   is	   also	   from	   Kerkenna.	   By	  telling	  me	  to	  call	  her	  ‘Tata’	  Besma	  was	  indicating	  to	  me	  that	  Meriam	  was	  her	  close	  friend	  whom	   I	   could	   trust	   and	   treat	   as	   I	   would	   Besma,	   a	   woman	   of	   my	   mother’s	   generation.	  Besma	  herself	   calls	  her	   friend	   ‘Meriouma’,	  using	   the	  diminutive.	  Kinship	   terms	  were	  not	  used	   only	   to	   refer	   to	   those	   who	   shared	   a	   regional	   origin.	   Whilst	   she	   would	   not	   have	  described	   her	   as	   a	   relative	   in	   these	   terms,	   Nour	   (who	   we	   shall	   meet	   below)	   was	   also	  known	   to	   Jamila	   and	  me	  as	   ‘Tata’.	   Equally,	   kinship	   terms	  were	   frequently	  used	   to	   show	  respect	   and	   build	   trust	  when	  meeting	   complete	   strangers,	   not	   the	   least	  when	   soliciting	  help	  (as	  we	  shall	  see	  in	  the	  court	  office	  in	  chapter	  3).	  	  
More	   and	  more	  people,	   however,	   lived	   far	   from	   their	   ‘house’.	  As	  Besma	   told	  me,	  her	  ‘house’	  was	  in	  Northern	  Tunisia	  and	  her	  immediate	  neighbour,	  Nejia’s,	  ‘house’	  was	  in	  central	   Tunisia.	   She	   and	  Nejia	   lent	   each	   other	  money	   and	   their	   sons	   lived	   together	   like	  brothers,	   borrowing	   each	   other’s	   clothes.	   She	   considered	   Nejia’s	   little	   girl	   like	   another	  daughter.	   Besma	   also	   provided	   essential	   support	   for	   Nejia	   each	   time	   she	   had	   a	   dispute	  with	  her	  husband,	  something	  that,	  unfortunately,	  happened	  all	  too	  frequently.	  Equally,	  for	  Saida,	  who	  had	  moved	  to	  Morouj	  for	  its	  cheap	  rent	  after	  she	  was	  forced	  out	  of	  the	  marital	  home	  due	  to	  domestic	  violence,	  some	  of	  the	  neighbouring	  women	  provided	  a	  vital	  support	  network.	  They	  offered	  her	  odd	   jobs	  to	  earn	  money,	  help	  with	  babysitting,	   legal	  advice	   in	  view	   of	   her	   pending	   divorce	   (one	   of	   the	   ladies	   had	   studied	   law)	   and,	   perhaps	   most	  importantly,	  company	  so	  that	  she	  did	  not	  have	  to	  spend	  all	  day	  alone	  in	  the	  small	  room	  she	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104	  cf	  chapter	  2.	  
105	  cf	  Singerman	  (2006)	  for	  her	  discussion	  of	  the	  familial	  ethos	  in	  Cairo,	  a	  moral	  ideal	  that	  often	  contrasts	  with	  the	  
practice	  of	  kinship	  and	  relatedness	  in	  the	  city.	  
106	  Tata,	  the	  French	  for	  aunty,	  is	  used	  as	  a	  term	  of	  endearment	  or	  respect	  for	  women	  of	  approximately	  your	  
mother’s	  generation.	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was	  able	  to	  rent	  with	  her	  3-­‐year-­‐old	  son.	  	  In	  this	  way,	  solidarity	  between	  neighbours	  may	  grow	  out	  of	  necessity,	  even	  where	  genuine	  affection	  such	  as	   that	  which	  existed	  between	  Nabiba	  and	  Nejia	  has	  yet	  to	  flourish.	  
Consequently,	   the	   seeds	   of	   many	   friendships	   were	   sown	   as	   people	   went	   about	  daily	  life.	  Jamila	  had	  her	  own	  network	  of	  friends	  that	  started	  in	  school	  and	  remained	  in	  her	  neighbourhood	  in	  Morouj.	  These	  merged	  with	  her	  mother’s	  as	  they	  frequently	  spent	  time	  together	  with	  Nour	  and	  her	  daughters	  who	  were	  mutual	  friends.	  Years	  of	  friendship	  began	  as	   the	   girls	   borrowed	   each	   other’s	   schoolbooks	   and	   helped	   each	   other	  with	   homework.	  Aunty	  (Tata)	  Rhadia	  is	  a	  notable	  exception	  among	  Besma’s	  friends,	  as	  she	  does	  not	  come	  from	   Kerkenna.	   (Although	   I	   suspected	   that	   Besma’s	   husband	   approved	   less	   of	   this	  friendship	  than	  he	  did	  of	  some	  of	  the	  others).	  
The	   duty	   of	   mutual	   care	   between	   neighbours	   was,	   according	   to	   Besma,	   also	   a	  religious	   duty.	   Besma	   stressed	   the	   importance	   that	   the	   religion	   places	   on	   helping	   your	  close	  neighbours,	  a	  statement	  that	  was	  far	  more	  than	  just	  words	  to	  her,	  as	  she	  frequently	  went	  out	  of	  her	  way	  to	  help	  those	   living	  close	  by.	  As	  well	  as	   these	  women	  whom	  Besma	  considered	   friends,	   by	   enacting	   what	   she	   believed	   was	   required	   of	   a	   good	   Muslim	   and	  neighbour,	   she	  also	  became	  closer	   to	  her	   immediate	  neighbours	   in	   the	   time	   that	   I	   knew	  her.	   The	   relationships	   between	   these	   neighbouring	   families	   seemed	   to	   tighten	   as	   they	  exchanged	   visits	   and	   support	   during	   difficult	  moments	   in	   their	   lives.	   As	   she	   helped	   her	  neighbours,	  they	  were	  slowly	  becoming	  friends.	  
This	   was	  most	   notable	   during	   Ramadan,	   when	   people	   traditionally	   tend	   to	   visit	  each	  other	  more	  frequently	  and	  the	  immediate	  neighbours	  came	  a	  few	  times	  to	  break	  the	  fast	  with	  us.	  Just	  before	  I	  left	  Tunisia,	  the	  death	  of	  one	  of	  the	  neighbours,	  Amm	  Ahmed107	  also	  accentuated	  these	  ties.	  Ahmed	  lived	  close	  to	  Besma’s	  house	  and	  his	  health	  had	  been	  deteriorating	   for	   some	   months.	   During	   this	   time,	   Besma	   and	   her	   husband	   visited	   him	  regularly	   in	  hospital,	   together	  with	  Salah,	  who	  lived	  next	  door	  and	  was	  also	  friends	  with	  Besma’s	   husband.	  When	  he	   suddenly	   died	   the	   day	   after	  Aïd	   el-­Kebir,	   Besma	   sprang	   into	  action,	  helping	   the	  new	  widow	  prepare	   food	   for	   the	   funeral	  and	   for	  guests	  who	  came	   to	  pay	   their	   respects.	   Her	   husband,	   son,	   Salah	   and	   another	   neighbour	   helped	   out	   by	  slaughtering	  the	  sheep	  needed	  to	  make	  the	  couscous	  and	  preparing	  the	  meat	   in	  Besma’s	  garden,	  to	  ease	  the	  strain	  on	  the	  bereaved	  family.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107	  Amm:	  Literally	  ‘paternal	  uncle’,	  a	  term	  of	  endearment	  or	  respect	  for	  men	  of	  your	  father’s	  generation	  or	  older.	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Besma	  and	  her	  husband	  acted	  as	  surrogate	  parents	  to	  Salah,	  who	  comes	  from	  the	  countryside	  in	  the	  interior	  of	  Tunisia,	  and	  his	  young	  wife,	  Nejwa,	  who	  had	  left	  her	  native	  soil	  for	  the	  first	  time	  to	  join	  her	  husband	  in	  Morouj.	  Unfamiliar	  with	  city	  life	  and	  far	  from	  her	  family,	  Nejwa,	  who	  was	  only	  17	  when	  she	  married,	  has	  become	  increasingly	  close	  to	  Besma.	   I	   do	   not	   think	   that	   Besma	  would	   describe	   Nejwa	   as	   a	   friend	   and	   she	   expresses	  reservations	  about	  her,	  given	  that	  she	  comes	  from	  the	  countryside,	   ‘the	   interior’	  and	  not	  from	  the	  South,	  but	  she	  nonetheless	  sees	  it	  as	  her	  human	  duty	  to	  be	  kind	  to	  this	  girl,	  who	  is	  so	  far	  away	  from	  her	  mother.	  She	  is	  doing	  a	  favour	  for	  Nejwa’s	  mother,	  Gamara,	  of	  whom	  she	   is	   fond;	   if	   Jamila	   were	   ever	   far	   from	   home	   and	   need	   of	   help,	   she	   would	   hope	   that	  another	  woman	  would	  be	  so	  kind	  to	  her	  daughter.	   It	  has	  even	  been	  known	  for	  Besma	  to	  intervene	  to	  defend	  Nejwa	  in	  marital	  disputes	  with	  her	  much	  older	  husband;	  it	  would	  be	  inappropriate	   for	   Besma’s	   husband	   to	   intervene,	   to	   preserve	   the	   couple’s	   intimacy,	   but	  Besma’s	   intervention	   as	   an	   older	  woman	   and	  mother-­‐figure	   is	   deemed	   appropriate	   and	  Nejwa’s	   husband	   is	   bound	   to	   respect	   her	   (at	   least	   overtly).	   In	   this	  way,	   in	   this	   neolocal	  setting	  where	  people	   live	   far	   from	   close	   kin,	   neighbours	   and	   friends	   take	   on	   the	   role	   of	  caring	  for	  one	  another	  and,	  in	  the	  process,	  create	  new	  webs	  of	  relatedness.	  
The	   ability	   to	  weave	   a	  web	   of	   relationships	   is,	   however,	   limited	   by	   the	  material	  constraints	   that	   increasingly	   weighed	   on	   these	   families	   struggling	   to	   bring	   up	   their	  children	   in	   a	   difficult	   economic	   climate.	   Economic	   difficulties	   make	   households	   more	  atomised,	  as	  people	  are	  less	  willing	  or	  able	  to	  share	  resources	  that	  are	  scarce	  and	  hard	  to	  come	  by.	  Those	  I	  knew	  in	  Morouj	   in	  their	  40s	  and	  50s	  often	  reminisced	  to	  me	  about	  the	  golden	  days	  of	  childhood,	  when,	  as	  Besma’s	  neighbour	  Zeineb	  (aged	  48)	  put	   it:	   ‘Life	  was	  better	   in	   all	   respects	   …	   We	   had	   good	   food	   and	   everything	   was	   better	   and	   plentiful.’	  Maintaining	   friendships	  has	  a	   financial	   cost	  as	  visitors	  must	  be	  offered	  something	   to	  eat	  and	  drink.	  Besma	  regretfully	  told	  me	  that,	  financially,	  she	  could	  not	  allow	  herself	  to	  share	  food	   with	   close	   friends	   or	   neighbours,	   as	   was	   common	   practice	   in	   the	   past.	   Material	  impoverishment	  is	  felt	  alongside	  the	  loss	  of	  the	  close	  relationships	  in	  the	  house	  that	  would	  once	  have	  been	  supportive	  when	  times	  were	  hard.	  
The	  economic	  climate	  contributes	  to	  the	  sense	  of	  dislocation	  and	  lack	  of	  trust	  in	  a	  further	  respect.	  In	  spite	  of	  the	  genuine	  affection	  that	  exists	  between	  many	  of	  these	  women,	  Besma,	   like	  many	  others,	   feared	   that	   these	   friendships	  may	  really	  be	  based	  on	   ‘interest’,	  the	   potential	   for	   gain	   -­‐	   material	   or	   otherwise.	   In	   addition,	   people	   tended	   to	   hide	   any	  success	  or	  riches	  they	  did	  have	  for	  fear	  of	  attracting	  the	  jealousy	  of	  others	  that	  put	  them	  at	  risk	  of	  being	  subject	  to	  the	  evil	  eye.	  (This	  was	  another	  reason	  for	  the	  safety	  pin	  that	  had	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appeared	  on	  my	  bedside	   table).	   Even	   those	  Besma	   is	   closest	   to,	  mostly	   come	   to	   see	  her	  when	   they	  want	   something.	  Whilst	   necessity,	   proximity	   and	   human	   kindness	   draw	   this	  group	   together,	   these	   newer	   friendships	   are	   bitter	   sweet;	   even	   these	   women	   cannot	  supplant	  the	  virtually	  life-­‐long	  friendships	  she	  has	  in	  Kram.	  	  
	  
CONCLUSION	  	  
As	   ethical	   personhood	  has	   become	  dislocated,	   it	   is	   difficult	   to	   evaluate	   the	   intentions	   of	  others	  who	  may	  have	   an	   ulterior	  motive	   for	   befriending	   you	   or	  whose	   kind	  words	  may	  conceal	  a	  threat	  in	  disguise.	  (Hence,	  the	  appearance	  of	  the	  safety	  pin	  on	  my	  bedside	  table,	  with	   which	   I	   began	   this	   chapter).	   As	   traditional	   markers	   of	   ethical	   personhood,	   like	   a	  person’s	   regional	   identity	   or	   family	   origin,	   have	   become	   illegible	   in	   the	   setting	   of	   the	  neighbourhood,	   it	   is	   increasingly	   difficult	   to	   locate	   others	   socially.	   Judicious	   practice	   is	  wrought	   with	   uncertainty,	   as	   the	   basis	   on	   which	   it	   is	   made	   cannot	   be	   trusted.	   	   In	   this	  setting,	  itself	  dislocated	  –	  as	  in	  the	  court	  (chapter	  4)	  –	  moral	  judgement	  must	  be	  based	  on	  performance	  and	  appearances	  may	  not	  be	  all	  that	  they	  seem.	  These	  doubts	  about	  who	  to	  trust	  lead	  to	  a	  sense	  of	  uncertainty	  and	  anxiety.	  	  
This	   chronic	   uncertainty	   is	   deepened	  by	   the	   implicit	   political	   implications	   of	   the	  way	  in	  which	  a	  person’s	  performance	  of	  ethical	  personhood	  may	  be	  judged.	  Jamila’s	  father	  did	  not	  want	  her	  to	  veil	  because	  he	  feared	  that	  this	  would	  be	  read	  as	  a	  political	  statement	  with	   undesirable	   consequences.108	   The	   potential	   for	   judgement	   by	   her	   father	   and	   by	  agents	  of	  the	  state	  who	  may	  wrongly	  interpret	  her	  intentions	  shapes	  the	  way	  in	  which	  she	  expresses	  her	  modesty	  and	  piety.	  	  
It	   is	   in	  this	  context,	  where	  trust	  is	  hard	  to	  build	  and	  where	  the	  fear	  of	  repression	  coupled	  with	  the	  processes	  of	  dislocation	  I	  have	  described	  creates	  radical	  uncertainty,	  that	  marriages	  are	  formed	  and	  break	  down.	  In	  the	  next	  chapters,	  we	  shall	  see	  how	  this	  process	  of	   dislocation	   and	   the	   resulting	   uncertainties	   permeate	   the	   practice	   of	  marriage	   and	   of	  divorce,	   not	   the	   least	   as	   the	   uncertainties	   of	   moral	   judgement	   intertwine	   with	   those	  surrounding	  legal	  judgement	  in	  cases	  of	  divorce.	  Equally,	  if	  rights	  are	  relational	  as	  Joseph	  (1997)	   has	   suggested,	   we	   shall	   see	   how	   this	   is	   so	   in	   Tunisia,	   where	   relationships	   with	  neighbours	   and	   friends	   have	   taken	   on	   importance	   alongside	   those	   with	   kin	   and	   where	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108	  See	  McBrien	  (2009)	  for	  a	  comparable	  analysis	  of	  the	  practice	  of	  veiling	  in	  Kyrgyzstan.	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webs	  of	  relatedness	  are	  marked	  with	  uncertainty	  and	  anxiety	  in	  the	  heterogeneous	  setting	  of	  the	  city	  suburbs.	  
	  
EPILOGUE.	  MAKING	  MOROUJ:	  NO	  RETURN	  
	  
Besma	  (9)	  
Besma’s	   family’s	   visits	   to	   Kerkenna	   continue.	   Having	   their	   own	   car	   and	   better	  
financial	   circumstances	   than	   during	   her	   childhood	   allows	   them	   to	   make	   annual	  
visits,	   to	   see	   her	  husband’s	  mother	  and	   to	  harvest	   the	   olives	   from	   their	   trees.	   Each	  
time	   the	  car	   comes	  back	   full	  of	  Kerkenni	  delights:	  olives	   from	   their	   trees,	   fresh	   fish	  
and	  octopus.	  	  
However,	  life	  in	  Kerkenna	  can	  be	  harder	  than	  the	  fond	  memories	  suggest	  lacking	  in	  
some	  of	  the	  material	  comforts	  that	  are	  prevalent	  in	  the	  city.	  Following	  a	  dispute	  with	  
her	   daughter,	   Habiba	   threatened	   to	  move	   back	   to	   Kerkenna	   to	   her	   father’s	   house	  
where	  her	  grandchildren	  now	   live.	  Besma	  said	   that	  her	  children	  would	  never	  allow	  
this.	  The	  winter	  in	  Kerkenna	  is	  hard	  for	  an	  old	  lady.	  	  
Besma	  tells	  me	  that	  there	  is	  a	  whole	  neighbourhood	  in	  Kerkenna	  full	  of	  older,	  single	  
men.	   These	  men,	   having	   finished	   bringing	   up	   their	   families	   in	   Tunis,	  move	   back	   to	  
their	   grandfather’s	   house	   in	   Kerkenna	   upon	   retirement.	   Their	   wives	   refuse	   to	   go,	  
preferring	  to	  stay	  close	  to	  their	  children	  and	  grandchildren,	  and	  the	  couples	  divorce.	  	  
Besma	  can	  imagine	  that	  Morouj	  will	  become	  a	  ‘houma’	  like	  Kram	  is	  to	  her	  mother	  in	  
the	  future.	  She	  cannot	  imagine	  going	  back	  to	  live	  in	  Kerkenna,	  even	  after	  she	  retires.	  
Although	   she	   has	   blood	   connections	   with	   many	   people	   there,	   these	   are	   distant	  
relatives;	  her	  close	  family	  are	  in	  Kram.	  If	  she	  imagines	  staying	  in	  Morouj,	  however,	  it	  
is	  because	  of	  her	  house	  and	  most	  of	  all	  her	  children,	  whom	  she	  hopes	  will	  stay	  there	  
to	   bring	   up	   her	   grandchildren.	   She	  wants	   to	   play	   an	   active	   role	   in	   their	   lives.	   Her	  
sons,	   she	   hopes	  will	   live	   upstairs,	   following	   the	   patrilocal	   tradition.	  Her	   daughter’s	  
place	  of	  residence	  is	  less	  certain	  and	  will	  depend	  on	  her	  future	  husband.	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One	  dream	  would	  be	  for	  her	  daughter	  to	  marry	  a	  neighbour,	  meaning	  that	  she	  could	  
keep	  her	  close	  by	  and	  help	   look	  after	  the	  grandchildren	  and	  clean	  her	  home,	  whilst	  
she	   goes	   out	   to	   work.	   Recently,	   one	   friend	   had	   evoked	   the	   possibility	   of	   leaving	  
Morouj;	  her	  marriage	  was	  breaking	  down	  and	  she	  did	  not	  wish	  to	  remain	  in	  Morouj	  
with	   the	   stigma	   attached	   to	   being	   a	   divorced	   woman.	   Besma	   immediately	  
reproached	  her,	  asking	  how	  could	  she	  consider	  leaving	  all	  her	  friends?	  Besma	  would	  
undoubtedly	  miss	  this	  woman	  she	  is	  fond	  of,	  who	  forms	  part	  of	  her	  support	  network.	  
These	   people,	   and	   the	   webs	   of	   relationships	   between	   them,	   are	   in	   the	   process	   of	  
making	  Morouj	  into	  more	  than	  a	  formerly	  empty	  field.	  Especially	  those	  relationships	  
between	  parents	  and	  children,	  which	  are	  the	  most	  solid	  of	  all.	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CHAPTER	  2	  –	  	  
MARRIAGE	  IS	  LIKE	  A	  WATERMELON	  
	  
Besma	  (1)	  
We	  went	  to	  Besma’s	  parent’s	  house	  in	  Kram	  to	  join	  in	  preparations	  for	  her	  brother’s	  
wedding.	   Outside,	   the	   women	   of	   the	   family	   and	   various	   female	   friends	   busied	  
themselves	  preparing	  food	  for	  the	  first	  of	  the	  wedding	  parties	  to	  be	  held	  that	  night	  on	  
the	  roof	  of	  the	  house.	  ‘Marriage,’	  they	  told	  me,	  ‘is	  like	  a	  watermelon.	  You	  don’t	  know	  
whether	  it	  is	  sweet	  or	  bitter	  until	  you	  cut	  it	  open.’	  	  
The	  apparently	  unwilling	  groom	  lay	  on	  his	  bed,	  visible	  through	  the	  door	  that	  opened	  
onto	  the	  courtyard,	  grappling	  with	  the	  uncertainties	  of	  his	  pending	  marriage	  to	  his	  
second	   cousin.	  Would	   his	  watermelon	   be	   sweet	   or	   bitter?	   	  His	  mother	   had	   decided	  
that	  it	  was	  high	  time	  that	  he	  married	  and	  a	  suitable	  match	  was	  found	  in	  the	  family.	  I	  
was	  pleased	  to	  discover	   that	   their	  marriage	  was	  sweet.	  Subsequent	  visits	   found	  the	  
couple	  happily	  settled	  into	  their	  marital	  home	  above	  the	  parental	  roof.	  A	  high	  level	  of	  
mutual	  respect	  and	  compromise	  meant	  that	  the	  groom	  retained	  some	  of	  his	  freedom	  
and	   could	   continue	   to	   visit	   his	   friends,	   whilst	   his	   wife	   went	   about	   her	   duties	   and	  
enjoyed	  their	  Saturday	  tradition	  of	  going	  out	  for	  a	  meal	  together,	  giving	  her	  one	  day	  
off	  from	  cooking	  every	  week.	  	  
	  
INTRODUCTION	  	  
Marriage,	   like	   life	   in	   the	   neighbourhood	   as	   seen	   in	   the	   last	   chapter,	   was	   ripe	   with	  uncertainties.	   This	   chapter	   examines	   how	   the	   processes	   of	   dislocation	   described	   in	   the	  previous	  chapter	  shape	  the	  practice	  of	  marriage.	  In	  particular,	  it	  explores	  marriage	  among	  the	   predominantly	   lower-­‐middle	   class	   inhabitants	   of	   Morouj	   and	   Besma’s	   network	   in	  relation	   to	   changing	   patterns	   of	   consumption	   that	   shape	   the	   material	   relationship	  between	  the	  spouses.	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In	   this	   context,	   I	   focus	   on	   two	   related	   aspects	   of	   marriage:	   how	   marriages	   are	  formed	  and	  how	  marital	  duties	  are	  understood	  and	  carried	  out.	  Through	   this	  discussion	  we	  can	  explore	  why	  divorce	   is	   taboo	  and	  why	  some	  people	   remain	   stuck	   in	  unhappy	  or	  abusive	  marriages	  rather	  than	  file	  for	  divorce.	  
‘CONSENT’	  
Through	  the	  PSC,	  that	  made	  the	  consent	  of	  both	  spouses	  the	  first	  condition	  of	  marriage,109	  Bourguiba	  explicitly	  wanted	  to	  change	  the	  basis	  on	  which	  marriages	  are	  made.	  As	  part	  of	  his	  nation-­‐building	  project,	  he	  wanted	  to	  weaken	  an	  individual’s	  reliance	  on	  kin	  in	  favour	  of	  an	  emphasis	  on	  national	  solidarity	  and	  citizenship.	  As	  Abdulahmid,	  our	  Arabic	  teacher	  at	  the	  Bourguiba	  Institute	   for	  Modern	  Languages	  taught	  us	  during	  the	  part	  of	   the	  course	  that	  covered	  the	  PSC,	  marriage	  should	  be	  based	  on	  the	  ‘freedom	  of	  choice’	  of	  the	  spouses:	  	  
‘Before,	  the	  father	  chose	  a	  husband	  for	  his	  daughter.	  Her	  suitors	  spoke	  to	  him	  directly	  and,	  if	   he	   agreed,	   the	   daughter	   had	   no	   right	   to	   refuse.	   The	   PSC	   cancelled	   this.	   It	   is	   now	   a	  condition	  of	  marriage	  that	  both	  consent.	  The	  person	  officiating	  asks	  the	  bride	  if	  she	  accepts	  the	  marriage,	  and	  she	  signs	  to	  show	  her	  agreement.	  In	  the	  past	  there	  was	  forced	  marriage,	  now	  this	  is	  no	  longer	  the	  case.	  As	  God	  said:	  there	  is	  no	  compulsion	  in	  religion.’	  
In	  this	  way,	  our	  teacher	  stressed	  how	  the	  notion	  of	  each	  spouse	  consenting	  to	  the	  marriage	  was	  not	  a	  foreign	  one;	  rather	  it	  was	  felt	  to	  be	  part	  of	  the	  religion.	  This	  view	  was	  echoed	   in	  Morouj.	   Samia,	   Besma’s	   neighbour,	   explained	   to	  me	   a	   proverb	   of	   the	   Prophet	  Mohammed,	  who	   said	   that	  when	  a	  man	   comes	   to	  marry	   your	  daughter,	   the	  mother	   and	  father	  should	  check	  if	  she	  agrees	  and	  if	  not,	  should	  not	  force	  her	  to	  marry.	  Aziz,	  aged	  79,	  also	   underlined	   this	   point:	   ‘even	   before	   the	   PSC,	   in	   sharia	   law,	   you	  must	   ask	   if	   the	   girl	  agrees	  to	  the	  marriage.	  Forced	  marriage	  is	  forbidden.	  Sometimes	  the	  brother	  tries	  to	  force	  his	  sister,	  and	  tells	  her	  to	  marry	  her	  cousin	  (paternal	  uncle’s	  son)	  instead	  of	  someone	  else,	  but	   this	   is	   ’forbidden	   in	   the	   religion’.’	   In	   this	   way,	   the	   PSC	   was	   legitimated	   as	   being	  compatible	   with	   Islam,	   as	   opposed	   to	   practices	   like	   forced	   marriage	   that	   had	   been	  maligned	   and	   were	   considered	   antiquated.	   Nonetheless,	   in	   a	   rare	   direct	   ethnographic	  reference	   to	   the	  PSC,	  Abu	  Zahra	  noted	   that	   in	  her	  village,	   ‘people	   regret	   very	  much	   that	  today110	   girls	   have	   a	   say	   in	   their	   marriage	   and	   are	   given	   the	   power	   to	   challenge	   the	  authority	  of	  their	  fathers’	  (1982:	  128).	  Alternatively,	  however,	  according	  to	  Hafsia	  in	  her	  historical	   account	   of	   marriage	   in	   Tunisia,	   women	   have	   always	   given	   their	   consent	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109	  PSC,	  Article	  3.	  	  
110	  Her	  study	  was	  carried	  out	  in	  the	  1970s.	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marriage	   before	   two	   witnesses,	   although	   a	   male	   guardian	   was	   delegated	   to	   sign	   the	  marriage	  contract	  on	  their	  behalf	  (2005:	  38-­‐9).	  
Anthropological	  work	  on	  Tunisian	  kinship	  discusses	  how	  marriages	  were	  formed	  in	   terms	   of	   the	   relationship	   between	   two	   groups	   and	   how	   marriage	   strategies	   have	  evolved	  in	  light	  of	  economic	  changes.	  Goody	  has	  emphasized	  that	  ‘a	  change	  in	  productive	  system	   [that]	   will	   have	   an	   important	   affect	   on	   social	   organization’	   will	   subsequently	  influence	   interpersonal	   relations	   and	   marriage	   strategy.	   Land	   being	   replaced	   by	   other	  forms	  of	  cultural	  capital,	   such	  as	  education	  (Goody	  1998:	  104)	  –	  as	  has	  occurred	   for	   the	  inhabitants	  of	  Morouj	  –	  emerges	  alongside	  the	  rise	  of	  women’s	  employment	  in	  the	  labour	  market	   as	   key	   factors	   which	   influence	   the	   mode	   of	   social	   stratification	   and	   marital	  strategies.111	  There	  is	  little	  information,	  however,	  on	  how	  marriages	  are	  formed	  in	  urban	  settings,	  although	  Holmes-­‐Eber’s	  1980’s	  urban	  ethnography	  of	  Tunis	  (2003:	  55)	  supports	  Abu	  Zahra’s	  conclusion112	   that	  education	  privileges	  marriage	  outside	  the	  group,	  which	   is	  most	   likely	   to	   occur	   in	   families	  where	   ‘all	   daughters	   go	   to	   school	   [and]	   some	  may	   even	  qualify	  for	  jobs/professions’	  (1992:	  51).	  
The	   notion	   of	   what	   might	   have	   been	   meant	   by	   ‘consent’	   historically	   in	   Tunisia,	  when	  a	  male	  guardian	  signature	  was	  also	  required	  for	  marriage,	  contrasts	  with	  the	  PSC’s	  understanding	  of	  consent	  as	  freedom	  of	  choice	  as	  portrayed	  by	  our	  teacher.	  Furthermore,	  these	  accounts	  appear	  to	  emphasize	  structure	  rather	  than	  agency	  or	  choice	  in	  the	  making	  of	  marriages.	  How	  might	  consent	  be	  understood	  according	   to	  more	  nuanced	  accounts	  of	  agency	  that	  move	  beyond	  this	  dichotomy?	  	  
Laidlaw,	  following	  Williams,	  identifies	  three	  kinds	  of	  terms	  that	  must	  be	  reconciled	  for	   an	   understanding	   of	   agency:	   ‘determinism,	   choice/intention,	   ethical	   terms	   such	   as	  blame	  and	  responsibility’	  (2010:	  154).	  He	  proceeds	  to	  locate	  agency	  in	  the	  third	  of	  these	  terms,	  in	  responsibility:	  
	  ‘Speaking	   of	   how	   much	   ‘agency’	   the	   acting	   subject	   may	   or	   may	   not	   have	   is	   roughly	  speaking	  meaningless.	   This	   is	   not	   an	   increase	   in	   their	   general	   capacity	   to	   get	  what	   they	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111	  Abu	  Zahra’s	  1960’s	  ethnography	  examines	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  post-­‐colonial	  economic	  and	  political	  reforms	  on	  
marriage	  practice	  in	  the	  Tunisian	  village	  of	  Sidi	  Ameur.	  The	  abolition	  of	  habous	  lands,	  which	  had	  previously	  assured	  
the	  dominance	  of	  the	  founding,	  prestigious	  Zawiya	  group,	  combine	  with	  the	  introduction	  of	  compulsory	  education	  
and	  a	  political	  system	  no	  longer	  based	  on	  descent	  to	  allow	  upward	  social	  mobility	  to	  the	  Ramada,	  previously	  the	  
lower	  social	  strata	  in	  the	  village.	  Marriage	  became	  a	  battleground	  where	  the	  ancient	  antagonisms	  between	  the	  two	  
groups	  could	  continue	  to	  be	  expressed	  in	  the	  new	  economic	  climate,	  as	  the	  Ramada	  aimed	  to	  use	  their	  new	  cultural	  
capital	  to	  inter-­‐marry	  with	  Zawiya	  women,	  whilst	  the	  Zawiya	  sought	  to	  maintain	  their	  policy	  of	  in-­‐group	  marriage	  as	  
‘the	  marriage	  of	  Zawiya	  women	  is	  more	  controllable	  than	  the	  ownership	  of	  land	  and	  olive	  trees.’	  (1982:161).	  
112	  cf.	  Goody	  citing	  education	  among	  factors	  which	  influence	  how	  we	  chose	  a	  mate	  (1998:104).	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want	  done.	  It	  comes	  instead	  as	  responsibility	   for	  particular	  happenings	  or	  states	  of	  affairs	  and	   this	  may	   include	   states	   of	   affairs	   that	   they	   have	   rather	   limited	   capacity	   to	   influence.’	  (ibid,	  my	  emphasis)	  
However,	   by	   focussing	  on	  how	  an	   individual	  may	  be	  held	   accountable	   for	   things	  beyond	   their	   control,	   it	   is	   not	   clear	  what	   place	   Laidlaw	  gives	   to	   intentionality.	   In	  which	  cases	  is	  it	  relevant	  to	  take	  an	  individual’s	  intention	  into	  account	  when	  evaluating	  whether	  they	  are	  responsible	   for	   their	  actions?	  (I	  will	   return	  to	   this	  question	   in	  detail	   later	  on).	   I	  will	   argue	   that	   attending	   to	   the	   place	   of	   intention	   in	   ‘agency’	   contributes	   to	   an	  understanding	   of	   the	   gendered	   nature	   of	   ethical	   personhood	   and	   of	   the	   gender	  inequalities	  that	  emerge	  in	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  law.113	  	  
If	  intentionality	  is,	  or	  is	  not,	  taken	  into	  account	  it	  is	  because,	  as	  I	  will	  argue,	  moral	  judgement	   lies	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   ‘agency’	   and	   consequently	   emerges	   as	   a	   more	   pertinent	  concept	   through	   which	   to	   understand	   how	   marriages	   are	   formed	   and	   ended.	   Laidlaw	  suggests	   this	   implicitly	  as	  he	  also	  defines	  agency	  via	   ‘the	  ways	   in	  which	   responsibility	  or	  accountability	  for	  actions	  and	  their	  effects	  are	  attributed	  to	  persons	  and	  things.’	  (ibid,	  my	  emphasis)	   Consequently,	   agency	   –	   read	   as	   judicious	   practice	   based	   on	   a	   form	   of	   ethical	  personhood	   that	   is	   relational	   and	   defined	   by	   responsibilities	   –	   provides	   a	   framework	  through	  which	   to	  understand	   the	  practice	  of	  marriage	  and	   the	  practice	  of	  divorce,	  given	  that	   the	  attribution	  of	   responsibility	   for	  marital	  breakdown	   is	  at	   the	  core	  of	   the	  work	  of	  the	  family	  judge.114	  	  
‘MARITAL	  DUTIES’	  
In	  later	  chapters	  we	  shall	  return	  to	  how	  responsibility	  is	  attributed	  in	  the	  divorce	  courts	  and	   how	   intentionality	   is	   relevant	   to	   the	   legal	   judgment	   process.	   Behind	   this	   lies	   an	  understanding	  about	  what	  husbands	  and	  wives	  are	  perceived	  to	  be	  accountable	  for:	  their	  responsibilities	   or,	   as	   the	   PSC	   puts	   it,	   their	   ‘marital	   duties.’	   Due	   to	   the	   ambiguity	   and	  silences	  of	  the	  law,	  this	  moral	  category	  takes	  on	  significance	  in	  the	  divorce	  court.	  Bowen	  highlighted	   the	   importance	   of	   exploring	   how	   the	   social	   norms	   relevant	   to	   the	   law	   are	  evoked	  in	  other	  contexts	  and	  by	  ordinary	  people.	  He	  concludes	  from	  this	  that,	  if	  ordinary	  people	   are	   influenced	   by	   these	   norms,	   then	   they	   would	   also	   shape	   decisions	   taken	   by	  judges	   (1998:	  395).	   In	   the	  Tunisian	  case,	   the	   legal	   code	  makes	   the	   relationship	  between	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113	  See	  ch4-­‐7.	  
114	  In	  ch4-­‐7,	  I	  will	  trace	  the	  relationship	  between	  judicious	  practice	  (as	  described	  in	  chapters	  1	  and	  2)	  and	  judicial	  
practice	  as	  the	  judge	  reaches	  decisions	  in	  divorce	  cases.	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law	  and	  norms	  explicit.	  It	  is	  in	  the	  neighbourhood,	  that	  I	  was	  immersed	  in	  the	  ‘custom	  and	  habit’	  that	  informed	  the	  work	  of	  the	  court,	  (not	  the	  least	  as	  some	  of	  the	  judges	  I	  knew	  lived	  not	  far	  away),	  and	  where	  ‘morality’	  was	  lived	  and	  breathed	  as	  my	  informants	  went	  about	  their	  lives.	  In	  this	  way,	  through	  my	  interactions	  and	  observations,	  the	  legal	  terms	  ‘marital	  duties’	   and	   ‘custom	   and	   habit’	   were	   brought	   to	   life	   for	   me,	   informing	   my	   own	  understanding	  of	  the	  divorce	  files	  and	  cases.	  I	  was	  also	  to	  learn	  about	  the	  challenges	  that	  people	   face	   as	   it	   becomes	   increasingly	   difficult	   to	   live	   up	   to	   ideal	   marital	   roles	   in	   the	  contemporary	  social	  and	  economic	  climate.	  
Lambek	   describes	   how	   specific	   rituals	   bring	   particular	   ethical	   criteria	   into	   play	  (2010:	  18).	  Marriage	  is	  one	  such	  ritual	  act,	  a	  form	  of	  promise	  initiated	  by	  the	  signing	  of	  the	  marriage	   contract	   and	   the	   celebration	   of	   the	   marriage	   (ibid:	   17).	   As	   such,	   marriage	  initiates	  a	  new	  state	  of	  ‘ethical	  personhood’	  (ibid:	  42-­‐44);	  married	  couples	  are	  expected	  to	  act	   as	   ‘good’	   husbands	   and	   wives	   and	   may	   be	   judged	   (by	   others	   and	   themselves,	   and	  potentially	   the	   court)	   as	   a	   result.	   How,	   then,	   are	   marital	   duties	   defined	   in	   the	  neighbourhood?	  How	  are	  they	  enacted	  in	  practice?	  	  
The	  female	  Family	  Judge	  pointed	  to	  a	  key	  way	  in	  which	  the	  marital	  relationship	  is	  changing;	  a	  second	  reason	  for	  the	  increase	  in	  divorce,	  she	  told	  me,	  was	  that	  women	  work.	  She	  suggested	  that	  this	  made	  women	  less	  tolerant	  of	  marital	  discord	  and	  more	  likely	  to	  file	  for	   divorce	   even	   for	  minor	   reasons.	  Available	   statistics115	   confirm	  a	   considerable	   rise	   in	  female	   wage	   labour116	   in	   Tunisia	   over	   recent	   decades,	   encouraged	   by	   the	   post-­‐colonial	  state	   in	   its	   aim	   to	   redefine	   gender	   roles.	   The	   limited	   ethnographic	   work	   tells	   us	   little,	  however,	   about	   how,	   or	   if,	   this	   change	   has	   contributed	   to	   modifying	   the	   conjugal	  relationship	   and	   the	   gendered	   division	   of	   labour	   within	   the	   household.	   Holmes-­‐Eber	  highlights	   the	   low	   proportion	   of	   women	   who	   continued	   to	   work	   after	   marriage	   due	   to	  social	   pressures	   that	   kept	  women	   at	   home,	   sometimes	   in	   spite	   of	   financial	   need	   (2003:	  86).	   It	  was	  a	  question	  of	   ‘family	  honour’	   to	  keep	  women	  at	  home	  and,	  as	  such,	   ‘women’s	  work	   and	   seclusion	   are	   generally	   related	   to	   class’	   (ibid:	   23),	   although	   she	   suggests	   that	  economic	   factors	   were	   making	   this	   increasingly	   difficult	   for	   middle-­‐class	   men.	   Rugh,	  discussing	   the	   lower	  classes	  of	  urban	  Egypt,	  where	  similar	  beliefs	   surrounding	  women’s	  work	   prevailed	   until	   the	   1980s,	   found	   that	   attitudes	   became	  more	   accepting	   of	   female	  employment	  as	  a	  result	  of	  economic	  difficulties,	  ‘rising	  expectations	  about	  what	  the	  basic	  needs	  of	  the	  household	  were’	  and	  the	  role	  model	  set	  by	  middle-­‐class	  women	  who	  worked	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115	  In	  1999,	  24.6%	  of	  the	  economically	  active	  population	  (over	  age	  15)	  was	  female,	  compared	  to	  only	  6%	  in	  1966	  
(UNDP	  2001:	  74).	  
116	  cf.	  Goody	  (1976)	  for	  impact	  of	  the	  gendered	  division	  of	  labour	  in	  a	  quite	  different	  context.	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in	  more	  ‘prestigious’	  jobs	  without	  a	  loss	  of	  status	  (1984:	  284).	  Education	  played	  a	  crucial	  role	   in	   opening	   the	   door	   to	   such	   higher	   status	   jobs	   for	   women,	   and	   parents	   began	   to	  encourage	  their	  daughters	  into	  education	  as	  ‘preparation	  for	  marriage,’	  as	  more	  and	  more	  parents	  grew	  to	  believe	  that	  ‘young	  men	  are	  beginning	  to	  seek	  wives	  who	  work’	  (ibid:	  285	  &	   287).	   Once	   again,	   attitudes	   to	   women’s	   work	   are	   described	   taking	   into	   account	   the	  gendered	   use	   of	   space	   and	  moral	   concerns	   surrounding	   female	  movements	   outside	   the	  house.	   How	   has	   the	   conjugal	   relationship	   changed	   in	   light	   of	   increased	   female	  employment?	  	  




Besma	  (2)	  	  
Besma’s	   brother’s	   marriage	   to	   a	   relative	   from	   Kerkenna	   was	   not	   unusual.	   Whilst	  
discussing	  Besma’s	   family	   tree	  and	   that	  of	  her	  husband,	   I	   soon	   realised	   that	   it	  was	  
quicker	   to	  ask	  who	  did	  not	   come	   from	  Kerkenna,	   rather	   than	  who	  did.	   In	  addition,	  
most	  come	  not	  only	  from	  Kerkenna	  but	  from	  the	  same	  village.	  In	  her	  opinion,	  90-­95%	  
of	   people	   in	   the	   family	  marry	   people	  who	   are	   ‘from	  Kerkenna.’	   She	   does	   not	   think	  
that	  this	  ‘regionalism’	  in	  her	  family	  tree	  is	  unique	  and	  that	  90%	  of	  family	  trees	  would	  
display	  a	  similar	   level	  of	  bias	   towards	  people	  coming	   from	  the	  same	  region.	  Besma	  
and	  her	  four	  siblings	  all	  married	  people	  from	  Kerkenna.	  Her	  three	  brothers	  had	  what	  
she	  would	   call	   ‘traditional’	  marriages,	  meaning	   from	  within	   the	   family.	  Her	   sister’s	  
marriage	   resulted	   from	   a	   chance	   encounter	   between	   their	   mothers	   on	   the	   beach.	  
Besma’s	   parents	  were	   reassured,	   as	   her	   father	  had	  worked	  with	   the	  brother	   of	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117	  I	  also	  draw	  on	  interviews	  and	  time	  spent	  elsewhere	  in	  Central	  Tunis	  and	  the	  Northern	  suburbs	  and	  conversations	  
with	  friends	  there.	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potential	   son-­in-­law.	   Having	   established	   that	   the	   man	   had	   a	   sound	   financial	  
situation,	  owning	  his	  own	  house,	  the	  marriage	  between	  them	  was	  quickly	  arranged.	  	  
One	  of	  the	  few	  marriages	  in	  the	  family	  that	  involved	  someone	  not	  from	  Kerkenna	  was	  
the	  cause	  of	  some	  scandal,	  especially	  because	  the	  male	  relative	  who	  chose	  to	  marry	  
‘out’	   was	   well	   off.	   The	   groom’s	   close	   family	   were	   happy	   that	   he	   had	   found	   a	   love	  
match,	  a	  girl	   he	   studied	  with	  at	  university.	  However,	   other	   relatives	  were	   resentful	  
that	  he	  had	  squandered	  his	  wealth	  on	  an	  outsider.	  	  
	  
The	   marriages	   that	   took	   place	   in	   Besma’s	   family	   highlight	   the	   co-­‐existence	   of	  different	   types	   of	   marriage.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   there	   are	   what	   my	   informants	   called	  ‘traditional’	  marriages	   that	  are	   like	  unopened	  watermelons	  and	  are	  most	  often	  arranged	  by	  the	  couple’s	  mothers.	  Love	  is	  expected	  to	  grow	  after	  the	  marriage.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  there	   are	   ‘love	   marriages’	   that	   presuppose	   some	   contact	   between	   the	   spouses	   before	  marriage,	  arranged	  by	  the	  couple	  themselves.	  Here,	  romantic	  love	  precedes	  the	  marriage	  between	  two	  individuals	  who	  are,	  most	  often,	  unrelated.	  	  
The	  family	  trees	  I	  collected	  in	  the	  neighbourhood	  revealed	  striking	  changes	  in	  the	  way	   marriages	   were	   formed,	   especially	   in	   the	   most	   recent	   generations.	   Besma’s	  experience	  provides	  a	  good	  example	  of	   this,	  especially	  when	  contrasted	  with	   that	  of	  her	  mother	  and	  their	  joint	  aspirations	  concerning	  her	  own	  daughter’s	  future	  spouse.	  	  
	  
Besma’s	  Mother	  
Besma’s	  parents	  had	  recently	  celebrated	  their	  47th	  wedding	  anniversary.	  Both	  grew	  
up	   in	   the	   same	   neighbourhood	   in	   Kerkenna.	   In	   the	   1950s,	   her	   father,	   Hichem,	   had	  
been	   offered	  work	   in	   the	   village	   of	   Sidi	   Bou	   Said	   near	   the	   capital,	  where	   his	   elder	  
sister	  was	  already	  living,	  and	  moved	  there	  to	  live	  with	  her	  and	  her	  husband.	  When	  he	  
was	  in	  his	  early	  20s,	  his	  family	  decided	  it	  was	  time	  for	  him	  to	  marry	  and	  his	  mother	  
started	  looking	  for	  a	  wife	  for	  him	  in	  Kerkenna.	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Mabrouka,	  Besma’s	  mother,	  explained	  that	  she	  came	  to	  marry	  Hichem,	  as	  he	  was	  her	  
sister’s	   neighbour.	   Her	   sister	   had	   a	   daughter	   of	   a	   similar	   age	   to	   Mabrouka	   and	  
wanted	  her	  daughter	  to	  marry	  Hichem.	  He	  refused,	  as	  he	  had	  grown	  up	  with	  the	  girl	  
and	  considered	  her	  a	   sister.	  Mabrouka’s	   sister	  was	   fond	  of	  Hichem	  and	   said	   that	   it	  
was	   the	   same	   to	   her	   whether	   he	   married	   her	   daughter	   or	   Mabrouka.	   One	   day,	  
Mabrouka	  and	  her	  mother	  were	  talking	  about	  Hichem	  and	  Mabrouka	  decided	  to	  visit	  
her	  sister	  next	  door	  to	  discuss	  him.	  Much	  to	  their	  surprise	   -­	  as	  Hichem	  was	  already	  
working	  away	   in	  Sidi	  Bou	  Said	  -­	  he	  was	  outside	   in	  the	  street,	  having	  come	  home	  to	  
visit	  Kerkenna	  for	  the	  summer.	  She	  had	  previously	  been	  proposed	  marriage	  by	  a	  rich	  
Moroccan,	  but	  her	  father	  had	  refused	  the	  match	  as,	  in	  the	  days	  before	  telephones	  and	  
travel,	  he	  did	  not	  want	  his	  daughter	  living	  so	  far	  away.	  	  
As	  she	  was	  only	  14,	  10	  years	  younger	  than	  her	  husband,	  Mabrouka	  and	  Hichem	  were	  
not	  allowed	  to	  sign	  their	  marriage	  contract	  in	  Kerkenna.	  After	  an	  appointment	  with	  
a	  doctor	   to	  confirm	  that	   she	  was	  apt	   for	  marriage	   (that	   she	  had	  reached	  puberty),	  
Mabrouka	  travelled	  to	  Sfax	  with	  her	  father	  to	  obtain	  permission	  from	  the	  court.	  The	  
judge	   insisted	  on	   speaking	   to	  her	  alone	   to	  ask	  her	  how	   she	  knew	   the	  man	   she	  was	  
going	  to	  marry.	  She	  explained	  that	  he	  was	  her	  sister’s	  neighbour.	  The	  judge	  asked	  if	  
she	   wanted	   to	   marry	   this	   man.	   She	   said	   that	   whatever	   her	   father	   wanted	   was	  
‘blessed’	  (mabrouk)	  and	  that	  she	  gave	  her	  consent.	  Armed	  with	  a	  certificate	  from	  the	  
judge,	  they	  were	  able	  to	  proceed	  to	  the	  notary’s	  office	  to	  sign	  the	  marriage	  contract	  
before	  two	  witnesses.	  The	  couple	  did	  not	  see	  each	  other	  before	  the	  wedding	  night.	  	  
Newly	  married,	  Mabrouka	  came	  to	  live	  with	  her	  husband	  in	  his	  sister’s	  house	  in	  Sidi	  
Bou	  Said.	  Consequently,	  she	  learned	  the	  essential	  tasks	  of	  a	  wife,	  such	  as	  cooking	  and	  
washing,	   from	   her	   sister-­in-­law,	   rather	   than	   from	   her	   mother.	   Mabrouka	   fell	  
pregnant	  almost	   immediately	  and	  gave	  birth	   to	  Besma,	   their	   first	   child,	  11	  months	  
after	  her	  marriage.	  
	  
Besma’s	  mother’s	  marriage	  demonstrates	  the	  crucial	  role	  played	  by	  the	  female	  kin	  of	   both	   families	   in	   making	   the	   match,	   even	   though	   her	   father	   gave	   the	   final	   stamp	   of	  approval.	  Mabrouka	  officially	  consented,	  as	  the	  law	  requires,	  although	  the	  terms	  in	  which	  she	  related	  this	  to	  me	  imply	  that	  she	  never	  would	  have	  contradicted	  her	  father.	  She	  also	  expressed	  her	  consent	  to	  the	  judge	  in	  terms	  of	  following	  her	  father’s	  wishes.	  The	  marriage	  
	   80	  
was	  a	  reassuring	  one	  due	  to	  the	  proximity	  of	  both	  families	  who	  were	  known	  to	  each	  other,	  even	   if	   the	   spouses	   themselves	   had	   not	  met.	   By	   stressing	   how	   she	  met	   her	   husband	   on	  their	   wedding	   night,	   Mabrouka	   expresses	   her	   own	   modesty,	   a	   marker	   of	   her	   ethical	  personhood	  as	  a	  good	  daughter	  to	  a	  good	  father.	  
What	  is	  striking	  in	  these	  accounts	  is	  the	  increase	  in	  marriage	  age,	  in	  particular	  for	  girls,	  across	  recent	  generations.	  Although	  the	  PSC	  set	  a	  minimum	  marriage	  age	  for	  girls118	  and	   boys,	   my	   informants	   cited	   education	   as	   the	   reason	   behind	   the	   increase	   in	   girls’	  marriage	  age.	  Rajah	  (in	  her	  80s)	  was	  unsure	  how	  old	  her	  mother	  would	  have	  been	  when	  she	   married.	   ‘Girls	   married	   when	   they	   were	   still	   running	   around	   playing	   with	   other	  children,’	   she	   told	  me,	   ‘so	   they	  would	   cry	  when	   they	   had	   to	   get	  married.	   Now	   girls	   get	  married	  later	  as	  they	  want	  to	  study.’	  	  
Besma’s	   own	   marriage	   is	   both	   very	   similar	   and	   very	   different	   to	   her	   mother’s.	  Reflective	   of	   this	   general	   pattern	   that	   I	   also	   noted	   in	   the	   family	   trees	   I	   had	   collected,	  Besma	  was	   older	   than	   her	  mother	  when	   she	  married,	   having	   already	   started	   university	  studies.	  	  
Although	  Besma	  was	  older	  and	  an	  adult,	  the	  match	  was	  nonetheless	  agreed	  by	  her	  father	   on	   her	   behalf	   (even	   though	   she	   was	   consulted	   as	   a	   matter	   of	   courtesy)	   and	   she	  barely	  knew	  her	  husband	  prior	  to	  their	  engagement.	  Unlike	  her	  mother,	  however,	  she	  did	  have	  the	  opportunity	  to	  see	  a	  little	  of	  her	  fiancé	  before	  the	  wedding	  night:	  
	  
Besma	  (3)	  
Besma’s	   face	   lights	   up,	  when	   I	   ask	   her	   how	   she	   came	   to	  marry	   Ali.	   It	   started	   at	   a	  
wedding	  in	  Kerkenna.	  Her	  husband	  was	  working	  in	  Tunis,	  but	  wanted	  to	  marry	  a	  girl	  
from	  Kerkenna,	  so,	  as	  often	  happens	  at	  such	  events,	  his	  mother	  was	  keeping	  her	  eyes	  
open	   for	  an	   eligible	   young	  girl	   to	  marry	  her	   son.	  His	  mother	   spotted	  Besma,	   asked	  
people	  whose	  daughter	  she	  was	  and	  was	  pleased	  with	  what	  she	  heard.	  Following	  this,	  
Ali	   came	   to	  Tunis,	   accompanied	   by	  Besma’s	   cousin,	   to	   have	   a	   look	   at	   her.	   The	   two	  
men	  were	  standing	  in	  the	  street	  in	  central	  Tunis	  and	  her	  cousin	  was	  describing	  her	  to	  
him.	   ‘So	   she	   looks	   a	   bit	   like	   that	   girl	   over	   there?’	  Ali	   concluded.	   It	  was	  Besma.	  Her	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118	  Minors,	  like	  Besma’s	  mother,	  could	  be	  married	  with	  permission	  from	  a	  court.	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cousin	  came	  to	  speak	  to	  her	  and	  pointed	  out	  Ali,	  who	  had	  a	  big	  grin	  on	  his	  face,	  in	  the	  
distance.	  That	  night,	  her	  cousin	  went	  to	  speak	  to	  Besma’s	  father	  about	  a	  friend,	  who	  
was	   interested	   in	  asking	   for	  Besma’s	  hand.	  Her	   father	   inquired	  about	   the	   family	  he	  
was	   from,	   what	   job	   he	   did	   and	   how	   much	   he	   earned	   and	   then,	   satisfied	   with	   the	  
answers,	  asked	  when	  the	  young	  man	  was	  going	  to	  come	  to	  see	  him.	  
Ali	  came	  to	  her	  father’s	  house	  the	  next	  day,	  bearing	  a	  gift	  of	  fruit.	  Shy	  by	  nature,	  he	  
was	   red-­faced	   with	   embarrassment.	   Besma	   listened	   secretly	   through	   a	   window,	  
whilst	   her	   father	   asked	   him	   some	   questions.	  Her	   father	   then	   instructed	   him	  not	   to	  
bother	   his	   daughter	   on	   the	   street	   and	   to	   bring	   his	   family	   -­	   parents,	   siblings	   and	  
spouses	   -­	   from	   Kerkenna	   for	   the	   official	   proposal.	   Besma’s	   mother	   discussed	   the	  
match	  with	  her.	  Besma	  replied	  that	  she	  would	  do	  whatever	  her	  parents	  thought	  best.	  
She	   was	   20	   at	   the	   time	   and	   had	   just	   repeated	   her	   first	   year	   studying	   law	   at	  
university.	  Her	  mother	  told	  her	  that	  she	  was	  getting	  old	  and	  that	  it	  would	  be	  best	  for	  
her	   to	   stop	   her	   studies	   after	   the	   engagement	   to	   work	   and	   save	   money	   for	   her	  
wedding	  trousseau.	  Her	  family	  was	  not	  so	  well	  off	  that	  they	  could	  provide	  a	  trousseau	  
for	  her	  and	  at	   the	   time	   it	  was	  possible	   to	   find	  work	  with	  a	  diploma	  and	  university	  
studies	  were	  deemed	  less	  necessary.	  	  
The	   proposal	   party	   travelled	   up	   from	   the	   island	   and	   they	   were	   engaged	   a	   month	  
later.	   Ali	   gave	   her	   a	   watch,	   which	   she	   still	   wears	   when	   she	   dresses	   up	   for	   special	  
occasions.	   Besma’s	   mother	   tells	   me	   that	   they	   were	   pleased	   when	   Ali	   came	   to	   the	  
house	  to	  ask	  for	  Besma’s	  hand	  in	  marriage,	  as	  they	  knew	  his	  parents	  and	  family.	  ‘We	  
took	  him	  for	  his	  family,’	  she	  says.	  
Besma	  was	   21	  when	   she	  married	   the	   next	   year.	   	   They	   were	  married	   in	   Kerkenna.	  
There	  are	  photos	  of	  her	  husband	  following	  the	  local	  tradition	  of	  walking	  slowly	  back	  
from	   the	   Saint’s	   tomb	  accompanied	  by	  male	   friends	  and	  musicians	  before	  going	   to	  
collect	   his	   bride,	   photographed	   nervously	   waiting	   at	   her	   father’s	   house.	   A	   further	  
photograph	   depicts	   her	   anxiously	   holding	   her	   husband’s	   hand,	   sitting	   on	   a	   bed,	  
awaiting	  their	  wedding	  night.	  
	  
Again,	   the	  groom’s	  mother	  played	  a	   central	   role	   in	   instigating	   this	  marriage.	  The	  role	  played	  by	   the	   couple’s	  parents	   in	   arranging	   the	  marriage	   is	   reflective	  of	   the	   taboos	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relating	   to	   contact	   between	   unrelated	   men	   and	   women	   outside	   marriage.	   It	   is	  representative	   of	   Besma’s	   good	   ethical	   personhood	   that	   she	   did	   not	   meet	   her	   husband	  herself.	   Besma’s	   husband’s	   behaviour	   in	   approaching	   her	   family	   with	   his	   intentions	  signalled	  his	  own	  good	  ethical	  personhood	  and	  this,	  together	  with	  his	  family	  background	  as	   a	   son	   of	   a	   family	   known	   to	   them	   in	   Kerkenna	   and	   his	   position	   as	   a	   good	   future	  breadwinner,	   confirmed	   him	   as	   a	   good	   match	   for	   their	   daughter.	   As	   with	   Mabrouka’s	  marriage,	  the	  family	  were	  reassured	  both	  by	  the	  regional	  and	  family	  origins	  of	  the	  groom;	  both	  of	  these	  forms	  of	  identity	  made	  him	  known	  and	  trusted	  and	  were	  seen	  as	  guarantees	  that	  he	  would	  make	  a	  good	  husband.	  
There	  is	  also	  a	  subtle	  subtext	  in	  the	  way	  that	  Besma	  recounts	  her	  own	  marriage	  as	  well	  as	  that	  of	  her	  mother.	  Both	  these	  tales	  (and	  many	  others	  recounted	  to	  me	  by	  Besma)	  involved	  coincidences:	  Hichem	  just	  happened	  to	  be	  standing	  outside	  the	  door	  as	  they	  were	  talking	  about	  him;	  Ali	   just	  happened	  to	  see	  Besma	   in	   the	  city	  centre.	  These	  coincidences	  point	   to	   the	   workings	   of	   a	   higher	   power	   implying	   that	   the	   marriages	   were	   shaped	   by	  divine	  will,	  what	  my	   informants	  called	   ‘maktoub’	   (written	  by	  God)	  as	  well	  as	   the	  human	  actors	   involved.	  Maktoub	   implies	   that	  neither	  Besma	  and	  her	  mother,	  nor	   their	   families,	  were	  fully	  in	  control	  of	  their	  own	  destinies	  and	  that	  she	  trusts	  her	  fate	  to	  God.	  As	  we	  shall	  see	   in	   later	   chapters	   discussing	   divorce,	   talking	   about	   ‘maktoub’	   may	   be	   a	   way	   of	  expressing	   thanks	   for	   something	   fortuitous	   or	   a	  way	   in	  which	   someone	   draws	   on	   their	  faith	  in	  God	  in	  order	  to	  find	  the	  strength	  to	  cope	  with	  a	  difficult	  hand	  that	  they	  may	  have	  been	  dealt.	  	  
Strong	  taboos	  continued	  to	  surround	  the	  mixing	  of	  the	  sexes	  for	  women	  of	  Besma’s	  generation,	   despite	   having	   been	   exposed	   to	   men	   of	   their	   own	   age	   through	   eduction	  (Besma	   also	   attended	   university).	   Consequently,	   when	   interviewing	   women	   of	   Besma’s	  generation	  (in	  their	  40s	  and	  50s),	   it	   is	  unsurprising	  that	  my	  question	   ‘how	  did	  you	  meet	  your	  husband?’	  was	  most	  frequently	  met	  with	  the	  reply,	  ‘I	  didn’t!’	  This	  response	  displays	  a	  particular	   form	  of	   ethical	  personhood	   in	  underlining	   the	   appropriate	   absence	  of	   contact	  with	  the	  opposite	  sex,	  the	  presumed	  presence	  of	  virginity	  and	  her	  diffidence	  to	  the	  natal	  family,	   especially	   the	   father.	   As	   a	   46-­‐year-­‐old	  wife	   and	  mother,	   it	  would	   never	   occur	   to	  Besma	  or	  her	  brothers	  to	  contradict	  their	  father,	  even	  now.	  	  
In	   Besma’s	   mother’s	   generation,	   it	   was	   not	   uncommon	   to	   learn	   that	   the	   couple	  literally	   saw	   each	   other	   for	   the	   first	   time	   as	   they	   entered	   the	   bedroom	   for	   the	  wedding	  night.	  The	  norm	  ‘before’	  was	  that	  the	  couple	  did	  not	  know	  each	  other	  before	  the	  wedding.	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In	   some	   cases,	   photos	   were	   exchanged	   so	   they	   could	   see	   if	   they	   liked	   each	   other.	   ‘The	  woman	   met	   her	   husband	   on	   the	   wedding	   night!’	   Souha,	   another	   53	   year-­‐old	   wife	  explained.	   Irkam	  (aged	  50)	  was	  a	  notable	  exception	   to	   this	   rule	  as	   she	  and	  her	  husband	  spent	  a	   lot	  of	  time	  together	  before	  they	  married,	   ‘more	  than	  fiancés	  do’,	   in	  her	  words,	  as	  they	  had	  been	  volunteers	  together	  at	  the	  Red	  Crescent.	  	  
Halti	  Zohra,	  aged	  52,	  was	  more	  typical	  of	  this	  generation.	  She	  told	  me	  that	  she	  had	  ‘met’	   her	  husband	  at	   a	  wedding,	   although	   she	  did	  not	   know	   it	   at	   the	   time.	  They	  did	  not	  speak.	   ‘It	   was	   not	   like	   now,’	   she	   told	   me.	   Her	   husband	   saw	   her	   at	   the	   wedding	   and	  arranged	  the	  marriage	  with	  her	  brother	  (in	  the	  absence	  of	  her	  father	  who	  had	  died	  when	  she	  was	  only	  6).	  	  
Interviewing	  other	  women	  of	  Besma’s	  generation	  in	  the	  neighbourhood	  confirmed	  the	   central	   role	   played	   by	   female	   kin	   in	   arranging	  marriages	   under	   the	   auspices	   of	   the	  father’s	  ultimate	  authority.	  Tata	  Faza	  told	  me	  that	  her	  mother	  married	  when	  she	  was	  11.	  Her	  father	  was	  23.	  When	  they	  put	  on	  her	  the	  traditional	  gold	  bracelets	  worn	  by	  women	  at	  marriage	  in	  Kerkenna,	  she	  took	  them	  off	  and	  threw	  them	  into	  the	  sea.	  ‘In	  those	  days’,	  Faza	  explained	   to	  me,	   ‘the	   father	   had	   the	   last	  word.’	   So	   she	  did	  not	   dare	   say	   anything	   to	   her	  father.	  She	  was	  afraid	  of	  her	  husband	  who	  went	  out	  drinking	  with	  his	  friends.	  Her	  mother-­‐in-­‐law	  tried	  to	  reassure	  her	  that	  she	  would	  not	  be	  harmed.	  	  
Hedia,	  aged	  55,	  met	  her	  husband	  via	  her	  sister,	  who	  knew	  her	  husband’s	  sister.	  His	  family	  approached	  theirs	  and	  agreed	  on	  the	  marriage.	  Hedia	  said	  that	  her	  father	  was	  the	  ‘boss’	  and	  she	  would	  do	  whatever	  he	  said.	   In	  any	  case,	  a	  good	  father	  would	  not	  send	  his	  daughter	  to	  a	  bad	  place.	  Consequently,	  validating	  the	  choice	  of	  spouse	  for	  his	  child	  reflects	  a	   father’s	   ability	   to	   exercise	   his	   own	  moral	   judgement;	   his	   own	   ethical	   personhood	   and	  ability	  to	  appear	  as	  a	  good	  father	  is	  at	  stake.	  
Faza	  herself	   (of	  Besma’s	   generation)	   also	  proved	   something	  of	   an	   exception	   in	   a	  different	   way,	   marrying	   late	   for	   a	   woman	   of	   her	   generation,	   aged	   30.	   Her	   brother	   had	  refused	   previous	   offers	   of	   marriage	   on	   her	   behalf,	   as	   it	   was	   useful	   having	   her	   to	   help	  around	  the	  house	  after	  her	  mother	  died	  at	  a	  young	  age.	  She	  eventually	  married	  a	  relative	  (her	   husband	   and	   mother	   are	   first	   cousins).	   Her	   mother,	   mother-­‐in-­‐law	   and	   aunt	   are	  sisters-­‐in-­‐law	  as	  they	  married	  three	  brothers.	  Her	  mother-­‐in-­‐law	  arranged	  the	  match.	  Faza	  had	  been	  in	  love	  with	  another	  man	  (who	  was	  forced	  by	  his	  mother	  to	  marry	  his	  niece),	  so	  she	  married	  for	  practical	  reasons,	  to	  have	  a	  husband	  rather	  than	  for	  a	  love	  match.	  As	  her	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husband	  had	  been	  previously	  divorced	  he	  did	  not	  want	  a	  second	  failed	  marriage.	  This	  gave	  Faza	  a	  lot	  of	  power	  to	  negotiate	  things.	  She	  is	  grateful	  that	  he	  is	  faithful	  and	  calm	  and	  does	  not	  drink	  and	  for	  the	  most	  part	  they	  get	  on	  very	  well.	  
Some	   fathers,	   however,	   may	   have	   less	   choice	   and,	   sadly,	   deviate	   from	   the	   ideal	  model	   of	   the	   protective,	   caring	   father.	   Neila	   was	   desperate	   to	   divorce	   her	   abusive	  husband,	  whom	   she	  had	  been	   forced	   to	  marry	  when	   she	  was	  15	   (relatively	   young	   for	   a	  woman	  of	  her	  generation;	   she	  was	  37	  when	  we	  met).	  Although	  she	  did	  not	  agree	   to	   the	  marriage	  (she	  met	  him	  during	   their	  6	  month	  engagement	  and	  did	  not	   like	  him),	  still	   she	  did	   not	   dare	   contradict	   her	   father.	   Her	   father	   had	   seven	   daughters	   and	   was	   extremely	  poor	  and	  so	  agreed	  to	  give	  them	  to	  the	  first	  man	  who	  came	  to	  ask.	  	  
Whilst	   I	   did	  not	   speak	   to	   so	  many	  men,	   those	   I	   did	   speak	   to	   suggested	   a	   similar	  experience	  to	  Besma’s	  husband	  and	  father	  regarding	  how	  they	  came	  to	  chose	  their	  spouse.	  The	  emphasis	  was	  more	  on	  the	  union	  of	  two	  families,	  rather	  than	  two	  individuals	  coming	  together	   to	   form	   a	   conjugal	   couple.	   This	   sentiment	   echoes	   the	   residence	   patterns	  prevalent	   in	   rural	   areas	   (where	   a	   majority	   of	   these	   people	   came	   from),	   where	   couples	  frequently	   lived	  patrilocally	   after	  marriage,	   and	  where	   there	  was	  a	  gendered	  division	  of	  labour	  that	  would	  see	  women	  spending	  considerable	  time	  together.	  	  
For	   instance,	  Moncef,	  aged	  56,	  who	  owned	  a	  grocer’s	  shop	   in	  Morouj,	  echoed	  the	  women	  I	  interviewed	  in	  telling	  me	  that	  he	  did	  not	  meet	  his	  wife	  before	  their	  marriage.	  His	  mother	   arranged	   the	  match	   as	   they	   lived	   in	   the	   same	  neighbourhood.	   For	  him,	   this	  was	  logical	   as,	   given	   he	  was	  working	   in	   the	   capital	   away	   from	  his	   native	   Siliana,	   his	  mother	  would	  have	  to	  live	  with	  his	  wife	  and	  not	  him.	  Moncef	  thought	  this	  system	  made	  sense	  and	  should	   be	   used	   more	   often.	   He	   lamented	   that	   people	   these	   days	   married	   ‘strangers’,	  people	  outside	   their	   family	  and	  region.	  This	  created	   tensions,	  he	   thought,	  as	  each	   family	  has	  their	  own	  way	  of	  living.	  Also,	  families	  would	  be	  diluted	  and	  disappear.	  However,	  when	  I	  asked	  him	  about	  the	  kind	  of	  man	  he	  hoped	  his	  daughter	  would	  marry,	  he	  merely	  replied	  that	  it	  was	  down	  to	  ‘destiny’	  (maktoub),	  hinting	  at	  the	  rapid	  shifts	  in	  the	  social	  landscape.	  	  
Although	  the	  traditional	  ideal	  of	  marriage	  between	  first	  paternal	  cousins	  fulfils	  the	  requirement	   of	   marrying	   someone	  who	   is	   known	   to	   both	   families,	   it	   is	   an	   ideal	   that	   is	  losing	  favour:	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Zohra	  and	  Nabil	  (1)	  
Zohra	   (aged	   46),	   and	   her	   sister,	   Saida,	   gave	   me	   greater	   insight	   into	   ‘cousin	  
marriages’,	  considered	  the	  ‘traditional’	  kind.	  These	  two	  sisters	  married	  two	  brothers	  
who	  were	  their	  cousins.	  In	  both	  cases,	  these	  were	  first	  and	  foremost	  love	  marriages.	  A	  
love	   story	   grew	   between	   Saida	   and	   her	   cousin	   Chorki	   when	   he	   visited	   his	   uncle	  
during	   summer	   holidays	   when	   they	   were	   both	   teenagers.	   As	   the	   families	   lived	   far	  
apart,	  Zohra	  did	  not	  meet	  Nabil,	  Chorki’s	  brother,	  until	  she	  was	  14	  at	  an	  event	  in	  the	  
family	  village.	  Her	  face	  glowed	  as	  she	  told	  me	  that	  it	  was	  love	  at	  first	  sight.	  He	  was	  
then	  able	  to	  visit	  her	  under	  the	  pretext	  of	  visiting	  his	  uncle,	  even	  though	  the	  constant	  
presence	  of	  a	  chaperone	  made	  it	  difficult	  to	  do	  more	  than	  exchange	  furtive	  glances.	  
The	   rest	   of	   the	   year,	   they	   exchanged	   love	   letters	   in	   secret	   –	   sent	   to	   a	   neighbour’s	  
address	  to	  prevent	  her	  father	  intercepting	  them.	  They	  married	  when	  she	  was	  only	  17.	  
Only	  later	  did	  Zohra	  learn	  that	  her	  grandfather	  had	  always	  wished	  for	  her	  to	  marry	  
her	  cousin.	  In	  addition,	  she	  had	  always	  got	  on	  well	  with	  her	  mother-­in-­law	  who	  was,	  
of	   course,	   also	  her	  aunt.	  There	  was	  no	   chance	  of	  her	  marriage	  breaking	  down,	   she	  
told	   me,	   as	   their	   relatives	   would	   intervene	   immediately	   to	   help	   them	   solve	   any	  
problems	  (and	  it	  did	  not	  matter	  that	  they	  had	  always	  lived	  neolocally	  away	  from	  the	  
rest	  of	  the	  family).	  
Concerning	  her	  sons’	  future	  marriages,	  Zohra	  is	  adamant	  that	  they	  should	  not	  marry	  
in	   the	   family.	   Given	  how	  many	  marriages	  within	   the	   family	   there	   have	   been	   in	   the	  
past	   (hers	   was	   the	   third	   generation	   of	   intermarriage),	   they	   are	   lucky	   not	   to	   have	  
suffered	  any	  genetic	  abnormalities.	  Her	  sons	  need	  to	  marry	  ‘out’	  to	  introduce	  a	  fresh	  
pool	  of	  genes	  and	  to	  avoid	  potential	  health	  problems	  in	  their	  children.	  She	  also	  notes	  
how	  her	  brother	  married	  his	  French	  wife	  (who	  divorced	  him)	  too	  fast;	  it	  is	  a	  mistake	  
to	  marry	  quickly	  without	  getting	  to	  know	  the	  other	  person	  first.	  	  
	  
As	   Moncef	   suggested,	   in	   Besma’s	   daughter’s	   generation,	   there	   is	   a	   generational	  shift	   towards	   marriage	   with	   a	   partner	   who	   is	   initially	   unknown	   and	   unfamiliar	   by	  traditional	  standards.	  As	  we	  heard	  above,	  one	  of	  Besma’s	  relatives	  married	  a	   love	  match	  he	  had	  met	  at	  university,	   rather	   than	  someone	   from	  within	   their	   family,	  and	  his	  parents	  supported	  him	  in	  this.	  Mixed	  education	  and	  mixing	  of	  the	  sexes	  in	  places	  of	  work	  leads	  to	  increased	   opportunities	   for	  men	   and	  women	   to	  meet	   in	   acceptable	   contexts,	   away	   from	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the	  watchful	  eyes	  of	  parents	  and	  neighbours,	  as	  well	  as	   in	   less	  acceptable	  circumstances	  such	  as	  out	  in	  the	  street	  or	  in	  cafés.	  	  
	  
Salima	  
Salima,	  22,	   had	   recently	  married	  her	  husband,	   aged	  34.	   She	  met	  him	  walking	  with	  
her	   cousin	   in	   the	   souk	  when	  asking	   for	  directions	   in	  a	  baker’s	   shop.	   It	  was	   ‘love	  at	  
first	   sight’.	   They	   agreed	   to	   marry	   a	   week	   later	   and	   the	   wedding	   took	   place	   the	  
following	   year.	   As	   we	   spoke	   she	   had	   just	   fallen	   pregnant.	   She	  was	   happy	   that	   her	  
marital	  home	  was	  a	  short	  distance	   from	  her	  mother’s	  house,	   so	   that	  she	  could	  visit	  
her	  mother	  and	  sister	  easily	  whilst	  her	  husband	  was	  at	  work.	  
	  
Only	  among	  the	  youngest	  generation	  –	  women	  like	  Salima	  in	  their	  20s	  –	  did	  I	  hear	  tales	   of	   couples	   who	   met	   independently	   from	   their	   families,	   such	   as	   in	   a	   café	   or	   shop.	  (Irkam	  above	  is	  a	  rare	  exception).	  
	  
SEX	  AND	  THE	  CITY	  
The	  possibility	  of	  love	  coming	  before	  marriage	  is	  connected	  with	  the	  fear	  that	  sex	  may	  also	  precede	  marriage.	  Marriage,	  as	  a	  ritual,	  plays	  a	  key	  role	  in	  initiating	  a	  woman’s	  legitimate	  sexual	   relationship.	   It	   is	   significant	   that,	   whilst	   a	   couple	   are	   legally	   considered	  married	  once	  they	  have	  signed	  the	  wedding	  contract,	  they	  are	  not	  socially	  considered	  married	  until	  the	  wedding	  party	  has	  been	  held.119	  Only	  then,	  once	  the	  religious	  obligation	  of	  ‘publicising’	  the	   marriage	   has	   been	   fulfilled	   are	   they	   free	   to	   consummate	   the	   marriage	   and	   begin	   a	  sexual	   relationship.	   As	   Besma	   explained,	   this	   is	   to	   ensure	   the	   paternity	   of	   any	   children	  born	   from	   that	   relationship.	   These	   concerns	   about	   paternity	   are	   in	   turn	   related	   to	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119	  The	  consummation	  of	  the	  marriage	  also	  holds	  legal	  significance.	  In	  practice,	  a	  man’s	  duty	  to	  pay	  his	  wife	  
maintenance	  begins	  only	  once	  the	  marriage	  has	  been	  consummated	  and	  not	  after	  the	  contract	  has	  been	  signed.	  
The	  marriage	  is	  assumed	  to	  have	  been	  consummated	  if	  the	  husband	  and	  wife	  have	  been	  witnessed	  entering	  a	  
bedroom	  together.	  If	  a	  husband	  refuses	  to	  consummate	  the	  marriage,	  the	  wife	  can	  legally	  ‘consummate’	  the	  
marriage	  in	  order	  to	  force	  his	  eligibility	  to	  pay	  her	  nafaqa.	  As	  such,	  the	  beginning	  of	  their	  sexual	  relationship	  also	  
marks	  the	  start	  of	  their	  responsibility	  to	  carry	  out	  their	  marital	  duties.	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incest	  taboo;	  if	  born	  outside	  marriage,	  a	  child	  may	  not	  know	  who	  his	  father	  is	  and	  could,	  therefore,	   unknowingly	   marry	   his	   or	   her	   own	   sibling.	   In	   this	   way,	   the	   need	   to	   control	  female	   sexuality	   is	   linked	   with	   broader	   religious,	   moral	   concerns	   and	   becomes	   a	   key	  ethical	  criterion	  that,	  as	  we	  shall	  see,	  is	  applied	  unequally	  to	  women	  rather	  than	  men.	  
Wassim,	  a	  male	   lawyer	  in	  his	  early	  30s,	  explained	  to	  me	  rather	  ominously	  (when	  we	   were	   alone	   together	   in	   his	   office),	   that	   whenever	   a	   man	   and	   a	   woman	   are	   alone	  together,	   there	   is	   always	   a	   third	   party	   present:	   the	   devil,	   representing	   the	   threat	   of	  temptation.	   	   These	   fears	   about	   illicit	   sex	   that	   is	   increasingly	   a	   possibility	   as	   men	   and	  women	   mix	   in	   public	   spaces	   lead	   to	   tensions	   about	   whom	   to	   trust,	   given	   continued	  expectations	  of	  virginity	  and	  the	  control	  of	  female	  sexuality.	  	  
An	   intact	  hymen	  on	  marriage,	  as	  proof	  of	  virginity,	   remained	  a	  marker	  of	  ethical	  personhood	   and	   suitability	   as	   a	   wife,	   even	   if	   the	   conventions	   surrounding	   this	   had	  changed.	  Traditionally,	   a	  white	   cloth	   stained	  with	  blood	   from	   the	   freshly	  broken	  hymen	  would	  be	  displayed	  after	  a	  couple’s	  wedding	  night	  as	  evidence	   that	  everything	  had	  gone	  well.	  The	  performance	  of	  a	  successful	  wedding	  night	  was	  crucial	  and	  could	  also	  create	  a	  sense	   of	   complicity	   between	   the	   couple.	   A	   woman	   now	   in	   her	   70s	   told	   me	   how	   her	  husband	  brought	  a	  small	  bird	  and	  a	  knife	  with	  him	  on	  their	  wedding	  night.	  This	  allowed	  them	  to	  produce	  the	  blood	  stained	  cloth	  required	  of	  them,	  whilst	  the	  actual	  events	  of	  that	  night	  remained	  between	  the	  husband	  and	  his	  young,	  terrified	  bride.	  As	  Besma	  would	  tell	  me,	   this	   tradition	   is	  now	  seen	  as	  antiquated	  and	  has	  been	  replaced	  by	   inquisitive	  phone	  calls	   from	   the	   groom’s	   mother	   and	   sisters	   the	   next	   day.	   Here	   too,	   the	   complicity	   of	  husband	  and	  wife	  can	  protect	  the	  couple’s	  intimacy,	  whatever	  may	  have	  happened	  on	  the	  wedding	  night.	   Indeed,	  many	  women	  of	  Besma’s	   generation	   spoke	   of	   their	   fear	   on	   their	  wedding	  night,	  as	  they	  were	  necessarily	  inexperienced	  and	  sometimes	  totally	  unaware	  of	  what	  would	  happen,	  together	  with	  their	  gratitude	  for	  their	  husband’s	  understanding.	  
In	  previous	  generations	  when	  girls	  married	  much	  younger,	   including	  before	   they	  reached	  puberty,	  these	  issues	  related	  to	  virginity	  would	  have	  been	  less	  relevant.	  Virginity	  is	  a	  purely	  feminine	  concept,	  as	  I	  was	  to	  learn	  when,	  much	  to	  his	  amusement,	  I	  told	  one	  of	  the	  male	  lawyers	  that	  some	  devout	  Christian	  men	  in	  the	  UK	  choose	  to	  remain	  virgins	  until	  marriage.	   Once	   he	   had	   stopped	   laughing,	   he	   explained	   to	   me	   that	   men	   could	   not	   have	  virginity;	   they	   literally	   have	   nothing	   to	   lose.	   Also,	   as	   a	   young	   man	   himself,	   a	   believing	  Muslim,	   the	   idea	   of	   another	   young	  man	   voluntarily	   avoiding	   sex	  was	   highly	   amusing	   to	  him.	  Were	   these	  men	  ugly	  or	  exceptionally	  shy,	  he	  asked	  me?	  He	  did	  concede	   that	  some	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Muslim	  men,	  who	  he	   characterized	  as	   religious	  extremists,	  may	  abstain	   from	  sex	  before	  marriage.	   Some	   mothers	   I	   knew	   who	   had	   sons	   expected	   them	   to	   have	   sex	   prior	   to	  marriage	  and	  the	  idea	  did	  not	  seem	  to	  bother	  them.	  They	  were,	  however,	  not	  expected	  to	  marry	  these	  immoral	  girls.	  	  
For	  the	  young	  women	  I	  knew,	  the	  situation	  was	  difficult.	  Najet,	  a	  young	  woman	  in	  Morouj,	  was	  especially	  worried	   for	  girls	  who	  had	  recently	  moved	  to	  the	  capital	   from	  the	  countryside.	   Coming	   from	  a	   ‘very	   closed	   society’,	   these	   girls	  were	  more	  naive	   and	  more	  likely	  to	  do	  ‘ugly	  things’,	  whereas	  city	  girls	  had	  more	  ‘open	  mentalities’,	  they	  studied	  and	  watched	  satellite	  television.	  Just	  because	  a	  city	  girl	  has	  a	  boyfriend,	  it	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  she	  is	  going	  to	  do	  ‘ugly	  things.’	  	  
Mothers	   most	   certainly	   did	   not	   expect	   their	   daughters	   to	   engage	   in	   sex	   before	  marriage	   and	   policed	   their	   daughters	   for	   any	   signs	   that	   this	   might	   be	   happening.	   One	  young	  woman	  told	  me	  she	  hid	  her	  contraceptive	  pills	  at	  work	  to	  prevent	  her	  mother	  from	  finding	  them.	  Another	  told	  me	  she	  was	  frustrated	  that	  she	  could	  not	  wax	  her	  legs,	  as	  her	  mother	  would	  want	  to	  know	  why.	  Besma,	  like	  many	  mothers,	  had	  advised	  her	  daughter	  to	  avoid	  various	  (non-­‐sexual)	  activities,	  such	  as	  gymnastics,	  that	  could	  inadvertently	  result	  in	  the	  hymen	  breaking	  and	  the	  girl	  ‘losing	  her	  virginity’.	  I	  told	  her	  about	  a	  girl	  I	  knew	  whose	  hymen	  had	  broken	  whilst	  horse	  riding	  when	  she	  was	  11	  years	  old.	  Besma’s	  response	  was	  simply,	  ‘did	  her	  mother	  cry?’	  
Some	   young	  women	  were	   patient	   and	   practiced	   restraint,	   whilst	   others	   did	   not	  want	  to	  wait	  until	  they	  were	  married	  before	  having	  sex.	  One	  young	  woman	  explained	  how	  she	  evaded	  the	  problem	  of	  keeping	  her	  virginity	  by	  engaging	  only	  in	  sexual	  practices	  that	  would	  not	  result	  in	  breaking	  the	  hymen.	  Another	  young	  woman,	  who	  had	  lost	  her	  virginity	  was	   devastated	   when	   her	   mother	   discovered	   this	   fact,	   tearing	   at	   her	   own	   face	   and	  shouting	  that	  her	  daughter	  had	  given	  away	  the	  most	  precious	  thing	  that	  she	  had.	  She	  was	  seriously	   considering	   having	   her	   hymen	   –	   and	   with	   it	   her	   family’s	   honour	   –	   restored	  before	   marriage.	   She	   could	   not	   imagine	   marrying	   a	   Tunisian	   man	   who	   would	   be	  understanding	   about	   her	   sexual	   activity	   before	   marriage,	   even	   if	   he	   had	   been	   sexually	  active	   himself.	   Even	   a	   decision	   as	   intimate	   as	   whether	   to	   start	   a	   sexual	   relationship	  requires	  the	  careful	  exercise	  of	  judicious	  practice	  and	  is	  best	  characterised	  by	  a	  notion	  of	  ‘agency’	  that	  takes	  a	  girl’s	  wider	  relationships	  and	  responsibilities	  into	  account.	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The	   female	   body	   itself	   becomes	   the	   basis	   for	   moral	   judgement,	   specifically	   the	  hymen,	   the	   integrity	   of	   which	   represents	   a	   woman’s	   modesty	   and	   virginity	   prior	   to	  marriage.	  Even	   the	  physical	  marker	  of	   this	  virtue	   in	   the	   female	  body	  could	  no	   longer	  be	  trusted	   due	   to	   the	   frequent	   rumours	   and	   alleged	   prevalence	   of	   hymen	   reconstruction	  surgery.	  As	  a	  result,	  even	  the	  female	  body	  is	  able	  to	  ‘perform’	  virginity.	  This	  possibility	  of	  the	   hymen	   being	   reconstructed	   caused	   a	   great	   deal	   of	   anxiety	   among	   young	  men.	   How	  could	   they	  be	  sure	   if	   their	   future	  bride	  was	  a	  virgin?	  The	  male	   lawyer	  mentioned	  above	  feared	  marrying	   a	   girl	  who	  had	  had	   this	   operation;	   he	  hoped	   that	  his	   sexual	   experience	  would	   allow	   him	   to	   ascertain	   whether	   his	   future	   wife	   was	   really	   a	   virgin	   or	   not.	  Consequently,	  the	  issue	  of	  virginity	  –	  a	  moral	  criterion	  applied	  to	  women	  and	  not	  men	  –	  or	  fear	  of	  the	  lack	  of	  it,	  created	  an	  atmosphere	  of	  mistrust	  between	  young	  men	  and	  women.	  	  
Another	  young	  man	  told	  me	  that	  he	  slept	  with	  his	  long-­‐term	  girlfriend	  in	  order	  to	  check	   this	   fact.	  She	  seemed	   far	   too	  used	  to	  having	  sex	  and	  he	  could	  not	  believe	   that	   this	  was	  her	  first	  time;	  he	  consequently	  never	  contacted	  her	  again.	  I	  heard	  several	  accounts	  of	  girls	  who	  slept	  with	  their	  boyfriends	  after	  much	  soul	  searching,	  only	  to	  be	  dumped	  so	  that	  the	  boyfriend	  could	  marry	  a	  virgin.	  	  
Once	   again,	   as	   with	   dislocated	   selves,	   appearances	   cannot	   be	   trusted.	   Najet	  repeated	  a	  view	  I	  heard	  many	  times	  that	  ‘it	  has	  returned	  to	  how	  it	  was	  before.’	  As	  men	  do	  not	  trust	  women,	  they	  turn	  to	  their	  mothers	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  choosing	  their	  wives,	  since	  women	   know	  women	   better	   than	  men	   do,	   especially	   given	   the	   operation	   that	   exists	   to	  restore	  the	  hymen.	  Najet	  believed	  that	  only	  2-­‐3	  %	  of	  men	  would	  accept	  to	  marry	  a	  woman	  who	  was	  not	  a	  virgin	  –	  even	  if	  the	  woman	  had	  lost	  her	  virginity	  to	  the	  man	  himself!	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	   there	  was	  a	  general	   sentiment	   that	   it	  was	   impossible	   for	  a	  man	   to	   remain	  a	  virgin	  before	  he	  married,	  in	  spite	  of	  recommendations	  in	  the	  religion	  for	  men	  to	  practice	  constraint	  by	  praying,	  fasting	  and	  doing	  sport.	  One	  mother	  of	  three	  young	  men	  hinted	  at	  a	  reason	  for	  this	  acceptance,	  suggesting	  that	  at	  least	  one	  spouse	  should	  know	  what	  to	  do	  on	  the	  wedding	  night.	  A	  successful	  wedding	  night	  is,	  therefore,	  just	  as	  much	  an	  affirmation	  of	  masculinity,	  a	  man’s	  ability	  to	  perform	  sexually,	  as	  it	  is	  of	  femininity,	  a	  woman’s	  virginity	  as	  proof	  of	  her	  prior	  constraint.	  
A	  WOMAN’S	  WORK	  
As	  we	  saw	  in	  the	  first	  chapter,	  these	  concerns	  about	  female	  sexuality	  and	  moral	  decadence	  are	  heightened	  by	  the	  increasing	  movements	  of	  women	  outside	  the	  house.	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Female	  education	  and	  the	  difficulties	  in	  paying	  for	  the	  high	  costs	  of	  a	  wedding	  have	  lead	  many	  young	  women	  to	  work	  prior	  to	  their	  marriages.120	  I	  met	  various	  women	  in	  their	  early	  20s	  who	  were	  working,	  as	  Besma	  had	  done,	  to	  save	  up	  for	  her	  wedding	  ‘trousseau’.	  In	  many	   cases,	   such	   as	   Samia’s	   daughter	  who	  was	  working	   in	   a	   factory,	   the	   implication	  was	   that	  she	  would	  stop	  working	  when	  she	  married.	  The	  new	  economic	  climate	  made	   it	  difficult	  for	  women	  to	  embody	  the	  ideals	  expected	  of	  them	  as	  a	  good	  daughter	  or	  wife.	  The	  following	  story	  of	  Zohra	  and	  her	  daughter	  demonstrates	  how	  being	  outside	  the	  home	  –	  in	  particular	  to	  engage	   in	   less	   ‘prestigious’	   forms	  of	  work	  –	  can	   lead	  to	   fears	  of	   immorality,	  reflected	  not	  only	  in	  the	  daughter	  but	  also	  in	  the	  mother.	  
	  
Zohra	  and	  her	  Daughter	  
Cracks	  began	  to	  appear	  in	  Zohra’s	  marriage.	  Last	  year,	  the	  couple	  had	  argued	  over	  
their	  son’s	  circumcision	  party.	  He	  was	  being	  stingy	  and	  wanted	  to	  scrimp	  on	  the	  food	  
and	  sweets.	  Zohra	  was	  far	  from	  pleased.	  
However,	   the	   main	   source	   of	   tension	   between	   Zohra	   and	   her	   husband	   was	   their	  
eldest	  daughter.	  Someone	  had	  asked	  her	  father	  to	  whom	  she	  was	  engaged,	  as	  she	  had	  
been	  seen	  in	  a	  café	  with	  a	  man	  from	  her	  work.	  Needless	  to	  say,	  she	  was	  not	  engaged.	  
Her	  parents	  argued	  about	  whether	   she	   should	  continue	  working.	  He	  wanted	  her	   to	  
give	  up	  work,	  whilst	  Zohra	  disagreed	  and	  found	  herself	  stuck	  between	  her	  daughter’s	  
and	   her	   husband’s	  wishes.	   It	  was	   finally	   the	   daughter	  who	   decided	   to	   leave.	   Zohra	  
said	  she	  would	  choose	  to	  support	  her	  daughter’s	  desire	  to	  work	  in	  any	  case.	  She	  saw	  
the	  practical	  economic	  argument	  for	  her	  daughter	  to	  continue	  working.	  
With	  tensions	  rising,	  Zohra	  and	  her	  daughter	  went	  out	  to	  the	  rural	  part	  of	  Ben	  Arous	  
to	   see	   someone	  who	  practices	  black	  magic	  who	  gave	   them	  something	   to	  put	   in	  her	  
husband’s	   food.	   After	   her	   husband	   had	   (unknowingly)	   eaten	   this,	   the	   problems	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  120	  On	  marriage,	  a	  wife	  and	  her	  family	  must	  provide	  certain	  things	  for	  the	  future	  marital	  home,	  known	  as	  the	  
wedding	  ‘trousseau’	  or	  ‘jihaz’.	  These	  may	  include:	  soft	  furnishings	  (curtains,	  cushions,	  carpets,	  quilts),	  bed	  linen	  and	  
towels,	  crockery,	  kitchen	  ware,	  decorative	  items	  like	  ornaments,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  supply	  of	  clothes	  for	  herself.	  A	  
husband	  should	  provide	  larger	  items	  like	  the	  bed,	  cupboards,	  sofa,	  large	  electrical	  items	  like	  the	  television	  and	  
white	  goods,	  including	  the	  fridge.	  These	  exchanges	  replace	  in	  some	  way	  the	  mahr	  (dower)	  that	  was	  essentially	  
abolished	  by	  Bourguiba	  and	  in	  practice	  was	  a	  symbolic	  10	  or	  20	  dinars	  (around	  £3).	  Husbands	  would	  also	  contribute	  
to	  the	  cost	  of	  the	  wedding	  party,	  buying	  food.	  Other	  significant	  costs	  include	  the	  wedding	  dress	  –	  even	  hiring	  an	  
elaborate	  dress	  could	  cost	  over	  500	  dinars	  -­‐	  ,	  the	  costs	  of	  preparing	  the	  bride	  (hairdressing,	  hamam),	  renting	  the	  
party	  venue	  and	  buying	  the	  food	  for	  the	  various	  wedding	  parties).	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resolved	   themselves.	  This	   respite	   lasted	  until	  another	  of	  Zohra’s	  daughters	   told	  her	  
father	  what	  had	  happened.	  	  
	  
This	  father’s	  fears	  about	  his	  daughter	  underline	  how	  in	  order	  to	  be	  perceived	  as	  a	  good	   father	   and	   for	   one’s	   daughter	   to	   be	   thought	   of	   as	   a	   good	   potential	   wife,	   the	  performance	  of	  ethical	  personhood	  is	  paramount.	  For	  women	  in	  particular,	  this	  is	  tied	  up	  with	   appropriate	   sexual	   behaviour,	   or	   rather	   the	   absence	  of	   overt	   sexual	   contact	   before	  marriage	   (or	   any	   behaviour	   that	   could	   lead	   people	   to	   cast	   aspersions	   about	   a	  woman’s	  sexual	  modesty	  and	  restraint).	  	  
THE	  STIGMA	  OF	  DIVORCE	  
These	   fears	   surrounding	   female	   sexuality	   contributed	   to	   the	   bad	   reputation	   given	   to	  divorced	  women	  who,	  no	  longer	  virgins,	  having	  been	  initiated	  into	  sexuality	  activity	  when	  they	  married,	  were	  ‘free’	  to	  engage	  in	  sexual	  relations,	  as	  they	  no	  longer	  had	  anything	  to	  lose.121	  Awatef,	  aged	  33,	  who	  had	  been	  married	   for	  9	  years	   told	  me,	   	   ‘in	   the	  Arab	  world,	  being	  a	  divorced	  woman	  is	  horrible.	  A	  divorced	  man	  can	  take	  (marry)	  a	  girl	  (virgin),	  and	  it	  is	  OK.	  A	  divorced	  woman	  has	  a	  bad	  reputation,	  even	   if	  she	  was	  wronged	  against,	  even	   if	  she	  is	  good.	  Like	  someone	  who	  has	  been	  in	  prison.’	  This	  is	  why,	  after	  her	  husband	  walked	  out	  following	  a	  dispute,	  Zohra	  was	  plagued	  by	  rumours	  in	  the	  neighbourhood,	  in	  spite	  of	  struggling	   to	   retain	   an	   appearance	   as	   a	   good	   wife	   and	   was	   desperate	   to	   repair	   her	  unhappy	  marriage.	  	  
The	  stigma	  of	  divorce	  and	  the	  related	  fears	  of	  sexual	  freedom	  of	  divorced	  women	  have	  become	  a	  greater	  issue	  now	  that	  remarriage	  is	  more	  difficult.	  I	  was	  initially	  surprised	  when	  several	  women	  noted	  that	  divorce	  was	  not	  such	  an	  issue	  in	  the	  past.	  Nadia,	  herself	  suffering	  from	  the	  stigma	  of	  being	  a	  young	  divorced	  woman,	  noted	  how	  divorce	  was	  not	  ‘dramatic’	   in	   the	   past.	   Both	   her	   grandmother	   and	   her	   grandfather	   were	   divorced	   three	  times.	   As	   her	   grandmother	  was	   the	   only	   daughter	   and	   had	   seven	   brothers	   and	   she	  was	  pretty	   and	   her	   father	   rich,	   she	   had	   no	   trouble	   remarrying.	   (Although	   she	   adds	   that	   her	  grandmother	  first	  married	  at	  14,	  divorcing	  at	  17.	  Her	  third	  and	  final	  marriage	  was	  the	  only	  one	  to	  produce	  children).	  These	  days,	  Nadia,	  an	  attractive	  woman	  in	  her	  30s,	  is	  seen	  as	  a	  sexual	  predator.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121	  cf	  Hill	  (1979)	  on	  the	  significance	  of	  social	  representations	  of	  divorced	  women.	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I	  was	   also	   struck	   by	   the	   history	   of	   divorce	   in	   Besma’s	   family	   tree.	   Knowing	   her	  strong	  opposition	  to	  divorce	  in	  current	  times,	  I	  asked	  her	  why	  she	  was	  not	  shocked	  by	  a	  grandmother	   in	   the	   family	   who	   had	   divorced	   7	   times.	   She	   explained	   how	   in	   the	   past	  remarriage	  was	  easier	  for	  divorced	  women.	  There	  were	  many	  men	  without	  wives,	  as	  the	  mortality	   rate	   of	   women	   was	   higher.	   Equally,	   polygamy	   was	   possible.	   These	   days,	   a	  divorced	  woman	  has	  fewer	  chances	  to	  remarry.	  If	  she	  does	  not	  remarry,	  it	  is	  assumed	  that	  she	  sleeps	  around:	  	  
‘Even	  her	  parents	   look	  down	  on	  her	  and	  say	  that	  she	   is	  dirty.	  The	  divorced	  daughter	   is	  a	  source	   of	   dishonour.	   The	   grandmother	  divorced	  many	   times,	   but	   remarried	  many	   times.	  She	  could	  have	  become	  a	  second	  or	  third	  wife	  and	  this	  was	  not	  a	  problem.	  Now,	  a	  divorced	  woman	  has	  nothing	   to	  hold	  her	  back	  sexually.	   122	   	  Her	  honour	   is	  under	   threat	  and	  she	   is	  morally	  bad.	  Men	  are	  always	  men.’	  	  
This	   last	   comment	  sums	  up	   the	  way	   in	  which	  divorced	  women	  are	  subject	   to	   far	  greater	   stigmatization	   than	  men,	   as	   it	   is	   deemed	   ‘normal’	   for	   a	  man	   to	   engage	   in	   sexual	  relations,	  whether	  married	  or	  not.	  Besma’s	  commentary	  also	  stresses	  the	  relational	  nature	  of	  ethical	  personhood	  as	  a	  bad	  daughter	  reflects	  badly	  on	  the	  honour	  of	  her	  natal	  family.	  Consequently,	  these	  gendered	  attitudes	  to	  sexuality	  inform	  how	  divorced	  men	  and	  women	  are	  perceived	  and	  contribute	  to	  an	  individual’s	  willingness	  to	  file	  for	  divorce.	  
AN	  IDEAL	  HUSBAND	  
Because	  a	  good	  potential	  husband	  is	  less	  bound	  by	  his	  sexual	  behaviour	  before	  marriage,	  a	  man	  who	  makes	  a	  good	  husband	  is	  one	  who	  has	  the	  potential	   to	  make	  a	  decent	   living	   in	  order	  to	  support	  his	  family.	  His	  perceived	  morality,	  however,	  remains	  under	  scrutiny,	  if	  in	  slightly	  different	  ways.	  The	  women	  I	  spoke	  to	  were	  looking	  for	  husbands	  who	  were	  kind,	  patient	  and	  generous	  and	  who,	  often	  first	  and	  foremost,	  were	  good	  Muslims.	  (Not	  the	  least	  because	  it	  is	  strictly	  forbidden	  for	  a	  Muslim	  woman	  to	  marry	  a	  non-­‐Muslim).123	  
Even	  for	  Besma,	  Kerkenni	  identity	  was	  not	  the	  first	  criteria	  she	  was	  looking	  for	  in	  her	  daughter’s	  future	  husband.	  The	  only	  possible	  suitor	  within	  the	  family	  had	  decided	  to	  marry	   a	   fellow	   student	   he	   had	   fallen	   in	   love	  with,	   supported	   by	   his	   parents.	   Therefore,	  Besma	  had	  started	  keeping	  her	  eyes	  open	  closer	  to	  home.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122	  She	  means	  this	  literally,	  as	  a	  married	  woman	  is	  no	  longer	  a	  virgin	  and	  has	  no	  hymen.	  
123	  The	  opposite	  is	  not	  true.	  A	  Muslim	  man	  may	  marry	  a	  Christian	  or	  Jewish	  woman.	  As	  children	  follow	  their	  father’s	  
religion,	  his	  children	  would	  become	  Muslim.	  If	  a	  Muslim	  woman	  married	  outside	  her	  religion,	  her	  children	  would	  
not	  be	  Muslims	  and	  this	  is	  perceived	  as	  a	  rejection	  of	  her	  faith.	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Besma	  (4)	  
Besma	  asked	  me	  if	  there	  were	  any	  young	  men	  working	  with	  my	  husband	  who	  would	  
potentially	   suit	   her	   daughter	   as	   a	   husband.	   By	   then,	   it	   was	   clear	   to	   me	   that	   a	  
‘suitable’	  man	  would	  have	  to	  be	  Arab	  and	  Muslim.	  I	  suggested	  a	  Moroccan	  colleague	  
–	   a	   practising	  Muslim,	  well-­educated	  with	   a	   sound	   financial	   situation,	  who	   travels	  
abroad	  (and	  who	  had	  asked	  me	  to	  help	  him	  find	  a	  wife)	  …	  ‘No	  way,’	  she	  said.	  The	  man	  
must	   be	   ‘Tunisian’.	   There	  was	   a	  Tunisian	   colleague,	  who	   I	   had	  met	   once,	   also	  well	  
educated	  with	  a	   good	   job	  and	   in	   his	   early	   30s.	   This	  was	  much	  more	  what	   she	  was	  
looking	  for.	  ‘Where	  is	  he	  from?’	  she	  asked,	  interest	  tangibly	  growing	  on	  her	  face.	  The	  
Sahel,	   I	   replied,	   the	   coastal	   region,	   known	   for	   being	   prosperous	   and	   having	   some	  
affinities	  with	  her	  native	  Kerkenna.	  The	  response	  pleased	  her.	  
	  
One	  of	  the	  neighbours	  (not	  Kerkenni)	  seemed	  a	  good	  option,	  not	  the	  least	  as	  Manel	  had	   taken	   a	   shine	   to	   him	   and	  he	   to	   her.	  He	  was	   buying	   his	   own	  home	   and	   ran	  his	   own	  small	  business.	   	  As	  their	  neighbour,	  he	  was	  a	  known	  entity;	  he	  went	  to	  the	  mosque	  with	  her	   husband.	   In	   addition,	   if	   she	  married	   a	   neighbour,	   Besma	  would	   be	   able	   to	   help	   her	  daughter,	   expected	   to	   have	   a	   professional	   career	   after	   her	  medical	   studies,	   to	   clean	   her	  house,	   make	   the	   dinner	   and	   take	   care	   of	   future	   grandchildren	   whilst	   she	   was	   at	   work.	  Besma	  did	  not	  underestimate	  the	  importance	  of	  this	  support,	  as	  she	  herself	  had	  had	  three	  children	   whilst	   working.	   Regional	   identity	   suddenly	   seemed	   less	   significant	   than	   other	  factors	   in	  providing	  a	  presumed	  guarantee	  of	   the	  good	  ethical	  personhood	  required	  of	  a	  suitable	  marriage	  prospect.	  
	  
UNMAKING	  MARRIAGE	  
The	  caveat	  when	  parents	  make	  marriages	  is	  the	  possibility	  that	  the	  parents	  are	  at	  fault	  if	  the	  marriage	   is	  unhappy	  or	  breaks	  down.	   If	   the	   chosen	   spouse	   turns	  out	   to	  be	  bad,	   this	  suggests	   that	   the	   parents	   (in	   particular	   the	   father	   who	   has	   the	   final	   word)	   have	   not	  exercised	  their	  moral	  judgement	  judiciously.	  If	  it	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  parental	  honour	  to	  make	  a	  
	   94	  
good	   choice	   of	   spouse	   for	   a	   child,	   the	   public	   failure	   of	   a	  marriage	   is	   a	  matter	   of	   shame	  which	  must	  be	  hidden,	  even,	   it	   seems,	   if	   this	  means	   that	   the	  child	  remain	   in	  a	  miserable	  marriage.	  	  
	  
Nour,	  who	  did	  not	  divorce	  
Nour,	   a	   woman	   in	   her	   40s,	   was	   very	   unhappily	   married	   with	   two	   children.	   Her	  
mother	  once	  confided	  in	  me	  that	  they	  had	  made	  a	  mistake.	  They	  thought	  they	  knew	  
their	  future	  son-­in-­law	  as	  he	  worked	  with	  the	  bride’s	  father	  and	  as	  he	  came	  from	  the	  
same	  region	  of	  origin.	  He	  seemed	  a	  good	  match	  and	  owned	  his	  own	  home.	  Once	  they	  
had	  married,	   Nour	   quickly	   discovered	   that	   he	   had	   lied.	   He	   did	   not	   own	   the	   house,	  
rather	   his	   sister	   did.	   Also,	   he	   drank	   and	   was	   violent.	   She	   returned	   to	   her	   father’s	  
house	  only	  to	  be	  abruptly	  told	  to	  return	  to	  her	  husband;	  her	  father	  was	  adamant	  that	  
no	  daughter	  of	  his	  would	  divorce.	  She	  repeated	  this	  a	  year	  later,	  only	  to	  be	  sent	  back	  
once	  again.	  Not	  long	  after,	  she	  fell	  pregnant	  and	  abandoned	  any	  thoughts	  of	  divorce	  
for	  the	  sake	  of	  her	  child.	  When	  we	  met,	  her	  first	  child	  was	  nearly	  15	  years	  old.	  Nour	  
worked	  and	  provided	  for	  the	  children	  herself.	  She	  complained	  that	  her	  husband	  had	  
never	  even	  bought	   them	  milk.	  She	  had	   fled	   the	  marital	  bed	  and	  was	  being	  wrongly	  
accused	   of	   cheating	   on	   her	   husband	   by	   her	   sisters-­in-­law.	   She	   resigned	   herself	   to	  
staying	  in	  the	  marriage,	  saving	  face	  for	  her	  natal	   family,	  and	  effectively	  raising	  her	  
two	  children	  alone.	  As	  with	  Besma,	   there	  was	  no	  question	  of	  her	  going	  against	  her	  
father’s	  word.	  
	  
Even	  those	  traditional	  indicators	  of	  good	  ethical	  personhood	  –	  regional	  and	  family	  origin	  –	  can	  be	  deceptive.	  Although	  Nour’s	  husband	  appeared	  a	  good	  match,	  he	  turned	  out	  to	   be	   a	   liar	   and	   a	   cheat.	   In	   this	   case,	   her	   family	   did	   not	   have	   intimate	   knowledge	   of	   his	  family	  as	  they	  lived	  in	  the	  dislocated	  setting	  of	  the	  neighbourhood.	  Could	  they	  otherwise	  have	  avoided	  this	  mistake?	  Nour	  had	  little	  choice	  but	  to	  stay	  put	  and	  cope	  in	  her	  difficult	  marriage	   in	   order	   to	   avoid	   revealing	   her	   parents’	   error	   of	   judgement	   that	   may	   cast	  aspersions	  on	  their,	  and	  subsequently	  her,	  own	  ethical	  personhood.	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Aziz	   shared	   the	   view	   that	   marriage	   and	  marital	   problems	   should	   remain	   in	   the	  family:	  
	  
Aziz	  
Aziz,	   aged	   79,	   was	   born	   in	   a	   small	   village	   in	   the	   agricultural	   heartlands	   near	   the	  
Algerian	   border.	   Since	   his	   father’s	   death,	   as	   the	   eldest	   son,	   he	   had	   ruled	   over	   the	  
whole	   family,	   including	   his	   nieces	   and	   nephews.	  He	   could	   tell	   them	  all	  what	   to	   do.	  
Even	   those	   living	   abroad	   phoned	   him	   to	   ask	   his	   advice	   or	   permission,	   including	  
permission	   to	   marry,	   and	   to	   settle	   marital	   disputes.	   They	   asked	   ‘not	   the	   judge	   or	  
anyone	   else,	   but	   him.’	   In	   his	   family	   ‘divorce	   is	   forbidden	   (haram).’	   Should	   marital	  
disputes	  arise,	  they	  had	  to	  be	  solved.	  After	  his	  brother	  divorced,	  his	  father	  did	  not	  let	  
him	   marry	   anyone	   else,	   sending	   all	   potential	   wives	   away.	   After	   three	   years,	   his	  
brother	  remarried	  his	  first	  wife.	  
Aziz’s	  wife	  agreed,	  ‘there	  is	  no	  divorce.’	  The	  couple	  ‘should	  always	  find	  a	  solution	  for	  
their	   problems.’	   Although	   ‘not	   all	   families	   are	   like	   this.	   Going	   to	   the	   police	   or	   the	  
court	  is	   ‘forbidden	  (haram)’	   for	  both	  men	  and	  women	  in	  his	  family.	  These	  problems	  
are	   ‘a	   family	  matter.’	   Aziz	   concurred.	   	   He	   did	   not	   like	   the	   legal	   system:	   ‘the	   judge	  
(should)	  never	  interfere	  …	  Now	  you	  have	  to	  get	  divorced	  with	  a	  judge	  and	  the	  court	  
must	   attempt	   reconciliation	  …	   If	   there	   are	   two	  good	   fathers	   in	   the	   family,	   it	  won’t	  
end	  up	  in	  court.	  If	  there	  is	  no-­one	  (to	  help	  reconcile	  the	  couple),	  they	  will	  go	  to	  court.’	  
	  
Here,	   the	   intervention	  of	   the	   state	  was	  directly	   juxtaposed	  with	   the	  weakness	  of	  the	  family.	  A	  child	  divorcing	  can	  be	  a	  damning	  commentary	  on	  the	  ethical	  personhood	  of	  their	  natal	  family,	  especially	  of	  their	  father.	  The	  burden	  of	  protecting	  the	  honour	  or	  wishes	  of	  their	  family	  weighed	  on	  both	  men	  and	  women,	  or	  to	  put	  it	  into	  other	  terms,	  shaped	  their	  ‘agency’	  with	  regard	  to	  accessing	  their	  legal	  rights	  to	  divorce.124	  Again,	  there	  is	  a	  caveat	  to	  this	  situation.	  One	  of	  the	  divorcing	  women	  I	  interviewed	  told	  me	  that	  her	  father	  had	  been	  staunchly	  against	  divorce	  prior	  to	  the	  failure	  of	  her	  marriage	  to	  an	  abusive	  husband.	  Her	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124	  Cf	  Joseph	  (1997)	  for	  comparative	  sense	  of	  women’s	  ability	  to	  access	  their	  rights	  and	  how	  this	  relates	  to	  kinship	  in	  
Lebanon.	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father	   came	   to	   see	   that	   divorce	  would	   enable	  his	   daughter	   to	   escape	   from	  her	   suffering	  and	  to	  seek	  amends;	  consequently,	  he	  became	  an	  advocate	  for	  a	  woman’s	  right	  to	  divorce.	  
Other	   women	   declined	   to	   divorce	   to	   protect	   the	   moral	   reputation	   of	   their	  daughters	   and	   their	   daughters’	  marriage	   prospects,	   rather	   than	   the	  moral	   reputation	   of	  their	  father:	  
	  
Nejia	  
Nejia	  wears	  the	  foulard.	  She	  is	  42	  and	  tells	  me	  that	  she	  thinks	  the	  foulard	  makes	  her	  
look	   older.	   She	   was	   born	   and	   grew	   up	   in	   Siliana	   in	   the	   North.	   She	   moved	   to	   the	  
suburbs	   of	   Tunis,	   where	   her	   husband	   worked,	   when	   she	   married,	   although	   he	   is	  
originally	   from	  Siliana	   too.	   They	  have	   3	   boys	   aged	  23,	   21	   and	  20	  and	  2	   daughters	  
aged	  19	  and	  14.	  She	  is	  ’at	  home‘	  (a	  housewife).	  She	  expected	  marriage	  to	  be	  ’heaven‘,	  
restful,	  but	   in	   fact	   it	   is	   ’tiring‘,	  because	  of	   the	  children.	  She	  and	  her	  husband	  argue	  
and	  he	  hits	  her.	  She	  does	  not	  want	  to	  divorce	  due	  to	  her	  children.	  She	  says	  it	  is	  hard	  
for	  a	  daughter	  to	  find	  a	  husband	  if	  her	  parents	  are	  divorced.	   ‘Women’,	  she	  explains,	  
‘are	  patient	  and	  good	  as	  they	  have	  children	  and	  refrain	  from	  asking	  for	  divorce.’	  
	  
Being	  married	  itself	  –	  and	  remaining	  married	  -­‐	  is	  a	  criterion	  of	  ethical	  personhood,	  in	   particular	   for	   a	  woman	   Sacrificing	   herself	   for	   her	   children	   and	   showing	   ‘patience’	   in	  light	   of	   marital	   problems,	   even	   tolerating	   domestic	   violence,	   Nejia	   displays	   the	   moral	  criteria	  required	  of	  a	  good	  wife.	  
	  
MAKING	  HUSBANDS	  AND	  WIVES	  
Marriage	   entails	   a	   ritual	   transformation	   bringing	   to	   bear	   new	   criteria	   that	   define	   a	  person’s	   ethical	   personhood.	   These	   expectations	   for	   people	   to	   embody	   –	   or	   at	   least	   to	  perform	   –	   the	   ideals	   associated	   with	   being	   a	   good	   husband	   or	   wife	   were	   strikingly	  homogenous	   across	   social	   classes	   and	   regions.	   Given	   the	   changes	   in	   sociality	   and	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economic	   struggles,	   however,	   these	   ideals	   were	   increasingly	   difficult	   for	   both	  men	   and	  women	   to	   live	   out	   in	   the	   lower-­‐middle	   classes	   observed.	   Marriage	   too	   has	   become	  dislocated,	   contingent	   on	   the	   ability	   of	   each	   spouse	   to	   perform	   their	   ideal	   role,	   whilst	  struggling	  with	  the	  reality	  of	  married	  life	  behind	  closed	  doors.	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  both	  the	  forms	  of	   house	   and	  kinship	   and	   friendship	  have	   changed.	  But	  perceptions	   of	  what	   ideal	  marital	  roles	  should	  be	  do	  not	  seem	  to	  have	  changed	  significantly	  –	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  changing	  economic	  reality.	  Thus	  it	  is	  increasingly	  difficult	  (sometimes	  impossible)	  to	  live	  up	  to	  the	  idealised	   expectations	   associated	  with	  being	   a	   good	  husband	  or	  wife	   and	   fulfilling	   all	   of	  one’s	  marital	  duties.	  This	  next	  section	  will	  set	  out	  some	  of	  these	  highly	  gendered	  religious	  and	  moral	  ideals	  that	  people	  are	  expected	  to	  fulfil	  as	  husbands	  and	  wives	  and	  also	  some	  of	  the	  difficulties	  in	  realising	  these	  ideals	  in	  these	  times.	  	  
MAKING	  IDEAL	  WIVES	  	   	  ‘I	  am	  everything	  at	  home.	  He	   is	  not	  responsible	   for	  anything.’	   (Neila,	  housewife	  aged	  42,	  mother	  of	  5.)	  
When	  I	  asked	  one	  of	  the	  divorced	  men	  I	  interviewed	  what	  he	  would	  like	  to	  change	  in	  the	  law	  if	  he	  were	  President	  for	  a	  day,	  his	  immediate	  response	  was	  that	  he	  would	  stop	  women	  going	  out.	  A	  wife	  should	  always	  be	  at	  home.	  What	  about	  taking	  the	  children	  to	  school	  or	  buying	  food	  at	  the	  souq?	  He	  conceded	  that	  these	  activities	  should	  be	  allowed,	  but	  that	  any	  other	  outings	  should	  be	  prohibited.	  
Equally,	  when	  I	  asked	  Zeineb,	  Besma’s	  neighbour,	  when	  divorce	  was	  justified,	  she	  replied	   that	   a	   wife	   (like	   a	   husband)	   must	   refrain	   from	   doing	   things	   that	   are	   forbidden	  (haram)	   in	   the	   religion,	   like	   ’going	   out	   into	   the	   streets‘	   or	   ’letting	   just	   anyone	   into	   the	  house‘.	  A	  husband,	  she	  told	  me,	  does	  not	  like	  this	  behaviour,	  as	  he	  has	  to	  protect	  his	  home	  and	   their	   children.	   The	   notion	   of	   a	   wife	   being	   at	   home	   also	   hints	   at	   the	   legal	   language	  surrounding	   marriage	   in	   the	   PSC.	   Marriage	   is	   centred	   on	   the	   ‘cohabitation’125	   of	   the	  spouses.	  One	  of	  the	  grounds	  upon	  which	  a	  husband	  may	  file	  for	  a	  divorce,126	  is	  when	  a	  wife	  fails	  to	  cohabit	  with	  her	  husband	  and	  abandons	  the	  marital	  home.	  	  
A	  wife’s	  duties	  are	  both	  legally	  and	  socially	  tied	  to	  the	  house.	  Legally	  speaking,	  she	  has	  a	  duty	  of	  ‘cohabitation’	  that	  begins	  once	  the	  marriage	  has	  been	  consummated	  and	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125	  Article	  23	  refers	  to	  the	  reciprocal	  duty	  of	  husband	  and	  wife	  to	  cohabit	  peacefully.	  
126	  cf	  ch5.	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is	   the	  counterpart	  of	  her	  right	   to	  be	  provided	   for	  by	  her	  husband.	  Whilst	   the	   failure	  of	  a	  wife	  to	  cohabit	  with	  her	  husband	  takes	  centre	  stage	  in	  the	  divorce	  files	  (in	  later	  chapters),	  in	   the	   neighbourhood	   I	   found	   that	   ‘cohabitation’,	   the	   physical	   presence	   of	   a	  wife	   in	   the	  marital	  home,	  became	  a	  metaphor	  for	  the	  wife	  fulfilling	  all	  of	  her	  duties.	  	  
When	  asked	  what	  she	  does,	  a	  housewife	  (rabbat	  bayt)	  will	  simply	  reply,	  ‘(I	  am)	  at	  home’	  (fid-­dar).	  Women	  repeatedly	  told	  me	  that	  they	  do	  everything	  in	  the	  house	  and	  that	  the	  man	  does	  nothing.	  By	   this	   is	  meant,	   as	   Saida,	   a	  46-­‐year	  old	  housewife	   explained,	   ‘to	  clean	   the	  home,	  make	   food’	  and	  also	  carry	  out	  any	  duties	  related	   to	   the	  children.	  This	   is	  why	   Besma’s	   mother	   used	   to	   leave	   Morouj	   early	   to	   return	   home,	   saying	   that	   her	   son	  needed	  her,	  her	  son	  at	  the	  time	  being	  43	  years	  old.	  This	  did	  not	  seem	  to	  shock	  anyone	  but	  me.	  Zohra	  (Nabil’s	  wife)	  often	  laments	  that	  her	  husband	  and	  three	  sons	  simply	  do	  not	  eat	  if	  she	  is	  not	  there,	  even	  if	  she	  has	  left	  food	  on	  the	  table	  for	  them.	  
MAKING	  IDEAL	  HUSBANDS	  
‘The	  duties	  of	  the	  husband	  are	  outside.	  He	  is	  in	  the	  street	  and	  she	  is	  in	  the	  home.’	  (Ahlam,	  42	  year-­‐old	  housewife	  and	  mother)	  
In	   contrast,	  whilst	  a	  wife’s	  duties	  are	   traditionally	   seen	  as	  being	   founded	   in	   the	  home,	  a	  husband’s	  duties	  necessarily	  entail	  his	  being	  outside	   the	  home	   in	  order	   to	  make	  a	   living	  and	  to	  provide	  for	  his	  family.	  He	  should	  ‘work	  and	  bring	  in	  the	  money,’	  as	  one	  wife	  put	  it.	  Zeineb,	  a	  housewife	  aged	  48,	  stressed	  how	  the	  husband’s	  responsibilities	  are	  financial,	  ‘he	  cannot	   leave	   his	   wife	   and	   spend	   as	   he	   likes.	   Equally,	   a	   wife	   must	   carry	   out	   her	  responsibilities,’	  she	  added.	  
A	  husband’s	  responsibility	  to	  provide	  for	  his	  family	  is	  particularly	  onerous	  in	  times	  of	  high	  male	  unemployment	  and	  yet	  remained	  central	  to	  the	  meaning	  of	  marriage	  for	  men	  in	  Tunisia.	  Moncef	  (a	  shopkeeper)	  summed	  up	  the	  situation	  for	  me	  in	  these	  terms:	  	  
‘What	  is	  marriage?	  Marriage	  is	  an	  insurance	  policy.	  Why?	  As	  the	  dreams	  of	  single	  men	  and	  single	  women	  are	  different.	  The	  man	  studies.	  Why	  does	  he	  study?	  To	  work.	  And	  why	  does	  he	  work?	  To	  build	  a	  house.	  And	  why	  does	  he	  build	  a	  house?	  To	  fill	  it	  with	  a	  family.	  The	  man	  was	   free	  and	   then	   imprisoned.	  He	  hurries	  home	   from	  work,	  does	   the	   shopping	  and	   then	  comes	   to	   see	   his	   children,	   wife,	   to	   relax.	   Marriage	   –	   there	   are	  many	   risks,	   like	   the	   new	  diseases,	  like	  AIDS.	  So	  it	  is	  better	  to	  get	  married.	  Otherwise	  you	  are	  like	  a	  bee,	  each	  time	  in	  a	  different	  flower.’	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(And,	  as	  we	  shall	  see,	  failing	  to	  maintain	  his	  family	  may	  quite	  literally	  lead	  to	  a	  man	  losing	  his	  freedom	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  prison	  sentence).	  
Financial	   pressures,	   in	   particular	   the	   difficulty	   of	   providing	   a	   marital	   home,	  weighed	  upon	  many	  men,	  forcing	  them	  to	  wait	  longer	  and	  longer	  to	  get	  married	  once	  they	  had	  managed	  to	  find	  the	  financial	  resources	  necessary.	  These	  constraints	  accumulated	  to	  form	   the	  worrying	   social	   phenomenon	  of	   ‘delayed	  marriage	   (‘azouf	   ‘an)’	   that	   concerned	  many	   of	   my	   informants	   greatly.	   (The	   later	   people	   married,	   the	   greater	   the	   risk	   of	   sex	  outside	  wedlock).	  
Where	   possible,	   parents,	   like	   Besma	   and	   her	   husband,	  were	   trying	   to	   help	   their	  sons,	  by	  building	  storeys	  on	  top	  of	  their	  homes	  to	  be	  used	  as	  future	  marital	  homes.	  	  
	  
Besma	  (5)	  
The	  upper	  floor	  of	  Besma’s	  house	  was	  reserved	  for	  their	  eldest	  son,	  then	  at	  university	  
abroad,	  for	  when	  he	  married.	  Given	  the	  increasing	  price	  of	  rent	  and	  buying	  property,	  
being	  able	  to	  provide	  a	  marital	  home	  for	  your	  son	  was	  a	  distinct	  advantage.	  After	  all,	  
why	  ‘waste’	  money	  on	  rent,	  if	  the	  couple	  can	  be	  provided	  with	  somewhere	  to	  live	  by	  
the	  family?	  If	  her	  son	  earns	  good	  money	  abroad,	  Besma	  hoped	  they	  could	  even	  build	  a	  
second	   storey	   on	   top,	   a	  wish	   that	   later	   became	   true	  after	   the	   revolution,	  when	   the	  
authorities	  were	   less	   concerned	  with	   planning	   regulations.	   Her	   house	   is,	   therefore,	  
broadly	   similar	   in	   format	   to	   her	   parents’	   house,	   with	   its	   outside	   living	   space	  
surrounding	  the	  house	  and	  extra	  accommodation	  on	  the	  roof.	  	  
	  
Besma	  explained	  this	  to	  me	  as	  a	  return	  to	  traditional,	  patrilocal	  residence	  patterns	  and	  a	  move	  away	  from	  the	  neolocal	  conjugal	  couple.	  Perhaps	  this	  is	  also	  a	  sign	  that	  Morouj	  is	  slowly	  becoming	  a	  ‘houma’	  as	  families	  start	  to	  lay	  down	  roots	  there.	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Zohra	  and	  Nabil	  (2)	  
Nabil	  (Zohra’s	  husband)	  wanted,	  like	  Besma,	  to	  provide	  for	  his	  sons’	  futures.	  He	  asked	  
me	  why,	  in	  Europe,	  people	  like	  small	  children	  and	  babies	  a	  lot,	  but	  are	  not	  so	  fond	  of	  
adolescents	  and	  older	  children;	  when	  they	  are	  18,	  children	  become	  independent	  and	  
move	  out	  of	  home	   into	  their	  own	  place	  with	  their	  own	  car	  and	  boy	  or	  girlfriend.	   In	  
Tunisia,	  they	   like	  to	  keep	  hold	  of	  them,	  until	  they	  are	  much	  older	  and	  leave	  of	  their	  
own	  accord.	  ‘Why	  do	  you	  think	  I	  built	  this	  big	  house?	  It	  is	  not	  for	  myself,	  but	  for	  my	  
sons,’	  he	  told	  me.	  They	  are	  unlikely	  to	  have	  the	  means	  that	  he	  has	  now,	  so	  he	  plans	  
ahead	  to	  provide	  a	  place	  for	  all	  three.	  	  
	  
Nabil	   feared	   for	   his	   sons’	   futures,	   although	   they	   were	   all	   bright	   students	   at	  university.	  A	  good	  education	  was	  no	  guarantee	  of	  finding	  and	  keeping	  a	  good	  job.	  Finding	  employment	  most	  often	  involved	  having	  the	  right	  contacts	  and	  could	  be	  a	  heavily	  political	  matter,	   especially	   if	   the	  pay	  was	   lucrative.	  Unfortunately,	   this	   solution	  comes	  up	  against	  expectations	   of	   neolocal	   residence	   associated	  with	   urban	   living	   that	   can	   create	   tensions	  between	   the	   parents	   and	   their	   future	   daughter-­‐in-­‐law.	   Alternatively,	   given	   increasing	  female	   employment,	   it	  was	   not	   unusual	   for	   a	  wife	   to	   own	   the	  marital	   home,	   a	   fact	   that	  could	  also	  be	  the	  source	  of	  tensions	  within	  the	  marriage.	  
	  
Zohra	  and	  Nabil	  (3)	  
Nabil’s	  attitude	   towards	  marriage	  can	  be	  understood	   from	  a	  story	  he	  once	   told	  me	  
about	  a	  nephew	  who	  married,	  divorced	  and	  then	  remarried	  the	  same	  woman.	  ‘They’	  
found	  this	  nephew	  a	  wife	  and	   ‘we’	   (himself	  and	  other	   family	  members)	  went	   to	  her	  
father’s	   house	   to	   ask	   for	   her	   hand	   in	   marriage.	   This	   father	   was	   ‘traditional’	   and	  
agreed	  on	  condition	  that	  the	  couple	  would	  not	  see	  each	  other	  before	  the	  marriage.	  	  
The	  nephew’s	  parents	  built	  a	  flat	  for	  the	  couple	  on	  top	  of	  their	  house.	  Due	  to	  the	  way	  
the	  house	  was	  constructed,	  they	  were	  obliged	  to	  build	  this	  new	  storey	  with	  a	  shared	  
entrance.	  After	   they	  were	  married,	   the	  wife	   complained	   that	  her	  husband	   spent	  all	  
his	  time	  with	  his	  parents	  laughing	  and	  talking,	  whilst	  she	  was	  upstairs	  in	  their	  house	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alone.	   After	   she	   left,	   many	   family	   members	   went	   over	   to	   see	   the	   wife	   to	   try	   to	  
persuade	  her	  to	  come	  back.	  The	  wife	  finally	  agreed,	  on	  the	  condition	  that	  they	  would	  
have	   their	   own	   home	   or	   at	   least	   their	   own	   entrance;	   both	   of	   these	   options	   proved	  
impossible	   financially	   or	   technically	   and	   they	   divorced.	   By	   this	   time,	   the	   wife	   was	  
pregnant	  with	  a	  baby	  boy.	  The	  husband	  went	  to	  the	  clinic	  and	  paid	  all	  her	  medical	  
bills	  and	  suggested	  they	  try	  again;	  he	  did	  not	  want	  his	  son	  to	  grow	  up	  with	  another	  
man	  and,	  apart	  from	  her	  loneliness,	  there	  were	  no	  real	  problems	  between	  them.	  They	  
remarried	   and	   returned	   to	   live	   above	   his	   parent’s	   house.	   They	   both	   worked	   as	  
teachers.	  They	  have	  bought	  a	  plot	  of	  land	  with	  his	  salary	  and	  they	  live	  off	  her	  salary.	  	  
	  





As	  we	  are	  drawing	  his	  family	  tree,	  I	  ask	  Anas	  (Habiba’s	  son)	  why	  people	  used	  to	  have	  
so	  many	  children.	  He	  tells	  me	  that	  people	  did	  not	  know	  about	  family	  planning	  before	  
the	  1960s,	  and	  they	  would	  keep	  going	  until	  they	  had	  a	  son.	  He	  points	  out	  one	  family	  
on	  the	  family	  tree	  who	  had	  6	  daughters	  and	  then	  a	  son.	  His	  daughter,	  sitting	  with	  us,	  
who	  is	  12,	  says	  that	  people	  used	  to	  kill	  baby	  girls	  as	  they	  wanted	  boys.	  He	  adds	  that	  
‘God	   gives	   and	   God	   takes	   away.	   Many	   children	   used	   to	   die	   from	   illnesses	   that	   we	  
suffered	  from	  in	  the	  past.’	  He	  also	  adds	  that	  men	  used	  not	  to	  work	  much.	  I	  am	  led	  to	  
understand	  from	  this	  that	  they	  used	  to	  fill	  their	  days	  pestering	  their	  wives	  for	  sexual	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activity.	  He	  tells	  me	  of	  a	  neighbour	  in	  Sfax	  who	  is	  very	  poor	  and	  has	  14	  children.	  ‘He	  
keeps	  calling	  for	  his	  wife,’	  Anas	  concludes.	  
Besma	   explains	   how	   only	   ‘natural’	   methods	   of	   contraception	   are	   permitted	   in	   the	  
religion	   (the	   withdrawal	   method,	   ‘counting	   the	   days’	   and	   avoiding	   sex	   on	   fertile	  
days).	  In	  practice,	  men	  resist	  using	  condoms	  and	  consequently	  many	  younger	  women	  
take	  the	  pill,	  whilst	  older	  women	  use	  coils.	   	   In	  the	  Koran,	   it	   says	  that	  a	  man	  should	  
look	  for	  a	  wife	  who	  gives	  birth	  a	  lot	  and	  love	  her;	  this	  is	  how	  Besma	  understands	  that	  
contraception	   is	   forbidden.	   It	   (family	   planning)	   is	   all	   down	   to	   Bourguiba,	   she	  
explains.	  He	  was	  ‘secular.	  He	  liked	  women	  and	  wanted	  all	  Tunisian	  women	  to	  be	  like	  
French	   women.	   He	   once	   ripped	   a	   sifsaree	   off	   a	   woman	   in	   the	   street	   and	   wanted	  
women	  to	  stop	  wearing	  the	  veil,	  as	  he	  said	  it	   is	  not	  in	  our	  traditions.	  This	  is	  why	  he	  
wanted	   to	   introduce	   family	  planning.	  He	  only	  gave	   child	   support	   for	   the	   first	   three	  
children.	  Zine	  (Ben	  Ali)	   increased	  this	  to	  four	  to	  encourage	  people	  to	  have	  children.	  
Bourguiba	  did	  it	  to	  discourage	  people	  from	  having	  children.	  They	  would	  say,	  he	  only	  
gives	  me	  money	  for	  three,	  so	  after	  this	  I	  will	  have	  an	  abortion	  to	  remove	  the	  baby.’	  I	  
discover	  many	  women	  I	  know	  who	  have	  had	  abortions,	  either	   for	  health	  reasons	  or	  
because	   they	  had	  too	  many	  children.	  Habiba	  explained	  that	  abortion	   is	  accepted	   in	  
the	  religion	  up	  to	  40	  days	  when	  ‘the	  baby	  becomes	  a	  soul’.	  She	  regrets	  the	  abortion	  
she	  had	  after	  this	  limit	  that	  is	  ‘haram’	  and	  fears	  that	  she	  will	  not	  be	  forgiven	  for	  this	  
sin.	  
	  
As	  Moncef	  explained	  further	  above,	  if	  people	  marry	  and	  build	  a	  home,	  it	  is	  because	  they	   want	   to	   fill	   it	   with	   a	   family.	   Radical	   changes	   in	   family	   size	   have	   occurred	   in	   the	  context	  of	   state	  politics	  designed	   to	  promote	   family	  planning.	   In	   this	  context,	   changes	   in	  the	  structure	  of	   the	  house	  also	  document	  changes	   in	   the	  structure	  of	   the	   family	  and	  this	  sets	   the	  scene	   in	  which	  men	  and	  women	  strive	   to	  play	  out	   their	   roles	  as	   ideal	  husbands	  and	  wives.	  	  
The	  family	  trees	  I	  collected	  reflected	  the	  striking	  change	  in	  the	  number	  of	  children	  born	  in	  each	  generation	  and	  the	  impact	  of	  family	  planning	  that	  made	  a	  reduction	  in	  family	  size	  possible,	  whilst	  economic	  changes	  made	  having	  fewer	  children	  desirable.	  Habiba	  told	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me	   how	   people	   used	   to	   have	   a	   lot	   of	   children,	   maybe	   15-­‐16.127	   Her	   23	   year-­‐old	  granddaughter	   ascribed	   the	   reduced	   family	   size	   to	   economic	   changes.	   She	   told	  me	   how	  people	  used	  to	  have	  12	  children,	  whereas	  now	  they	  just	  have	  2.	  Before	  they	  could	  live	  on	  little	  money.	  Now	  life	  is	  expensive.	  	  
	  
MAKING	  A	  LIVING	  
Changes	  in	  the	  economy	  and	  an	  increased	  dependence	  on,	  and	  desire	  for,	  consumer	  goods	  have	  made	  life	  expensive	  and	  restricted	  the	  size	  of	  family	  that	  couples	  seek	  to	  build.	  128	  As	  people	  migrated	  away	  from	  the	  countryside,	  they	  also	  migrated	  out	  of	  a	  particular	  type	  of	  economy,	  frequently	  based	  on	  agricultural	  production	  and	  owning	  land.	  
	  
Zohra	  and	  Nabil	  (4)	  
Nabil	   spoke	   about	   his	   childhood	   in	   the	   agricultural	   heartland	   of	   El	   Kef,	   where	   his	  
parents	   were	   farmers,	   with	   a	   nostalgia	   that	   betrayed	   his	   regrets	   about	   today’s	  
increasingly	  consumer	  society.	  His	  sons’	  expectations	  for	  these	  consumer	  goods	  made	  
an	  increased	  household	  income	  necessary.	  	  
He	  contrasts	  the	  life	  his	  sons	  expect	  with	  his	  childhood	  when	  he	  helped	  work	  on	  the	  
farm	  during	  school	  holidays:	  
‘We	  were	  almost	  in	  the	  stone	  age.	  We	  used	  to	  make	  everything	  ourselves.’	  ‘Tabouna’	  
(a	   traditional	   bread)	  was	  baked	   in	  a	   clay	  oven	  over	  a	  wood	   fire.	  The	  whole	   family	  
shared	  a	   room	  sleeping	   together	  under	  one	  blanket	  on	  a	   large	  grass	  mat.	  He	  often	  
wonders	   how	   his	   parents	  managed	   to	   have	   11	   children!	   (Sadly,	   two	   of	   his	   siblings	  
died).	  He	  adds	   that	   in	   the	   past	   ‘people	   did	   all	   these	   things	  with	   pleasure.	   This	  was	  
their	  life.’	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127	  cf	  Goody	  1976.	  This	  shift	  reflects	  Goody’s	  argument	  relating	  changes	  in	  the	  type	  economy	  (here,	  away	  from	  an	  
economy	  based	  on	  agricultural	  production	  at	  a	  time	  when	  many	  of	  these	  people	  frequently	  lived	  in	  the	  countryside	  
prior	  to	  the	  rural	  exodus	  towards	  wage	  labour)	  to	  changes	  in	  family	  size.	  
128	  cf	  Goody	  1976.	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Like	  many	  others	  who	  talk	  about	  the	  past,	  he	  keeps	  mentioning	  how	  life	  was	  ‘before.’	  
I	   ask	   him,	   what	   he	  means	   by	   this.	   Before	   what	   exactly?	   Things	   changed	   for	   them,	  
when	  his	  father	  bought	  machines	  for	  the	  farm.	  His	  father	  then	  became	  a	  mechanic,	  as	  
he	  could	  only	  afford	  to	  buy	  second-­hand	  machines	  that	  constantly	  broke	  down!	  Then	  
the	  children	  studied	  and	  no	  one	  took	  over	  the	  farm	  from	  his	  father.	  They	  let	  someone	  
run	  it	  for	  them,	  in	  return	  for	  the	  profits,	  but	  he	  did	  not	  take	  good	  care	  of	  it	  as	  it	  did	  
not	  belong	  to	  him.	  Many	  of	  the	  animals	  died.	  Only	  the	  walls	  of	  the	  old	  house	  are	  left.	  If	  
they	  had	  stayed	  there,	  he	  could	  have	  started	  growing	  a	  more	  profitable	  type	  of	  crop	  
like	   olives,	   instead	   of	   wheat,	   but	   this	   would	   have	   required	   a	   lot	   of	   work.	   Now,	   his	  
family	  have	  only	  a	  small	  house	  in	  the	  village,	  inhabited	  by	  his	  elderly	  mother.	  	  
Zohra	   says	   that	   her	   sons	   complain	   that	   they	   have	   to	   share	   a	   room	   (there	   are	   two	  
bedrooms	   for	   three	   sons)	   and	   have	   become	   materially	   very	   demanding	   under	   the	  
influence	   of	   marketing	   and	   consumerism,	   wanting	   designer	   clothes	   and	   other	  
consumer	   goods	   like	  mobile	   phones.	   Fortunately,	   relatives	   can	   bring	   some	   coveted	  
items	   from	   France.	  When	   she	  was	   a	   child,	   she	   took	   it	   for	   granted	   that	   she	   had	   to	  
share	  a	  room	  with	  her	  sisters.	   	  She	  did	  not	  expect	  to	  receive	  a	  present,	   just	  because	  
someone	  else	  did,	  trusting	  that	  it	  would	  be	  her	  turn	  next	  time.	  
	  
Nabil	   is	   fortunate	   that	  he	  has	  a	  good	   job	  and	   that	  his	  generous	   salary,	   combined	  with	   the	   rent	   from	   the	   roof	   apartment,	   enables	   them	   to	   have	   a	   good	   standard	   of	   living.	  Nonetheless,	  when	  Zohra	   fell	  pregnant	  a	   fourth	   time,	  her	  husband	  persuaded	  her	   that	   it	  made	  sense	  to	  have	  an	  abortion	  to	  avoid	  overstretching	  them	  financially.	  	  
However,	   the	   pressure	   to	   consume	   and	   reliance	   on	   material	   goods	   that	   are	  purchased	  rather	  than	  produced	  by	  wives	  in	  the	  home	  makes	  it	  increasingly	  necessary	  for	  a	   household	   to	   have	   two	   incomes.	   As	   Besma’s	   mother	   pointed	   out,	   women	   now	   earn	  money	  outside	  the	  house	  to	  buy	  products	  in	  the	  supermarket,	  rather	  than	  making	  supplies	  of	   these	   foods,	   like	   Besma	   and	   her	   mother	   still	   do;	   wives	   increasingly	   produce	   wages	  rather	   than	   hlalam.129	   The	   increased	   demand	   for	   consumer	   goods	   weighs	   heavily	   on	  parents,	  who	  must	  provide	   for	   their	   children.	  As	  Zeineb	  put	   it,	   ‘before,	  you	  had	  children	  and	  just	  let	  them	  live	  and	  eat	  from	  your	  plate.	  Now	  there	  are	  nappies	  and	  things	  and	  it	  is	  very	  expensive.’	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129	  cf	  Ch1	  on	  women	  making	  annual	  supplies	  of	  essential	  foods.	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I	   often	   heard	   these	   husbands	   and	   wives	   in	   the	   neighbourhood	   reminisce	   about	  their	  childhoods,	  perceived	  as	  a	  time	  when	  people	   lived	  simply,	  with	   few	  material	  needs	  and	  when	   they	   themselves	  were	   free	   from	  responsibility.	  Besma	  also	   took	   refuge	   in	  her	  memories	   of	   a	   time	   when	   life	   was	   easier.	   She	   had	   also	   made	   a	   significant	   financial	  contribution	  to	  the	  household	  through	  her	  work	  before	  she	  was	  made	  redundant.	  
	  
Besma	  (6)	  
Besma	  and	   her	   husband	   did	   not	   remain	   living	   at	   her	   parents’	   house	   for	   long	   after	  
their	   marriage.	   Besma	   had	   spotted	   a	   block	   of	   flats	   near	   the	   city	   centre	   in	   Hai	   Al	  
Hadhra,	   which	   she	   dreamed	   about	   living	   in.	   Not	   long	   after,	   by	   coincidence,	   her	  
husband’s	  employer	  offered	  him	  the	  opportunity	  to	  buy	  one	  of	  these	  very	  same	  flats.	  
No	  doubt,	  Besma’s	  income	  helped	  with	  this	  purchase	  as	  she	  continued	  working	  after	  
her	  marriage.	  The	  children	  were	  cared	   for	  by	  a	  childminder	  whilst	  she	  worked.	  She	  
saved	   every	   penny	   she	   earned	   to	   give	   to	   her	   family;	   she	   saved	   the	   restaurant	  
vouchers	  given	  to	  her	  by	  her	  employer,	  to	  treat	  the	  children	  with	  cakes.	  Every	  month,	  
she	  and	  her	  husband	  placed	  their	  money	  together	  on	  a	  shelf	  and	  this	  fund	  was	  used	  
communally	   for	   the	   family	   expenses.	   On	   top	   of	   her	   full	   time	   job,	   Besma	   bore	   the	  
burden	  of	  all	  of	   the	  housework,	  although	  she	   tells	  me	   that	  her	  husband	  would	  help	  
occasionally.	   When	   I	   lived	   with	   them,	   after	   she	   was	   made	   redundant,	   she	   was	   ‘at	  
home’.	  I	  rarely,	  if	  ever,	  saw	  her	  husband	  help	  with	  the	  domestic	  chores.	  	  
Their	   three	  children	  were	  born	   in	   their	  new	  home.	  As	   the	  children	   started	  growing	  
up,	  the	  flat	  began	  to	  feel	  cramped.	  Her	  husband	  noticed	  an	  advertisement	  for	  land	  for	  
sale	   in	   Morouj.	   Besma	   had	  mixed	   feelings;	   Morouj	   was	   far	   away,	   but	   the	   children	  
were	  fast	  outgrowing	  the	  apartment	  and	  the	  price	  of	  the	  land	  was	  too	  good	  to	  refuse.	  
They	   still	   own	   the	   flat,	   kept	   in	   safekeeping	   for	   their	   eldest	   son	   and	   rented	   out	   to	  
provide	  some	  useful	  income.	  
	  
Whilst	  ideal	  notions	  of	  what	  makes	  a	  good	  husband	  or	  wife	  remain	  constant	  –	  and	  surprisingly	   homogenous	   across	   social	   classes	   –	   it	   is	   increasingly	   difficult	   to	   live	   up	   to	  these	  ideals	  of	  a	  sole	  male	  breadwinner	  married	  to	  a	  wife	  who	  remains	  at	  home.	  Firstly,	  as	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we	  saw	  above,	  wives	  must	   leave	   the	  house	   to	   socialise,	   if	   for	  no	  other	   reason.	   Secondly,	  educated	  wives	  are	  driven	  to,	  or	  may	  want	  to,	  go	  out	  to	  work.	  Tensions	  appear	  between	  ideal	  notions	  of	  marital	  duties	  –	  and	  the	  forms	  of	  ethical	  personhood	  associated	  with	  being	  a	  ‘good’	  wife	  or	  husband	  who	  fulfils	  these	  duties	  –	  and	  the	  reality	  in	  which	  these	  roles	  are	  constantly	  changing.	  	  
Zohra’s	   dispute	   with	   her	   husband	   over	   their	   daughter’s	   work	   (cited	   above)	  indicates	  how	  in	  some	  households,	  it	  is	  either	  not	  possible	  or	  perceived	  as	  undesirable	  for	  a	   woman	   to	   work.	   This	   is	   frequently	   for	   reasons	   related	   to	   the	   suspicions	   and	   taboos	  surrounding	   female	   presence	   outside	   the	   home.	   Salima,	   in	   her	   early	   20s,	   had	   not	  completed	  her	  studies.	  Before	  meeting	  her	  husband	  she	  had	  worked	   in	  a	  print	  shop,	  but	  her	   husband	   wanted	   her	   to	   stop.	   She	   also	   preferred	   not	   to	   work	   so	   that	   she	   could	  concentrate	   on	   her	   responsibilities	   at	   home	   (not	   the	   least	   because	   she	   was	   pregnant).	  Irkam,	  aged	  50	  (and	  educated	  to	  secondary	  school	   level),	  did	  have	  a	  civil	  service	   job	  but	  stopped	  working	  when	   she	   had	   children.	   Her	   daughter	   told	  me	   that	   her	   father	   had	   not	  wanted	  her	  mother	  to	  work.	  Some	  women	  did	  not	  have	  the	  same	  opportunities.	  Another	  woman	  of	  Irkam’s	  age	  was	  illiterate.	  Her	  daughter	  suggested	  that	  her	  father	  preferred	  her	  mother	  being	  dependent	  and	  forced	  to	  remain	  at	  home.	  As	  we	  met,	  this	  lady	  was	  learning	  to	  read.	  She	  told	  me	  that	  she	  wanted	  to	  read	  the	  Koran;	  this	  provided	  a	  reason	  for	  leaving	  the	  home	  and	  becoming	  literate	  that	  her	  husband	  would	  find	  difficult	  to	  object	  to.	  
If	   the	   wife	   does	   not	   work,	   however,	   the	   pressure	   on	   the	   male	   breadwinner	   is	  immense.	  As	  Zeineb,	  herself	  a	  housewife,	   told	  me	  regretfully,	  her	  husband	  worked	  night	  and	   day.	   If	   he	   had	   only	   worked	   in	   the	   day,	   there	   would	   have	   been	   a	   thousand	   things	  missing.	  	  
Consequently,	   the	   ability	   of	   a	  wife	   to	  work	   in	   a	   respectable	   profession	   takes	   on	  increased	   value	   in	   the	   marriage	   market.130	   Jamila’s	   good	   education	   that	   will	   lead	   to	   a	  respectable	  career	  as	  a	  doctor	  in	  the	  future	  will	  enable	  her	  to	  ‘help’	  her	  husband	  provide	  for	  their	  household.	  Fathi,	  a	  young	  man	  working	  in	  the	  court,	  was	  pleased	  to	  be	  engaged	  to	  a	  secondary	  school	  teacher	  who	  not	  only	  had	  a	  steady	  income	  as	  a	  civil	  servant,	  but	  whose	  work	  would	  be	  easy	  to	  combine	  with	  her	  future	  role	  as	  mother.	  The	  idiom	  in	  which	  this	  is	  expressed,	  as	  working	  wives	  ‘helping’	  their	  husbands,	  underlines	  the	  tensions	  that	  prevail	  as	   ‘traditional’	   gender	   roles	   are	   increasingly	   difficult	   to	   live	   up	   to	   for	   both	   men	   and	  women.	  This	  is	  a	  shift	  compared	  to	  the	  logic	  of	  Besma’s	  parents,	  who	  told	  her	  to	  stop	  her	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130	  Cf	  Ch3	  on	  how	  Faza	  juggles	  her	  roles	  as	  working	  wife	  and	  mother.	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university	  studies	  when	  she	  became	  engaged	  in	  order	  to	  work	  and	  save	  up	  money	  for	  the	  wedding,	  or	  Zohra’s	  (aged	  46)	  parents,	  who	  similarly	  told	  her	  to	  stop	  her	  education	  as	  she	  was	   getting	   married.	   A	   sign	   of	   the	   changing	   times,	   in	   retrospect,	   Besma’s	   mother	   now	  regrets	  that	  she	  did	  not	  encourage	  Besma	  to	  finish	  her	  studies.	  The	  implication	  here	  was	  that	  these	  women	  would	  work	  temporarily	  to	  help	  provide	  their	  ‘trousseau’	  and	  then	  stop	  once	  married.	  During	  the	  time	  I	  knew	  her,	  Zohra	  later	  briefly	  found	  a	  job	  at	  a	  call	  centre,	  but	   gave	   it	   up	   within	   a	   few	   months	   as	   she	   found	   it	   impossible	   to	   combine	   with	   her	  responsibilities	  as	  wife	  and	  mother.	  The	  breaking	  point	  was	  the	  month	  of	  Ramadan,	  when	  her	  manager	  would	  not	  let	  her	  change	  her	  working	  hours	  to	  be	  home	  in	  time	  to	  cook	  for	  her	  family	  ready	  for	  the	  breaking	  of	  the	  fast.	  
Often,	  women	  are	  required	  to	  work	  to	  meet	  the	  basic	  costs	  of	  living,	  rather	  than	  to	  pay	   for	   consumer	   goods	   and	   luxuries.	   Male	   unemployment	   has	   made	   this	   a	   greater	  imperative.	   Others,	   like	   Nejia,	   begin	   work	   because	   of	   marital	   breakdown,	   when	   their	  husbands	   are	   unwilling	   rather	   than	   unable	   to	   provide	   for	   the	   family.	   A	   female	   lawyer	  living	   in	   Morouj,	   who	   frequently	   works	   with	   women	   who	   are	   victims	   of	   violence,	  commented	   to	   me	   on	   the	   amazing	   resourcefulness	   of	   women,	   who	   may	   be	   poorly	  educated,	  and	  their	  ability	  to	  find	  the	  money	  they	  need	  to	  escape	  from	  a	  marriage	  that	  has	  become	  intolerable.	  Nejia’s	  father	  had	  married	  her	  off	  to	  the	  first	  person	  who	  asked	  for	  her	  hand	  when	  she	  was	  only	  15,	  finding	  himself	  extremely	  poor	  with	  7	  daughters	  to	  care	  for.	  Poverty	   also	   meant	   that	   Nejia	   could	   not	   take	   refuge	   in	   her	   father’s	   house.	   Educated	   to	  secondary	   school	   level,	   Nejia	   managed	   to	   obtain	   a	   loan	   to	   start	   a	   small	   shop	   selling	  women’s	   clothes	   after	   struggling	   for	   years	   and	   selling	  most	   of	   the	   furniture	   to	   feed	   her	  children,	  whilst	  her	  husband	  –	  who	  was	  employed	  –	  did	  not	  provide	  for	  his	  family.	  The	  gas	  and	   electricity	   had	   been	   cut	   off	   and	   she	   kept	   food	   in	   her	   neighbour’s	   fridge.	   She	   was	  hopeful	  that	  her	  new	  independent	  income	  would	  enable	  her	  to	  pay	  for	  a	  divorce.	   ‘Should	  the	  mother	  provide	  for	  the	  children?’	  she	  lamented.	  ‘No!	  The	  father	  should	  maintain	  them.’	  She	  described	  her	  husband	  as	  something	  ‘extra’	  in	  her	  life,	  something	  she	  did	  not	  need	  and	  could	  live	  better	  without.	  	  
If	   women	   are	   increasingly	   required	   to	   work,	   it	   is	   less	   practical	   for	   women	   to	  remain	   in	   the	   home,	   the	   traditional	   site	   of	   their	   marital	   duties.	   The	   breakdown	   of	  ‘traditional’	  marital	  roles,	   led	  to	  an	  inherent	  contradiction	  between	  a	  nostalgia	  for	  a	  past	  when	   things	   seemed	   easier	   as	  material	   needs	  were	  more	   easily	  met	   and	   the	   sense	   that	  women	  are	  better	  placed	  in	  society	  today	  as	  they	  are	  educated	  and	  ‘free’	  in	  different	  ways.	  Having	  also	  told	  me	  that	  things	  were	  better	  ‘before’,	  Zeineb	  went	  on	  to	  tell	  me	  in	  the	  same	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conversation	  that,	   in	  some	  respects	  as	  far	  as	  the	  situation	  of	  women	  is	  concerned,	  things	  are	  better	  now	  that	  women	  are	   ‘cultured’	  and	  able	  to	  read.	   It	   is	  also	  better	  that	  men	  are	  now	   more	   engaged	   in	   family	   life	   and	   take	   on	   more	   responsibilities	   with	   the	   children,	  ‘instead	  of	   just	  going	  to	  sleep.’	  Souad	  (aged	  35,	  born	  and	  bred	  in	  the	  North)	  told	  me	  that	  things	  used	   to	  be	  better	  as	  women	  were	   ‘afraid	  of	  men’.	  The	  man	  was	   ‘the	  ruler’.	   In	   this	  contradiction,	   there	   are	   undertones	   of	   a	   fear	   of	   moral	   breakdown,	   that	   things	   are	   no	  longer	   the	  way	   they	  should	  be	  and	   that	   these	  changes	  may	  be	   responsible	   for	   the	  social	  problems	   that	   trouble	   people–	   such	   as	   a	   ‘high’	   divorce	   rate,	   juvenile	   delinquency	   and	  young	  women	  engaging	  in	  sexually	  loose	  behaviour.	  	  
Zohra	  felt	  that,	  whether	  or	  not	  a	  wife	  has	  a	  high	  level	  of	  education	  and	  works,	  ‘the	  husband	  has	  the	  upper	  hand	  at	  home’.	  This	  is	  the	  natural	  order	  of	  things	  to	  her,	  according	  to	  the	  religion.	  As	  she	  explained,	  there	  should	  be	  respect	  between	  husband	  and	  wife,	  but	  especially	  from	  the	  wife	  to	  her	  husband,	  as	  ‘a	  man	  is	  a	  man	  and	  a	  woman	  is	  a	  woman.’	  She	  repeats	  the	  same	  sentiment	  to	  me	  when	  we	  discuss	  how	  she	  imagines	  her	  sons’	  married	  life	   in	  the	  future.	   ‘A	  man	  should	  help	  his	  wife	  (with	  the	  housework),	  but	  it	  should	  not	  be	  his	   responsibility.	  He	   should	   still	   be	   able	   to	   come	  home	   and	   find	   food	  on	   the	   table.	   The	  man’s	  responsibilities	   include	   first	  and	   foremost	   ‘to	  provide	   for	   the	   family,	   to	  work.’	  She	  tells	  me	  that	   I	  should	  respect	  my	  husband,	  because	   ‘a	  man	  is	  still	  a	  man’	  and	   ‘we	  should	  always	  respect	  a	  man	  more	  than	  a	  woman.	  Even	  if	  the	  woman	  is	  a	  Minister	  and	  the	  man	  is	  a	  farmer,	  we	  should	  still	  respect	  the	  man	  more.’	  Indeed,	  the	  female	  Family	  Judge	  told	  me	  that,	   although	   she	  was	   a	   judge	   at	   work,	   she	   remained	   a	   wife	   at	   home	   carrying	   out	   her	  marital	  duties	  as	  other	  women	  do.	  
	  
CONCLUSION	  
Reading	   agency	   as	   a	   network	   encompassing	   relationships	   and	   responsibilities	   (Laidlaw	  2010;	  Strathern	  2004)	  provides	  a	  more	  pertinent	  model	  for	  understanding	  the	  agents	  who	  make	  and	  end	  marriages.	  These	   individuals	   appear	   to	  be	   related	  and	   responsible	   rather	  than	  docile	  or	  empowered.	  Consequently,	  morality	  does	  not	  reside	  in	  the	  individual,	  but	  in	  the	   web	   of	   relationships;	   a	   father’s	   ethical	   personhood	   is	   at	   stake	   when	   his	   daughter	  divorces	  or	   loses	  her	  virginity	   (however	   this	  occurred)	  because	  his	  own	   judgement	   is	  at	  stake.	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Moreover,	   ‘agency’	   appears	   as	   a	   less	   fitting	   way	   to	   read	   and	   understand	   these	  decisions	  than	  does	  judicious	  practice.	  Viewing	  consent	  in	  marriage	  or	  the	  decision	  to	  file	  for	   divorce	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   continuous	   exercise	   of	   moral	   judgement	   accounts	   for	   the	  subtleties	   of	   the	   different	   relationships	   that	   must	   be	   weighed	   up	   and	   also	   the	  responsibilities	   that	   are	   held	   by,	   and	   that	   help	   shape,	   the	   ethical	   personhood	   of	   those	  concerned.	  	  
Husbands	   and	  wives	   emerge	   as	   particular	   kinds	   of	   ethical	   persons,	   new	   criteria	  having	   been	   instantiated	   by	   the	   ritual	   act	   of	  marriage	   itself,	   opening	   each	   spouse	   up	   to	  judgement	   in	   light	  of	   the	  marital	  duties	  expected	  of	   them.	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	   these	  duties	  are	  highly	  gendered	  and	  remain	  so	  even	  in	  the	  difficult	  economic	  climate	  that,	  along	  with	  the	   growing	   norm	   of	   neolocality,	   places	   greater	   emphasis	   on	   the	   conjugal	   couple	   who	  struggle	  together	  to	  raise	  their	  children	  and	  make	  ends	  meet.	  
What	  emerges	  is	  a	  further	  form	  of	  dislocation:	  between	  the	  ideal	  and	  the	  real	  (or	  the	   possible)	   as	   far	   as	   enacting	   marital	   duties	   is	   concerned.	   The	   public	   act	   of	   a	   happy	  marriage	   is	   a	   further	   form	   of	   performance,	   keeping	   up	   the	   appearance	   of	   how	   people	  continue	  to	  believe	  marriage	  should	  be,	  even	  as	  subtle	  changes	  in	  the	  conjugal	  relationship	  are	  occurring	  behind	  closed	  doors.	  In	  this	  way,	  even	  once	  opened,	  marriage	  continues	  to	  be	  like	  a	  watermelon,	  ripe	  with	  new	  kinds	  of	  uncertainty	  that	  may	  make	  it	  bitter	  or	  sweet.	  	  
These	   ambiguities	   related	   to	   marital	   roles	   echo	   changes	   in	   the	   PSC.	   Firstly,	   the	  addition	   of	   a	   phrase	   in	   article	   23	   indicated	   that	   ‘the	   wife	   shall	   contribute	   to	   the	  maintenance	  of	  the	  family,	  if	  she	  has	  property.’	  (Although,	  the	  wife’s	  contribution	  is	  clearly	  conditional	  and	  the	  lawyers	  I	  interviewed	  were	  unclear	  about	  whether	  a	  salary	  would	  be	  considered	  ‘property’	  or	  how	  ‘property’	  should	  be	  defined).	  Secondly,	  the	  change	  in	  legal	  vocabulary	   in	   the	   PSC131	   appeared	   to	   move	   towards	   a	   legal	   model	   of	   the	   marital	  relationship	  founded	  on	  reciprocity	  rather	  than	  the	  dominance	  of	  the	  husband.	  
Whilst	  marriage	  has	  become	  dislocated,	  kinship	  retains	  a	  central	   role	   in	  people’s	  lives,	   albeit	   in	   subtly	   different	   ways.	   Once	   based	   on	   residence	   in	   the	   same	   place	   and	  intimate	   involvement	   in	   each	   other’s	   daily	   lives,	   neolocal	   residence	   has	   shifted	   the	  way	  couples	   relate	   with	   their	   kin,	   rather	   than	   eroding	   these	   relationships	   entirely.	   In	   these	  difficult	  economic	  times,	  kinship	  may	  be	  taking	  on	  renewed	  importance	  as	  there	  is	  a	  shift	  back	   towards	   living	  patrilocally,	  as	  concerned	  parents	   like	  Besma	  and	  Nabil	  build	   future	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131	  See	  Introduction.	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marital	  homes	  for	  their	  sons.	  It	  remains	  to	  be	  seen	  whether	  their	  sons	  will	  take	  up	  these	  offers	  of	  material	  support,	  like	  Besma’s	  brothers	  have	  done,	  and	  decide	  to	  live	  above	  their	  father’s	  house.	  	  
	  
Besma	  (7)	  
Besma’s	  husband	  once	  discussed	  hypothetically	  what	  he	  would	  do	  if	  polygamy	  were	  
reintroduced.	   He	   would	   not	   take	   another	   wife,	   he	   concluded.	   He	   owed	   her	   far	   too	  
much.	   It	  was	  she	  who	  had	  struggled	  with	  him	  and	   ‘worn	  herself	  out’	  as	   they	  raised	  
their	   children	   together.	   In	   the	   days	   when	   Besma	   had	   worked,	   they	   pooled	   their	  
resources	  to	  provide	  for	  the	  family.	  These	  days,	  Besma	  took	  care	  to	  save	  them	  money,	  
using	  their	  resources	  wisely.	  A	  glowing	  smile	  lit	  up	  Besma’s	  face.	  His	  response	  pleased	  
her	  greatly.	  
	  
	   111	  
CHAPTER	  3	  -­	  	  
FROM	  BOTH	  SIDES:	  ABOUT	  THE	  COURT	  HOUSE	  
	  
Saida	  and	  Karima	  
When	  I	  met	  Saida	  in	  Morouj,	  she	  was	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  an	  acrimonious	  divorce.	  Having	  
been	   thrown	  out	  of	  her	  home	  by	  her	  husband	  and,	   far	   from	  her	  native	  Algeria,	   she	  
lived	  alone	  with	  her	  3-­year-­old	  son	   in	  precarious	  conditions.	   I	  offer	  her	  a	   lift	   to	   the	  
court	  to	  spare	  her	  the	  expense	  and	  time	  of	  travelling	  and	  to	  provide	  moral	  support	  in	  
the	  intimidating	  space	  of	  the	  court.	  	  
I	  am	  conscious	  that	  her	  contact	  with	  me	  will	  automatically	  win	  her	  better	  treatment	  
from	  the	  clerks.	  Souad,	  a	  clerk	  in	  her	  mid-­40s,	  herself	  a	  wife	  and	  mother,	  takes	  time	  
to	  listen	  to	  Saida.	  She	  then	  offers	  advice	  on	  the	  law	  and	  its	  procedures:	  she	  must	  file	  
her	  request	  to	  travel	  to	  Algeria	  with	  her	  son	  for	  Aïd	  at	  the	  Court	  of	  Tunis	  (where	  her	  
husband	  resides,	   rather	   than	   in	  Ben	  Arous);	  her	   right	   to	  a	   rent	  allowance	  officially	  
ceased	  when	  her	  husband	   told	   the	   judge	  he	  had	  decided	   to	   reconcile	  with	  his	  wife,	  
thereby	  ending	  a	  previous	  divorce	  case	  he	  had	  filed	  against	  her.	   ‘As	   long	  as	  he	  says	  
that	   he	  will	   return	   to	   his	  wife	   in	   front	   of	   the	   judge	   and	   the	   court,	  we	   suppose	   this	  
happens’,	  she	  explains.	  Saida	  asks	  if	  –	  in	  her	  present	  divorce	  case–	  she	  should	  ask	  for	  
a	   lump	   sum	   or	   monthly	   payments	   in	   compensation.	   Souad	   replies	   that	   a	   monthly	  
pension	  can	  be	  ‘light’	  (very	  low).	  She	  adds	  that	  she	  does	  not	  see	  why	  she	  cannot	  travel	  
to	  Algeria	  with	  her	  son	  unless	  her	  husband	  has	  taken	  legal	  measures	  to	  prevent	  her	  
travelling.	   She	   advises	   Saida	   to	   move	   back	   to	   Algeria	   after	   her	   divorce:	   ‘there	   is	  
nothing	  left	  for	  you	  here.’	  Yet,	  I	  know	  that	  Saida	  is	  afraid	  of	  losing	  custody	  of	  her	  son	  
if	  she	  tries	  to	  move	  away.132	  
A	  few	  weeks	  later,	  as	  I	  drive	  Karima,	  another	  clerk,	  back	  to	  the	  neighbourhood	  where	  
we	  both	  live,	  she	  explains	  how	  she	  has	  previously	  helped	  Saida.	  However,	  she	  is	  afraid	  
that	   Saida	  has	  not	   listened	  and	  asks	  me	   to	   repeat	  her	  advice.	   I	   am	   touched	  by	  her	  
genuine	  concern.	  Like	  Souad,	  Karima	  is	  afraid	  that	  Saida’s	  case	  would	  be	  thrown	  out	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132	  She	  would	  be	  required	  to	  respect	  the	  father’s	  visiting	  rights.	  Evidently,	  it	  would	  be	  impractical	  and	  undesirable.	  
for	  him	  to	  travel	  to	  Algeria	  every	  weekend	  to	  visit	  his	  son.	  
	   112	  
of	  court,	  as	  she	  is	  not	  filing	  it	  in	  the	  jurisdiction	  where	  her	  husband	  currently	  lives.133	  
In	  addition,	  she	  thinks	  that	  Saida	  does	  not	  have	  enough	  evidence	  to	  prove	  the	  harm	  
done	   to	  her	   by	  her	  husband.134	  Although	   Saida	  has	  proof	   that	   she	  used	   to	   live	   in	   a	  
hostel	  for	  children	  in	  danger,	  this	  is	  not	  sufficient	  as	  she	  had	  only	  lived	  there	  because	  
she	  is	  Algerian	  and	  had	  nowhere	  else	  to	  go.	  ‘People’,	  Karima	  explains,	  ‘do	  not	  want	  to	  
take	  in	  women	  running	  from	  their	  husbands,	  in	  case	  the	  police	  get	  involved	  and	  they	  
end	  up	  in	  trouble	  themselves.’	  Saida’s	  husband	  is	  likely	  to	  triumph	  as	  he	  is	  following	  
the	   law	  to	  the	   letter;	  her	   lawyer	   is	  only	  using	  her	   for	  money	  and	  surely	  knows	  that	  
her	   case	  will	  be	   rejected	   for	  being	   filed	   in	   the	  wrong	   jurisdiction.	   ‘He	  will	   say	   later	  
that	   it	  was	  not	  his	   fault	  and	  that	   it	  was	  the	   judge’s	  decision’,	  Karima	  adds.	  She	  has	  
also	   taken	  Saida	   to	   see	   the	   family	   judge	   to	  ask	  whether	   she	  could	   travel	   to	  Algeria	  
with	   her	   son	   for	   the	   religious	   festival.	   Regretfully,	   he	   could	   not	   agree	   to	   this	   as	   he	  
could	  not	  guarantee	  that	  she	  would	  not	  run	  off	  with	  her	  son.	  	  
	  
INTRODUCTION	  
Moving	  between	  the	  neighbourhood	  and	  the	  court	  –	  literally	  in	  this	  vignette	  –	  highlighted	  the	  numerous	   links	   that	   existed	  between	   these	   supposedly	   separate	   sites.135	  From	   these	  perspectives,	  to	  borrow	  Latour’s	  metaphor,	  the	  court	  office	  took	  on	  a	  ‘star-­‐like	  shape	  with	  a	  centre	  surrounded	  by	  many	  radiating	  lines	  with	  all	  sorts	  of	  tiny	  conduits	  leading	  to	  and	  fro’	  (2005:	  117).	  This	  chapter	  focuses	  on	  the	  actors	  who	  enter	  the	  court	  office,	  as	  the	  legal	  code	  requires	  both	  men	  and	  women	  to	  divorce	   judicially	  and	  for	   litigants	  to	  come	  to	  the	  office	  for	  various	  bureaucratic	  purposes.	  	  
WT	  Murphy	  found	  –	  in	  a	  different	  context	  –	  that	  the	  ‘rule	  of	  law’	  requires	  ‘a	  barrier	  between	  the	  inside	  and	  outside	  of	  the	  courtroom’,	  a	  ‘means	  for	  determining	  the	  difference	  between	   what	   is	   relevant	   and	   what	   is	   irrelevant	   to	   the	   discourse	   that	   unfolds	   inside’	  (1997:	   197).	   He	   talks	   about	   an	   adjudication	   system	   that	   provides	   an	   ‘ethical	   space	   in	  which	   everything	   can	   be	   subjected	   to	   a	   particular	   kind	   of	   often	   ‘uninformed’	   or	  decontextualized	  critical	  scrutiny’	  (ibid:	  209).	  Such	  a	  separation	  would	  appear	  necessary	  for	  law	  to	  have	  its	  own	  morality.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133	  This	  requirement	  is	  established	  in	  jurisprudence,	  rather	  than	  the	  legal	  code.	  
134	  cf	  chapter	  5	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  evidence.	  
135	  Cf	  Mitchell’s	  approach	  to	  ‘the	  question	  of	  the	  state	  and	  its	  relationship	  to	  society’	  (2006:184).	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The	   PSC,	   however,	   in	   defining	   marital	   duties	   according	   to	   ‘custom	   and	   habit’,	  explicitly	  demands	  a	  degree	  of	  continuity	  between	  the	  courthouse	  and	  the	  community.	  To	  pass	  judgement,	  the	  court	  must	  try	  to	  see	  into	  the	  intimate	  domain	  of	  the	  household,	  the	  stage	  where	  marital	  disputes	  are	  played	  out,	  a	  space	  that	  is	  frustratingly	  kept	  out	  of	  view.	  In	  order	  to	  try	  to	  comprehend	  the	  litigants	  and	  their	  marital	  disputes,	  after	  a	  first	  moment	  of	   decontextualization,	   I	   argue	   that	   the	   practice	   of	   the	   law	   requires	   a	   process	   of	   re-­‐contextualisation	  that	  takes	  place	  as	  those	  individuals	  who	  work	  in	  the	  law	  create	  human	  bridges	  with	  the	  household	  and	  neighbourhood	  and	  the	  moral	  values	  and	  ideals	  that	  are	  dominant	  there.	  	  
This	  chapter	  seeks	  to	  outline	  the	  kind	  of	  ethical	  space	  that	  constitutes	  the	  Tunisian	  family	  court	  that	  is	  both	  apart	  from,	  and	  a	  part	  of,	  the	  context	  in	  which	  the	  law	  is	  applied.	  Interrogating	  this	  space	  and	  peoples’	  experiences	  in	  it	  reveals	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  court	  is	  part	  of	  the	  broader	  process	  of	  reassembling	  the	  moral.	  
In	  tracing	  these	  connections,	  I	  follow	  Goodale	  and	  his	  approach	  to	  studying	  human	  rights	  by	  reading	   them	  as	   ‘ethical	   theory	  as	  social	  practice’	  which	  he	  has	  defined	  as	   ‘the	  development	   of	   normative	   ideas	   through	   the	   dynamic	   interaction	   between	   the	   many	  different	  sources	  reflected	  in	  these	  complicated	  arrangements’	  (2006:	  29).	  As	  a	  result,	  he	  finds	  that	  human	  rights	  are	  never	  separate	  from	  the	   ‘swirl	  of	  other	  sources	  of	  normative	  inspiration,	  which	  include	  unwritten	  community	  rules	  of	  behaviour,	  Bolivian	  state	   law	  …	  standards	  associated	  with	  evangelical	  Christianity’	   (ibid:	  29).	   Similarly,	  we	  will	   find	   that	  personal	  status	  law	  concerning	  divorce	  is	  never	  separate	  from	  the	  ‘swirl’	  of	  related	  kinds	  of	  ‘normative	  inspiration’,	  a	  moral	  storm	  in	  an	  office	  shaped	  teacup.	  	  
In	  turn,	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  Tunisian	  state	  is	  at	  stake,	  as	  the	  state,	  via	  its	  court	  and	  legal	  code	  may,	  or	  may	  not,	  be	  seen	  to	  uphold	  those	  dominant	  values	  associated	  with	  an	  Islamic	  version	  of	  morality,	  as	  expected	  of	  it	  by	  the	  majority	  of	  its	  citizens.	  
In	   this	  context,	   this	  chapter	  sketches	  the	  swirling	   forces	  that	  are	  visible	   from	  the	  vantage	  point	  of	  the	  court	  office	  and	  seeks	  to	  portray	  what	  happens	  within	  its	  four	  walls.	  As	  in	  the	  previous	  chapters	  focusing	  on	  the	  house,	  the	  courthouse	  shapes	  and	  documents	  the	  relationships	  that	  are	  formed	  between	  people,	  between	  litigants	  and	  the	  agents	  of	  the	  law	  who	  work	  there.	  We	  observe	  these	  from	  two	  sides:	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  court	  staff	   and	   that	   of	   the	   litigants.	   	   First,	   we	   will	   look	   at	   the	   court	   from	   the	   outside	   in:	   the	  elements	  that	  make	  the	  court	  appear	  unwelcoming	  and	  separate	  and	  the	  legal	  procedures	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that	  compel	   litigants	  to	  enter	  this	  strange	   institutional	  world.	  Secondly,	  we	  will	  view	  the	  court	  office	  from	  the	  inside	  out.	  Karima	  –	  my	  own	  entry	  point	  into	  the	  court,	  whom	  I	  first	  met	  at	  her	  home	  in	  Morouj	  –provides	  a	  case	  study,	  enabling	  us	  to	  consider	  one	  of	  the	  key	  actors	  of	   the	   court	  office	   from	  both	   sides	  of	   the	  apparent	  divide	   in	  her	  professional	   and	  home	  environments.	  We	  will	  also	  meet	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  court	  staff	  and	  observe	  the	  office	  life	  of	   these	   individuals	   marked	   as	   much	   by	   community	   spirit	   as	   by	   professional	   activity.	  Finally,	  we	  will	   find	  out	  what	  happens	  when	  both	  sides	  collide	  and	  explore	  the	  nature	  of	  the	   interactions	   between	   staff	   and	   litigants	   and	   how	   these	   interactions	   inform	   litigants’	  perceptions	  of	  the	  morality	  of	  the	  law.	  
	  
OUTSIDE	  IN	  
The	   English	   term	   ‘courthouse’	   could	   be	   misleading	   in	   making	   the	   court	   sound	  unobtrusively	  familiar	  and	  house-­‐like.	  The	  most	  frequently	  used	  Arabic	  terms	  speak	  more	  of	   the	   way	   the	   court	   was	   perceived	   by	   my	   litigants,	   being	   referred	   to	   most	   often	   as	  
mahkama	  (literally	   ‘place	  of	  judgement)	  or	  qasr	  al-­‘adala	  (palace	  of	  justice),	  terms	  which	  create	  a	  sense	  of	  distance	  and	  estrangement	  and	  hint	  at	  the	  litigants’	  aspirations	  of	  what	  might	  be	  found	  there:	  a	  favourable	  judgement	  or	  justice	  for	  harm	  suffered	  in	  marriage.	  	  
This	   sense	   of	   separation	   was	   heightened	   by	   the	   physical	   distance	   between	   the	  Court	  of	  First	   Instance	  of	  Ben	  Arous	  and	  anywhere	  where	   litigants	  might	  visit	  on	  a	  daily	  basis.	  Coming	  to	  the	  court	  required	  a	  special	  effort,	  often	  travelling	  on	  public	  transport	  for	  potentially	  an	  hour	  or	  more	  given	  the	  large	  area	  of	  the	  court’s	  jurisdiction.	  
The	  imposing	  building	  is	  distinguishable	  as	  a	  state	  institution	  by	  the	  red	  Tunisian	  flag	   flying	   from	   the	   roof.	   Several	   storeys	   high,	   it	   is	   reached	   by	   a	   broad	   flight	   of	  marble	  steps	   leading	   to	  a	  heavy	  wooden	  door.	  A	  small	  cubicle	  houses	   the	  uniformed	  police	  who	  patrol	  the	  entrance.	  Immediately	  opposite	  this	  door	  are	  three	  large	  rooms	  used	  for	  public	  hearings.	  To	  each	  side,	   corridors	  and	  steps	   lead	  up	  and	  down	  to	  a	  maze	  of	   small	  offices,	  home	   to	   the	   different	   sections	   of	   the	   court	   and	   their	   clerks.	   The	   basement	   houses	   the	  archives	   and	   clerks	   from	  whom	   litigants	   buy	   fiscal	   stamps	   to	   validate	   their	   documents.	  The	  public	  prosecutor’s	  spacious	  office	   is	  right	  at	   the	   top	  of	   the	  building,	  only	  accessible	  via	  his	  secretary’s	  office.	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The	  Personal	  Status	  Office,	  responsible	  for	  divorce	  cases	  and	  other	  personal	  status	  issues,	  and	  where	  I	  spent	  time	  observing	  and	  consulting	  divorce	  files,	  is	  the	  closest	  office	  to	  the	  main	  hall.	  Staff	  were	  constantly	  interrupted	  by	  lost	  citizens	  looking	  for	  completely	  different	   services	   amidst	   poorly	   sign-­‐posted	   corridors.	   These	   people	   added	   to	   the	  numbers	   of	   litigants	   and	   lawyers	   already	   present	   in	   the	   entrance	   of	   the	   small	   office,	  waiting	  to	  consult	  documents	  or	  registers	  related	  to	  their	  case.	  The	  unmarked	  door	  next	  to	  this	  office	  is	  the	  office	  of	  the	  Family	  Judge.	  	  
To	   hold	   back	   this	   flood	   of	   people,	   who	   could	   number	   up	   to	   fifteen,	   a	   wooden	  rostrum	  was	  placed	  in	  front	  of	  the	  door,	  which	  also	  served	  to	  house	  the	  record	  books	  for	  easy	  consultation.	  One	  book	  listed	  all	  the	  divorce	  cases	  by	  number,	  mentioning	  start	  and	  end	  dates	  and	  the	  type	  of	  divorce	  at	  the	  outset	  and	  at	  judgement	  (changes	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  divorce	  being	  relatively	  common).	  A	  second	  book	  listed	  cases	  under	  judgement	  date;	  all	   cases	   considered	   at	   each	   Friday	   hearing	   are	   registered	   with	   the	   outcome	   of	   the	  judgement,	  indicating	  the	  next	  steps	  to	  be	  taken.	  A	  further	  book	  listed	  cases	  being	  taken	  to	  appeal,	  specifying	  whether	  it	  was	  the	  grounds	  of	  the	  divorce	  or	  the	  details	  of	  the	  divorce	  settlement	   (compensation	   payments,	   child	   maintenance	   or	   custody)	   that	   were	   being	  disputed.	  
Inside	  the	  office	  a	  long	  series	  of	  cupboards	  stored	  the	  files	  currently	  in	  process	  or	  recently	   completed.	   Paperwork	   dominated	   the	   office	  with	   files	   stacked	   on	   any	   available	  surface.	   One	   desk	   boasted	   a	   computer,	   which	   arrived	   a	   few	   months	   after	   I	   started	  fieldwork	   and	   was	   one	   of	   relatively	   few	   in	   the	   court.	   This	   machine	   was	   rarely	   used	   –	  except	   for	  playing	   solitaire	   –	  until	   I	  was	   ending	  my	   fieldwork	  when	  a	  new	  clerk	   started	  entering	   divorce	   cases	   into	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Justice	   database	   for	   statistical	   purposes.	  	  Accurately	  and	  conscientiously	  copying	  out	  documents	  and	  keeping	  records	  up	  to	  date	  by	  hand	  was	   the	  key	  activity	  of	  most	  of	   the	   clerks	  who	  worked	   there.	  A	  portrait	  of	  Ben	  Ali	  looked	  down	  on	  them	  as	  they	  worked.	  
One	  morning	  I	  arrived	  at	  the	  courthouse	  to	  find	  a	  woman	  sitting	  nervously	  on	  the	  steps,	  fearful	  of	  what	  she	  may	  find	  inside.	  Trying	  to	  reassure	  her	  that	  the	  judges	  were	  good	  men,	  I	  learned	  that	  she	  had	  come	  because	  her	  husband	  no	  longer	  provided	  for	  her	  and	  she	  could	   carry	   on	   no	   longer	   without	   support.	   Like	   this	   woman	   and	   Saida,	   most	   litigants	  seemed	   to	   enter	   the	   court	   with	   a	   degree	   of	   apprehension.	   The	   physical	   symbols	   that	  marked	  the	  court	  out	  as	  a	  separate,	  institutional	  sphere	  echoed	  the	  psychological	  barriers	  that	   prevented	   others	   from	   entering	   this	   taboo	   space	   at	   all.	   (Zohra,	   in	   the	   previous	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chapter,	   avoided	   the	   court	   to	   prevent	   making	   the	   breakdown	   of	   her	   marriage	  irretrievable).	  Another	   litigant	  had	   come	   to	   the	   court	  because	  her	  husband	  had	   filed	   for	  divorce.	   She	   told	   me	   that	   she	   had	   contemplated	   committing	   suicide	   and	   killing	   her	  children	   to	   escape	  her	   abusive	  marriage;	   the	   idea	  of	   coming	   to	   a	   court	   and	   asking	   for	   a	  divorce	  herself	  had	  never	  even	  occurred	  to	  her.	  	  
A	  FILE	  IS	  BORN	  
A	   case	   cannot	   exist	   without	   a	   file,	   its	   written	   embodiment.	   	   It	   is	   because	   of	   the	  documentary	   basis	   of	   the	   law	   and	   the	   various	   legal	   procedures	   to	   produce	   these	  documents,	  that	   litigants	  were	  compelled	  to	  come	  to	  the	  court	  and	  expose	  themselves	  to	  public	   scrutiny	   as	   they	   interacted	  with	   the	   staff	  who	  worked	   there.	   In	   this	  way,	   the	   law	  literally	  requires	  the	  neighbourhood	  to	  enter	  the	  court	  through	  its	  inhabitants.	  
The	   presence	   of	   files	   all	   over	   the	   court	   office	   was	   viewed	   as	   a	   reminder	   of	   the	  worrying	   prevalence	   of	   divorce.	   The	   obligation	   to	   carry	   out	   certain	   legal	   procedures	  relating	   to	   their	   cases	   compelled	   litigants	   to	   make	   the	   long	   journey	   to	   court.	   Although	  some	  divisions	  are	  drawn	  along	  socioeconomic	  lines,	  as	  those	  who	  can	  afford	  a	  lawyer	  can	  avoid	   regular	  visits	   to	  deal	  with	   the	  mundane	  paperwork,	   all	   litigants	  must	   come	   to	   the	  court	   at	   least	   once	   for	   their	   compulsory	   reconciliation	   sessions.	   Some	   expressed	  frustration	  at	  being	  made	  to	  wait	  since	  they	  had	  been	  forced	  to	  take	  time	  off	  work	  to	  come	  to	  the	  court.	  	  
In	  order	  to	  initiate	  a	  divorce	  case,	  the	  petitioner	  (or	  their	  lawyer)	  must	  come	  to	  the	  court	  office	  with	  various	  documents.	  First	  is	  the	  ‘summons’	  written	  from	  one	  spouse	  to	  the	  other	  summoning	  them	  to	  the	  court	  for	  the	  first	  reconciliation	  session.	  It	  may	  be	  written	  by	  a	  petition	  writer	  or	  a	   lawyer,	  or	  occasionally	  by	   the	   litigant	   if	   they	  are	  confident	  and	  aware	  of	  the	  legal	  form	  the	  document	  must	  take.	  This	  document	  includes	  a	  ‘subject’	  which	  outlines	   the	   reasons	   why	   the	   litigant	   is	   asking	   for	   divorce.	   It	   is	   always	   stamped	   and	  requires	  a	   ‘fiscal	  stamp’	  costing	  5	  dinars	  (increased	  to	  12	  dinars	   in	  September	  2008),	  as	  fees	  paid	  to	  the	  court.	  The	  marriage	  certificate	  and	  birth	  certificates	  of	  both	  litigants	  and	  any	  children	  must	  also	  be	  presented.	  Once	  the	  correct	  documents	  are	  present,	  a	  new	  case	  can	  be	  born,	  slipped	  into	  its	  own	  distinctive	  yellow	  cardboard	  jacket	  and	  attributed	  a	  case	  number	  that	  is	  registered	  in	  the	  ‘general	  record	  book’.	  The	  litigant	  will	  be	  given	  a	  date	  for	  their	  first	  reconciliation	  session	  with	  the	  judge,	  which	  he	  or	  she	  must	  communicate	  to	  the	  spouse	  via	  legal	  means,	  by	  taking	  the	  document	  to	  a	  notary	  who	  will	  summon	  the	  spouse	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to	   the	   court	   on	   the	   allotted	  date.	  As	   cases	   are	   continually	   born,	   and	   the	   clerks	   are	   their	  midwives,	  this	  paperwork	  formed	  an	  important	  part	  of	  their	  job.	  
When	   a	   case	   is	   finalised,	   a	   clerk	  must	   fill	   out	   a	   standard	   sheet,	   including	   details	  such	   as	   names	   and	   date	   of	   birth	   of	   the	   litigants,	   date	   and	   place	   of	   marriage,	   mother’s	  maiden	  name	  and	  date	  of	  divorce.	  The	  form	  always	  begins	  with	  the	  man,	  in	  contrast	  with	  the	  yellow	  cardboard	  sleeves,	  which	  begin	  with	  the	  litigant	  asking	  for	  divorce	  regardless	  of	  gender.	  These	  sheets	  made	  at	  the	  end	  of	  each	  case	  are	  handwritten	  by	  a	  clerk	  and	  then	  sent	  to	  the	  typists.	  Once	  typed,	  they	  are	  stamped	  and	  signed	  by	  the	  judge,	  and	  the	  litigant	  has	  to	  pay	  fees	  to	  the	  court	  (with	  a	  minimum	  payment	  of	  30	  dinars	  or	  2%	  of	  the	  financial	  settlement,	  Karima	  called	  this	  a	   ‘divorce	  tax’).	  Once	  cases	  are	  completed	  the	  couple	  must	  return	   to	   collect	  a	   sheet	   stating	   that	   they	  have	  divorced.	  This	  must	   then	  be	   taken	   to	   the	  town	   hall	   so	   that	   their	   birth	   certificates	   (which	   also	   register	   marital	   history)	   can	   be	  amended.	  
	  
INSIDE	  OUT:	  DAILY	  LIFE	  IN	  THE	  OFFICE	  
Whilst	   later	   chapters	   focus	   on	   the	   files	   themselves,	   here	   we	   will	   focus	   on	   the	   files’	  guardians	   and	   gatekeepers,	   the	   litigants	   and	   court	   staff	   brought	   together	   in	   this	   small,	  non-­‐descript	  room,	  measuring	  no	  more	  than	  20	  square	  metres.	  We	  will	  see	  how	  the	  staff	  experience	  and	  interact	  with	  the	  space	  of	  the	  court	  office	  and	  each	  other,	  before	  turning	  to	  how	  the	   ‘outsiders’,	   the	   litigants,	   experience	   this	   space.	   It	  was	   these	  people	  who	   formed	  human	   bridges	   via	   the	   moral	   values	   and	   prejudices	   they	   carried	   with	   them	   from	   their	  respective	  houses,	  linking	  the	  world	  of	  the	  court	  with	  that	  of	  the	  neighbourhood.	  	  
Even	  for	  those	  who	  worked	  there,	  the	  office	  was	  not	  always	  exactly	  hospitable.	  It	  was	  often	  boiling	  hot	  in	  the	  summer	  heat	  with	  only	  a	  fan	  to	  cool	   it	  down	  (that	  tended	  to	  blow	  the	  papers	  around	  the	  office)	  or,	  in	  early	  winter,	  cold	  enough	  to	  warrant	  keeping	  on	  a	  coat,	  especially	  when	  the	  winter	  chill	  came	  early	  before	  the	  heating	  was	  turned	  on	  after	  December	  15th.	  The	  window	  was	  often	  open	  so	  that	  Fathi,	  the	  gopher,	  could	  smoke.	  	  
Only	   Karima,	   who	   had	   worked	   there	   for	   about	   15	   years,	   remained	   during	   the	  whole	  period	  of	  my	  fieldwork.	  Others	  came	  and	  went.	  Three	  permanent	  clerks	  worked	  in	  the	  office	  at	  any	  one	  time.	  As	  well	  as	  managing	  the	   files,	   recording	  details	   in	   the	  various	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record	  books	  and	  preparing	  the	  files	  for	  court,	  Karima	  took	  notes	  during	  the	  weekly	  public	  divorce	   sesions.	   I	  was	   initially	   surprised	   to	   see	   that	  Karima	  veiled	   at	  work,	  wearing	   the	  Tunisian	   foulard.	   In	  the	  public	  hearings,	  she	  wore	  a	  bonnet,	   instead	  of	  the	  scarf,	   to	  cover	  all	  but	  the	  ‘moon’	  of	  her	  face	  alongside	  her	  court	  uniform,	  veiling	  being	  forbidden	  in	  state	  institutions.	  	  
Souad,	   carried	   out	   the	   same	   job	   in	   the	   public	   session	   dealing	   with	   children	   in	  danger	  and	  custody.	  During	  my	   fieldwork,	   Souad	  and	  Karima	  changed	  places,	   as	  Karima	  had	   had	   enough	   of	   divorce	   after	   over	   10	   years!	   The	   third	   clerk	   was	   responsible	   for	  recording	   statistics	   among	   other	   things.	   It	   is	   difficult	   to	   say	   exactly	   what	   this	   clerk’s	  responsibilities	  were	  as	   the	  position	  was	   filled	  by	  people	  who	  appeared	   to	  do	  very	   little	  indeed.	  All	  clerks	  assisted	  the	  litigants.	  	  
Whilst	   Karima,	   Souad	   and	   Sanaa	   were	   all	   married	   with	   children,	   Amira	   (who	  replaced	  Sanaa)	  was	  only	  around	  30	  year’s	  old	  and	  had	  been	  widowed	  at	  a	  young	  age.	  She	  was	  engaged	  to	  be	  married	  in	  a	  ‘love	  marriage’;	  her	  new	  husband	  accepted	  her	  son	  as	  she	  was	  widowed.	  	  
In	   2008,	   Fathi	   joined	   the	   team.	   A	   man	   in	   his	   late	   twenties,	   he	   worked	   as	   an	  assistant,	   helping	   carry	  piles	   of	   files	   between	  different	   offices	   and	  managing	   the	   flow	  of	  litigants	   for	   the	   reconciliation	   sessions.	   He	   was	   not	   classed	   as	   a	   permanent	   employee	  (unlike	   the	  others	  who	  had	   the	  status	  of	   civil	   servants)	  and	  earned	  significantly	   less.	  He	  hoped	  that	  one	  day	  his	  position	  would	  be	  made	  permanent.	  I	  was	  told	  rather	  cynically	  that	  this	  aspiration	  might	  explain	  his	  conscientious	  attitude.	  Always	  polite,	  he	  helped	  the	  clerks	  manage	  the	  stream	  of	  litigants	  who	  came	  to	  the	  office.	  
Another	   familiar	   face	   was	   the	   Mauritanian	   intern,	   who	   Karima	   said	   must	   have	  been	  sent	  to	  Tunisia	  because	  Tunisia	  is	  famous	  for	  family	  law.	  He	  seemed	  shocked	  by	  the	  amount	  of	  divorce	  in	  Tunisia	  and	  declared	  that	  what	  he	  saw	  happening	  in	  Tunisia	  was	  ‘not	  freedom’,	  as	  he	  understood	  it.	  At	  least	  one	  of	  the	  clerks	  was	  inclined	  to	  agree	  with	  him.	  
A	   few	   other	   people	   sometimes	   came	   and	   sat	   on	   the	   spare	   chair	   in	   the	   office,	  chatting	  to	  the	  staff.	  These	  included	  the	  cleaning	  lady,	  the	  IT	  support	  technician	  and	  a	  man	  who	  worked	  in	  the	  office	  responsible	  for	  children	  in	  danger.	  Another	  regular	  visitor	  was	  a	  waiter	  from	  the	  café	  across	  the	  street,	  who	  came	  to	  collect	  the	  cups	  used	  that	  day.	  To	  my	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surprise,	   the	   office	   was	   also	   visited	   by	   a	   travelling	   saleswoman	   selling	   a	   selection	   of	  clothes,	  perfume	  and	  makeup.	  
I	  came	  to	  know	  two	  family	  judges	  during	  my	  fieldwork.	  The	  first,	  Judge	  Samia,	  gave	  me	  permission	  to	  carry	  out	  fieldwork.	  She	  was	  replaced	  by	  Judge	  Ali	   in	  September	  2008.	  Much	   to	   my	   relief,	   he	   accepted	   my	   presence.	   Both	   Family	   Judges	   were	   married	   with	  children	   and	   in	   their	   mid-­‐40s.	   I	   also	   got	   to	   know	   the	   Cantonal	   Judge	   (who	   deals	   with	  maintenance	   payment	   cases),	   a	   gentleman	   in	   his	   mid-­‐30s	   who	   was	   also	   married	   with	  children	  and	  dealt	  with	  the	  nafaqa	  cases	  so	  often	  linked	  with	  divorce	  files.	  	  
	  
FROM	  BOTH	  SIDES	  NOW	  
There	  can	  be	  no	  stronger	  embodiment	  of	  the	  movement	  between	  the	  court	  office	  and	  the	  neighbourhood	   than	   Karima,	   the	   well-­‐respected	   clerk	   who	   first	   introduced	   me	   to	   the	  court.	  I	  knew	  Karima	  both	  in	  her	  home	  and	  workplace,	  allowing	  me	  to	  observe	  the	  moral	  values	  that	  she	  carried	  with	  her	  between	  these	  two	  sites,	  whether	  talking	  about	  how	  she	  experienced	  life	  as	  a	  working	  mother	  or	  discussing	  divorce	  cases	  with	  her	  colleagues	  and	  the	   litigants.	  Her	  own	  expectations	  and	  experience	  of	  marriage	  necessarily	   informed	  her	  work	  (and	  vice-­‐versa).	  Simultaneously,	  in	  contrast	  to	  Besma,	  she	  demonstrated	  alternative	  ways	   of	   navigating	   the	   uncertainties	   of	   Morouj,	   that	   did	   not	   rely	   on	   an	   increasingly	  invisible	  regional	  identity.	  Karima,	  then,	  reveals	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  moral	  webs	  are	  woven	  between	   the	   court	   and	   the	   neighbourhood	   by	   the	   human	   actors	   who	   work	   there.;	  consequently,	  	  it	  is	  worth	  spending	  some	  time	  in	  her	  company	  and	  learning	  about	  her	  life	  inside	  and	  outside	  the	  court.	  
THE	  STORY	  OF	  KARIMA	  	  
When	   Besma	   introduced	   me	   to	   Karima,	   I	   was	   intrigued	   that,	   although	   she	   had	   an	  encyclopaedic	  knowledge	  of	  most	  people	  in	  the	  neighbourhood,	  she	  did	  not	  know	  where	  Karima	   or	   her	   husband,	   Hakim,	   ‘came	   from’.	   Rather,	   as	   an	   indication	   of	   her	   high	  moral	  standing	  and	  character,	  she	  stressed	  their	  strong	  religiosity,	  telling	  me	  that	  I	  should	  trust	  Karima	   and	   Hakim	   and	   should	   act	   in	   front	   of	   them	   with	   additional	   caution.	   Both	   had	  completed	  the	  pilgrimage	  to	  Mecca	  and	  were	  widely	  respected.	  Karima	  literally	  wore	  her	  religious	   identity	   in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  Tunisian	   ‘foulard’	   (head	  scarf),	   the	  use	  of	   the	  French	  term	  denoting	  that	  she	  tied	  her	  scarf	   in	  the	   ‘traditional’	  Tunisian	  way	  (a	  knot	  tied	  under	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her	  chin)	  and	  not	  in	  the	  politically	  connotated	  manner	  of	  the	  ‘hijab’.	  	  In	  the	  court,	  she	  was	  known	  as	   ‘the	  religious	  one’,	  as	   few	  women	  wore	   the	  veil	  at	  work.	  She	  was	  conscious	  of	  being	  a	  symbol	  of	  Islam	  and	  took	  this	  role	  seriously;	  she	  knew	  that	  she	  would	  be	  judged	  on	  her	  moral	  behaviour	  more	  strictly	  than	  other	  women	  who	  did	  not	  veil.	  The	  pertinence	  of	  the	  epithet	  was	  brought	  home	  to	  me	  when	  another	  (less	  well-­‐respected)	  clerk	  decided	  to	  start	  veiling	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  improve	  her	  reputation.	  The	  general	  consensus	  was	  that	  this	  was	   ridiculous;	   the	   experiment	   was	   very	   short-­‐lived.	   It	   went	   to	   show	   that	   the	   person	  makes	  the	  veil,	  rather	  than	  the	  veil	  the	  person.	  
Karima	   shared	   Besma’s	   nostalgia136	   at	   the	   loss	   of	   a	  more	   communal	   way	   of	   life	  centred	   on	   the	   Arab	   house	   she	   shared	   with	   uncles	   and	   cousins	   during	   her	   childhood.	  However,	   for	   both	   Karima	   and	   her	   husband,	   religion	   and	   education	   appeared	   to	   be	   the	  most	  important	  elements	  of	  their	  life	  stories	  and	  identities.	  Karima	  studied	  for	  two	  years	  after	  her	  Baccalaureat,	  but	  now	  held	  a	  position	  that	  equated	  to	  someone	  with	  a	  Master’s	  degree,	  having	  passed	  various	  competitive	  exams	  that	  qualified	  her	  for	  promotion.	  As	  I	  left	  Tunisia,	  she	  was	  being	  promoted	  once	  again	  to	  head	  clerk.	  Hakim,	  who	  was	  visibly	  proud	  of	   her	   professional	   achievements,	  was	   educated	   to	   doctoral	   level	   and	   had	   a	   career	   that	  reflected	   this.	   In	   their	   mid-­‐40s,	   they	   had	   two	   children	   in	   their	   teens,	   both	   of	   whom	  excelled	  in	  their	  studies.	  
On	  Marriage	  
Karima’s	   attitudes	   to	   both	   marriage	   and	   divorce,	   as	   well	   as	   her	   own	   experiences	   as	   a	  working	  wife	  and	  mother,	  informed	  her	  work	  in	  the	  court.	  
	  
Karima	  
Given	   that	   our	   first	  meeting	   takes	   place	  when	   Besma	   deliberately	   takes	  me	   to	   see	  
Karima	   to	   talk	   about	   divorce,	   the	   conversation	   naturally	   turns	   to	   marriage	   and	  
marital	  duties.	  We	  are	  not	  the	  only	  people	  to	  visit	  Karima	  to	  talk	  about	  divorce;	  as	  
her	   professional	   activity	   is	  well	   known	   in	   the	   neighbourhood,	   various	   people	   go	   to	  
her	   for	   legal	   advice.	   Besma	   is	   typically	   chatty	   and	   curious	   and	   asks	   her	   questions	  
about	   the	   people	   getting	   divorced	   in	   the	   court.	   She	   asks	   how	   long	   they	   have	   been	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136	  See	  chapter	  1.	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married.	  Karima	  replies	   that	  many	  couples	  have	  been	  married	   for	   less	   than	  a	  year.	  
Both	   women	   sigh	   disapprovingly.	   One	   couple	   though,	   Karima	   adds,	   have	   been	  
married	  for	  more	  than	  40	  years.	  Besma	  wants	  to	  know	  why	  they	  would	  want	  to	  get	  
divorced	  after	  such	  a	  long	  time.	  She	  replies	  that	  in	  these	  cases,	  it	  can	  be	  because	  the	  
wife	   no	   longer	  wants	   to	   have	   sex	  with	   her	   husband	  and	   so	   the	   husband	  asks	   for	   a	  
divorce.	  They	  discuss	  whether	  this	  is	  right	  or	  not.	  	  
Besma	  is	  sympathetic	  to	  the	  wife.	  She	  must	  be	  an	  older	  woman,	  who	  has	  already	  had	  
all	  her	  children	  and	  she	  must	  pray.	  (As	  people	  have	  to	  cleanse	  themselves	  thoroughly	  
before	   praying	   after	   sexual	   activity,	   sexual	   relations	   can	   be	   seen	   as	   a	   nuisance	  
necessitating	   lots	   of	   extra	   bathing).	   All	   women	   have	   moments,	   when	   they	   are	   not	  
desirous	  of	  their	  husbands,	  after	  a	  hard	  day	  completing	  all	  the	  household	  chores,	  and	  
their	  husbands	  should	  be	  patient.	  Karima	  seems	  to	  take	  the	  side	  of	  the	  husband.	  She	  
is	   adamant	   that	   it	   is	   ‘one	   of	   his	   rights’	   to	   have	   sex	   with	   his	   wife	   and	   this	   is	   even	  
mentioned	   in	   the	   Koran.	   Besma	   asks	   whether	   the	   reverse	   is	   true,	   if	   there	   are	   any	  
wives	  who	  divorce	  their	  husbands,	  as	  they	  do	  not	  want	  to	  have	  sex	  with	  them.	  Karima	  
says	  this	  does	  not	  happen,	  although	  there	  are	  some	  rapid	  divorces	  straight	  after	  the	  
marriage,	  if	  the	  husband	  has	  hidden	  his	  impotence.137	  She	  adds	  that	  there	  is	  a	  lot	  of	  
infidelity	   in	   Tunisia.	   Both	   women	   say	   ‘hamdullah’	   (thank	   God,	   I	   am	   OK)	   and	   then	  
laugh	  nervously.	  	  
Karima	  continues	  talking	  about	  marital	  strife.	  The	  problem	  in	  Tunisia	  today	  is	  that	  
people	   think	   that	  women	  and	  men	  are	   ‘kif	  kif’	   (‘the	   same,	   identical’),	  whereas	   they	  
are	   complementary,	   as	   is	  mentioned	   in	   the	   Koran.	   A	   perfect	   example	   of	   this	   is	   the	  
sexual	  one.	  She	  shows	  this	  complementarity	  by	  placing	  her	  two	  hands	  together	  with	  
their	  palms	  and	  fingers	  matching.	   ‘Two	  become	  one.’	  Problems	  arise	  when	  the	  man	  
and	  woman	  become	  confused	  and	   the	  woman	  does	  not	   fulfil	  her	   role.	  For	   instance,	  
sometimes	  a	  wife	  is	  tired	  when	  she	  comes	  home	  from	  work	  and	  tells	  her	  husband	  to	  
fetch	  a	  pizza.	   ‘This	   is	   not	  normal.’	   She	  adds,	   in	  a	   sentiment	   I	  was	   to	  hear	   repeated	  
many	  times,	  that	  these	  days,	   ‘men	  do	  not	  have	  any	  rights,’	  whereas	  ‘women	  have	  all	  
the	  rights.’	  She	  feels	  that	  Tunisia	  is	  moving	  away	  from	  Islam	  and	  away	  from	  sharia	  
and	   this	   is	   not	   a	   good	   thing.	   For	   instance,	   in	   Tunisia	   women	   can	   divorce	   without	  
grounds	   and	   have	   more	   rights	   than	   in	   some	   European	   countries.	   They	   begin	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137	  There	  are	  divorces	  requested	  by	  wives,	  as	  their	  husband	  does	  not	  want	  to	  have	  sex	  with	  them,	  although	  as	  for	  
financial	  issues,	  one	  problem	  can	  be	  intricately	  intertwined	  with	  another.	  I	  saw	  at	  least	  one	  file	  like	  this	  and	  there	  
was	  one	  case	  in	  reconciliation,	  in	  which	  the	  judge	  provided	  advice	  on	  this	  topic.	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compare	   Tunisia	   to	   Libya,	   where	   polygamy	   is	   still	   allowed.	   But,	   Karima	   asks,	   is	   it	  
Libya	  which	  is	  too	  closed	  or	  Tunisia	  which	  is	  too	  open?	  	  
On	   a	   separate	   occasion,	   I	   ask	   Karima	   whether	   her	   husband	   ever	   helps	   with	   the	  
cooking.	  (I	   later	  realise	  that	  my	  question	  may	  have	  implied	  that	  she	  was	  neglecting	  
her	  wifely	  duties,	  something	  I	  would	  not	  wish	  to	  suggest).	  Never,	  she	  simply	  replies.	  It	  
is	  not	  so	  much	  that	  he	  does	  not	  want	  to	  help,	  but	  that	  he	  does	  not	  know	  how	  to	  cook.	  
And	  he	  is	  often	  away	  on	  business	  trips	  all	  over	  Tunisia.	  When	  I	  joined	  her	  on	  bus	  rides	  
home	  from	  work,	  she	  was	  always	  straining	  to	  get	  back	  quickly	  so	  that	  she	  could	  start	  
cooking	  the	  dinner.	  	  
During	  Ramadan,	  she	  sometimes	  does	  chores	  until	  2	  am.	  She	  makes	  an	  effort	  to	  bake	  
sweet	   things	   for	   her	   children,	   when	   she	   gets	   home	   from	   work,	   whilst	   they	   are	  
studying	  for	  their	  exams.	  ‘They	  deserve	  something	  sweet,’	  she	  says.	  	  
Karima	  neatly	  sums	  up	  the	  wife’s	  martial	  duties:	   ‘children	  and	  house.’	  The	  husband	  
‘provides	  for	  the	  family.’	  Hakim	  ‘is	  not	  the	  kind	  to	  ask	  for	  my	  salary,’	  she	  says.	  ‘I	  want	  
to	  buy	  things	  for	  my	  children.’	  In	  the	  end,	  ‘at	  work	  or	  at	  home,	  we	  both	  have	  duties	  to	  
do.’	  
Much	  to	  the	  surprise	  of	  our	  mutual	   friend,	  who	  had	  warned	  me	  not	  to	  shake	  hands	  
with	  Karima’s	   husband	   (as	   someone	  who	  has	   done	   the	  Hajj,	   he	   should	   not	   touch	  a	  
foreign	  woman	  and	  she	  also	  believed	  I	  should	  cover	  my	  head	  in	  front	  of	  him),	  Hakim	  
was	   not	   the	   least	   shocked	   by	   my	   bare	   head	   when	   he	   arrived	   home	   unexpectedly	  
during	  one	  of	  my	  visits.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  he	  greeted	  me	  warmly	  with	  an	  outstretched	  
hand	  and	  spontaneously	  offered	  help	  with	  my	  study.	  Ironically,	  he	  became	  one	  of	  the	  
men	   I	   knew	   best	   in	   the	   neighbourhood	   and	   treated	   me	   to	   many	   interesting	  
discussions,	   against	   a	   backdrop	   of	   Karima	   ironing	   or	   getting	   on	   with	   some	   other	  
household	  chore	  and	  his	  children	  helping	  each	  other	  with	  their	  homework.	  Unusually,	  
he	   was	   not	   averse	   to	   serving	   drinks	   and	   food	   himself;	   usually,	   husbands	   would	  
instruct	  their	  wives	  to	  provide	  such	  hospitality.	  	  
Consequently,	  I	  was	  able	  to	  have	  a	  similar	  discussion	  about	  marriage	  with	  Hakim.	  He	  
was	  aware	  that	  changes	  in	  life	  were	  having	  an	  impact	  on	  marital	  life	  in	  a	  number	  of	  
ways.	  He	   stressed	  how	   for	   the	  husband	   the	  main	  duty	   is	   to	   ‘provide	   for	   the	   family’;	  
even	  in	  the	  religion,	  the	  ‘costs	  of	  living’	  are	  to	  be	  paid	  by	  the	  man.	  His	  views	  evoked	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the	   tensions	   between	   the	   ideals	   and	   the	   realities	   of	   married	   life,138	   in	   particular	  
concerns	  about	  how	  gender	  roles	  are	  changing	  in	  connection	  with	  the	  rising	  cost	  of	  
living.	  
	  ‘’Before’,	  he	  began,	  ‘it	  was	  the	  wife	  alone	  who	  cared	  for	  the	  children.	  Now,	  if	  the	  wife	  
works,	   they	  should	  help	  each	  other.	  But’,	  he	  added,	   ‘Karima	  does	  nearly	  everything.	  
Women	   do	  more	   than	  men.	  Men	   don’t	   really	   care.	   They	   go	   to	   the	   café.	   They	   come	  
home	   to	   find	   the	   meal	   ready.	   Men	   must	   help	   their	   wives,	   even	   at	   home.	   It	   is	   not	  
enough	  to	  only	  do	  the	  shopping	  and	  to	  leave	  the	  wife	  carrying	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  burden.	  
It	   is	   hard	   for	  women	   in	   Tunisia.	   She	   does	   everything	   in	   the	   home,	   in	   the	   street,	   at	  
work.	  Karima	  wears	  herself	  out.	  Normally,	   they	  should	  share.	  Life	   is	  hard.	   If	  people	  
have	   [their	   children’s]	   grandparents,	   who	   can	   help	   out	   [with	   childcare],	   they	   can	  
relax	  a	  bit.	  Those	  with	  origins	  outside	  the	  capital	  have	  no	  grandparents	  to	  help	  out.	  
These	  people	  have	   to	  use	  a	  crèche.	  At	   least	  a	  wife	  who	   is	   ‘at	  home’	   is	  a	  bit	   relaxed.	  
Most	  women	  work,	  as	  one	  salary	  is	  no	  longer	  enough	  to	  maintain	  a	  decent	  standard	  
of	  living.	  All	  children	  study.	  Girls	  study	  and	  want	  to	  work.	  They	  do	  not	  study	  to	  stay	  at	  
home.	  	  
Some	  men	   do	   not	  want	   their	  wives	   to	  work.	  Not	   because	   they	   are	   stubborn,	   but	   if	  
their	  wives	  have	  not	  achieved	  much	  in	  their	  studies	  and	  would	  not	  earn	  much,	  they	  
prefer	   them	   to	   stay	   at	   home	   with	   the	   children,	   if	   they	   are	   well-­off	   enough.	   Most	  
women	  work	  because	  they	  really	  need	  to,	  not	  just	  because	  they	  want	  to.	  The	  cost	  of	  
living	   is	  very	  high.	   It	   is	  difficult.	  Even	   if	  both	  [parents]	  work,	   they	  can	  barely	   ‘cover	  
the	   heads’	   of	   the	   children.	   So	   now	   people	   have	   2	   or	   3	   children	   instead	   of	   5.	   My	  
grandmother	  had	  14	  children!	  [Only	  9	  of	  them	  survived].	  And	  her	  husband	  had	  been	  
married	  before	  and	  already	  had	  children	  too!’	  
	  
Friendship	  
Working	  life	  means	  that	  both	  Hakim	  and	  Karima	  have	  different	  strategies	  and	  criteria	  for	  making	   friends,	   compared	   to	   Besma,	   although	   they	   share	   the	   fear	   of	   friendships	   being	  founded	  on	  ‘interest’	  rather	  than	  genuine	  affection.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138	  See	  chapter	  2.	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Asking	  Hakim	  and	  Karima	  about	  their	  friendships	  revealed	  an	  aspect	  of	  court	  life	  that	  I	  had	  underestimated.	  Hakim	  talks	  to	  me	  about	  his	  circle	  of	  friends.	  His	  friends	  are	  his	  neighbours,	   although	  now	   it	   is	   rare,	   as	   life	   is	   ‘difficult’,	   so	  now	  he	  only	  makes	   friends	  at	  work.	  It	  is	  not	  like	  it	  used	  to	  be.	  He	  now	  sees	  his	  neighbours	  more	  frequently	  than	  his	  natal	  family,	  ‘more	  often	  than	  my	  brother	  and	  my	  mother.’	  	  
The	  notion	  of	  life	  has	  changed	  a	  lot,	  he	  ponders.	  People	  have	  two	  or	  three	  friends.	  Mostly	   it	   is	   a	   question	   of	   ‘mentality’,	  who	   you	  make	   friends	  with.	   He	   says	   that	   his	  wife	  knows	  the	  neighbours,	  but	  only	  frequents	  a	  few	  women	  who	  are	  close	  neighbours.	  It	  is	  a	  question	   of	   ‘proximity’	   and	   sharing	   ‘the	   same	   mentality.’	   The	   essential	   thing	   is	   that	  someone	  is	  not	  making	  friends	  with	  you	  for	  a	  specific	  purpose;	  they	  just	  want	  friendship.	  They	  are	  not	  looking	  to	  profit	  from	  you.	  	  
Karima,	   who	   is	   doing	   the	   ironing,	   adds	   that	   she	   would	   not	   make	   friends	   with	  people	  who	  do	  not	  have	  the	  same	  level	  of	  education	  or	  people	  who	  ‘act	  in	  a	  way	  she	  finds	  bizarre.’	   Her	   husband	   concurs.	   It	   is	   about	   ‘loyalty,	   sincerity.’	   After	   all,	   you	   cannot	   be	  friends	  with	  everyone,	  apart	   from	  your	  childhood	   friends.	  Previously,	   ‘people	  you	  know’	  were	  considered	  better	  than	  ‘people	  you	  do	  not	  know’,	  this	  being	  the	  logic	  behind	  cousin	  marriage	  in	  the	  past.	  Now,	  he	  adds,	  ‘we	  do	  not	  marry	  our	  children.	  It	  is	  they	  who	  choose.’	  
	  
‘NEIGHBOURHOOD’	  SPIRIT	  
It	   is	   not	   just	   Hakim	   who	   befriends	   his	   work	   colleagues.	   Karima	   is	   also	   close	   to	   her	  colleagues.	  She	  spends	  a	  substantial	  amount	  of	  time	  at	  work	  and	  is	  not	  at	  home	  during	  the	  day	   to	  visit	  neighbours.	  The	   court	   staff	   go	  on	  annual	  holidays	   together,	   accompanied	  by	  their	   spouses	   and	   children,	  which	  Karima	   always	   enjoys.	   She	   told	  me	   after	   the	   last	   trip,	  that	   they	   had	   had	   a	  wonderful	   time	   and	   that	   there	  was	   a	   ‘family	   atmosphere’	   between	  them.	   Souad,	   another	   clerk	  whose	   husband	   also	  works	   in	   the	   court	   and	  whose	   children	  frequently	   come	   to	   the	  office	   after	   school,	   doing	   their	   homework	  on	   the	   edge	  of	   a	   desk,	  also	  looked	  forward	  to	  these	  trips.	  
A	   tragic	   event	   at	   the	   end	   of	  my	   fieldwork	  made	  me	   realise	   how	   close	   the	   bonds	  were	  between	  the	  ladies	  who	  work	  together	  in	  the	  court	  and	  how	  attached	  I	  had	  become	  to	   the	   people	   there.	   Arriving	   to	   visit	   Karima	   and	  Hakim,	   they	   told	  me	   that	   they	   did	   not	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have	  much	  time,	  as	  Souad’s	  mother	  had	  died	  suddenly.	  It	  took	  me	  a	  moment	  to	  realise	  that	  they	  were	  referring	  to	  Souad	  the	  clerk	  who	  worked	  closely	  with	  Karima	  in	  the	  court	  office.	  Souad	  had	  phoned	  her	  that	  morning	  with	  the	  sad	  news.	  It	  struck	  me	  that	  Souad	  turned	  to	  Karima,	  apparently	  as	  one	  of	  her	  first	  ports	  of	  call,	  in	  this	  time	  of	  need.	  Another	  colleague	  (who	   lived	   in	   the	   same	   area)	   joined	   us.	   Together,	   we	  went	   to	   Souad’s	   brother’s	   house,	  where	   their	  mother’s	   body	   had	   been	   laid	   out	   under	   a	   green	   cloth	   next	   to	   a	   copy	   of	   the	  Koran,	  to	  give	  the	  family	  our	  condolences.	  	  
The	  staff	  also	  pulled	  together	  for	  happier	  occasions.	  Karima	  and	  Souad	  organized	  a	  collection	   for	   Fathi’s	  wedding	   to	   give	   him	   a	   helping	   hand	  with	   the	   onerous	   costs	   of	   the	  wedding	  celebrations	  and	  all	  the	  things	  needed	  to	  begin	  married	  life.	  Many	  of	  the	  lawyers	  who	  frequently	  came	  to	  the	  office	  also	  gladly	  contributed.	  
As	  in	  the	  neighbourhood,	  where	  similar	  events	  brought	  Besma	  and	  her	  neighbours	  closer	   together,	   these	   relationships	   were	   constructed	   gradually	   by	   the	   daily	   exchanges	  that	  took	  place	  in	  the	  court	  office:	  exchanges	  of	  ideas,	  assistance,	  advice,	  affection,	  recipes	  and	  food.	  I	  was	  known	  to	  all	  as	  ‘Saroura’	  (‘little	  Sarah’)	  and	  the	  majority	  of	  staff	  who	  knew	  each	   other	   well	   similarly	   addressed	   each	   other	   affectionately	   in	   the	   diminutive.	   As	  elsewhere,	   rules	   of	   hospitality	   and	   sharing	   applied;	   it	   was	   inconceivable	   not	   to	   share	   a	  sandwich	   bought	   in	   the	   ‘fast	   food’	   across	   the	   road	   if	   people	   were	   working	   over	   lunch.	  Homemade	   biscuits	   were	   brought	   in	   and	   tasted	   with	   delight,	   just	   as	   Besma	   shared	   the	  results	   of	   her	   baking	  with	   her	   neighbourhood	   friends.	   It	   was	   not	   lost	   on	  me	   that	   all	   of	  these	  working	  mothers	  still	  found	  the	  time	  to	  bake	  the	  sometimes	  complicated	  and	  time-­‐consuming	  recipes	  for	  special	  occasions.	  	  
These	  people	  brought	  the	  ‘neighbourhood’	  spirit	  across	  the	  visible	  boundaries	  that	  demarcated	  the	  court	  as	  a	  state	  institution	  with	  its	  high,	  whitewashed	  walls	  and	  red	  flag.	  The	  ‘neighbourhood-­‐like’	  nature	  of	  life	  in	  court	  (for	  like	  any	  work	  place,	  it	  is	  far	  more	  than	  a	   place	   of	   work)	   suggests	   that	   it	   is	   would	   be	   better	   to	   speak	   of	   ‘community’	   spirit	   (or	  another,	   less	   place-­‐specific	   name),	   as	   it	   is	   no	  more	   tied	   uniquely	   to	   the	   neighbourhood	  than	   it	   is	   to	   the	   court,	   especially	   to	   those	  who	   have	   a	   long	   history	   of	   collaboration	   and	  friendship.	   Ironically,	   one	   of	   the	   key	   differences	   in	   the	   way	   spaces	   structure	   sociality	  differently,	  is	  that	  the	  court	  office	  is	  in	  some	  ways	  similar	  to	  the	  Arab	  house	  remembered	  so	  fondly	  by	  both	  Karima	  and	  Besma.	  Free	  from	  the	  taboos	  of	  crossing	  between	  the	  private	  space	  of	  the	  home	  and	  the	  public	  space	  of	  the	  street,	   it	   is	  easier	  to	  circulate	  freely	  inside	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the	  space	  of	  the	  court.	  From	  this	  perspective,	  as	  actors	  circulate,	  the	  illusion	  of	  separation	  between	  neighbourhood	  and	  court	  is	  broken	  down.	  
ATTITUDES	  TO	  DIVORCE	  
The	  morality	  of	  the	  neighbourhood	  entered	  the	  court	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  staff’s	  attitudes	  to	  divorce	  and	   to	   those	  who	  divorce.	  The	   female	   staff	   appeared	   to	   choose	   to	  wear	  publicly	  their	  private	  roles	  as	  wives	  and	  mothers,	  as	  if	  they	  needed	  to	  show	  that,	  although	  working,	  they	  were	  not	  neglecting	  their	  marital	  duties.	  Presenting	  a	  correct	   image,	  as	  a	  good	  wife	  and	   good	   ethical	   person,	   appeared	   to	   be	   the	   basis	   of	   their	   legitimacy,	  when	   interacting	  with	  litigants	  or	  when	  putting	  forward	  sometimes	  cynical	  opinions,	  especially	  on	  some	  of	  the	  juicier	  divorce	  cases	  that	  came	  into	  the	  office.	  	  
Karima	  did	  not	  find	  it	  easy	  working	  on	  divorce.	  She	  was	  genuinely	  concerned	  for	  the	   children	  of	   divorcing	   couples:	   all	   too	  often	   children	  paid	   the	  price	   for	   their	   parent’s	  mistake	   or	   their	   mother’s	   unwillingness	   to	   ‘sacrifice	   herself’	   for	   her	   children.	   This	   was	  perhaps	  one	  of	  the	  most	  frequently	  alluded	  to	  problems	  with	  divorce,	  providing	  the	  link	  in	  the	   chain	   to	   social	   breakdown,	   the	   increasingly	   familiar	   (to	   me)	   argument	   that	   the	  children	  of	  divorce	  lacked	  a	  proper	  upbringing	  and	  would	  become	  ‘thieves’	  (the	  boys)	  and	  ‘prostitutes’	   (the	   girls	   –	  meaning	  women	  with	   loose	   sexual	   behaviour,	   rather	   than	   to	  be	  taken	  literally).139	  
The	   cases	   that	   were	   considered	   worthy	   of	   discussion	   or	   comment	   in	   the	   office,	  could	  be	   read	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  moral	  barometer.	  Some	  were	  evoked	  merely	  because	  of	   their	  shock	   value	   –	   the	   discussion	   appearing	   to	   be	   a	   kind	   of	   coping	  mechanism,	   allaying	   the	  strong	  feelings	  these	  cases	  could	  evoke	  among	  staff	  who	  were	  confronted	  more	  often	  than	  general	  citizens	  with	  sometimes	  horrific	  facts.	  Gruesome	  photographs	  of	  the	  consequences	  of	   domestic	   violence	   would	   be	   shared,	   glances	   exchanged	   between	   saddened	   eyes.	   (A	  woman	  who	  tried	  to	  poison	  herself	  and	  her	  three	  daughters,	  resulting	  in	  the	  death	  of	  the	  youngest	  child,	  being	  a	  case	  in	  point;	  she	  was	  sent	  to	  prison	  for	  murder	  and	  her	  husband	  divorced	  her).	  
Cases,	   which	   were	   considered	   shocking	   and	   evoked	   comment	   among	   the	   staff,	  included	  speedy	  cases	  of	  divorce,	  such	  as	  one	  60-­‐year	  old	  man,	  who	  was	  divorcing	  his	  wife	  after	   only	   two	  weeks	   of	  marriage.	   It	  was	   concluded	   that	   his	  wife	  must	   not	   have	   been	   a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139	  See	  chapter	  7.	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virgin,	   although	   this	   was	   never	   mentioned	   in	   the	   case	   (the	   law	   forbids	   using	   this	   as	   a	  grounds	   for	  divorce);	   they	  were	  divorcing	  by	   consent	   and	   the	   file	  quoted	   ‘differences	  of	  character’	   as	   the	   grounds	   for	   divorce.140	   By	   contrast,	   divorce	   of	   couples	   who	   had	   been	  married	  for	  decades	  and	  grown	  old	  together	  –	  was	  also	  deemed	  saddening,	  if	  not	  shocking.	  One	  example	  of	   this	  was	  a	  couple	  who	  were	  cousins	  and	  had	  been	  married	   for	  55	  years	  and	  were	   divorcing	   due	   to	   their	   ‘cuisine	   interne’	   (a	   French	   expression	   used	   in	   Tunisian	  Arabic	   meaning	   ‘things	   that	   go	   on	   behind	   closed	   doors’).	   One	   clerk	   reacted	   by	   tutting	  solemnly	  and	  saying,	  ‘haram,	  haram.’	  (forbidden,	  in	  the	  religious	  sense;	  with	  repetition	  for	  emphasis).	  One	  clerk	  asked	  the	  other	  where	  this	  couple	  were	  from.	  They	  were	  from	  Gafsa,	  in	   Southern	   Tunisia,	   considered	   to	   be	   more	   ‘traditional.’	   ‘Difficult,	   difficult,’	   the	   other	  replied.	  	  
The	   kinds	   of	   things	   the	   clerks	   (vocally	   and	   strongly)	   disapprove	   of	  will	   become	  apparent	  in	  their	  interactions	  with	  litigants	  below:	  
WHERE	  BOTH	  SIDES	  MEET	  
	  
Malika	  
I	  met	  Malika	  in	  the	  office	  where	  she	  practiced	  as	  a	  child	  psychologist.	  Articulate	  and	  
well	   presented,	   she	   looked	  much	   younger	   than	   her	   45	   years.	   Her	   divorce	  was	   over	  
when	  we	  met	  and	  she	  was	  able	   to	  reflect	  on	  her	  ordeal.	  She	  only	  went	   to	   the	  court	  
when	   she	   had	   to,	   for	   the	   compulsory	   sessions	   related	   to	   the	   children,	   for	   instance	  
which	   she	   said	   was	   very	   ‘stressful,	   anxiety-­producing’.	   ‘They	   are	   not	   going	   to	   side	  
with	  you,’	  she	  lamented.	  ‘I	  never	  left	  the	  court	  with	  the	  impression	  that	  justice	  would	  
be	  done’.	  The	  ‘intervention	  of	  other	  people’	  was	  needed	  to	  ensure	  success,	  something	  
she	   had	   learned	   via	   bitter	   experience	   in	   earlier	   sessions	   of	   litigation	   with	   her	  
estranged	   husband.	   Her	   success	   in	   these	   –	   recovering	   custody	   of	   her	   children	  who	  
had	  been	  ‘kidnapped’	  by	  their	  father	  after	  school	  and	  who	  then	  denied	  her	  access	  to	  
them	  –	  she	  attributed	  to	  having	  known	  ‘the	  right	  people’	  who	  could	  intervene	  on	  her	  
behalf,	  although,	  in	  her	  words	  ‘It	  was	  my	  right.	  I	  should	  not	  have	  needed	  this’.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140	  My	  opinion	  is	  that	  they	  had	  been	  forced	  into	  marrying	  by	  the	  family	  and,	  having	  fulfilled	  their	  duty,	  were	  freeing	  
themselves.	  I	  have	  heard	  of	  men	  who	  are	  divorced	  or	  widowed	  being	  pushed	  into	  marriage	  by	  their	  families	  as	  they	  
‘need’	  a	  woman	  in	  their	  lives	  (not	  the	  least	  to	  cook	  and	  clean	  for	  them	  in	  their	  old	  age,	  although	  obviously	  more	  is	  
implied).	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I	  enquired	  how	  she	  was	  received	  by	  the	  court	  staff.	  ‘If	  you	  are	  lucky,’	  she	  replied,	  ‘you	  
fall	  on	  a	  gem’.	  Yet,	  like	  many	  litigants	  she	  did	  not	  feel	  welcome,	  even	  when	  asking	  for	  
information.	  	  
She	  was	  disappointed	   that	   ‘the	   judge	   is	   inaccessible	  unless	  you	  know	  someone’	  and	  
said	  it	  was	  ‘better	  to	  use	  lawyers	  who	  have	  easy	  access,	  as	  they	  are	  colleagues’.	  
Ironically,	  her	  experience	  differed	  from	  this.	  I	  asked	  her	  to	  tell	  me	  about	  any	  positive	  
aspects	  of	  her	  experience	  with	  the	  divorce	   law	  and	  proceedings.	  The	  only	  thing,	  she	  
told	  me,	   was	   ‘having	   had	   the	   intelligence	   to	   find	   a	   compromise	   and	   to	   cut	   off	   the	  
haemorrhage.’	   The	   person	   who	   helped	   them	   find	   this	   compromise	   was	   the	   Family	  
Judge.	  Both	  she	  and	  her	  husband	  filed	  for	  divorce	  for	  harm	  a	  few	  days	  apart.	  Making	  
the	   connection	   between	   both	   cases,	   the	   judge	   advised	   the	   couple	   to	   divorce	   by	  
consent	   and	   to	   agree	   to	   a	   divorce	   that	   favoured	   their	   children.	   With	   this	  
encouragement,	  they	  were	  able	  divorce	  more	  quickly	  and	  less	  painfully.	  Nonetheless,	  
Malika’s	  memories	  of	  divorce	  were	  haunted	  by	  a	  lingering	  sense	  of	  injustice.	  It	  was	  a	  
humane,	   personal	   intervention	  –	  and	  not	  a	   legal,	   institutionalised	  procedure	   -­	   that	  
had	   saved	   her.	   In	   her	   words:	   ‘I	   would	   be	   in	   the	   shit,	   if	   it	   were	   not	   for	   Samia	   (the	  
Family	  Judge).’	  	  
	  
LEGAL	  MORALITY;	  STATE	  LEGITIMACY	  
If	   the	   court	   is	   a	   morally	   ambiguous	   space,	   it	   is	   because	   the	   question	   of	   whether	   it	   is	  appropriate	  for	  the	  state	  to	  intervene	  in	  the	  intimate	  domains	  of	  private	  life	  that	  remains	  open	  to	  (moral)	  questioning.	  On	  my	  first	  morning	  in	  court,	  I	  struck	  up	  a	  conversation	  with	  one	  of	  the	  many	  men	  staring	  at	  me	  as	  I	  stood	  waiting	  outside	  the	  office	  failing	  to	  recognise	  Karima’s	   frantic	   signalling	   for	  me	   to	   come	   inside.	  He	   told	  me	   that	   his	   divorce	   had	   been	  finalised	   that	   day	   ending	   three	   months	   of	   marriage	   to	   a	   woman	   much	   older	   than	   him.	  Putting	  his	  hand	  over	  his	  heart,	  he	  told	  me	  that	  she	  had	  no	  ‘get	  up	  and	  go,	   like	  a	  car	  you	  have	   difficulty	   starting.’	   ‘The	   trouble	   is,’	   he	   continued,	   ‘when	   the	   state	   gets	   involved	   in	  things	   that	   it	   shouldn’t	   get	   involved	   in	  …	   You	   have	   to	   get	  married	   in	   the	   town	   hall	   and	  divorced	  in	  the	  court	  and	  this	  causes	  chaos.’	  He	  continued	  intertwining	  his	  critique	  of	  the	  state	   with	   that	   of	   women’s	   materialism:	   women	   are	   ‘only	   interested	   in	   maintenance	  payments	  and	  get	   to	  keep	  the	  house.	  The	  court	   tells	  you	  how	  much	  you	  have	   to	  pay	  her	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each	  month	  and	  it	  is	  a	  problem.’	  As	  he	  spoke,	  I	  noted	  that	  he	  used	  ‘the	  state’	  and	  ‘the	  law’	  almost	  interchangeably.	  
The	   court	   is	   a	   space	  where	   the	   state’s	  moral	   legitimacy	   is	   on	   trial;	   litigants	   also	  engage	  in	  judicious	  practice	  as	  they	  are	  given	  a	  sense	  of	  whether	  the	  state	  supports	  good	  husbands	  and	  wives,	  whilst	  chastising	  bad	  ones,	  thereby	  upholding	  a	  sense	  of	  justice	  that	  litigants	  like	  Malika	  (whom	  we	  met	  above)	  were	  looking	  for.141	  	  
The	  court	   is	  also	  a	   liminal	  space,	  where	  the	  risk	  of	   trespassing	  moral	  boundaries	  and	  stepping	  into	  the	  territory	  of	  ‘haram’	  	  (that	  which	  is	  religiously,	  morally	  forbidden)	  is	  ever	  present	  (if	  this	  boundary	  has	  not	  already	  been	  surpassed	  by	  entering	  the	  court	  itself).	  It	   is	   through	  contact	  between	  the	  state’s	  officials	  and	   its	  citizens	   in	   this	  ethical	  and	   legal	  space	  that	  people	  came	  to	  experience	  the	  state	  as	  morally	  upstanding	  or	  morally	  bankrupt.	  
Like	  Saida,	  however,	  many	   litigants	  did	  not	  only	  come	  to	   fulfil	   their	  bureaucratic	  obligations,	  but	  to	  seek	  sympathy	  and	  advice,	  perhaps	  believing	  that	  this	  could	  influence	  their	  divorce	  case	  for	  the	  better.	  In	  doing	  so,	  they	  opened	  themselves	  up	  to	  being	  morally	  judged	  by	  the	  court	  staff	  who,	  as	  pawns	  of	  the	  state’s	  justice	  system,	  find	  themselves	  in	  a	  position	   of	   power	   over	   litigants.	   In	   the	   process,	   particular	   versions	   of	   morality	   are	  performed	  and	  reproduced	  in	  the	  court	  office.	  
Malika’s	  experience	  underlines	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  personal	  interactions	  which	  occur	   in	   court,	   that	   informed	   her	   attitude	   to	   her	   divorce	   and	   to	   the	   justice	   system.	   The	  relatively	  positive	  outcome	  in	  her	  case	  was	  down	  to	  luck	  and	  interpersonal	  contact,	  rather	  than	   systematically,	   institutionally	   guaranteed	   rights.	   She	   was	   grateful	   to	   Family	   Judge	  Samia	  rather	  than	  to	  the	  law	  (not	  the	  least	  as	  her	  husband	  escaped	  any	  retribution	  for	  his	  underhand	  tactics	  that	  preceded	  their	  divorce	  case).	  
Nervous,	  anxious	  litigants	  enter	  the	  unfamiliar	  space	  of	  the	  court	  as	  strangers	  and	  are	  forced	  to	  interact	  with	  those	  who	  are	  at	  home	  there.	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  sense	  that	  there	  are	  two	  sides	  –	  that	  the	  court	  is	  a	  separate,	  threatening	  institutional	  space,	  an	  instrument	  of	  state	  justice	  –	  influences	  the	  interactions	  that	  take	  place	  within	  its	  office.	  Not	  unlike	  the	  neighbourhood,	  where	  familiarity	  and	  ‘who	  you	  know’	  are	  invaluable	  resources,	  a	  power	  dynamic	   is	   created	   between	   those	   inside	   and	   those	   outside.	   Unlike	   the	   neighbourhood,	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  See	  chapter	  6.	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those	  familiar	  with	  the	  court	  are	  the	  gatekeepers	  to	  a	  state-­‐backed	  justice	  system	  that	  can	  have	  a	  legally	  enforceable	  impact	  on	  the	  lives	  of	  the	  litigants.	  
How,	  then,	  do	  litigants	  and	  clerks	  navigate	  their	  interactions,	  where	  both	  are	  in	  the	  same	   space	   but	   in	   very	   different	   kinds	   of	   territory	   and	   in	   which	   the	   state’s	   perceived	  morality	  is	  simultaneously	  at	  stake?	  
	  
NAVIGATING	  LEGAL	  TERRITORIES	  
I	  was	  not	   in	   the	   least	   surprised	   that	  Malika	   felt	   that	   her	   experience	   in	   the	   office	  depended	   on	   luck.	   Not	   only	   did	   different	   clerks	   treat	   litigants	   differently	   but	   the	   same	  clerk	  could	  treat	  litigants	  in	  strikingly	  different	  ways	  depending	  on	  their	  mood,	  health	  or	  workload	  and	  the	  business	  of	  the	  office.	  The	  same	  clerk	  who	  went	  out	  of	  her	  way	  to	  help	  particular	  litigants	  would	  be	  best	  avoided	  on	  days	  when	  she	  had	  a	  headache.	  I	  knew	  this,	  but	  the	  litigants	  often	  did	  not.	  	  
As	  I	  was	  frequently	  in	  the	  office,	  taking	  notes	  and	  sitting	  at	  a	  desk	  or	  the	  corner	  of	  a	  desk,	  litigants	  often	  assumed	  that	  I	  worked	  in	  the	  court.	  This	  could	  be	  quite	  frustrating,	  as	  I	  had	  to	  explain	  that	  I	  was	  unable	  to	  help	  them.	  On	  one	  occasion,	  I	  had	  to	  talk	  myself	  out	  of	  an	  argument	  with	  a	  pushy	  woman,	  who	  was	  convinced	  that	  I	  was	  merely	  unwilling	  to	  help	   her;	   she	   simply	   did	   not	   believe	   that	   I	   did	   not	  work	   there.	   She	  became	   increasingly	  fawning	  trying	  to	  win	  my	  help	  and	  then	  irate	  as	  I	  was	  unable	  to	  help.	  	  
It	  fascinated	  me	  to	  see	  with	  whom	  staff	  sympathised	  and	  the	  tactics	  litigants	  used	  to	  win	   their	   favour.	  There	  was	  no	  service	  mentality,	  no	   idea	   that	   the	  staff	  were	   there	   to	  serve	  the	  litigants.	  More	  frequently	  I	  had	  the	  impression	  that	  the	  bustle	  of	  litigants	  in	  the	  doorway	  impeded	  the	  staff	  from	  getting	  on	  with	  their	  paperwork.	  Instead,	  it	  was	  up	  to	  the	  individual	   litigant’s	   interpersonal	   skills,	   notably	   their	   ability	   to	   perform	   good	   ethical	  personhood,	   to	   win	   the	   clerk’s	   favour,	   whether	   they	   got	   what	   they	   needed	   or	   not.	   As	  mentioned	  above,	  they	  came	  to	  register	  new	  cases,	  obtain	  dates	  for	  reconciliation	  session,	  to	  check	  the	  record	  books	  to	  find	  out	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  judgements	  or	  to	  make	  copies	  of	  the	   sheet	   from	   the	   reconciliation	   sessions	   in	   order	   to	   activate	   the	   judge’s	   rulings	   on	  maintenance	  payments,	  rent	  allowance	  and	  custody.	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Mounira	  described	  how	  she	  efficiently	  presented	  herself	  in	  a	  favourable	  manner	  in	  the	  office,	  whilst	  directly	  making	  a	   link	  between	   the	  perceived	  morality	  of	   the	   state	  and	  her	  experience	   in	  the	  court.	  When	  I	  asked	  her	  how	  she	  felt	  about	  the	   justice	  system,	  she	  replied	  based	  on	  her	  treatment	  during	  her	  divorce	  case:	  
	  
	   Mounira	  
There	  were	  ‘ups	  and	  downs’.	  She	  had	  noticed	  that	  when	  she	  put	  on	  makeup,	  did	  her	  
hair,	  dressed	  nicely	  and	  spoke	  French,	  	  ‘they	  roll	  out	  the	  red	  carpet	  for	  me’	  and	  it	  was	  
better	  than	  when	  she	  spoke	  in	  Arabic.	  One	  of	  the	  secretaries	  in	  the	  court	  helped	  her	  
when	  she	  discovered	  she	  could	  not	  speak	  Arabic.	  Men	  in	  particular	  were	  very	  kind	  to	  
her	  when	  she	  spoke	  French.	  They	  offered	  her	  their	  phone	  numbers,	   ‘just	   in	  case	  you	  
need	  me.’	  She	  took	  them	  and	  then	  threw	  them	  away.	  Women	  were	  also	  kind	  to	  her.	  
One	  secretary	  took	  pity	  on	  her,	  when	  she	  discovered	  she	  was	  divorcing,	  and	  gave	  her	  
the	  papers	  she	  needed	  immediately,	  instead	  of	  having	  to	  wait	  for	  six	  weeks.	  	  
	  
Whilst	  clothes	  and	  sexuality	  can	  say	  a	  lot	  in	  the	  court	  office,	  the	  language	  used	  to	  solicit	  help	  is	  religiously	  charged,	  as	  it	  would	  be	  in	  other	  contexts,	  such	  as	  when	  haggling	  for	  a	  good	  price	  at	  the	  market	  or	  asking	  a	  neighbour	  for	  a	  favour.	  One	  of	  the	  most	  frequent	  expressions	   used,	   both	   to	   solicit	   help	   and	   to	   show	   gratitude,	   is	   ‘[may	   God]	   bless	   your	  parents’	  (rahm	  walidaik).	  Kinship	  terms	  are	  also	  frequently	  used,	  as	  they	  are	  throughout	  Tunisia,	   to	   forge	   solidarity:	   ‘thank	   you,	  my	   sister/	  my	  brother’.	   The	   terms	   ‘my	  maternal	  aunt/	   paternal	   uncle’,	   which	   are	   used	   when	   speaking	   to	   someone	   of	   your	   parent’s	  generation,	  were	  not	  required	  in	  court	  given	  the	  age	  of	  the	  staff.	  Older	  litigants	  may	  refer	  to	   them	   as	   ‘my	   daughter,	   my	   son’.	   	   Karima,	   in	   her	   religious	   garb,	   could	   be	   referred	   to	  respectfully	  as	   ‘Hajja’,	   a	   compelling	  way	   to	   call	   for	  her	  help.	   In	   this	  way,	  bonds	  of	   social	  solidarity	  were	   actively	   brought	   into	   the	  mostly	   anonymous	   context	   of	   the	   court	   office,	  replete	  with	  the	  moral	  obligations	  inherent	  in	  this	  language.	  	  
Some	  were	   less	   appropriate	   than	   others,	  making	   the	   court	   a	   particularly	   hostile	  environment.	  One	  clerk	  in	  particular	  created	  a	  lot	  of	  animosity,	  as	  she	  was	  prone	  to	  stress	  and	   easily	   overwhelmed	   by	   the	   heavy	   traffic	   of	   people	   in	   the	   office.	   One	  man	   dared	   to	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approach	  her,	  coming	  out	  from	  behind	  the	  rostrum	  and	  leaning	  on	  her	  desk,	  asking	  calmly	  but	  firmly	  for	  help.	  She	  shouted	  at	  him	  sharply	  and	  repeatedly,	  in	  the	  name	  of	  the	  Prophet,	  to	  get	  away	  from	  her;	  fortunately	  Fathi	  appeared	  and	  calmed	  down	  the	  situation.	  This	  was	  not	   an	   isolated	   incident.	   Everyone	  was	   relieved	  when	   this	   clerk	  moved	   to	   another	   post	  requiring	  less	  contact	  with	  the	  public.	  Whilst	  this	  clerk	  was	  particularly	  turbulent,	  I	  saw	  all	  of	  the	  staff	  argue	  with	  or	  shout	  at	  litigants	  at	  one	  time	  or	  another,	  although	  the	  latter	  was	  fortunately	  less	  common.	  
On	  the	  other	  hand,	  as	  seen	  in	  the	  opening	  vignette,	  staff	  occasionally	  went	  out	  of	  their	  way	   to	   help	   litigants	  who	   had	  won	   their	   sympathy,	   especially	   if,	   like	  Mounira,	   the	  litigant	   appeared	   to	  be	   innocent	   and	  was	   suffering	   at	   the	  hands	  of	  his	   or	  her	   spouse.	   In	  these	  cases,	   the	  clerks	  would	  offer	  advice,	  provide	  documents	   rapidly	  and	  even	   take	   the	  litigant	  to	  see	  the	  Family	  Judge.	  I	  never	  saw	  Karima	  receive	  anything	  at	  all	  in	  return	  for	  her	  services;	  she	  saw	  it	  as	  a	  moral	  duty	  to	  help	  people.	  The	  turbulent	  clerk	  mentioned	  above	  did	  once	   receive	   a	  box	  of	  Tunisian	  pastries	   as	   a	   thank	  you	   from	  a	   litigant,	   although	   this	  was	  partly	  an	  apology	  for	  him	  having	  reduced	  her	  to	  tears	  with	  his	  overbearing	  nature	  on	  a	  previous	  visit.	  	  
Not	   all	   contact	   in	   the	   court	   was	   anonymous.	   As	   Malika	   found,	   having	   a	   contact	  (whether	   direct	   or	   via	   a	   mutual	   acquaintance)	   was	   deemed	   valuable;	   there	   was	   an	  implication	   that	   if	   you	   knew	   someone,	   you	   would	   be	   guaranteed	   pleasant	   and	   efficient	  service.	  This	  too	  is	  not	  unique	  to	  this	  court	  setting.	  At	  the	  extreme	  end	  of	  this	  scale	  was	  a	  relatively	   widespread	   fear	   of	   corruption.	   Various	   litigants	   expressed	   their	   anxiety	   that	  their	   spouse	  may	   know	   someone	   in	   the	   court	  who	   could	   be	   bribed	   and	   that	   corruption	  would	   win	   them	   the	   case.	   Saida,	   who	   we	   shall	   meet	   below,	   was	   concerned	   about	  documents	  ‘disappearing’	  from	  her	  file,	  presumably	  not	  under	  their	  own	  volition.	  I	  should	  note	  that	  I	  did	  not	  observe	  any	  sign	  of	  this	  corrupt	  behaviour	  in	  the	  office	  where	  I	  spent	  my	  time.	  
Such	   tactics	  do	  not	  always	  work.	  A	   stranger	  once	  arrived	   in	   the	  office	  asking	   for	  Karima,	  saying	  that	  they	  had	  come	  on	  behalf	  of	  a	  mutual	  friend;	  she	  had	  never	  heard	  of	  the	  person	  in	  her	  life.	  She	  told	  the	  person	  that	  they	  could	  find	  ‘Karima’	  in	  an	  office	  that	  does	  not	  exist	  on	  the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  court,	  although	  she	  is	  the	  only	  person	  of	  that	  name	  in	  the	  building.	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Dominant	   expectations	   of	   ideal	   marital	   duties	   formed	   the	   basis	   for	   moral	  judgements	  about	  the	  ethical	  personhood	  of	  litigants.	  These	  judgements	  were	  sometimes	  made	  explicit	   to	   the	   litigants	  and	  concerned	  the	  clerk’s	  perception	  of	  who	  was	  to	  blame.	  Their	  reading	  of	  the	  litigant’s	  intentions	  was	  also	  paramount.	  It	  would	  be	  unfair	  to	  say	  that	  the	  female	  staff	  sympathised	  more	  with	  the	  wives	  than	  the	  husbands.	  In	  one	  case,	  the	  staff	  took	  the	  side	  of	  the	  husband,	  who	  was	  divorcing	  his	  wife	  without	  grounds,	  as	  he	  did	  not	  have	  enough	  proof	  to	  divorce	  her	  for	  harm.	  His	  wife	  was	  described	  as	  ‘dirty’	  and	  unfit	  to	  look	   after	   the	   children.	  His	  wife	  would	  not	   agree	   to	  divorce	  by	   consent,	   as	   her	  husband	  was	  a	  businessman	  and	  she	  hoped	  to	  get	  a	   lot	  of	  money.	  Their	  concern	  was	  what	  would	  happen	  to	  the	  children;	  his	  elderly	  mother	  would	  be	  unable	  to	  look	  after	  the	  children	  of	  a	  young	  age,	  making	  it	  difficult	  for	  him	  to	  gain	  custody	  rather	  than	  his	  wife.	  	  The	  wife	  came	  across	   as	   ill	   intentioned,	   concerned	   with	   money	   rather	   than	   her	   children.	   Sana’s	  conversation	   with	   another	   litigant	   in	   the	   office	   points	   to	   the	   presumption	   that	   women	  seek	   material	   gain	   in	   divorce	   cases,	   casting	   aspersions	   as	   to	   the	   morality	   of	   their	  intentions.	  	  This	  man,	  a	  civil	  servant,	  explained	  that	  he	  wanted	  to	  divorce	  without	  grounds.	  Sana	  asked	  how	  much	  he	  earned;	  his	  salary	  was	  ‘OK’.	  She	  advised	  him	  that	  he	  would	  have	  to	  tell	  the	  court	  this	  and	  that	  his	  wife	  would	  take	  some	  of	  his	  money.	  	  
One	  form	  of	  moral	  judgement	  present	  (levelled	  against	  the	  state	  as	  much	  as	  any	  of	  the	   individuals	   concerned)	   was	   the	   kind	   of	   divorce	   that	   may	   have	   been	   avoidable	   if	  polygamy	   were	   still	   possible.	   One	   couple	   came	   into	   the	   court	   to	   divorce	   as	   they	   were	  unable	  to	  have	  children.142	  Karima	  sighed	  and	  commented	  that	  the	  problem	  is	  that	  there	  is	  no	  polygamy;	  if	  there	  were,	  this	  man	  could	  take	  a	  second	  wife	  to	  have	  children,	  if	  his	  first	  wife	  agreed	  to	  remain	  married.143	  (This	  is	  assumed	  to	  be	  a	  favourable	  outcome	  for	  the	  first	  wife,	  who	  would	  avoid	   the	  undesirable	   status	  of	   a	  divorced	  woman	  with	   little	   chance	  of	  remarriage,	  whilst	   retaining	   the	  protection	  and	  support	  of	  her	  husband).	  She	  quotes	   the	  Koran	  and	  Ijtihad	  to	  back	  up	  the	  religious	  legitimacy	  of	  this	  option.	  	  
Concern	  for	  the	  children	  and	  the	  obligation	  to	  fulfil	  marital	  duties	  (legal,	  religious	  and	  moral)	  were	  other	  frequent	  themes.	  For	  instance,	  Farid,	  a	  recently	  divorced	  man	  came	  to	   the	   office	   as	   he	   was	   considering	   appealing	   the	   level	   of	   maintenance	   payments	   (100	  dinars)	  and	  rent	  allowance	  (150	  dinars)	  ruled	  in	  his	  divorce	  judgement,	  given	  that	  his	  wife	  also	   works.	   The	   clerk,	   as	   well	   as	   responding	   to	   his	   questions	   about	   the	   procedures	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142	  Although	  Tunisia	  was	  one	  of	  the	  first	  Muslim	  countries	  to	  make	  adoption	  legal	  in	  1958,	  it	  is	  still	  considered	  
‘haram’	  by	  many,	  due	  to	  the	  perceived	  risk	  of	  incest,	  with	  children	  not	  knowing	  who	  their	  biological	  parents	  and	  
siblings	  are.	  	  
143	  This	  follows	  the	  common	  assumption	  that	  the	  wife	  is	  to	  blame	  for	  infertility.	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involved	   in	   taking	   a	   case	   to	   appeal,	   advised	  him	   to	   drop	   the	   idea	   as	   she	   considered	   the	  payments	  low	  and	  reasonable	  given	  his	  salary	  (800	  dinars).	  ‘Who	  can	  rent	  a	  house	  for	  150	  dinars	  anyway?’	  she	  told	  him.	   ‘You	  should	  take	  responsibility	   for	  your	  children.’	  To	  back	  this	  up,	  she	  quoted	  from	  the	  Koran:	  ‘al-­rijal	  qawwamun	  ‘ala	  al-­nisa’.144	  	  He	  was	  not	  swayed	  and	  promised	  to	  return	  with	  the	  necessary	  paperwork.	  (His	  female	  lawyer	  agreed	  with	  the	  clerk’s	  opinion,	  although	  she	  could	  do	  little	  about	  her	  client’s	  determination	  to	  appeal).	   I	  suggested	  to	  the	  clerk	  that	  he	  might	  be	  reluctant	  to	  pay	  her,	  as	  he	  felt	  that	  his	  wife	  was	  the	  one	  in	  the	  wrong	  in	  their	  divorce	  case.	  She	  merely	  replied	  that	  I	  should	  not	  believe	  what	  he	   tells	  me,	   adding	   nebulously	   that	   his	  wife	   has	   a	   strong	   character	   and	   ‘women	   rule	   at	  home.’	  
Contrary	  to	  what	  Mounira	  believed,	  but	  in	  line	  with	  what	  she	  actually	  experienced,	  the	   Family	   Judge	   is	   far	   from	   inaccessible.	   Although	   staff	   in	   the	   office	   would	   say	   the	  contrary,	  lawyers	  tell	  me	  that	  anyone	  is	  entitled	  to	  speak	  to	  the	  judge.	  People	  can	  and	  do	  knock	  on	  her	  door	  for	  help.	  She	  is	  also	  driven	  by	  a	  sense	  of	  moral	  duty	  and	  unhesitatingly	  goes	   beyond	   her	   job	   description	   when	   necessary.	   She	   thinks	   this	   is	   partly	   because	   the	  position	  of	  Family	  Judge	  is	  relatively	  new	  and	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  her	  work	  is	  not	  clear.	  On	  one	  of	  my	   first	  meetings	  with	  her,	  a	   lady	  who	  was	  visibly	  extremely	  poor,	  came	   into	   the	  office	   asking	   for	   the	   judge’s	   help.	   She	  was	   brandishing	   small	   bandages	   covered	   in	   fresh	  blood.	   She	   asked	   the	   judge	   to	   help	   her	   take	   her	   children	   somewhere	   safe,	   so	   that	   their	  father	   could	   not	   beat	   them,	   and	   burst	   into	   tears.	   Although	   this	   was	   not	   her	   role,	   she	  intervened	  to	  put	  this	  woman	  in	  touch	  with	  the	  Representative	  of	  Children	  in	  Danger,	  who	  deals	  with	  children	  at	  risk.	  On	  another	  occasion,	  one	  of	   the	   judges	   intervened	   in	  a	  much	  more	  personal	  context.	  He	  had	  carried	  out	  a	  private	  sitting	  with	  a	  divorced	  woman	  who	  could	  no	  longer	  afford	  to	  keep	  her	  children.	  She	  appealed	  to	  the	  court	  to	  take	  them	  from	  her	   until	   she	   could	   afford	   to	   care	   for	   them	  herself.	   (Her	   husband	  was	   failing	   to	   pay	  her	  
nafaqa).	  As	  well	  as	  doing	  all	  that	  was	  legally	  necessary,	  the	  judge	  summoned	  the	  woman	  back	  to	  the	  court	  at	  a	  time	  when	  it	  was	  usually	  closed.	  He	  withdrew	  some	  cash	  to	  give	  her	  and	  arranged	   for	  his	  sister	   to	  give	  her	  some	  of	  her	  children’s	  old	  clothes.	  He	  carried	  out	  these	   kind	   acts	   discretely;	   I	   came	   to	   know	  of	   this	   by	   chance.	   Again,	   he	  was	   driven	   by	   a	  simple	  human	  desire	  to	  help	  someone	  who	  was	  clearly	  suffering	  so	  much.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  144	  This	  was	  a	  popular	  quote	  (verse	  33,	  4th	  surat	  in	  the	  Book	  of	  Women)	  frequently	  cited	  in	  relation	  to	  women’s	  rights.	  One	  of	  my	  informants	  pointed	  me	  to	  Dr	  Yusuf	  Ali’s	  ‘translation’	  of	  this	  phrase	  (adding	  that	  the	  Koran	  cannot	  be	  translated	  directly,	  only	  its	  ‘meaning’	  can	  be	  translated):	  ‘men	  are	  the	  protectors	  and	  maintainers	  of	  women’.	  The	  meaning	  of	  the	  word	  qawwamun	  is	  especially	  controversial.	  Several	  feminists	  with	  whom	  I	  discussed	  this	  term	  understood	  this	  to	  mean	  that	  men	  were	  (wrongly)	  entitled	  to	  dominate	  women	  according	  to	  the	  religion.	  Others	  stressed	  the	  male	  duty	  to	  take	  care	  of	  his	  wife	  embodied	  in	  this	  phrase,	  rather	  than	  the	  wife’s	  subordination.	  The	  latter	  comment	  was	  made	  during	  a	  discussion	  about	  how	  working	  wives	  increasingly	  contribute	  to	  maintaining	  their	  families.	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An	  undercurrent	  of	  moral	  obligation	  flows	  through	  many	  of	  these	  interactions.	  
The	  judges	  and	  clerks	  help	  out	  those	  they	  take	  pity	  on	  because	  they	  cannot	  leave	  a	  child	  in	  danger	  or	   ignore	  someone’s	  evident	  suffering.	  This	  suggests	  that	  the	  staff	  have	  a	  human	  proclivity	   to	   ‘side	  with’	   those	  who	  are	  are	  able	   to	  present	   themselves	  as	  morally	  upstanding	  people,	  whose	  intentions	  are	  beyond	  reproach	  as,	  free	  from	  blame,	  they	  have	  been	   forced	   to	   enter	   the	   morally	   dubious	   space	   of	   the	   court	   for	   reasons	   beyond	   their	  control.	  
The	  exercise	  of	   judicious	  practice	  by	  state	  officials	  has	  an	  impact	  on	  the	  litigants’	  experience	  as	  they	  go	  about	  pursuing	  their	  legal	  right	  to	  divorce.	  In	  turn,	  this	  experience	  may	  influence	  how	  they	  perceive	  the	  law	  and	  its	  morality	  and	  consequently	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  state	  that	  created	  the	  divorce	  laws	  and	  the	  morals	  that	  it	  is	  seen	  to	  embody.	  
	  
PUBLIC	  DIVORCE	  HEARINGS	  
	   	  
Sabr	  
Sabr,	  a	  mild-­manered,	  modest	  man	   in	  his	  40s,	  attended	  himself	   the	  Friday	  morning	  
public	  court	  hearing;	  his	  wife	  had	  sent	  her	  lawyer.	  When	  they	  called	  his	  name,	  he	  had	  
to	   go	   to	   the	   front	   of	   the	   room	   and	   stand	   before	   the	   judge	   ‘with	   all	   those	   people	  
looking	  at	  me.’	  The	  judge	  asked	  him	  if	  he	  wanted	  to	  divorce	  and	  he	  assented.	  He	  said	  
that	   ‘this	  was	   the	   hardest	  moment	   of	  my	   life.	   Everyone	  was	  watching	  me.’	   He	  was	  
relieved	  that	  his	  wife	  was	  not	  there,	  as	  otherwise	  he	  would	  have	  had	  to	  explain	  why	  
he	  wanted	  to	  divorce	  and	  he	  would	  have	  been	  ashamed	  to	  tell	  his	  story	  in	  front	  of	  all	  
those	  people.145	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145	  The	  sheer	  number	  of	  cases	  means	  that	  the	  judge	  would	  not	  have	  time	  to	  ask	  all	  the	  litigants	  to	  explain	  their	  
problems,	  even	  if	  this	  were	  deemed	  desirable.	  Any	  discussion	  of	  an	  intimate	  nature	  required	  during	  these	  public	  
sessions	  is	  deferred	  to	  the	  end	  of	  the	  sitting,	  once	  everyone	  else	  had	  been	  asked	  to	  leave	  the	  room.	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Other	  than	  to	  do	  the	  necessary	  paperwork	  or	  to	  attend	  a	  reconciliation	  session,	  a	  third	   reason	  why	   litigants	  may	   be	   required	   to	   come	   to	   the	   court	   is	   to	   attend	   the	   public	  hearings	  during	  which	  divorce	  cases	  are	   judged.	  These	   take	  place	  every	  Friday	  morning.	  To	   Sabr,	   it	   seems	   that	   this	   deeply	   unpleasant	   experience	   opened	   him	   up	   to	   the	   moral	  judgement	   of	   his	   fellow	   divorcing	   citizens,	   in	   addition	   to	   that	   of	   the	   court;	   he	   links	   the	  public	  gaze	  to	  his	  shame.	  Leila146	  found	  her	  divorce	  case	  overwhelming.	  She	  felt	  as	  if	  she	  was	  carrying	  all	   the	  consequences	  of	  divorce	  alone:	  material,	  psychological	  and	  moral.	   ‘I	  feel	   like	   he	   has	   defeated	   me,’	   she	   sighed;	   she	   had	   started	   taking	   anti-­‐depressants.	   She	  stayed	  at	  home	  and	  sent	  her	  lawyer	  to	  the	  public	  hearing	  in	  her	  place.	  
Attendance	  at	  the	  public	  divorce	  hearing	  is	  not	  compulsory	  and	  litigants	  who	  can	  afford	   it	   may	   be	   represented	   by	   a	   lawyer.	   Nevertheless,	   the	   large	   hall	   is	   bursting	   with	  divorcing	  citizens	  every	  Friday.	  147	  
In	  the	  space	  of	  the	  public	  hearings,	  people	  particularly	  feel	  themselves	  to	  be	  under	  scrutiny,	   the	   subject	   of	   moral	   judgement	   under	   the	   weight	   of	   negative	   attitudes	   to	  divorce.148	  
On	  Friday	  mornings	  the	  public	  courtroom	  is	  crowded	  and	  stuffy	  with	  around	  150	  -­‐200	   cases	   going	   through	   each	   week.	   The	   last	   session	   before	   the	   court	   closes	   in	   July	   is	  particularly	   busy	   and	   can	   see	  more	   than	   200	   cases.	   (Besma	  wrongly	   saw	   this	   figure	   as	  evidence	   of	   the	   shocking	   prevalence	   of	   divorce.	   This	   is	   not	   the	   number	   of	   couples	  who	  divorce	  each	  week;	  only	  a	  relatively	  low	  percentage	  of	  these	  cases	  are	  finalized	  each	  week,	  others	  being	  referred	   for	   further	  action).	  The	  whole	  process	   lasts	  around	   three	  hours.	  A	  sheet	   of	   A3	   paper	   displays	   the	   list	   of	   case	   numbers	   and	   the	   names	   of	   litigants	   for	   that	  week’s	   hearings.	   	   A	   partial	   door	   shields	   the	   room	   from	   nosey	   onlookers,	   who	   are	  prevented	  from	  seeing	  the	  ‘stage’	  at	  the	  far	  end,	  where	  the	  judge	  and	  his	  assistants	  sit	  on	  large	  wooden	  chairs;	  the	  judges	  enters	  this	  space	  directly	  through	  the	  back	  door.	  The	  clerk	  has	   her	   own	   desk	   to	   the	   side	   and	   a	  male	   assistant	   (‘coursier’)	   in	   civilian	   clothes	   stands	  between	  them,	  passing	  files	  from	  the	  judge	  to	  the	  clerk	  and	  handing	  the	  clerk	  the	  litigants’	  ID	  cards	  to	  verify	  their	  identity.	  He	  also	  plays	  some	  role	  in	  security;	  on	  occasion	  the	  judge	  nods	  at	  him	  to	  silence	  someone	  trying	  to	  use	  a	  mobile	  phone.	  	  It	  is	  in	  this	  area,	  in	  front	  of	  the	   judge’s	  desk,	  where	   litigants	  or	   representing	   lawyers	   stand	  when	   their	   case	   is	  being	  examined.	  On	  the	  back	  wall	  in	  full	  view	  of	  everyone	  hangs	  the	  emblem	  of	  Tunisia,	  which	  is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146	  Cf	  Chapter	  6.	  
147	  Litigants	  also	  come	  to	  the	  court	  to	  attend	  the	  reconciliation	  session	  with	  the	  judge.	  See	  chapter	  4.	  
148	  Cf	  Chapter	  2.	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also	  displayed	  on	  policemen’s	  badges.	  This	  depicts	   scales149	   (to	   represent	   justice),	   a	   lion	  (strength)	  and	  a	  ship	  (freedom).	  A	  few	  ceiling	  fans	  circulate	  the	  warm	  air	  around	  the	  room	  and	  are	  powerless	  to	  alleviate	  the	  heat	  as	  summer	  approaches.	  	  
Rows	  of	  wooden	  benches	  reminiscent	  of	  church	  pews	  are	  lined	  up	  facing	  this	  stage	  area.	  The	  first	  two	  rows	  of	  wooden	  benches	  are	  reserved	  for	  lawyers	  and	  their	  secretaries,	  wielding	  armfuls	  of	  blue	   files.	   	  The	   lawyers	  are	  dressed	   in	   the	  court	  uniforms	  they	  must	  wear	   to	  be	  able	   to	  speak	   to	   the	   judge.	  Legal	  professionals	  are	  visibly	  distinguished	   from	  the	  litigants.	  Judges,	   lawyers	  and	  clerks	  wear	  the	  same	  uniform	  of	  a	  broad-­‐sleeved,	   loose	  black	   gown	   with	   a	   three-­‐pronged	   white	   tie	   to	   the	   front	   and	   a	   two	   thin	   black	   scarves	  hanging	   down	   the	   back,	   each	   with	   a	   white	   bobble	   on	   the	   end.	   A	   long	   wooden	   rostrum	  forms	   a	   barrier	   between	   the	   judge’s	   area	   and	   the	   public	   area.	   The	   rest	   of	   the	   room	   is	  packed	  with	   litigants.	   Uniformed	   police	   patrol	   the	   room,	   trying	   to	   prevent	   people	   from	  leaning	  on	  the	  white-­‐painted	  walls;	  the	  grey	  stains	  on	  the	  walls	  suggest	  this	  is	  not	  always	  successful.	  As	  far	  as	  I	  could	  tell,	  husbands	  and	  wives	  did	  not	  choose	  to	  sit	  together.	  Some	  litigants	   came	  with	   people	   I	   assumed	  were	   family	   for	  moral	   support.	   Some	  women	   sat	  weeping	  silently.	  	  
There	  is	  a	  third	  door	  to	  the	  side	  through	  which	  police	  officers	  escort	  litigants	  who	  have	  been	  permitted	  to	  leave	  prison	  for	  their	  divorce	  cases.	  On	  one	  occasion	  I	  sat	  next	  to	  a	  lady	   in	   tears,	   who	   told	   me	   that	   one	   of	   these	   men,	   handcuffed	   and	   flanked	   by	   two	  policemen,	  was	  her	  son.	  	  
Typically,	  those	  present	  will	  be	  the	  presiding	  Family	  judge	  and	  their	  two	  assistant	  judges,	   the	   clerk,	   the	   assistant,	   around	  10-­‐20	   lawyers,	   some	   legal	   secretaries	   and	   in	   the	  region	  of	  200	  litigants.	  The	  session	  is	  not	  open	  to	  members	  of	  the	  public	  who	  do	  not	  have	  an	   audience	   with	   the	   judge.	   Therefore,	   for	   each	   case,	   one	   or	   both	   of	   the	   spouses	   may	  attend	  or	  one	  or	  two	  lawyers;	  in	  some	  cases	  no-­‐one	  attends	  at	  all.	  	  
Observing	   those	   present	   in	   the	   room	   reveals	   that	   there	   is	   a	   mix	   of	   people	   in	  attendance	   in	   all	   aspects	   apart	   from	   social	   class;	   people	   who	   look	   wealthy	   are	   notably	  absent,	  presumably	  using	  their	  right	  to	  be	  represented	  by	  a	  lawyer.	  The	  litigants	  span	  all	  ages	  from	  those	  in	  their	  early	  twenties	  to	  pensioners	  and	  display	  different	  styles	  of	  dress	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149	  Many	  lawyers	  had	  a	  decorative	  model	  of	  some	  scales	  on	  their	  desk.	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from	   ladies	   in	   veils,	   old	   men	   in	   schechias,150	   young	   men	   in	   tight-­‐fitting	   t-­‐shirts	   and	  sunglasses,	  or	  young	  women	  in	  trousers	  with	  fashionable	  highlights	  in	  their	  hair.	  	  
A	  bell	   rings	  marking	   the	  start	  of	   the	   session.	  Everyone	   falls	   silent	  and	  stands	   for	  the	  entrance	  of	   the	   judge.	   She	   then	   indicates	   for	  everyone	   to	  be	   seated.	  The	   judge	   takes	  each	   file	   in	   turn	   calling	   out	   the	   case	   number	   and	   names	   of	   the	   litigants.	   If	   there,	   they	  indicate	  they	  are	  present	  and	  make	  their	  way	  to	  the	   front	  of	   the	  room.	  The	   judge	  briefly	  leafs	  through	  the	  file.	  This	  is	  also	  to	  check	  whether	  all	  the	  legally	  required	  documents	  are	  present;	  on	  one	  occasion	  she	  asked	  the	  couple	  to	  bring	  in	  their	  marriage	  contract,	  which	  was	  missing.	  
If	  both	  of	  the	  couple	  are	  present,	  the	  judge	  asks	  them	  if	  they	  agree	  to	  divorce.	  	  
On	   one	   occasion,	   she	   interrogated	   a	  man,	   as	   to	  why	   he	   had	   failed	   to	   attend	   the	  reconciliation	  session.	  In	  general,	  however,	  the	  poor	  acoustics	  in	  the	  room	  make	  it	  difficult	  to	   hear	   what	   is	   being	   said,	   which	   affords	   the	   couple	   under	   scrutiny	   some	   privacy.	   The	  judge	   deliberately	   lowers	   her	   voice,	   speaking	   in	   a	  whisper	   audible	   only	   to	   the	   assistant	  judges.	  
Given	   the	   quantity	   of	   files	   to	   process,	   only	   a	  minute	   or	   so	   is	   spent	   on	   each	   one,	  which	  does	  not	  allow	  time	  to	  enter	  into	  detail.	  Previously,	  the	  written	  files	  will	  have	  been	  examined	   by	   the	   judge	   with	   her	   colleagues	   in	   a	   private	   deliberation	   session.	   The	   vast	  majority	   of	   arguing	   takes	   place	   in	   the	   documents.	   It	   is	   rare	   for	   lawyers	   to	   present	  arguments	  orally	  in	  court	  or	  for	  the	  judge	  to	  question	  the	  litigants.	  In	  these	  cases,	  lawyers	  tend	   to	  speak	   in	  classical	  Arabic,	  echoing	   the	   level	  of	   language	  used	   in	  written	  petitions.	  Lawyers	  may	  hand	  the	  judge	  additional	  documents	  for	  the	  file	  during	  the	  session.	  
One	   of	   the	   longer	   discussions	   between	   a	   lawyer	   and	   the	   judge	   that	   I	   heard,	  involved	  a	  case	  where	  the	  husband	  was	  asking	  for	  divorce	  without	  grounds.	  This	  was	  his	  third	   divorce	   case,	   the	   previous	   two	   having	   been	   for	   harm.	   The	   husband	   was	   working	  abroad	   in	   Saudi	   Arabia;	   his	   wife	   had	   abandoned	   him,	   refusing	   to	   return	   there.	   They	  married	   in	  2005	  and	  had	  spent	  only	  a	   few	  months	  of	   their	  marriage	   living	   together	  and	  had	  no	  children.	  He	  was	  suggesting	  that	  she	  agreed	  to	  divorce,	  but	  was	  insisting	  he	  divorce	  without	   grounds,	   as	   he	  was	   rich	   and	   she	  hoped	   to	   receive	   a	   high	   level	   of	   compensation	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
150	  Traditional	  Tunisian	  rimless	  hat	  of	  red	  felt	  worn	  by	  men.	  Nowadays,	  only	  older	  men	  wear	  them	  on	  a	  regular	  
basis.	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payments.	  A	  figure	  of	  100,000	  dinars151	  was	  mentioned.	  The	  outcome	  was	  for	  the	  judge	  to	  order	  another	  reconciliation	  session.	  
The	   judge	   talks	   to	   the	   litigants	   in	   Tunisian	   Arabic.	   Arabic	   is	   the	   language	   of	   the	  courtroom;	  in	  cases	  involving	  mixed	  couples,	  translation	  must	  be	  used,	  even	  if	  the	  spouse	  is	  French	  and	  the	  judge	  is	  in	  fact	  fluent	  in	  French.	  
The	   clerk	   writes	   furiously,	   recording	   the	   judge’s	   decision	   on	   sheets	   of	   court	  notepaper	   which	   she	   has	   previously	   prepared	   with	   the	   case	   number	   and	   names	   of	   the	  litigants.	  The	  most	  frequent	  decision	  seems	  to	  be	  to	  give	  a	  date	  for	  a	  future	  hearing.	  (The	  judge	  later	  told	  me	  that	  this	  is	  a	  deliberate	  policy	  to	  give	  the	  couple	  more	  time	  to	  think,	  in	  the	  hope	  that	  they	  will	  reconcile).	  	  
One	  case	   is	  dismissed	  by	   the	   judge,	  who	  simply	   tells	   the	   lawyer	   that	   it	   is	  wrong;	  Karima	  screws	  up	  the	  sheet	  in	  a	  ball	  and	  throws	  it	  on	  the	  floor.	  
As	   people	   become	   agitated,	   as	   they	   inevitably	   do,	   spending	   several	   hours	   on	   a	  hard,	  wooden	  bench,	  the	  judge	  taps	  her	  pen	  on	  the	  table	  to	  restore	  silence.	  	  
The	   case	   of	   a	   couple	   who	   appeared	   to	   be	   in	   their	   seventies	   was	   called	   up.	   A	  commotion	   occurred	   as	   the	   wife	   struggled	   to	   leave	   her	   seat,	   leaning	   awkwardly	   on	   a	  walking	  stick.	  The	  judge	  motioned	  to	  her	  to	  remain	  seated,	  as	  everyone	  in	  the	  room	  looked	  round	   to	   see	  what	  was	  happening,	   exchanging	   sad	  or	   amused	  glances.	  Karima	   later	   told	  me	  that	  he	  was	  divorcing	  her	  as	  she	  was	  ill	  and	  could	  not	  work.	  If	  she	  was	  lucky,	  she	  would	  live	  with	  her	  daughter,	  who	  would	   look	  after	  her;	   this	  was	  more	   likely	  than	  her	  going	  to	  live	  with	  a	   son	  and	  his	  wife.	   She	  partly	   saw	   this	   as	  normal;	  he	  needs	  a	  woman	  and	   it	   is	  better	  for	  him	  to	  divorce	  and	  remarry,	  rather	  than	  doing	  things	  which	  are	  ‘haram’	  (notably	  committing	  adultery).	  It	  would	  be	  better	  for	  him	  to	  be	  patient	  and	  tolerant,	  but	  if	  he	  knows	  he	  cannot,	  he	  should	  divorce.	  
Any	   litigants	   present	   who	   tried	   to	   use	   their	   time	   in	   the	   court	   to	   complete	  paperwork	  in	  the	  office	  would	  often	  be	  disappointed,	  finding	  the	  door	  to	  the	  office	  locked,	  due	  to	  the	  overwhelming	  number	  of	  people	  trying	  to	  get	  in	  and	  the	  absence	  of	  one	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151	  Approximately	  £50,000,	  an	  extremely	  high	  and	  unheard	  of	  amount.	  The	  clerk	  said	  that	  she	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  
receive	  3-­‐4000	  dinars.	  See	  chapter	  6.	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clerks	   to	   work	   in	   the	   public	   hearing.	   Isolated	   and	   sometimes	   ashamed,	   litigants	   could	  literally	  find	  themselves	  shut	  out.	  
	  
CONCLUSION	  
The	  court	  as	  an	  ethical	  space	  is	  far	  from	  separate;	  ordinary	  ethics	  shape	  and	  are	  shaped	  by	  the	   operation	   of	   divorce	   law.	   Ethical	   theory	   intertwines	  with	   legal	   practice	   as	   the	   legal	  code	  and	  its	  procedures	  set	  the	  stage	  for	  the	  different	   interactions	  between	  litigants	  and	  court	  staff	  that	  require	  all	  parties	  to	  engage	  in	  judicious	  practice.	  In	  the	  process,	  particular	  moral	   criteria	   are	   enacted	   and	   reinforced.	   As	   we	   have	   seen,	   these	   criteria	   are	   often	  gendered.	  In	  particular,	  the	  court	  staff’s	  reading	  of	  the	  litigant’s	   intentions	  in	  the	  divorce	  case	   is	   central	   to	   how	   they	   perceive	   ethical	   personhood	   and	   this	   too	   is	   gendered.	  Unscrupulous	  husbands	  try	  to	  escape	  their	  duty	  to	  provide	  for	  their	  family.	  Unscrupulous	  wives	  try	  to	  profit	  financially	  from	  a	  divorce	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  their	  children’s	  wellbeing.	  
Simultaneously,	  the	  litigants	  are	  making	  their	  own	  judgements	  about	  the	  law	  that	  reach	  beyond	   their	  experience	  of	   the	  processes	  and	  encounters	  with	   its	   agents.	  Malika’s	  positive	   experience	   with	   the	   kindly	   family	   judge	   did	   not	   counteract	   her	   impression	   –	  shared	  by	  many	  -­‐	  that	  the	  legal	  system	  had	  failed	  to	  deliver	  justice.	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  legal	  ‘processes	   create	   the	   effect’	   of	   the	   law	  as	   ‘a	   distinct	   dimension	  of	   structure,	   framework,	  codification,	   expertise’	   (Mitchell	   2006:	  185)	   and	  also,	   as	  we	   shall	   see,	   of	  morality	   as	   the	  law	  seems	  to	  countenance	  particular	  moral	  criteria	  that	  are	  most	  readily	  reproduced	  via	  its	  procedures.	  
Consequently,	   in	   this	   peculiar,	   institutional	   context,	   ordinary	   ethics	   become	  extraordinary	  ethics	  as	   they	  are	  drawn	   into	   the	  operation	  of	   the	   law	  via	   this	  practice	  of	  reciprocal	  moral	  judgement.	  In	  the	  process,	  as	  we	  shall	  see	  again	  in	  the	  next	  chapter,	  both	  the	  morality	  of	  litigants	  and	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  state	  is	  at	  stake.	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CHAPTER	  4	  -­	  	  
RECONCILIATION	  AS	  THEATRE:	  TRACING	  THE	  SPIDER’S	  WEB	  
	   	  
Judge	  Karim	  (1)	  
It	  is	  9.30am	  on	  a	  cold	  December	  morning.	  I	  sit	  by	  the	  desk	  in	  the	  Family	  Judge’s	  office	  
to	  observe	  the	  reconciliation	  sessions.	  Judge	  Karim	  usually	  presides	  over	  commercial	  
affairs.	  Today	  he	  is	  in	  charge	  of	  the	  reconciliation	  sessions,	  a	  task	  he	  takes	  seriously,	  
both	  as	  a	   judge	  and	  a	  human	  being,	  seeing	   it	  as	  his	  moral	  duty	  to	  help	  prevent	  the	  
breakdown	   of	   a	   family.	   The	   reconciliation	   session	   provides	   a	   forum	  where	   couples	  
discuss	   their	   problems	   for	   perhaps	   the	   first	   time	   and	   may,	   in	   rare	   cases,	   be	  
susceptible	  to	  the	  advice	  of	  the	  judge.	  Many,	  however,	  appear	  to	  have	  no	  intention	  of	  
reconciling;	  by	  the	  time	  they	  reach	  the	  court	  and	  initiate	  divorce	  proceedings	  it	  is	  too	  
late.	  Instead,	  they	  battle	  to	  convince	  the	  judge	  of	  their	  own	  outstanding	  conduct	  as	  a	  
husband	  or	  wife	  and	  their	  spouse’s	  deficiencies	  in	  order	  to	  obtain	  a	  more	  favourable	  
divorce	  settlement.	  The	  ways	  in	  which	  they	  act	  out	  the	   ‘ideal’	  husband	  and	  wife	  are	  
revealing	  of	  the	  gender	  dynamics	  both	  in	  the	  legal	  code	  and	  in	  moral	  ideals	  related	  to	  
marriage.	  Behind	  these	  closed	  doors	  several	  tensions	  are	  at	  play:	  between	  the	  judge’s	  
role	  as	  judge	  with	  the	  power	  to	  take	  decisions	  which	  will	  impact	  the	  lives	  of	  litigants	  
and	  the	  game	  of	  cat	  and	  mouse	  which	  is	  played	  out	  as	  the	  judge	  attempts	  to	  discover	  
their	   ‘real	   problems’	   and	   save	   their	   marriages.	   As	   the	   judge	   navigates	   between	  
widely	   shared	  norms	   regarding	   ideal	  marital	   roles	  and	   the	   realities	   in	  which	   these	  




If	   the	   court	   is	   a	   factory	   for	   reassembling	   the	   moral,	   this	   takes	   place	   in	   its	   specific	  procedures	  such	  as	  the	  reconciliation	  sessions	  examined	  in	  this	  chapter.	  More	  often	  than	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not,	   these	   sessions	   are	   a	   legal	   formality	   that	   litigants	   have	   to	   endure	   before	   they	   are	  legally	  entitled	  to	  divorce,	  rather	  than	  having	  much	  to	  do	  with	  reconciliation	  as	  their	  name	  suggests.	  Reconciliation	  sessions	  often	  become	  a	  forum	  in	  which	  litigants	  strive	  to	  perform	  as	   the	   ideal	  husband	  or	  wife,	  whilst	  demonstrating	   their	   spouse’s	   failings	   in	   front	  of	   the	  judge.	  They	  become	  a	  site	  in	  which	  the	  morality,	  alongside	  the	  legality,	  of	  their	  actions	  is	  enacted,	  interpreted	  and	  contested.	  
The	   PSC	   requires	   at	   least	   one	   reconciliation	   session,152	   forcing	   litigants	   into	   this	  intimate	   encounter	   with	   the	   judge;	   divorce	   may	   only	   be	   pronounced	   once	   attempts	   at	  reconciliation	  have	  been	  carried	  out	  and	  shown	  to	  be	  fruitless	  (article	  32).	  Whilst	  litigants	  may	  be	   represented	  by	   their	   lawyers	   to	   carry	  out	   all	   the	  other	  procedures,	   each	   litigant	  must	  attend	  the	  reconciliation	  sessions	  in	  person.	  	  
As	   citizens	   enter	   the	   court	   and	   interact	   with	   its	   officials,	   legal	   procedures	  orchestrate	  encounters	  between	  actors	  who	  call	  upon	  categories	  that	  are	  at	  once	  legal	  and	  moral	   in	   order	   to	   negotiate	   their	   divorce	   case.	   The	   reconciliation	   sessions	   provide	   a	  privileged	  vantage	  point	  from	  which	  to	  observe	  what	  the	  categories	  of	  ‘marital	  duties’	  and	  ‘harm’	  mean	  in	  the	  practice	  of	  the	  law	  and	  the	  role	  of	  the	  judge,	  who	  is	  obliged	  to	  interpret	  the	  performances	  that	  litigants	  put	  on	  for	  his	  benefit.	  
The	   reconciliation	   sessions	   remained	   an	   enigma	   to	  me	   until	   the	   very	   end	   of	  my	  fieldwork.	  I	  had	  heard	  about	  them	  from	  litigants,	  judges,	  clerks	  and	  lawyers,	  but	  they	  had	  always	  been	  veiled	  in	  a	  cloak	  of	  secrecy.	  My	  burning	  curiosity	  to	  discover	  what	  happened	  behind	   the	   closed	   doors	  was	   satisfied	   thanks	   to	   the	   new	  male	   Family	   Judge.	   Although	   I	  only	  had	  the	  opportunity	  to	  observe	  one	  judge	  in	  action,	  all	  the	  judges	  I	   interviewed	  had	  carried	  out	   these	  sessions	  and	  I	  am	  also	  able	   to	  draw	  on	  their	  accounts	  of	  reconciliation	  sessions.	  Equally,	  I	  will	  draw	  on	  my	  interview	  material	  with	  litigants	  and	  lawyers.	  
If	  the	  law	  frames,	  but	  does	  not	  determine,	  how	  actors	  perform	  in	  this	  setting,153	  we	  need	  to	  consider	  the	  legal	  framework.	  Thereafter,	  we	  will	  enter	  the	  intimate	  space	  of	  the	  judge’s	   office	   and	   look	   at	   the	   reconciliation	   sessions	   from	   both	   sides,	   examining	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152	  In	  order	  to	  underline	  the	  role	  of	  these	  reconciliation	  sessions	  in	  protecting	  the	  family,	  a	  1981	  reform	  increased	  
their	  number	  to	  three,	  each	  spaced	  out	  by	  one	  month,	  for	  couples	  who	  have	  minor	  children.	  The	  spacing	  is	  
designed	  to	  factor	  in	  time	  for	  reflection	  in	  the	  hope	  that	  the	  couple	  will	  reconcile	  outside	  court.	  A	  further	  waiting	  
period	  of	  two	  months	  is	  required	  once	  the	  attempt	  at	  reconciliation	  is	  over,	  before	  the	  final	  judgement	  can	  be	  
pronounced.	  The	  apparent	  intention	  of	  the	  legislator	  to	  prevent	  divorce	  when	  children	  are	  involved	  echoes	  
attitudes	  met	  in	  the	  neighbourhood	  where	  divorce	  was	  more	  heavily	  frowned	  upon	  if	  a	  couple	  has	  children.	  
153	  Paraphrasing	  Lynch	  &	  Bogen	  1996.	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litigants’	   and	   the	   judge’s	   experiences	   and	   the	   role	   of	   the	   judge	   from	   both	   his	   own	  perspective	  and	  that	  of	  the	  litigants.	  	  
	  
RECONCILIATION	  SESSIONS:	  THE	  LEGAL	  FRAMEWORK	  
Intended	   to	   encourage	   the	   couple	   not	   to	   divorce,	   the	   reconciliation	   sessions	   play	   a	  significant	  role	  in	  the	  divorce	  procedure	  and	  are	  the	  responsibility	  of	  the	  Family	  Judge,	  a	  new	  position	  created	  in	  the	  1993	  reforms.	   In	  practice,	  however,	   they	  may	  be	  carried	  out	  by	  any	  judge	  in	  the	  court,	  as	  the	  workload	  is	  considered	  too	  great	  for	  one	  judge	  alone.	  	  
During	  reconciliation	  sessions,	  the	  judge	  takes	  crucial	  and	  immediately	  executable	  decisions	   on	   child	   custody,	   visiting	   rights,	   maintenance	   payments	   and	   living	  arrangements,	   producing	   a	   document	   that	   enters	   the	   divorce	   file	   and	   can	   be	   used	   as	  evidence.	   The	   judge	   (or	   a	   clerk)	   records	   what	   has	   been	   said	   (in	   the	   case	   observed	   the	  judge	  wrote	  himself)	  and	  the	  summary	  is	  signed	  by	  both	  litigants,	  giving	  it	  legal	  status	  as	  evidence.154	  
In	  addition,	  the	  reconciliation	  session	  provides	  an	  opportunity	  to	  confirm	  consent	  to	   divorce,	   hence	   giving	   up	   a	   chance	   of	   material	   or	   moral	   compensation.	   A	   malicious	  husband	   filing	   for	   a	   divorce	  without	   grounds	  would	   have	  much	   to	   gain	  were	   he	   able	   to	  bring	  along	  a	  woman	  posing	  as	  his	  wife,	  who	  consented	  to	  the	  divorce	  and	  to	  forego	  all	  her	  rights	   to	   financial	   compensation,	   the	   marital	   home	   and	   child	   custody.	   To	   avoid	   such	  subterfuge,	   and	  an	   indication	  of	   how	  much	   is	   at	   stake,	   the	   judge	   checks	   the	   litigants’	   ID	  cards	  and	  that	  an	  absent	  spouse	  has	  been	  duly	  notified	  by	  legal	  means.155	  
At	   stake	   in	   the	   reconciliation	   session	   is	   the	   divorce	   settlement,	   in	   particular	   the	  level	  of	  moral	  or	  material	  compensation	  payments.	  Litigants’	  arguments	  may	  be	  recorded	  by	  the	  judge	  and	  entered	  into	  the	  divorce	  file	  as	  documentary	  evidence,	  playing	  a	  role	  in	  the	  judgement.	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  relevant	  to	  explore	  the	  types	  of	  argument	  used	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  legal	  categories	  of	  ‘harm’	  and	  ‘marital	  duties’.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154	  Voorhoeve	  underlines	  the	  judge’s	  influence	  on	  the	  composition	  of	  evidence	  that	  enters	  the	  divorce	  file,	  notably	  
as	  the	  judge	  decides	  what	  is	  recorded	  in	  reconciliation	  sessions	  (2012:213).	  
155	  A	  penal	  sanction	  of	  one	  year	  was	  introduced	  in	  1993	  (PSC,	  Article	  32bis)	  to	  punish	  a	  spouse	  who	  uses	  fraudulent	  
means	  to	  prevent	  the	  other	  party	  from	  knowing	  about	  the	  reconciliation	  session.	  These	  precautions	  hint	  at	  what	  is	  
at	  stake	  in	  the	  reconciliation	  sessions.	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‘HARM’	  
The	   silence	   of	   the	   PSC	   as	   to	   a	   definition	   of	   ‘harm’	   and	   the	   related	   category	   of	   ‘marital	  duties’	  has	  the	  effect	  of	  opening	  up	  and	  foreclosing	  the	  judge’s	  space	  for	  interpretation	  in	  different	  ways.156	  
Although	  ‘harm’	  is	  a	  flexible	  legal	  category,	  dispositions	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  legal	  code	  constrain	  how	  it	  can	  be	  interpreted	  in	  practice.157	  Article	  23	  forms	  a	  bridge,	  making	  these	  dispositions	   relevant	   to	   the	   divorce	   case.	   For	   instance,	   a	   violent	   husband	   may	   be	  prosecuted	  under	  the	  penal	  code,158	  but	  his	  wife	  is	  entitled	  to	  divorce	  him	  because	  he	  has	  thereby	  been	  proven	  to	  fail	  in	  his	  ‘marital	  duties’	  according	  to	  article	  23	  that	  states	  that	  he	  must	   not	   cause	   her	   ‘harm’.	   Either	   spouse	  may	   file	   for	   divorce	   if	   their	   spouse	   has	   been	  violent	   to	   them	  or	   to	  a	  member	  of	   their	   family,	  as	  backed	  up	  by	   the	  penal	  code.	  Equally,	  both	   spouses	  may	  divorce	   for	   adultery,	   another	   form	  of	   ‘harm’	   that	   finds	  backing	   in	   the	  penal	  code.159	  
Two	  key	  forms	  of	  ‘harm’	  are,	  however,	  gender	  specific.	  A	  wife	  is	  allowed	  to	  divorce	  her	   husband	   if	   he	   fails	   to	   provide	   for	   her.	   The	   husband’s	   duty	   to	   provide	  maintenance	  (nafaqa)	   is	   backed	   up	   both	   in	   article	   23	   (PSC)	   that	   maintains	   him	   as	   the	   head	   of	   the	  household	  and	  in	  chapter	  4	  of	  the	  PSC	  (articles	  37-­‐53bis)	  dedicated	  to	  this	  duty.	  
The	  female	  counterpart	  of	  the	  male	  duty	  to	  pay	  maintenance	  is	  now	  considered	  to	  be	  a	  wife’s	  ‘cohabitation’	  with	  her	  husband,160	  the	  pre-­‐condition	  for	  her	  fulfilling	  the	  duties	  expected	  of	  a	  wife	  in	  social	  norms,	  such	  as	  cooking,	  cleaning	  and	  caring	  for	  the	  children.	  A	  husband	   may	   file	   for	   divorce	   due	   to	   the	   ‘harm’	   caused	   to	   him	   by	   his	   wife’s	   failure	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156	  Jurisprudence	  states	  that	  the	  interpretation	  of	  ‘harm’	  is	  left	  to	  the	  judge’s	  discretion	  (Voorhoeve	  2012:224).	  
157	  Notably,	  these	  dispositions	  entail	  their	  own	  procedures	  and	  allow	  litigants	  to	  prosecute	  their	  spouses	  and	  
produce	  legally	  permissible	  evidence	  of	  the	  harm	  done	  in	  the	  form	  of	  final	  judgements.	  The	  importance	  of	  this	  
evidence	  will	  be	  explored	  in	  detail	  in	  chapter	  5.	  
158	  The	  penal	  code	  (article	  218)	  was	  amended	  to	  instate	  a	  stronger	  sentence	  in	  cases	  of	  violence	  perpetrated	  by	  the	  
victim’s	  spouse.	  
159	  Both	  adultery	  and	  domestic	  violence	  law	  share	  the	  feature	  that	  the	  perpetrator’s	  spouse	  may	  drop	  the	  charges	  
at	  any	  time	  and	  the	  state	  will	  not	  continue	  the	  prosecution,	  implying	  a	  desire	  to	  encourage	  the	  couple	  to	  reconcile	  
and	  the	  ‘continuity	  of	  the	  family’,	  as	  one	  lawyer	  put	  it	  to	  me.	  	  The	  same	  lawyer	  explained	  that	  these	  are	  seen	  as	  
crimes	  of	  the	  ‘couple’	  rather	  than	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  ‘public	  order’,	  in	  which	  the	  state	  and	  its	  police	  must	  intervene	  
regardless	  of	  the	  desires	  of	  the	  immediate	  victim,	  as	  would	  be	  the	  case	  in	  the	  event	  of	  a	  burglary.	  
160	  A	  reform	  of	  the	  PSC	  in	  1993	  removed	  the	  wife’s	  duty	  to	  be	  obedient	  to	  her	  husband.	  The	  text	  of	  article	  23	  
replaced	  the	  wife’s	  obedience	  with	  the	  reciprocal	  duty	  of	  both	  spouses	  to	  ‘cohabit	  with	  kindness.’	  cf	  the	  
introduction.	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cohabit.	  Her	  abandoning	  the	  marital	  home	  without	  justification161	  is	  referred	  to	  as	  ‘nushuz’	  and	   is	   a	  purely	   feminine	   concept.	  There	   is	  no	   separate	   legal	  disposition	   to	   reinforce	   the	  wife’s	  duty	   to	  cohabit.	  Rather,	   ‘nushuz’	   is	   lent	   its	   legal	  backing	  by	   jurisprudence	  that	  has	  established	  this	  standardized	  interpretation	  of	  article	  23.162	  
Where	  clarifying	  legal	  dispositions	  and	  frequently	  used	  jurisprudence	  are	  absent,	  the	  definition	  of	  ‘harm’	  is	  left	  to	  the	  failure	  to	  fulfil	  ‘marital	  duties	  according	  to	  custom	  and	  habit’	   (article	  23).	   In	  practice	  this	  means	  that	   it	   is	   left	   to	  the	   judge	  and	  his	  discretion.	   163	  	  Consequently,	  if	  the	  law	  is	  a	  ‘spider’s	  web’,	  as	  Latour	  has	  suggested	  (2010:	  277),	  much	  can	  be	   learned	  about	   its	  nature	  by	   tracing	   the	  activities	  of	   ‘spiders’,	   the	   judges	  who	   interact	  with	  litigants	  and	  ultimately	  interpret	  the	  law.	  
Several	   law	  professionals	   suggested	   that	   the	   legislator	  had	   intentionally	  phrased	  the	  law	  to	  allow	  for	  flexibility	  and	  different	  interpretations.	  The	  cantonal	  judge	  supported	  this	   interpretation	   saying,	   ‘the	   customs	   and	   habits	   are	   not	   the	   same	   now	   as	   they	   were	  before.	  They	  are	  rules	  which	  progress	  and	  which	  are	  relative.’	  Seen	   in	   this	   light,	   the	   law	  expects	   judges	   to	   be	   flexible	   and	   to	   play	   an	   active	   role	   in	   interpreting	   the	   constantly	  changing	   institution	   of	   marriage,	   drawing	   on	   their	   knowledge	   of	   marriage	   outside	   the	  court	  as	  much	  as	  on	  their	  knowledge	  of	  the	  law.	  
It	  is	  not	  only	  litigants	  who	  have	  something	  at	  stake	  in	  the	  reconciliation	  sessions.	  In	  these	  sessions,	  litigants	  come	  into	  direct	  contact	  with	  the	  state	  embodied	  in	  the	  official	  persona	  of	  the	  judge.	  Judge	  Bechir,	  whilst	  explaining	  the	  philosophy	  of	  the	  PSC,	  pointed	  to	  the	   complex	   relationship	   between	   religion,	   law	   and	   morality.	   The	   state	   as	   legislator	  appears	  as	  the	  guardian	  of	  the	  ‘correct’	  interpretation	  of	  Islam.	  He	  told	  me:	  	  
‘The	  philosophy	  of	  the	  PSC	  was	  to	  distance	  us	  from	  false	  ideas	  of	  the	  religion.	  As	  Islam	  is	  a	  modern	   religion;	   as	   (there	   are)	   many	   false	   ideas	   about	   the	   religion.	   Islam	   was	   the	   ﬁrst	  religion	  to	  give	  rights	  to	  women	  (as	  in	  the	  sourat	  of	  women	  in	  the	  Koran).	  When	  you	  read	  it	  (this	   sourat),	   you	   feel	   as	   if	   it	   is	   for	   women	   today.	   But	   many	   people	   made	   mistakes	   in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161	  A	  decision	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Cassation	  (no.	  20425,	  7/12/88)	  shows	  that	  the	  court	  must	  examine	  the	  reasons,	  which	  
led	  the	  wife	  to	  leave	  the	  marital	  home.	  In	  the	  case	  described,	  the	  couple	  had	  been	  married	  for	  five	  years	  and	  had	  
one	  child.	  The	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  had	  granted	  the	  husband	  a	  divorce	  for	  harm	  based	  on	  his	  wife	  abandoning	  the	  
marital	  home.	  	  In	  fact,	  the	  husband	  had	  moved	  to	  a	  remote	  place,	  leaving	  the	  city	  where	  thefy	  married	  and	  their	  
child	  had	  grown	  up	  and	  where	  his	  wife	  had	  a	  job.	  The	  Court	  of	  Cassation	  ruled	  that	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  should	  have	  
looked	  beyond	  the	  simple	  fact	  of	  the	  wife’s	  absence	  from	  the	  marital	  home	  and	  should	  have	  taken	  these	  
circumstances	  and	  the	  husband’s	  ill	  will	  into	  account	  when	  evaluating	  the	  ‘harm’.	  
162	  A	  decision	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Cassation	  (no.	  2422,	  4/2/98)	  ruled	  that,	  if	  a	  wife	  remains	  away	  from	  home	  and	  refuses	  
to	  return,	  she	  is	  said	  to	  be	  failing	  to	  respect	  article	  23,	  which	  says	  that	  she	  must	  not	  cause	  harm	  to	  her	  spouse.	  
163	  See	  Voorhoeve	  (2012)	  for	  a	  detailed	  discussion	  of	  factors	  curtailing	  and	  opening	  up	  these	  interpretative	  spaces.	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practicing	  and	  applying	  the	  religion	  ...	  	  Each	  law	  has	  a	  philosophy.	  The	  philosophy	  of	  the	  PSC	  is	   this	   –	   to	   distance	   us	   from	   the	   customs	   of	   the	   older	   generations,	  who	   understood	   Islam	  wrongly.’	  
The	   judge,	   as	   the	   state	   official	   on	   the	   front	   line	   enacting	   this	   law	   in	   practice,	  becomes	   the	  public	   face	  of	   this	  version	  of	   ‘modern’	   Islam	  upon	  which	   the	   state	   seeks	   to	  build	  its	  legitimacy.	  In	  the	  reconciliation	  sessions,	  we	  might	  find	  clues	  as	  to	  the	  ideal	  moral	  criteria	   that	   define	   marital	   duties,	   as	   they	   are	   being	   challenged	   and	   redefined	   and	   in	  which,	  as	  we	  shall	  see,	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  state	  is	  simultaneously	  at	  stake.	  	  
	  
RECONCILIATION	  OBSERVED:	  BEHIND	  THE	  SCENE	  
	  
Judge	  Karim	  (2)	  
Sitting	  next	   to	   the	  desk	   in	   the	  Family	   Judge’s	  office,	   I	   can	   see	   the	   litigants	  begin	   to	  
gather	  outside.	  One	  of	  the	  clerks	  has	  told	  me	  with	  sympathy	  for	  the	  poor	  judge	  that	  
we	  are	  due	  to	  see	  60	  cases	  this	  morning;	  only	  25	  of	  these	  cases	  appear.	  The	  couples	  
are	   all	   summoned	   at	   the	   same	   time,	  meaning	   that	  many	   have	   to	  wait	   for	   up	   to	   5	  
hours.	   This	   long	   wait	   cannot	   help	   those	   who	   arrive	   daunted	   and	   nervous	   at	   the	  
prospect	   of	   the	   reconciliation	   session.	   Some	   come	  with	   relatives	   for	  moral	   support,	  
even	  though	  they	  must	  enter	  the	  judge’s	  office	  alone.	  	  
Reconciliation	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  something	  of	  a	  social	  leveller,	  as	  it	  is	  the	  one	  time	  that	  
all	  litigants	  must	  attend	  the	  court	  in	  person.	  A	  glimpse	  into	  the	  waiting	  room	  reveals	  
the	   mix	   of	   people	   present,	   who	   range	   from	   their	   20s	   to	   their	   70s,	   although	   the	  
majority	  appear	  to	  be	  in	  their	  30s	  and	  40s.	  An	  old	  woman	  walks	  along	  the	  corridor	  in	  
her	  slippers,	  wrapped	  in	  a	  sifsaree	  holding	  the	  ends	  between	  her	  teeth;	  other	  younger	  
litigants	  of	  both	  sexes	  wear	  jeans	  and	  the	  big,	  flashy	  sunglasses,	  which	  are	  in	  fashion	  
at	  the	  moment.	  Although	  it	  is	  sunny	  in	  December,	  some	  are	  clearly	  trying	  to	  conceal	  
their	  tear-­stained	  eyes.	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In	  some	  cases,	  only	  one	  litigant	  is	  present.	  Therefore,	  over	  the	  three	  days	  on	  which	  I	  was	  allowed	   to	   attend,	   I	   observed	   44	   cases	  where	   both	   litigants	   were	   present,	   8	   where	   the	  husband	  was	  alone	  and	  9	  where	  the	  wife	  came	  alone.	  In	  addition,	  the	  type	  of	  divorce	  was	  not	   always	   evoked	  and	  was	   impossible	   to	  deduce	  by	   listening	   to	   the	   litigants	  who	  were	  hurling	  accusations	  in	  every	  direction;	  as	  a	  result,	  I	  have	  not	  been	  able	  to	  record	  the	  type	  of	  divorce	  for	  each	  case.	  
The	  basic	  data	  I	  was	  able	  to	  note	  down	  enables	  me	  to	  paint	  a	  brief	  portrait	  of	  the	  kind	  of	  people	  who	  came	  to	  the	  court	  to	  divorce.164	  The	  vast	  majority	  of	  couples	  had	  one	  or	  more	  minor	  children.165	  For	  most,	   this	  was	   their	   first	  experience	  of	  divorce.	  Only	   four	  of	  the	   27	   men	   for	   whom	   I	   have	   this	   data	   had	   previously	   divorced,	   as	   had	   four	   out	   of	   30	  women.	   In	   two	   cases,	   the	   couples	   had	   previously	   divorced	   each	   other,	   subsequently	  remarried	  and	  were	  coming	  to	  divorce	  for	  a	  second	  time.166	  Only	  one	  man	  was	  previously	  widowed.	  
Most	  couples	  (21	  out	  of	  33	  couples)	  had	  only	  been	  married	  for	  5	  years	  or	  less,	  with	  two	  having	  been	  married	  for	  only	  5	  months.	  In	  contrast,	  11	  couples	  had	  been	  married	  over	  15	   years.	   The	   brief	   data	   I	   have	   on	   education	   levels	   and	   income	   provides	   some	   socio-­‐economic	  context,	  showing	  a	  broad	  spread;	  around	  half	  of	  the	  litigants	  had	  only	  primary	  level	  education,	  whilst	  others	  were	  educated	  to	  Baccalaureat	  level	  and	  beyond	  (8	  out	  of	  21	  women	  and	  3	  out	  of	  24	  men	  had	  been	  to	  university).	  
The	  professional	  situation	  of	  the	  litigants	  also	  varied	  widely.	  Out	  of	  34	  women	  for	  whom	  I	  had	  data,	  18	  were	  not	  working.	  Of	  these,	  5	  described	  themselves	  as	  ‘unemployed’	  or	  ‘redundant’,	  7	  as	  ‘not	  working’	  and	  6	  as	  ‘at	  home’	  167.	  Those	  women	  who	  did	  work	  had	  a	  range	  of	  jobs.	  At	  the	  lower	  paid	  end	  of	  the	  scale	  were	  those	  who	  did	  sewing	  or	  worked	  in	  factories;	   slightly	   higher	   paid	   would	   be	   those	   who	   worked	   in	   schools,	   teaching,	   as	  secretaries	  or	  in	  companies.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164	  Litigants	  attending	  their	  first	  session	  were	  asked	  their	  age	  and	  profile.	  However,	  those	  attending	  subsequent	  
sessions	  were	  no	  longer	  asked	  these	  questions.	  Consequently,	  I	  was	  forced	  to	  make	  my	  own	  estimates	  or	  
deductions	  in	  absence	  of	  precise	  data.	  
165	  Of	  the	  40	  cases	  for	  which	  I	  have	  this	  data,	  7	  couples	  had	  no	  children.	  21	  couples	  had	  only	  one	  child,	  and	  the	  
majority	  of	  these	  were	  of	  a	  young	  age,	  under	  10	  years	  old.	  10	  couples	  had	  two	  or	  more	  children.	  In	  two	  cases	  the	  
couple	  lived	  with	  the	  husband’s	  children	  from	  his	  first	  marriage:	  tellingly	  in	  both	  cases	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  wife	  and	  
these	  children	  to	  get	  on	  appeared	  to	  be	  a	  key	  reason	  for	  the	  divorce.	  
166	  In	  Tunisian	  law	  (following	  the	  Islamic	  principle	  of	  triple	  talaq)	  a	  couple	  may	  divorce	  and	  remarry	  up	  to	  three	  
times.	  In	  order	  to	  marry	  a	  fourth	  time,	  the	  wife	  must	  first	  be	  married	  to	  someone	  else	  and	  that	  marriage	  
terminated.	  	  
167	  See	  chapter	  2.	  This	  phrase	  referred	  to	  housewives;	  a	  man	  would	  never	  be	  ‘at	  home’.	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Of	  the	  32	  men	  for	  whom	  I	  had	  data,	  four	  were	  unemployed	  or	  redundant.	  The	  rest	  worked	   in	  a	  variety	  of	  professions	  as	   taxi	  drivers,	   civil	   servants,	   in	  commerce	  or	  private	  companies.	  Another	  was	  a	  teacher,	  one	  was	  a	  nurse	  and	  one	  man	  ran	  his	  own	  sports	  club.	  The	  highest	  paid	  worked	  as	  a	  pilot,	  an	  engineer	  or	  as	  a	  waiter	  in	  France.	  	  
Judge	  Karim,	  a	  man	  in	  his	  mid-­‐thirties	  smartly	  dressed	  in	  a	  black	  suit	  and	  tie,	  but	  without	  the	  ceremonial	  long,	  black	  robes	  worn	  for	  public	  hearings,	  is	  himself	  married	  with	  a	   baby	   son.	   He,	   like	   all	   of	   the	   heads	   of	   the	   chamber,	   was	   called	   upon	   to	   carry	   out	  reconciliation	   sessions	   to	   share	   this	   burden	   with	   the	   Family	   Judge.	   Senior	   judges	   are	  usually	   older	   and	   more	   experienced,	   and	   are	   more	   likely	   to	   be	   married	   and	   to	   have	  children,	  criteria	  that	  Family	  Judge	  Samia	  felt	  made	  these	  judges	  more	  able	  to	  sympathise	  with	   litigants.	  Her	   opinion	   underlines	   how	   reconciliation	   judges	   require	   knowledge	   and	  experience	  that	  reach	  beyond	  the	  law	  into	  their	  personal	  lives	  in	  order	  to	  play	  the	  role	  that	  the	  law	  demands	  of	  them.	  
Judge	  Karim	  echoed	  other	   judges	  I	  spoke	  to	   in	  his	  personal	  commitment	  to	  these	  sessions,	  working	   through	   his	   lunchtime	   into	   the	   afternoon	   to	   spend	   the	   time	   that	  was	  needed	  with	   each	   couple.	   The	   family	   and	   cantonal	   judges	   both	   told	  me	   that	   they	  would	  sometimes	  spend	  several	  hours	  trying	  to	  work	  out	  the	  problems	  of	  one	  couple,	  especially	  if	  the	  couple	  had	  children	  and	  there	  was	  a	  family	  to	  be	  saved.	  	  
Judge	   Karim	   insisted	   that	   the	   litigants	   sat	   facing	   each	   other	   on	   the	   two	   leather	  armchairs	  placed	  symmetrically	  at	  either	   side	  of	  his	   large	  desk.	  This	  was	   the	   first	  of	   the	  strategies	  that	  he	  used	  as	  he	  tackled	  the	  difficult	  task	  of	  ascertaining	  whether	  the	  couple	  could	  be	  reconciled.	  
Any	   illusion	   of	   couples	   entering	   these	   reconciliation	   sessions	   with	   the	   hope	   of	  reconciling	  was	  rapidly	  shattered	  when	  I	  spoke	  with	  litigants	  and	  their	  lawyers.	  Nor	  did	  I	  expect	   the	   litigants	   to	  evoke	   the	   ‘real	   reasons’	   for	   the	  divorce.	  The	  Family	   Judge	  pointed	  out	  that	  they	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  talk	  to	  me	  about	  the	  real	  problems	  than	  to	  him.	  
Most	  people	  entered	  the	  room	  with	  the	  intention	  of	  exploiting	  the	  legal	  format	  and	  its	   elasticity	   in	   order	   to	  pursue	   their	   own	   interest	   in	   their	   divorce	   case.	   Imed,	   a	   lawyer,	  explained,	  	  ‘people	  do	  not	  speak	  freely,	  they	  express	  themselves	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  a	  legal	  result.’	  As	  one	  female	  litigant	  put	  it,	  defending	  herself	  against	  her	  husband’s	  accusations	  of	  
	   149	  
immoral	  behaviour	  during	  one	  of	  the	  sessions,	  ‘any	  man	  who	  wants	  a	  divorce	  will	  say	  that	  there	  is	  something	  wrong	  with	  his	  wife!’	  	  
Many	   litigants	   seemed	   to	   have	   been	   either	   coached	   by	   their	   lawyers	   or	   given	  advice	  by	  friends	  or	  relatives	  about	  how	  they	  should	  behave	  in	  front	  of	  the	  judge.	  Indeed,	  the	  wife	  of	  one	  litigant	  refused	  to	  answer	  any	  of	  the	  judge’s	  questions	  directly	  for	  fear	  of	  saying	  something	  that	  would	  compromise	  her	  position	  and	  deferred	  any	  answers	  until	  the	  next	  session	  so	  that	  she	  could	  seek	  advice.	  	  
One	  of	  the	  most	  common	  pieces	  of	  advice,	  especially	  relevant	  in	  cases	  for	  divorce	  without	  grounds,	  was	  for	  the	  other	  party	  never	  to	  admit	  that	  they	  agreed	  to	  the	  divorce.	  Giving	   consent	   would	   lose	   them	   any	   entitlement	   to	   compensation.	   This	   led	   to	   the	  seemingly	   paradoxical	   situations	   often	   observed,	   where	   a	   wife,	   whose	   husband	   was	  divorcing	   her	  without	   grounds,	   presented	   an	   atrocious	   image	   of	   her	   neglectful,	   abusive	  husband,	  whilst	  insisting	  she	  wanted	  to	  remain	  in	  the	  marriage.	  
The	   notion	   that	   men	   and	   women	   are	   using	   strategies	   and	   acting	   out	   a	   role	  supposes	  an	  implicit	  understanding	  of	  which	  arguments	  are	  going	  to	  be	  compelling	  to	  the	  judge.	   Returning	   to	   the	   judge’s	   office,	   I	   will	   explore	   some	   of	   the	  main	   arguments	   used,	  showing	   how	   these	   are	   inherently	   gendered.168	  Which	  moral	   criteria	   come	   into	   play	   as	  litigants	   strive	   to	   portray	   themselves	   as	   ideal	   husbands	   and	  wives	  whilst	   showing	   their	  spouse’s	  deficiencies?	  Which	  of	  these	  ethical	  criteria	  does	  the	  judge	  appear	  to	  validate	  in	  his	  response	  to	  the	  litigants?	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
168	  Ethnographies	  of	  divorce	  in	  the	  Muslim	  world	  (Hill	  1979;	  Wuerth	  1998)	  found	  that	  the	  grounds	  for	  divorce	  vary	  
according	  to	  the	  social	  class	  of	  the	  litigants.	  It	  would	  be	  desirable	  to	  reproduce	  such	  an	  argument	  here,	  but	  the	  
discussion	  is	  necessarily	  limited	  by	  the	  available	  data	  and	  as	  I	  share	  the	  judge’s	  frustrations	  in	  locating	  the	  litigants	  
socially.	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Walid	  and	  Safia.	  	  
Dispute	  over	  violence.	  	  
Husband	  wants	  divorce	  for	  harm	  and,	  if	  not,	  without	  grounds.	  
Walid	  and	  Safia	  are	  a	  young	  couple	  in	  their	  late	  20s.	  Safia	  enters	  the	  room	  in	  tears.	  
The	   atmosphere	   is	   charged	   with	   bitterness.	   Walid	   seems	   almost	   unnaturally	   calm	  
and	   collected	   throughout,	  whilst	   she	   is	   nervous	   and	   distressed.	   The	   judge	   asks	   her	  
gently	  why	   she	   is	   crying.	  Does	   she	  not	  want	   to	  divorce?	   She	   replies	   in	   the	  negative	  
through	  her	  tears.	  
Walid,	  who	  studied	  to	  PhD	  level	  and	  earns	  a	  good	  living	  as	  a	  pilot,	  begins	  to	  talk,	  but	  
is	  silenced	  by	  his	  wife:	  ‘Don’t	  lie!	  Enough!	  For	  months,	  I	  have	  been	  living	  in	  our	  house	  
(her	   parent’s	   house),	   without	   my	   belongings.’	   She	   has	   a	   young	   baby.	   She	   and	   her	  
child	  share	  a	  bed	  with	  her	  divorced	  mother.	  All	  she	  wants,	  she	  says,	  is	  ‘stability.’	  
The	   judge,	   being	   authoritative,	   speaks:	   ‘In	   this	   world,	   a	   woman	   is	   always	   weaker	  
than	  a	  man.	  He	  who	  fears	  God…	  If	  you	  want	  to,	  go	  back	  to	  her.	  If	  not,	  divorce	  her	  and	  
give	  her	  her	  rights.’169	  
Walid	  tries	  to	  speak,	  but	  is	  again	  interrupted.	  Safia	  mentions	  their	  baby,	  who	  is	  just	  
three	  months	  old.	  She	  is	  breast-­feeding.	  She	  adds,	  ‘for	  6	  months	  he	  has	  not	  given	  me	  
my	  shariq	  rights.	  He	  beats	  me.	  I	  have	  been	  to	  hospital	  twice.	  He	  takes	  my	  salary.	  His	  
whole	  family	  judges	  me…’	  (Walid	  tries	  to	  defend	  himself).	  	  
Walid	  produces	  a	  letter	  he	  has	  written	  (by	  hand).	  He	  wants	  to	  reduce	  the	  nafaqa	  he	  
pays	   her	   and	   his	   son	   to	   300	   dinars	   due	   to	   his	   ‘conditions.’	   Safia	   asks	   for	   a	   rent	  
allowance	  and	  presents	  a	  typed	  letter	  to	  the	  judge.	  
The	  judge	  makes	  an	  unrelated	  phone	  call.	  Once	  he	  has	  finished,	  he	  asks	  whether	  there	  
is	   any	   chance	   of	   reconciliation.	   Safia	   explains	   that	   some	   of	   their	   friends	   had	  
intervened.	  His	  father	  and	  aunt	  also	  tried	  to	  reconcile	  them	  at	  her	  request.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
169	  This	  is	  a	  sentiment	  present	  in	  the	  religion,	  which	  many	  people	  quoted	  to	  me.	  Either	  they	  should	  remain	  married	  
in	  peace	  or,	  if	  they	  cannot,	  they	  should	  divorce	  in	  peace.	  They	  should	  divorce	  by	  consent	  just	  as	  they	  married	  by	  
consent.	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Walid	  mentions	  for	  the	  first	  time	  that	  he	  went	  to	  court	  to	  pursue	  a	  case	  against	  his	  
wife.	  He	  wants	  to	  divorce	  for	  the	  harm	  done	  to	  him	  by	  his	  wife	  and,	  if	  not,	  he	  will	  file	  
for	  divorce	  without	  grounds.	  He	  had	  to	  take	  two	  weeks	  off	  work	  due	  to	  the	  scars	  on	  
his	  face,	  which	  he	  says	  are	  due	  to	  his	  wife.	  
Safia	  interrupts:	  ‘I	  went	  to	  hospital	  twice.	  I	  swear	  to	  God!’	  	  
Walid	  says	  that	  he	  would	  stop	  the	  divorce,	  but	  he	  knows	  that	  she	  will	  continue	  being	  
violent.	   He	   dropped	   the	   court	   case	   against	   her.	   (Presumably	   because	   he	   lacked	  
evidence).	  
The	   judge,	   who	   seems	   quite	   angry,	   interrogates	   the	   husband:	   ‘what	   proof	   do	   you	  
have?	  You	  have	  no	  proof.	  Why	  do	  you	  think	  like	  this?’	  
He	  does	  not	  reply.	  Safia	  says	  that	  his	  aunt	  had	  said	  that	  his	  father	  told	  him	  to	  divorce	  
and	  to	  throw	  her	  out	  of	  home;	  he	  has	  been	  against	  the	  marriage	  from	  the	  start	  as	  she	  
is	  several	  years	  older	  than	  him.170	  
The	  judge	  gives	  them	  a	  date	  for	  the	  public	  hearing.	  
Walid	   asks	   him:	   ‘Tell	  me,	   your	   honour,	   how	   can	   you	   live	  with	   someone	  who	   beats	  
you?’	  
He	  responds:	   ‘Can	  I	  give	  you	  some	  advice?	  Either	  succeed	  in	  marriage	  or	  succeed	  in	  
divorce.’	  
	  
If	  Safia	  and	  Walid	  are	  in	  court,	   it	   is	  because	  attempts	  to	  reconcile	  them	  by	  family	  and	   friends	  have	   failed.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  his	   father	  would	  appear	   to	  be	  exacerbating	  any	  problems	   between	   them.	   The	   cantonal	   judge	   spoke	   at	   length	   of	   his	   fear	   that	   ‘the	  reconciliation	  phase	  is	  handicapped	  as	  the	  couple	  come	  to	  the	  court	  as	  a	  last	  resort,	  when	  it	   is	   too	   late.	   People	   are	   afraid	  of	   the	   court.	   It	  would	  be	  better	   to	   attempt	   reconciliation	  outside	  the	  court,	  (for	  instance)	  with	  a	  representative	  of	  the	  family	  and	  then	  only	  come	  to	  court	  when	   the	   breakdown	   became	   definitive.	   Reconciliation	  would	   be	   better	   if	   it	  were	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170	  It	  is	  a	  social	  taboo	  for	  a	  wife	  to	  be	  older	  than	  her	  husband.	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‘extra-­‐juridical,	   in	   the	   family.’	   He	   concludes	   ‘the	   status	   of	   judge	   and	   the	   function	   of	  reconciliation	   are	   incompatible.’	   For	   similar	   reasons,	   the	   cantonal	   judge	   felt	   very	  uncomfortable	   judging	   those	   who	   did	   share	   their	   intimate	   feelings	   with	   him.	   A	   lawyer,	  Manel,	  however,	  felt	  that	  reconciliation	  might	  be	  more	  likely	  using	  a	  mediator	  within	  the	  family.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	   problems	   between	   one	   couple	   she	   knew	  were	   caused	   by	  interference	   from	   the	   husband’s	   family,	  with	  whom	   the	   couple	   lived.	   They	  were	   able	   to	  resolve	  their	  differences	  in	  the	  neutral	  setting	  of	  the	  court.	  	  
The	  essential	  factor,	  which	  determines	  the	  utility	  of	  these	  sessions,	  seems	  to	  be	  the	  person	  of	  the	  judge.	  The	  judges	  I	  spoke	  to	  felt	  morally	  implicated	  when	  taking	  on	  this	  role	  in	  the	  divorce	  process.	  The	  cantonal	  judge	  felt	  guilty,	  especially	  if	  the	  couple	  have	  children,	  as,	  in	  his	  words,	  ‘it	  is	  not	  easy	  to	  rule	  on	  the	  breakdown	  of	  a	  family.’	  
He	  suggested	  to	  me	  that	  a	  judge	  should	  be	  able	  to	  treat	  the	  cases	  with	  ‘sang	  froid’	  (indifference),	   although,	   he	   believed	   it	   better	   for	   a	   woman	   to	   take	   these	   reconciliation	  sessions	  and	  divorce	  cases,	  as	  she	  is	  more	  sensitive	  and	  people	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  open	  up	  to	   her:	   ‘the	   couple	   will	   be	   shy	   and	   will	   be	   more	   likely	   to	   talk	   to	   a	   woman	   about	   their	  intimate	  life.’	  The	  cantonal	  judge	  is	  an	  extremely	  sensitive	  person,	  who	  easily	  gets	  caught	  up	  in	  the	  tragic	  stories	  he	  hears	  regularly	  in	  the	  court,	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  he	  would	  be	  kept	  awake	  at	  night	  unable	  to	  stop	  thinking	  about	  people	  he	  knows	  are	  suffering.	  Judges	  do	  not	  receive	   any	   specific	   training	   to	   carry	   out	   reconciliation	   sessions	   and	   the	   cantonal	   judge	  feared	   that	   they	   have	   an	   impact	   on	   the	   personal	   life	   of	   the	   judge.	   He	   suggests	   that	   the	  female	  Family	   Judge	  has	   to	   ‘sacrifice	  her	  health	  and	  her	   family	   life’	   in	  order	   to	  carry	  out	  her	   job.	  Finally,	  he	  asked	  for	  special	  permission	  to	  stop	  taking	  reconciliation	  sessions,	  as	  he	  started	  to	  hate	  marriage	  and	  had	  begun	  ruling	  out	  the	  possibility	  for	  himself.	   	  (He	  has	  since	  married	  and	  had	  children).	  The	  competence	  of	  the	  reconciliation	  judge	  is	  related	  to	  their	   personal	   and	   social	   knowledge,	   their	   ability	   to	   read	   situations	   and	   litigants	   and	  empahize	  with	  them,	  rather	  than	  their	  legal	  knowledge.	  
When	  Judge	  Karim	  started	  making	  an	  apparently	  personal	  phone	  call	  during	  Safia	  and	  Walid’s	   reconciliation	  session,	   I	  wrongly	   thought	  he	  was	  being	   indifferent	  and	  rude.	  After	   they	   left,	  he	   looked	  at	  me	  and	  asked	   if	   I	  had	  noticed	  what	  he	  had	  been	  doing.	  The	  phone	   call	  was	  part	  of	  his	   strategy	   to	   encourage	   the	   litigants	   to	   forget	  his	  presence	  and	  talk	  more	   openly,	   perhaps	   even	  mentioning	   the	   ‘real’	   reasons	   for	   their	   dispute.	   He	  was	  only	   too	   aware	   of	   the	   theatrics	   that	   litigants	   often	   engaged	   in	   when	   trying	   to	   win	   his	  sympathy:	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‘Each	  one	  tries	  to	  dominate	  the	  other,	  so	  that	  the	  judge	  gives	  him	  (or	  her)	  his	  rights.	  They	  try	  to	  show	  the	  other’s	  bad	  side	  in	  front	  of	  the	  judge.	  He	  says	  that	  she	  drinks,	  smokes,	  has	  
ʻa	  boyfriendʼ,	  does	  not	  cater	  for	  his	  needs	  or	  those	  of	  the	  children;	  she	  wants	  to	  live	  beyond	  my	  salary,	  she	  wants	  to	  have	  expensive	  clothes,	  she	  is	  against	  my	  parents/brothers/sisters.	  She	  says,	  he	  does	  not	  give	  me	  money,	  we	  are	  hungry,	  he	  spends	  money	  on	  his	  friends	  and	  wine.	  It	  is	  a	  ‘war	  without	  weapons.’	  
After	   these	   initial	   formalities,	   the	   judge	   opened	   the	   conversation	   by	   asking	   the	  petitioner	  why	  he	  or	  she	  wanted	  to	  divorce.	  Alternatively,	  if	  the	  couple	  were	  returning	  for	  a	   second	   or	   third	   session,	   he	  would	   simply	   ask,	   ‘have	   you	   reconciled?’	   This	  was	   almost	  unanimously	  met	  with	  a	  response	  of	  ‘no’;	  in	  the	  total	  of	  61	  cases	  I	  observed,	  only	  one	  had	  come	   to	   tell	   the	   judge	   he	   and	   his	  wife	   had	   reconciled.	   From	   this	  moment	   on,	   the	   judge	  switched	  states,	  trying	  to	  minimise	  his	  presence,	  in	  the	  hope	  that	  the	  litigants	  would	  talk	  more	  freely.	  On	  other	  occasions	  he	  also	  consulted	  his	  mobile	  phone,	  sending	  text	  messages	  or	  answering	  calls.	  Otherwise	  he	  sat	  silently,	  arms	  folded,	  listening.	  This	  is	  a	  strategy	  and	  part	  of	  the	  difficult	  balancing	  act	  he	  has	  to	  perform	  of	  juggling	  his	  role	  as	  judge	  with	  that	  of	  arbiter.	  He	  told	  me:	  
‘Why	   do	   I	   let	   them	   talk?	   As	   when	   they	   start	   arguing,	   they	   will	   lose	   control	   and	   talk	  impulsively	  about	  the	  real	  reason.	  At	  that	  time	  I	  am	  not	  a	  judge.	  At	  first	  I	  listen	  and	  [they]	  will	  say	  what	  they	  want	  to	  tell	  me,	  which	  I	  write	  down.	  Then	  they	  argue	  and	  I	  notice	  the	  real	   reasons,	  which	   they	  may	   not	   even	   realise.	   In	   the	   second	   session,	   I	   can	  work	   on	   the	  problem	  they	  mentioned.	  I	  write	  down	  these	  reasons.	  For	  example	  [in	  a	  case	  we	  saw	  of	  a	  wife	  whose	  husband	  has	  a	  second	  wife	  in	  Libya],	  I	  was	  pretending	  not	  to	  listen	  to	  relax	  him	  and	  get	  him	  to	  speak.	  I	  must	  make	  them	  feel	  I	  am	  not	  judging	  them.	  But,	  I	  must	  also	  show	  power,	  especially	  if	  he	  is	  not	  doing	  his	  duty	  towards	  the	  children.’	  
As	  he	  sees	  it,	  echoing	  the	  intention	  of	  the	  legislator	  and	  the	  Koranic	  imperative	  to	  assign	   arbiters	   to	   the	   disputing	   couple,	   his	   role	   in	   the	   reconciliation	   session,	   unlike	   the	  public	  hearing,	  is	  ‘not	  to	  judge	  them,	  but	  to	  make	  them	  get	  on.’	  The	  first	  step	  towards	  this	  aim	  consists	  of	  penetrating	  their	  ‘camouflage’	  and	  finding	  the	  ‘real	  reason.’	  If	  the	  problem	  is	   about	   their	   ‘intimate	   life’	   it	  may	   be	   changed	   and	   become	   something	   about	  money	   or	  children.	  	  
Like	  Judge	  Karim,	  the	  cantonal	  judge	  shared	  a	  strong	  frustration	  that	  people	  tried	  to	   conceal	   as	   much	   as	   possible.	   If	   judicious	   practice	   is	   contingent	   on	   context,171	   the	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  cf	  Lambek	  2010.	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reconciliation	  sessions,	  held	  in	  the	  anonymous	  setting	  of	  the	  court	  office,	  are	  frustratingly	  de-­‐contextualised.	   In	  a	  way,	   this	  echoes	  Besma’s	   frustrations	  as	   she	  navigates	   the	  newly	  constructed	   neighbourhood;	   judges	   are	   faced	   with	   the	   task	   of	   re-­‐contextualising	  litigants,172	  a	  task	  that	  they	  themselves	  deem	  crucial	  if	  they	  are	  to	  succeed	  in	  their	  task	  of	  reconciliation.	  Women	   try	   to	   portray	   themselves	   as	   victims.	  He	   added,	   ‘it	   is	   not	   easy	   to	  distinguish	  between	  the	  true	  and	  the	  false.’	  This	  is	  especially	  the	  case	  due	  to	  the	   ‘mixing’	  between	   regions,	   which	   has	   happened	   in	   recent	   decades.	   He	   adds,	   ‘you	   cannot	   trust	  appearances.	  The	  majority	  of	  people	   in	  Greater	  Tunis	  and	  Ben	  Arous	  come	  from	  all	  over	  Tunisia.’	  He	  tries	  to	  get	  an	  impression	  of	  who	  the	  couple	  are	  by	  looking	  at	  their	  profession	  and	  age,	  but	  after	  five	  minutes	  talking	  to	  them	  he	  finds	  that,	  ‘they	  have	  no	  character.	  They	  run	  away.	  They	  do	  not	  want	  to	  give	  away	  any	  information	  about	  themselves	  that	  I	  could	  use	  to	  reconcile	  them.’	  As	  a	  result,	  it	  becomes	  difficult	  to	  connect	  with	  the	  litigants	  and	  to	  know	  how	  to	  communicate	  with	  them.	  	  
Although	   I	   did	   not	   have	   the	   opportunity	   to	   observe	   the	   female	   Family	   Judge	   in	  action,	   she	   told	   me	   that	   she	   does	   her	   best	   to	   build	   rapport	   with	   each	   couple,	   sharing	  personal	  stories	  to	  build	  their	  trust.	  A	  lot	  may	  depend	  simply	  on	  whether	  the	  litigants	  like	  her	  or	  not.	  She	  may	  give	  an	  example	  from	  her	  own	  life,	  such	  as	  ‘I	  have	  a	  son	  of	  that	  age	  and	  I	   would	   never	   treat	   him	   like	   that.’	   She	   uses	   ‘any	   possible	   argument’	   to	   try	   to	   dissuade	  them:	   ‘your	  children	  are	  going	  to	  be	  unbalanced.	  They	  will	  not	  be	  good	  people	  in	  society	  and	   will	   not	   succeed	   in	   their	   lives.’	   In	   practice,	   the	   examples	   she	   gives	   are	   moral	  arguments	   about	   the	   ills	   of	   divorce	   and	   how	   the	   litigants	   and	   their	   families	   will	   be	  perceived	  in	  the	  neighbourhood	  after	  the	  divorce.	  
These	  judges’	  accounts	  stress	  the	  personal	  and	  psychological	  elements	  of	  the	  role	  of	  reconciliation	   judge.	  Emotions	  play	  a	  central	  role,	   too.	  The	   litigants,	   therefore,	   in	  their	  strategies,	  appeal	   to	   the	   judge	  both	   legally	  and	  personally.	  Safia’s	   tears	  did	  not	   leave	  the	  judge	  indifferent.	  As	  they	  left,	  he	  turned	  to	  me	  and	  said,	  ‘They	  made	  me	  nervous.’	  
Even	  if,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  the	  judge’s	  experience	  of	  reconciliation	  is	  marked	  by	  his	  doubts	  as	  to	  whom	  to	  trust,	  he	  may	  appear	  to	  be	  swayed	  one	  way	  or	  the	  other.	  Fears	  about	  how	  the	  reconciliation	  sessions	  could	  be	  manipulated	  by	  the	  different	  actors	  generated	  a	  high	  level	  of	  uncertainty	  and	  malaise	  among	  all	  those	  concerned.	  	  
Many	   litigants	   feared	   how	   their	   spouse	   would	   behave	   during	   the	   reconciliation	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  See	  chapter	  3.	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session	  and	  the	  detrimental	  impact	  this	  might	  have	  on	  the	  divorce	  settlement.	  One	  litigant	  told	  me	  bitterly	  that	  his	  wife	  had	  cried	  on	  purpose	  and	  dressed	  up	  in	  torn	  clothes	  to	  show	  the	  judge	  how	  much	  he	  was	  neglecting	  her.173	  His	  wife	  told	  the	  judge	  that	  he	  did	  not	  buy	  her	   food	   and	   clothes,	   but	   he	   insisted	   that	   this	  was	   not	   true	   and	   that	   she	  was	   repeating	  what	   her	  mother	   had	   told	   her	   to	   say.	   Another	  male	   litigant,	   divorcing	   his	   wife	  without	  grounds,	  was	  extremely	  pleased	  when	  his	  wife	  exclaimed	  out	  of	  pride	  that	  she	  too	  wanted	  a	  divorce,	  hence	  losing	  any	  entitlement	  to	  compensation	  payments.	  	  
Many	  people	  do	  not	  need	  to	  exaggerate	  or	  invent	  stories	  to	  convince	  the	  judge	  of	  their	  genuine	  suffering.	  Malika,	  for	  instance,	  had	  been	  badly	  treated	  and	  abandoned	  by	  her	  husband	  and	  beaten	  by	  her	  mother-­‐in-­‐law.	  When	   I	   spoke	   to	  her,	   large	  bruises	  were	  still	  healing	   on	   her	   arms.	   In	   spite	   of	   all	   this,	   she	   still	   loved	   her	   husband	   and	  did	   not	  want	   a	  divorce.	   She	   told	  me	   that	   she	   began	   crying	   in	   the	   reconciliation	   session.	   The	   judge	   saw	  instantly	  that	  she	  was	  sincere	  and	  tried	  to	  help	  her.	  In	  addition,	  her	  husband	  had	  told	  the	  court	   that	   they	  were	   divorcing	   by	   consent,	  when	   this	  was	   not	   the	   case;	   rapidly	   proving	  him	  to	  be	  a	  liar.	  The	  judge	  strongly	  defended	  her	  and	  shouted	  at	  the	  husband	  for	  mocking	  the	   court	   and	   the	   justice	   system	   and	   condemned	   him	   for	   not	   taking	   better	   care	   of	   his	  children.	  The	  judge	  held	  her	  back	  after	  the	  session.	  He	  told	  her	  to	  have	  patience	  and	  to	  ask	  for	   her	   rights.	   In	   this	   gesture,	   the	   judge	   seemed	   to	   be	   making	   a	   commentary	   on	   the	  respectively	  good	  and	  bad	  ethical	  personhood	  of	  both	  litigants.	  He	  went	  out	  of	  his	  way	  –	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  his	  role	  as	  judge	  –	  to	  support	  what	  he	  thought	  was	  right.	  
	  
DECONSTRUCTING	  THE	  IDEAL	  HUSBAND	  
Safia	   and	   Walid	   draw	   on	   the	   two	   marital	   duties	   that	   constitute	   the	   clearest	   legal	  definitions	  of	  ‘harm’:	  the	  husband’s	  duty	  to	  pay	  nafaqa	  and	  their	  reciprocal	  duty	  not	  to	  be	  violent.	  Violence,	  one	  of	  the	  key	  sources	  of	   ’harm’	  in	  marriage,	   is	  backed	  up	  by	  the	  penal	  code	  and	  constitutes	  one	  of	  the	  main	  justifications	  for	  divorce	  that	  was	  considered	  valid	  by	  people	  I	  interviewed	  in	  the	  neighbourhood.174	  	  
Violence	  was	  the	  problem	  most	  frequently	  invoked	  by	  women	  in	  the	  reconciliation	  sessions,	  26	  claiming	  to	  have	  suffered	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  their	  husband	  or	  one	  of	  his	  relatives,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
173	  Cf	  Bear	  on	  the	  duplicity	  of	  bodies	  and	  how	  this	  relates	  to	  the	  uncertainty	  of	  officials	  and	  may	  bring	  out	  their	  
prejudices	  (2007a:	  208).	  
174	  See	  chapter	  5.	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most	   often	   his	   mother.	   In	   one	   case,	   a	   wife	   claimed	   her	   husband	   had	   threatened	   their	  daughter	  with	  a	  knife.	  Seven	  men	  mentioned	  violence.	  Two	  of	  these	  claimed	  that	  their	  wife	  had	  hit	   them	  and	   two	   that	   she	  hit	  his	  mother.	   In	   several	   cases,	  both	  parties	  accused	   the	  other	  of	  violence,	  in	  some	  instances	  supported	  by	  penal	  cases	  in	  both	  directions.	  
Like	  Safia,	  not	  all	  of	  these	  women	  who	  said	  they	  had	  suffered	  violence	  were	  asking	  for	  a	  divorce	  or	  even	  claimed	  they	  wanted	  to	  divorce;	  tolerating	  violence	  was	  used	  as	  an	  indication	  of	  their	  patience	  and	  their	  determination	  to	  save	  their	  marriage.	  This	  forms	  part	  of	  their	  performance	  as	  the	  ‘ideal’	  wife	  who	  is	  willing	  to	  make	  sacrifices	  for	  her	  family	  and	  who	   does	   not	   want	   to	   divorce,	   thereby	   retaining	   her	   entitlement	   to	   compensation	  payments.	  	  
Leila,	  a	  wife	  in	  her	  early	  30s	  with	  a	  baby	  son,	  was	  beaten	  by	  her	  husband	  who	  had	  mental	  health	  problems.	  Knowing	  the	  difficulties	  of	  proving	  domestic	  violence,	  instead	  of	  asking	  for	  a	  divorce	  herself,	  she	  pushed	  her	  husband	  to	  ask	  for	  divorce	  without	  grounds.	  Now	  she	  attends	   the	  reconciliation	  sessions	  and	  tells	   the	   judge	  that	  she	  wants	   to	  stay	   in	  the	  marriage,	  in	  order	  to	  receive	  compensation	  from	  her	  husband.	  Her	  performance	  in	  the	  reconciliation	   session	   takes	   on	   greater	   significance	   where	   documentary	   evidence	   is	  lacking.175	  
Safia	   was	   one	   of	   26	   women	   to	   evoke	   her	   husband’s	   failure	   to	   pay	   nafaqa	   (or	  enough	  nafaqa)	  during	  the	  sessions;	  18	  of	  these	  specifically	  mentioned	  nafaqa	  as	  the	  main	  problem.	  Like	  many	  men,	  Walid	  cannot	  play	  the	  ideal	  husband	  as	  her	  salary	  is	  also	  needed	  to	  support	  the	  family.	  If	  she	  can	  hold	  this	  against	  him	  with	  some	  conviction,	  it	  is	  because	  his	  duty	  to	  be	  the	  sole	  provider	  is	  backed	  up	  by	  dispositions	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  law.176	  Like	  Safia,	  wives	  often	  accused	  their	  husbands	  of	  not	  maintaining	  them	  by	  detailing	  their	  own	  contribution	   to	   the	   household,	   filling	   in	   for	   their	   deficient	   husbands.	   Several	  wives	   had	  brought	  bills	  with	  them	  to	  show	  that	  they	  had	  paid	  them	  and	  that	  their	  husband	  had	  not.	  In	   a	   couple	   of	   cases,	   wives	   mentioned	   that	   the	   husband’s	   father	   was	   paying,	   which	  appeared	  to	  lead	  to	  further	  tension	  concerning	  parental	   interference	  in	  their	  marital	   life.	  Husbands	  mentioned	  either	  their	  unwillingness	  or	  inability	  to	  pay	  nafaqa	  or	  argued	  over	  their	  wife’s	   use	   of	   her	   salary.	   A	   couple	   of	   cases	   revealed	   tensions	  with	   their	   respective	  families,	   in	  a	   struggle	  over	   the	   spouse’s	   resources.	  The	  husbands	   commonly	   complained	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  See	  chapter	  5	  on	  the	  role	  of	  documentary	  evidence.	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that	  their	  wives	  were	  too	  demanding	  materially,	  for	  instance,	  having	  been	  used	  to	  a	  higher	  standard	  of	  living	  before	  marriage	  or	  making	  demands	  beyond	  their	  husband’s	  means.	  
As	   a	   legally,	   morally	   and	   religiously	   valid	   principle,	   nafaqa	   enters	   the	  reconciliation	   session	   in	   different	  ways	   and	  may	   be	  made	   to	   substitute	   for	   other	   things	  that	   are	   hidden	   from	   the	   court.	   Disputes	   over	   nafaqa	   do	   not	   happen	   only	   when	   the	  husband	   is	   devoid	   of	   resources.	   Sometimes	   it	   appears	   that	   other	   disputes	   –	  which	  may	  remain	   a	   mystery	   to	   the	   court	   –	   have	   lead	   him	   to	   stop	   paying	   nafaqa,	   out	   of	   revenge,	  because	  he	  believes	  she	  is	  not	  fulfilling	  her	  duties	  which	  are	  the	  counterpart	  of	  nafaqa,	  or	  as	  an	   indication	  that	  he	  has	   lost	   interest	   in	   the	  marriage.	  When	  Zohra	  disputed	  with	  her	  husband,	  as	  we	  saw	  in	  chapter	  2,	  and	  he	  left	  home,	  he	  also	  stopped	  paying	  her	  nafaqa;	  she	  secretly	  took	  a	  job	  washing	  dishes	  in	  a	  café	  to	  make	  ends	  meet	  until	  he	  returned.	  	  
Several	   women	   made	   comments	   during	   the	   reconciliation	   sessions	   which	  appeared	  to	  wound	  their	  husband’s	  masculinity	  by	  pointing	  out	  his	  failure	  to	  fulfil	  his	  role	  as	  breadwinner.	  One	  wife,	  who	  had	  taken	  out	  a	  court	  case	  for	  her	  husband’s	  failure	  to	  pay	  
nafaqa,	  exclaimed:	  ‘you	  did	  not	  buy	  the	  milk	  (for	  their	  baby	  daughter)	  or	  anything!	  It	  is	  the	  last	   thing	   that	  you	   thought	  about!	   I	  do	  not	  want	  your	  mother	   to	  pay.	   I	  want	  you	   to	   take	  your	  responsibility.’	  Her	  husband’s	  telling	  humiliated	  response	  to	  this	  was	  simply,	  ‘I	  am	  a	  man	  in	  front	  of	  you.’	  
However,	  the	  judge’s	  attitude	  and	  failure	  to	  follow	  up	  on	  this	  point	  (he	  makes	  no	  comment	  to	  Safia	  or	  Walid	  about	  his	  duty	  to	  pay	  nafaqa)	  suggests	  that	  he	  is	  aware	  of	  the	  reality	  in	  which	  two	  salaries	  are	  required	  to	  sustain	  a	  household.	  Rather,	  he	  offers	  Walid	  another	  possibility	   to	  appear	  powerful	  and	  play	   the	   ideal	  husband.	  The	   judge	  appeals	   to	  their	  shared	  Muslim	  identity,	  using	  words	  that	  echo	  those	  of	  the	  prophet	  Mohammed,	  to	  re-­‐establish	  the	  husband’s	  masculinity	  in	  a	  domain	  that	  does	  remain	  within	  his	  control;	  as	  a	  God-­‐fearing	  citizen	  he	  should	  treat	  his	  wife	  well	  and	  give	  her	  her	  rights	  if	  he	  pursues	  his	  divorce.	  In	  the	  present	  economic	  circumstances,	  this	  represents	  a	  more	  achievable	  way	  of	  playing	  the	  ideal	  husband	  than	  being	  a	  sole	  male	  breadwinner.	  
The	   judge’s	   suggestion	   that	  Walid	   should	   be	   willing	   to	   give	   her	   her	   rights	   if	   he	  wants	  to	  divorce	  relates	  to	  his	  annoyance	  that	  Walid	  is	  trying	  to	  pursue	  a	  divorce	  for	  harm	  without	   the	   necessary,	   legally	   permissible	   evidence.	   Without	   suitable	   documentary	  evidence,177	  Walid’s	  performance	   in	   the	  reconciliation	  session	  (like	  Samia’s	  above)	   takes	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on	   greater	   significance.	   Perhaps	   his	   wife	   will	   admit	   to	   her	   failings	   and	   enable	   him	   to	  divorce	   for	   harm	   if	   this	   is	   recorded	   by	   the	   judge?	  His	  willingness	   to	   change	   the	   type	   of	  divorce	   he	   is	   filing	   for	   suggests	   that	   he	   is	   aware	   that	   he	   lacks	   evidence.	   (If	   he	   divorces	  without	   grounds	  he	  wife	  will	   receive	   compensation).	   In	   this	   case,	   it	   seems	   that	   the	   ruse	  has	  failed	  and	  he	  has	  mostly	  succeeded	  in	  annoying	  the	  judge.	  
The	  judge	  was	  not	  the	  only	  one	  to	  bring	  religion	  into	  the	  room	  as	  a	  source	  of	  moral	  authority.	  Safia	  was	  one	  of	  many	  litigants	  to	  swear	  to	  God,	  to	  the	  prophet	  or	  on	  the	  Koran	  in	   an	   (often	   unsuccessful)	   attempt	   to	   assert	   that	   she	  was	   telling	   the	   truth.	   Allusions	   to	  religion	  are	  used	  to	  gain	  authority	  and	  legitimacy	  for	  what	  the	  litigant	  is	  saying.	  	  A	  couple	  of	  women	   added	   to	   this,	   ‘give	  me	   a	  Koran	   and	   I	  will	   swear	   on	   it!	   178‘On	  one	  memorable	  occasion,	  a	  wife	  had	  actually	  brought	  a	  copy	  of	  the	  Koran	  with	  her,	  whipped	  it	  out	  of	  her	  handbag	  and	  started	  swearing	  on	  it;	  her	  husband,	  not	  wanting	  to	  be	  outdone	  grabbed	  the	  book	   from	  her	  and	  swore	   that	  he	  had	  been	   telling	   the	   truth.	  Given	   that	   their	   arguments	  had	   been	   entirely	   opposed,	   one	   of	   them	  must	   have	   been	   lying.	   The	   judge	   did	   not	   seem	  impressed	  by	  this	  event.	  	  
In	   the	   sessions	   I	   observed,	   wives	   used	   a	   wider	   range	   and	   greater	   number	   of	  arguments	   in	   their	   attempt	   to	   convince	   the	   judge,	   compared	  with	  husbands.	   	  As	  well	   as	  failing	   to	   pay	  nafaqa	   and	   violence	   (both	   physical	   and	   ‘verbal’	   violence),	   husbands	  were	  accused	  of	  drinking	  and	  gambling,	  indicators	  of	  ‘bad’	  ethical	  personhood	  and	  of	  a	  husband	  not	   to	  be	   trusted.	   If	  wives	  were	  active	   in	  painting	  a	  portrait	  of	   their	  deficient	  husbands,	  which	  moral	  criteria	  come	  into	  play	  as	  husbands	  try	  to	  depict	  the	  failings	  of	  their	  wives?	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  A	  sharai’c	  means	  of	  collecting	  legally	  valid	  evidence,	  which	  remains	  in	  Tunisian	  law,	  is	  an	  oath	  sworn	  on	  the	  
Koran.	  This	  would	  normally	  take	  place	  in	  a	  mosque	  in	  front	  of	  an	  Imam.	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DECONSTRUCTING	  THE	  IDEAL	  WIFE	  
	  
Mehdi	  and	  Saida.	  	  	  
Conflict	  with	  his	  family.	  He	  asks	  for	  divorce	  without	  grounds.	  
Mehdi	  and	  Saida	  are	  in	  their	  early	  30s.	  Both	  are	  wearing	  jeans	  and	  an	  anorak	  and	  
look	  moderately	  well	  off.	  He	  passed	  his	  Baccalaureat,	  works	  as	  a	  car	  salesman	  
earning	  550	  dinars	  per	  month	  and	  lives	  in	  a	  pleasant,	  seaside	  suburb.	  This	  is	  his	  first	  
marriage.	  They	  live	  in	  a	  flat,	  which	  he	  owns,	  above	  his	  parents’	  house.	  They	  have	  been	  
married	  for	  two	  years	  and	  have	  a	  baby	  daughter.	  Saida	  studied	  to	  Master’s	  degree	  
level	  and	  works	  as	  an	  accountant	  earning	  500	  dinars.	  She	  is	  living	  with	  her	  brother	  
in	  central	  Tunis.	  
The	  judge	  asks	  Mehdi	  why	  they	  are	  disputing.	  He	  explains	  that	  the	  problems	  started	  
when	  they	  left	  the	  flat	  they	  were	  renting	  and	  moved	  into	  the	  flat	  above	  his	  elderly	  
parent’s	  house.	  She	  did	  not	  want	  to	  live	  there	  and	  left,	  taking	  their	  baby	  with	  her,	  
whom	  he	  has	  not	  seen	  for	  6	  weeks.	  The	  Judge	  looks	  at	  his	  mobile	  phone,	  before	  finally	  
making	  a	  phone	  call	  as	  Saida	  starts	  telling	  her	  side	  of	  the	  story.	  They	  had	  agreed	  to	  
live	  away	  from	  his	  ‘dar’	  (literally	  house,	  but	  here	  referring	  to	  his	  family)	  ,	  but	  he	  had	  
made	  her	  move	  into	  the	  small	  flat	  above	  his	  parents	  when	  she	  was	  heavily	  pregnant.	  
The	  judge	  tells	  her	  that	  she	  is	  wrong:	  ‘you	  cannot	  reject	  his	  family’.	  She	  reassures	  him	  
that	  she	  does	  not	  reject	  them;	  she	  goes	  to	  them	  for	  Aïd.	  But	  she	  cannot	  live	  there	  as	  
they	  restrict	  her	  freedom.	  	  
After	  she	  gave	  birth,	  her	  family	  managed	  to	  reconcile	  them	  and	  she	  returned	  to	  live	  
with	  her	  husband	  on	  the	  promise	  that	  his	  father	  would	  allow	  her	  independence	  and	  
freedom.	  In	  spite	  of	  this,	  his	  mother	  interfered.	  ‘His	  mum	  asked,	  ‘are	  his	  clothes	  
washed?’	  explains	  Saida.	  ‘Who	  is	  responsible	  for	  my	  husband?	  Me	  or	  his	  mum.’	  
The	  judge	  tries	  to	  calm	  her,	  ‘If	  my	  mother	  asked	  my	  wife	  that,	  she	  would	  just	  say	  yes.	  
She	  knows	  how	  to	  treat	  her.’	  Saida	  insists	  that	  she	  tried	  to	  love	  her	  mother-­in-­law,	  
but	  she	  interferes	  in	  their	  relationship,	  coming	  up	  to	  visit	  them	  at	  5am.	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Mehdi	  retaliates	  claiming	  she	  neglects	  her	  duties:	  ‘She	  goes	  out	  all	  day	  and	  leaves	  the	  
baby	  with	  my	  mother.	  From	  8am-­	  6pm.	  She	  wants	  me	  to	  erase	  my	  mum	  and	  dad	  from	  
my	  life.	  My	  mother	  cooks	  us	  dinner.	  She	  thinks	  …	  My	  mother	  dominates	  me.	  My	  wife	  
left	  the	  baby	  in	  Bizerte	  with	  her	  parents.’	  
The	  judge	  asks	  the	  husband	  again	  if	  he	  wants	  to	  divorce.	  Saida	  speaks	  over	  his	  reply	  
saying	  that	  their	  daughter	  is	  ill	  and	  that	  she	  was	  thrown	  out.	  The	  judge	  asks	  her	  if	  
she	  agrees	  to	  divorce.	  Saida	  replies,	  ‘I	  don’t	  want	  to	  divorce.	  If	  I	  did,	  I	  would	  have	  
asked	  for	  divorce.	  Do	  you	  men	  take	  (meaning	  marry)	  women	  for	  their	  salaries?’	  	  
She	  adds:	  ‘He	  tastes	  my	  food	  and	  says	  his	  mother	  cooks	  better.	  He	  is	  not	  diplomatic.	  I	  
don’t	  care	  about	  money.	  I	  have	  paid	  maintenance	  since	  I	  married	  and	  don’t	  keep	  
accounts.’	  
They	  argue	  between	  themselves.	  The	  judge	  makes	  another	  phone	  call.	  Mehdi	  says	  
that	  the	  real	  problem	  lies	  with	  his	  parents.	  Saida	  says	  that	  he	  has	  no	  ‘character’.	  He	  
retorts	  that	  he	  has	  a	  ‘moral	  obligation’	  as	  they	  are	  his	  parents.	  
The	  judge	  addresses	  Mehdi:	  	  
‘Women	  are	  women.	  You	  must	  stop	  your	  mum,	  if	  she	  crosses	  her	  boundaries.	  It	  is	  not	  
for	  the	  court	  to	  do	  this.	  I	  will	  give	  you	  advice	  about	  women.	  Sometimes	  a	  mother	  does	  
not	  know	  her	  boundaries.	  ...	  you	  must	  tell	  her,	  when	  she	  goes	  too	  far.	  Can	  you	  get	  your	  
wife	  and	  mother	  to	  agree?’	  
Mehdi:	  ‘She	  thinks	  that	  everything	  my	  mother	  does	  is	  a	  mistake.’	  
Judge	  to	  Mehdi:	  ‘This	  is	  all	  down	  to	  you.	  This	  is	  your	  duty	  and	  you	  failed!	  As	  I	  see	  it,	  
there	  is	  no	  problem	  between	  you	  as	  a	  couple.’	  
Mehdi:	  ‘It	  is	  a	  problem	  between	  my	  parents	  and	  my	  wife.	  But	  I	  feel	  that	  she	  does	  not	  
respect	  me.’	  
Saida:	  ‘Your	  parents	  dominate	  you	  and	  you	  just	  watch.’	  
Mehdi	  (who	  has	  tears	  in	  his	  eyes):	  ‘For	  18	  months,	  we	  have	  had	  problems.	  Her	  family	  
kept	  coming...’	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Saida:’	  Ahhhh!	  You	  have	  a	  problem	  with	  MY	  family?!’	  
Judge	  to	  Mehdi:	  ‘Don’t	  try	  to	  convince	  yourself	  that	  these	  are	  not	  real	  reasons.	  I	  will	  
give	  you	  another	  reconciliation	  session.	  Think	  how	  you	  imagine	  your	  life.	  What	  
differentiates	  between	  men?	  	  There	  is	  no	  success,	  unless	  you	  can	  resolve	  problems.	  
People	  management.	  Especially	  for	  men,	  more	  than	  for	  women;	  marriage,	  parents,	  
colleagues,	  etc.	  Each	  man	  has	  power.’	  
Saida:’	  I	  respect	  him.’	  
Mehdi:	  ‘She	  does	  not	  respect	  me!’	  
Saida:	  ‘Each	  month	  I	  pay	  the	  rent	  alone	  and	  provide	  for	  our	  family	  alone.	  Our	  
daughter	  cries	  and	  asks	  for	  her	  dad.	  I	  want	  to	  bring	  her	  (back	  from	  Bizerte).	  Where	  
can	  I	  put	  her?’	  
Mehdi	  says	  that	  he	  wants	  to	  see	  his	  daughter	  but	  fears	  that	  her	  family	  will	  block	  his	  
visit.	  The	  judge	  advises	  him	  to	  go	  to	  see	  her	  in	  Bizerte	  and	  that	  he	  can	  use	  the	  police	  if	  
necessary,	  if	  he	  cannot	  manage	  alone.	  He	  sets	  a	  date	  for	  the	  second	  reconciliation	  
session.	  
	  
This	   case	   illustrates	   some	   of	   the	   main	   arguments	   used	   by	   husbands	   to	  demonstrate	   the	   failings	   of	   their	   wives	   and	   the	  ways	   in	  which	   the	  morality	   of	   wives	   is	  founded	  in	  the	  house.	  Other	  than	  accusations	  of	  violence,	  moral	  criteria	  pertaining	  to	  a	  bad	  wife	   revolve	   around	   the	   house;	   wives	   are	   accused	   of	   going	   out	   of	   the	   house	   too	  much,	  neglecting	   their	   housework	   and	   children	   or	   abandoning	   the	   marital	   home	   completely	  (nushuz).	   Six	   husbands	   used	   explicitly	   moral	   arguments	   complaining	   that	   their	   wife’s	  behaviour	  was	  ‘bad’	  or	  shameful	  (going	  out	  until	  late	  at	  night,	  dressing	  in	  an	  inappropriate	  way).	  One	  man,	  responding	  to	  his	  wife’s	  accusation	  that	  he	  did	  not	  pay	  nafaqa,	  replied	  that	  he	   was	   ashamed	   of	   the	   clothes	   his	   wife	   wore	   and	   that	   her	   mother	   enouraged	   this	  behaviour,	   asking	   him	   why	   he	   does	   not	   allow	   his	   wife	   to	   wear	   ‘décolleté’	   (tops	   which	  reveal	  her	  cleavage).	  
Mehdi	  accuses	  Saida	  of	  neglecting	  her	  duties	  as	  she	  goes	  out	  of	  the	  marital	  home.	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Presumably,	   this	   is	  due	   to	  her	  work	  as	  an	  accountant	   that	  enables	  her	   to	  earn	  almost	  as	  much	  money	  as	  her	  husband.	  As	  a	  woman	  who	  works,	  there	  are	  tensions	  with	  her	  mother-­‐in-­‐law	  as	  she	  is	  unable	  to	  play	  the	  ideal	  wife	  and	  be	  the	  kind	  of	  mother	  that	  her	  husband’s	  mother	  was	   able	   to	  be.	  Her	   salary	   is	   essential	   to	   the	   running	  of	   the	  household	   (and	   she	  may	  well	  want	   to	  work	   given	   her	   level	   of	   education).	   In	   turn,	   she	   is	   able	   to	   accuse	   her	  husband	   of	   being	   weak	   and	   failing	   to	   be	   the	   ideal	   husband	   because	   she	   makes	   this	  financial	   contribution.	   In	   this	   sense,	   Mehdi’s	   accusations	   end	   up	   underlining	   his	   own	  failings	  as	  a	  husband,	  rather	  than	  her	  failings	  as	  a	  wife.	  	  
Mehdi	  was	  not	  the	  only	  husband	  to	  accuse	  his	  wife	  of	  going	  out	  a	  lot.	  As	  we	  saw	  in	  chapter	  1,	  in	  the	  neighbourhood	  it	  is	  frowned	  upon	  for	  women	  to	  go	  out.	  The	  responses	  of	  the	   wives	   to	   this	   argument	   points	   to	   the	   necessity	   of	   going	   out	   of	   the	   house	   in	   the	  contemporary	   neighbourhood,	   something	   the	   judge	   appeared	   to	   understand.	   Nebil,	   for	  instance,	   stated	   simply	   of	   his	   wife	   that	   ‘she	   goes	   out,’	   her	   immorality	   implicit	   in	   this	  phrase.	   	   In	   her	   defence,	   she	   retorted:	   ‘I	   only	   go	   to	   see	  my	   neighbour	   and	   friend.	   Is	   this	  ‘haram	   to	  me’?’	   Another	  wife	   explained	   that	   she	  went	   out	   to	   the	   grocer’s	   shop,	   a	   short	  distance	  away.	   In	  both	  cases,	   the	   judge	  did	  not	  respond	  to	   this	  particular	  point,	   focusing	  his	  efforts	  on	  other	  aspects	  of	  the	  marital	  dispute	  where	  he	  thought	  a	  difference	  could	  be	  made.	  
Although	  Mehdi	   is	   speaking	   to	   the	   legal	  expectation	  established	   in	   jurisprudence	  for	  wives	  to	  cohabit	  with	  their	  husbands,	  jurisprudence	  states	  that	  the	  wife	  is	  only	  at	  fault	  if	   her	   absence	   is	  unjustified.	  There	  are	  many	   legitimate	   reasons	  why	   she	  may	  be	  absent	  from	   the	  marital	   home.	   In	   the	   sessions	   I	   observed,	   the	   judge	   sought	   the	   reasons	   for	   the	  wife’s	  absence.	  Nebil,	   the	  husband	  whom	  we	  met	  earlier,	  was	   filing	   for	  divorce	   for	  harm	  due	  to	  his	  wife	  abandoning	  the	  marital	  home.	  His	  wife	  told	  the	  judge	  herself	  that	  she	  had	  spent	  the	  last	  6	  months	  in	  her	  father’s	  house,	  after	  10	  years	  of	  marriage.	  She	  claimed	  that	  her	   husband	   had	   spoken	   to	   her	   with	   ‘words	   of	   the	   street’	   and	   hit	   her	   for	   no	   reason,	  providing	  the	  judge	  with	  a	  justification	  for	  her	  absence	  before	  he	  had	  even	  asked	  for	  one.	  Nebil	   claimed	   that	   she	   went	   to	   her	   father’s	   house	   for	   any	   ‘small’	   reason.	   The	   judge	  declared:	   ‘one	  only	  leaves	  home	  for	  the	  biggest	  reason.’	  Saida	  continued	  her	  justification,	  ‘a	   wife	   who	   is	   beaten,	   sworn	   at	   …	   I	   cannot	   change	   him.’	   The	   judge	   appeared	   to	   lose	  patience	  with	  Nebil,	  telling	  him:	  ‘you	  made	  a	  mistake.’	  
Rather	   than	   showing	   any	   sympathy	   for	   her	   absence	   from	   the	  marital	   home,	   the	  judge	   identifies	   the	   essence	   of	  Mehdi	   and	   Saida’s	  marital	   tensions	   as	   lying	   between	   her	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and	  her	  parents-­‐in-­‐law,	  rather	  than	  between	  her	  and	  her	  husband.	  	  
Family	   problems,	   including	   interference	   from	  either	   family,	   tensions	   as	   they	   live	  with	  his	  family,	  disputes	  with	  children	  from	  a	  former	  marriage,	  the	  negative	  influence	  of	  a	  family	  member,	  or	  opposition	  by	  the	  family	  to	  the	  marriage,	  were	  common	  themes	  in	  the	  reconciliation	   sessions	   I	   observed.	   Saida	   demonstrates	   the	   tensions	   that	   exist	   between	  expectations	   (and,	   in	   her	   case,	   prior	   experience)	   of	   neolocal	   living	   and	   material	  circumstances	  that	  necessitate	  a	  return	  to	  patrilocal	  residence.179	  The	  judge	  seemed	  aware	  of	  these	  constraints.	  One	  wife	  explicitly	  stated	  that	  she	  argued	  with	  her	  husband’s	  family	  because	   she	   lived	   with	   them.	   The	   judge	   simply	   replied	   ‘this	   is	   not	   a	   problem’	   and	  encouraged	   the	   couple	   to	   reconcile	   for	   the	   sake	   of	   their	   son.	   In	   another	   case,	   the	   judge	  pointed	   out	   that	   the	   wife’s	   father-­‐in-­‐law	   was	   elderly,	   encouraging	   her	   to	   be	   patient,	  implying	  that	  she	  would	  gain	  the	  independence	  she	  craved	  after	  his	  death.	  	  
Mehdi	  and	  Saida’s	  case	  was	  one	  of	  8	  out	  of	  the	  61	  that	  I	  observed	  where	  the	  judge	  appeared	  to	  see	  a	  glimmer	  of	  hope	  and	  actively	  sought	  to	  reconcile	  the	  couple.	  In	  a	  couple	  of	   these	   cases,	   he	  merely	   encouraged	   the	   couple	   to	   keep	   thinking	   about	   their	   problems	  before	  the	  next	  session.	  In	  the	  other	  cases,	  he	  was	  more	  active,	  not	  only	  giving	  advice,	  but	  instructing	  them	  on	  how	  to	  proceed	  in	  the	  form	  of	  commands.	  In	  three	  of	  these	  cases,	  the	  problems	  seemed	  to	  be	  tied	  to	  difficulties	  between	  the	  wife	  and	  her	  husband’s	  family	  more	  than	  between	  the	  couple	  themselves.	  	  
In	  persuading	  them	  to	  reunite,	  he	  treated	  men	  and	  women	  differently,	  placing	  the	  emphasis	  on	  the	  husband,	  who	  should	  play	  an	  active	  role	   in	  reconciling	   the	  marriage	  by	  making	   the	   first	  move	   towards	   his	  wife.	   The	  wife,	   however,	  must	   also	   actively	   play	   her	  seemingly	   passive	   role	   if	   they	   are	   to	   reconcile.	   She	   must	   display	   the	   patience	   and	  intelligence	   expected	   of	   an	   ideal	  wife	   and	   be	   tolerant	   of	  what	   is	   often	   a	   tricky	  material	  situation	  that	  they	  do	  not	  have	  the	  means	  to	  change.	  As	  with	  Walid	  above,	  the	  judge	  also	  seemed	  to	  offer	  Mehdi	  an	  alternative	  way	  of	  reasserting	  his	  power	  as	  a	  man	  in	  a	  situation	  in	   which	   he	   is	   otherwise	   powerless.	   He	   placed	   the	   onus	   on	   Mehdi	   to	   manage	   the	  relationships	  within	   the	   family	  more	   harmoniously,	   especially	   that	   between	   his	  mother	  and	  his	  wife.	  Again,	  Mehdi	  is	  offered	  an	  alternative	  way	  of	  playing	  the	  ideal	  husband.	  
Not	  all	  couples	  spoke	  in	  front	  of	  the	  judge.	  A	  couple	  may	  jointly	  decide	  to	  present	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
179	  The	  reader	  will	  recall	  Besma	  and	  Nabil	  in	  chapter	  2	  building	  extra	  floors	  onto	  their	  houses	  to	  provide	  future	  
marital	  homes	  for	  their	  sons.	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wall	  of	  silence,	  in	  particular	  if	  they	  have	  already	  agreed	  to	  divorce	  by	  mutual	  consent	  and	  if	   there	   is	   nothing	   to	   be	   gained	   or	   lost	   in	   terms	   of	   compensation	   or	   child	   custody.	   In	   a	  couple	  of	  cases,	  the	  only	  response	  given	  to	  the	  judge’s	  question	  as	  to	  why	  they	  wanted	  to	  divorce	   was	   ‘maktoub’	   (literally	   ‘written’	   by	   God),	   lending	   religious	   legitimacy	   to	   their	  silence.	  There	   is	   little	   the	   judge	   can	  do	   if	   they	   refuse	   to	   speak.	  The	   judges	   I	   interviewed	  were	  divided	  on	  how	  much	  they	  would	  push	  couples	  who	  remained	  silent,	  depending	  on	  the	   time	   available	   and	  whether	   the	   couple	   have	   children.	   In	   their	   silence,	   a	   couple	  may	  escape	  legal	  judgement.	  
In	   stark	   contrast	   to	   this,	  much	   to	  my	   surprise,	   some	   couples	   discussed	   intimate	  problems	  with	  the	  judge,	  including	  lack	  of	  sexual	  relationship,	  adultery,	  infertility	  and	  the	  refusal	  to	  have	  children	  or	  more	  children.	  One	  wife	  complained	  that	  she	  was	  still	  a	  virgin	  some	   time	   after	   their	  marriage.	   Two	  wives	   said	   that	   their	   husband	   had	   taken	   a	   second	  wife;180	  one	  of	  these	  had	  married	  for	  the	  second	  time	  in	  Libya.	  Six	  other	  women	  mentioned	  that	   their	   husband	   had	   ‘another	   woman’.	   One	   complained	   that	   her	   husband	   refused	   to	  have	  any	  children,	  as	  he	  already	  had	  four	  children	  from	  a	  previous	  marriage.	  One	  did	  not	  like	  her	  husband	  looking	  at	  pornography.	  Far	  fewer	  men	  seemed	  willing	  to	  talk	  about	  this	  topic,	  although	  two	  also	  hinted	  at	  sexual	  problems.	  In	  one	  of	  these	  cases,	  the	  husband	  did	  not	  feel	  able	  to	  talk	  about	  it	  and	  indicated	  that	  the	  judge	  should	  read	  a	  letter	  included	  in	  the	   file;	   his	   wife	   was	   ill	   and	   unable	   to	   have	   sex.	   	   One	   husband	   accused	   his	   wife	   of	  prostitution;	  she	  had	  a	  lot	  of	  money	  and	  he	  claimed	  that	  this	  came	  from	  ‘all	  the	  men	  who	  come	  to	  the	  house.’	  One	  couple	  suffered	  from	  fertility	  problems	  and	  had	  agreed	  to	  divorce;	  it	  was	  not	  stated	  which	  party	  was	  infertile.	  	  
Two	   women	   mentioned	   their	   husband’s	   neglect	   of	   them	   in	   bed	   as	   their	   main	  reason	   for	   wanting	   a	   divorce.	   Judge	   Karim	   responded	   to	   these	   problems	   pragmatically,	  placing	   the	   emphasis	   on	   the	   husband	   to	   approach	   his	   wife	   and	   to	   restore	   their	   sexual	  relationship.	  Ahlam	  complained	  that	  her	  husband	  had	  abandoned	  her	  sexually.	  The	  judge	  advised	  her	  husband,	   ‘the	  most	  important	  thing	  is	  the	  ‘vie	  de	  couple’181.	  Especially	  for	  the	  man.	  This	  is	  the	  most	  important	  thing,	  above	  everything	  else.	  If	  you	  succeed	  in	  your	  ‘life	  in	  bed’.	  A	  man	  who	  is	  clever	  and	  successful	  gets	  this	  right.’	  Once	  again,	  Judge	  Karim	  appears	  to	  be	  offering	  the	  husband	  an	  alternative	  way	  of	  restoring	  his	  masculinity	  and	  playing	  the	  ideal	  husband.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
180	  Recalling	  that	  polygamy	  is	  illegal	  in	  Tunisia.	  	  
181	  He	  says	  this	  in	  French,	  although	  they	  are	  speaking	  Arabic.	  Literally	  ‘life	  as	  a	  couple’,	  he	  is	  referring	  to	  their	  sex	  
life.	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CONCLUSION	  
The	  moral	   criteria	  which	  define	  what	  makes	   an	   ideal	   husband	  or	  wife	   (that	   are	   already	  familiar	  to	  us	  from	  the	  neighbourhood)	  are	  given	  legitimacy	  by	  the	  law	  and	  its	  lacunae,	  in	  the	   spaces	  opened	  up	  by	   its	   failure	   to	   clearly	  define	   those	  key	   legal	   categories	  of	   ‘harm’	  and	   ‘marital	   duties’.	  The	   initially	   gender-­‐neutral	   wording	   of	   the	   law	   in	   practice	   rapidly	  becomes	   gendered.	   Firstly,	   in	   the	   legal	   code’s	   own	  dispositions	   that	   help	  define	   ‘marital	  duties’	  and	  secondly	  as	  ordinary	  ethics	  enter	  the	  practice	  of	  the	  law	  through	  the	  person	  of	  the	  judge.	  
Lynch	  &	  Bogen	  analysed	  the	  Iran-­‐Contra	  trials	  as	  being	  an	  inversion	  of	  Foucault’s	  spectacle	   of	   the	   scaffold;	   what	   was	   once	   hidden	   was	   made	   public	   (1996:	   93).	   In	   their	  words,	   ‘this	   ceremony	  provided	  a	   forum	   for	  enacting	  a	   civic	   ritual	   through	  which	  public	  representatives	   would	   pass	   judgement	   on	   the	   legal	   and	   moral	   status	   of	   actions	   taken’	  (ibid:	  89).	  The	  reconciliation	  sessions	  may	  also	  be	  read	  as	  a	  ceremony	  in	  which	  what	  was	  once	   kept	   in	   the	   familyis	   exposed	   in	   front	   of	   the	   state,182	   whose	   officials	   will	   pass	  judgement	   on	   the	   legal	   and	  moral	   status	   of	   actions	   and	   the	   ethical	   personhood	   of	   each	  spouse.	   Although	   the	  meetings	   take	   place	   behind	   the	   closed	   doors	   of	   the	   Judge’s	   office,	  public	  standards	  of	  normality	  and	  morality	  are	  heavily	  present.	  
Equally,	   Lynch	   &	   Bogen	   have	   stressed	   how,	   ‘formal	   orders	   are	   incapable	   of	  
determining	   the	   actual	   course	   and	   outcomes	   of	   social	   activities	   and	   that	   they	   are	  nonetheless	  practically	  relevant	  to	  their	  conduct’	  (ibid:	  120).	  The	  guilty	  may	  still	  refuse	  to	  confess;	   litigants	   can	  bend	   the	   rules	   of	   the	   format	   to	   their	   own	  ends.	   The	  performances	  litigants	  choose	  to	  put	  on	  for	  the	  judge	  enable	  them	  to	  retain	  some	  control	  over	  the	  extent	  to	  which	   the	  state	  can	   intervene	   in	   their	   intimate	   lives.	  They	  may	  also	  choose	   to	  remain	  silent.	  
The	   fluidity	   of	   the	   legal	   categories	   the	   litigants	   are	   performing	   within	   (‘marital	  duties’,	   ‘custom	  and	  habit’,	   ‘harm’)	  partially	  stems	  from	  the	  ambiguities	  of	  married	  life	  in	  the	  neighbourhood.183	  The	  strategies	  and	  performances	  of	   litigants	  and	   the	   judge	  during	  these	   reconciliation	   sessions	   demonstrate	   how	  marital	   duties	   are	   simultaneously	   being	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182	  cf	  chapter	  2	  on	  the	  taboos	  of	  entering	  the	  divorce	  court.	  
183	  cf	  chapter	  2.	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redefined	  through	  legal	  practice,	  as	  the	  law	  lends	  legitimacy	  to	  moral	  norms	  as	  they	  enter	  the	   court.	   The	   judge,	   frustrated	   as	   he	   seeks	   to	   reconcile	   couples	  he	   cannot	   locate,	   could	  theoretically	   ask	   questions	   about	   regional	   origin.	   However,	   he	   never	   did	   so	   in	   my	  presence.	  His	  understanding	  of	  the	  litigants’	  marital	  disputes	  is	  dependent	  on	  his	  ability	  to	  re-­‐contextualise,	   to	   read	   the	   situations	   he	   is	   presented	  with	   against	   the	   grid	   of	   his	   own	  understanding	  of	  marital	  ideals	  and	  his	  own	  experience	  and	  observations	  of	  married	  life.	  	  
Given	  that	   the	  couples	  observed	  varied	  broadly	   in	   terms	  of	  socio-­‐economic	  class,	  the	  arguments	  used	  by	  husband	  and	  by	  wives	  appeared	  surprisingly	  consistent.	  Litigants	  shared	  a	  common	  sense	  of	  the	  kinds	  of	  arguments	  that	  would	  appeal	  to	  the	  judge	  and	  the	  moral	  criteria	  that	  are	  expected	  of	  ideal	  husbands	  and	  wives	  that	  form	  the	  basis	  of	  these	  arguments.	   If	   region	   is	   less	   visible	   and	   reliable	   as	   a	   marker	   of	   ethical	   personhood	   and	  identity,	   it	   appears	   that	   there	   is	   a	   shift	   towards	   a	   homogenisation	   of	  moral	   values	   on	   a	  national	   level.	  Other	   factors	   enter	   into	  play	   as	   the	   judge	   interacts	  with	   litigants,	   not	   the	  least	   their	   shared	   religiosity	   and	   faith	   in	   Islam	   that,	   as	   we	   began	   to	   see	   in	   the	  neighbourhood,	   are	   beginning	   to	   displace	   other	   criteria	   as	   indicators	   of	   ethical	  personhood.	  	  	  
Whilst	   the	   cases	   I	   observed	   suggested	  broad	  agreement	   as	   to	   the	   ethical	   criteria	  that	  define	   ideal	  husbands	  and	  wives,	   the	   judge	  displayed	  his	  awareness	  of	   the	   tensions	  between	  these	  ideals	  and	  the	  realities	  of	  marriage.	  Due	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  reconciliation	  sessions	  and	  the	  silences	  in	  the	  legal	  code,	  the	  judge’s	  personal	  knowledge	  of	  society	  and	  its	  morality	  are	  explicitly	   invited	   into,	   and	  are	   required	  by,	   the	  practice	  of	   the	   law.	   	   In	  a	  different	  Muslim	  context,	  Bowen	  studied	  how	  judges	  crafted	  their	  decisions	  to	  make	  them	  convincing	  to	   litigants	  and	  concluded	  that,	   ‘we	  might	   therefore	  expect	   to	   find	  clues	  as	   to	  the	  norms	   supporting	   their	   decision	   in	   the	  narrative	   structure	   of	   the	   judgement’	   (1998:	  90).	   The	   arguments	   Judge	   Karim	   used	   to	   appeal	   to	   litigants,	   in	   particular	   those	   used	   to	  persuade	   them	   to	   reconcile,	   implicitly	   suggest	   his	   understanding	   that	   it	   is	   increasingly	  difficult	  to	  play	  the	  ideal	  husband	  or	  the	  ideal	  wife.	  He	  knows	  that	  a	  husband	  can	  no	  longer	  be	   sole	   breadwinner	   and	   that	   a	   wife	   cannot	   remain	   at	   home.	   Rather	   he	   suggests	  alternative	   avenues	   for	   playing	   the	   ideal	   husband	   that	   are	  more	   realistic	   in	   the	   difficult	  economic	  climate.	  
As	  a	  great	  deal	  hinges	  on	  the	  person	  of	  the	  judge,	  in	  this	  peculiar	  legal	  setting	  the	  moral	   may	   be	   reassembled	   in	   very	   different	   ways.	   Whilst	   this	   judge	   acknowledged	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contemporary	   realities,	   another	   judge	   may	   have	   underlined	   old	   prejudices.184	  Reconciliation	   sessions	   are	   an	   unpredictable	   encounter	   with	   an	   unknown	   entity;	  uncertainty	   and	   anxiety	   mark	   both	   the	   judge’s	   and	   litigants’	   experience	   of	   the	  reconciliation	   sessions	   and	   may	   lead	   to	   morality	   being	   redefined	   in	   potentially	  unpredictable	  ways.	  	  
It	   is	   possible	   to	   add	   a	   further	   layer	   of	   inversion	   to	   this	   secret	   spectacle	   of	  reconciliation.	   As	   they	   try	   to	   persuade	   the	   judge	   to	   take	   their	   side,	   litigants	  make	   their	  own	  judgements	  as	  to	  the	  morality	  and	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  state.	  Through	  the	  reconciliation	  sessions,	   therefore,	   the	  moral	   fabric	  of	  society	   is	  being	  rewoven	  as	   judicious	  and	   judicial	  practice	   combine.	   Simultaneously,	   the	   litigants’	   ability	   to	  play	   the	   ideal	   husband	  or	  wife	  and	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  law	  itself	  are	  placed	  under	  scrutiny.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
184	  In	  a	  very	  different	  setting	  (UK	  immigration	  law)	  in	  which	  the	  legal	  outcome	  and	  destiny	  of	  litigants	  relied	  upon	  
judicial	  discretion,	  White	  found	  the	  verdicts	  of	  her	  litigants	  depended	  on	  whether	  they	  came	  across	  ‘a	  nice	  judge	  on	  
a	  good	  day’	  (Caroline	  White	  2012:	  6).	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CHAPTER	  5	  -­	  	  
‘MAKTOUB’	  (1):	  DOCUMENTING	  DIVORCE	  
-­	  THE	  ROLE	  OF	  DOCUMENTARY	  EVIDENCE	  IN	  CASES	  OF	  DIVORCE	  FOR	  HARM	  
	  
	  ‘In	  Tunisia,	  the	  judge	  rules	  with	  what	  is	  written	  (al	  maktoub).	  Only	  with	  what	  is	  written.’	  (Saida,	  during	  her	  divorce)	  
	  
Saida	  (1)	  
When	  I	  first	  met	  Saida,	  a	  woman	  in	  her	  mid-­30s,	  in	  the	  single	  room	  she	  shared	  with	  
her	  3-­year	  old	  son,	  she	  was	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  not	  one	  but	  two	  divorce	  cases;	  both	  she	  
and	  her	  husband	  had	  filed	  for	  divorce	  on	  different	  grounds	  in	  different	  courts.	  In	  the	  
small	  apartment	  where	  she	  lived	  with	  her	  3-­year	  old	  son,	  she	  took	  a	  thick	  divorce	  file	  
from	   the	   cupboard.	   In	   it	   rested	   her	   hopes	   of	   bringing	   over	   two	   years	   of	   painful	  
divorce	   litigation	   to	   an	   end,	   of	   being	   released	   from	   an	   unhappy	   marriage	   and	  
granted	   her	   rights.	   In	   her	   recent	   reconciliation	   session	   her	   husband	   spoke	   to	   the	  
judge	  but	  she	  held	  her	  tongue.	  She	  hoped	  her	  documents	  would	  speak	  for	  themselves.	  
By	   the	   time	   I	   met	   Saida,	   I	   had	   developed	   my	   own	   relationship	   with	   divorce	   files	  
during	  my	   research.	   I	   had	   read	   too	  many	   cases	   which	   had	   been	   forced	   to	   change	  
track	  or	  had	  been	  rejected	  due	  to	  the	  difficulties	  of	  providing	  proof	  relating	  to	  such	  
an	  intimate	  domain	  of	  life.	  Her	  anxiety	  was	  mixed	  with	  hope,	  based	  on	  her	  confidence	  
that	  her	  evidence	  would	  hold	  up	  in	  court.	  I	  was	  not	  so	  sure.	  
	  
INTRODUCTION	  
Documents	   have	   been	   described	   as	   ‘the	   most	   boring	   of	   ethnographic	   artefacts’	   (Latour	  2010:	   26).	   	   For	   lawyers,	   expert	  weavers	   of	   legal	   texts,	   they	   are	   far	   from	  boring	   as	   both	  their	   livelihood	  and	  ability	   to	  gain	   justice	   for	   their	   client	  are	  at	   stake.	  For	   the	   judge,	   the	  documents	  map	  out	  the	  possible	  judgements.	  For	  litigants	  like	  Saida,	  her	  ‘fate’,	  lies	  in	  these	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assembled	  pages.	  In	  her	  words,	  the	  ‘maktoub’	  (that	  which	  is	  written	  by	  God,	  predestined,	  fate)	  may	  literally	  lie	  in	  the	  ‘maktoub’	  (that	  which	  is	  written,	  proof).	  
This	   chapter	   aims	   to	   respond	   to	   pleas	   made	   by	   scholars	  to	   take	   documents	  seriously	  by	  exploring	  a	  particular	  kind	  of	  legal	  document:	  the	  evidence	  provided	  in	  cases	  of	  divorce	  for	  harm	  (Latour	  2010;	  Riles	  2006).	  Whilst	  documents	  in	  general	  can	  be	  read	  in	  many	  ways	  (Riles	  2006),	   in	   law,	  documents	  are	   frequently	  read	   for	  what	   they	  can	  prove	  (Kelly	  2006,	  2012;	  Messick	  1989).	   In	   the	  Tunisian	  PSC,	  not	  only	  does	  evidence	  structure	  the	   kind	   of	   divorce	   available	   to	   a	   litigant,	   but	   it	   also	   serves	   as	   the	   basis	   for	   the	   divorce	  settlement,	  including	  any	  compensation	  payments	  awarded.	  	  
There	   are	   particular	   conditions	   to	   the	   documentary	   basis	   of	   Tunisia’s	   personal	  status	   law.	   Voorhoeve	   cites	   the	   restriction	   on	   the	   kind	   of	   evidence	   that	   is	   accepted	   in	  practice	   as	   being	   one	   factor	   that	   constrains	   judicial	   discretion	   and	   leads	   to	   the	  harmonisation	  of	   judgements	   in	  personal	   status	   law	   (2012).	  Legal	  documents	  enter	   into	  the	  process	  of	  reassembling	  the	  moral,	  but	  which	  forms	  of	  ‘harm’	  are	  easier	  to	  prove	  than	  others?	  	  
In	   the	   case	   files,	   as	   well	   as	   my	   interviews	   with	   judges,	   litigants	   and	   lawyers,	  ‘documents	  anticipate	  and	  enable	  certain	  actions	  by	  others’	   (Riles	  2006:	  21).	  We	  should	  ask	  then	  ‘how	  diverse	  types	  of	  agency	  are	  produced,	  185	  stretched	  or	  abbreviated	  through	  the	  medium	   of	   the	   documents’	   (ibid:	   21).	   Documents	   shape	   both	   the	   judge’s	   scope	   for	  interpretation	   as	   he	   makes	   his	   judgement	   and	   the	   strategies	   that	   can	   be	   deployed	   by	  litigants	  and	  their	  lawyers	  as	  they	  seek	  a	  favourable	  divorce	  settlement.	  	  
Seeing	   documents	   as	  mediums	   highlights	   their	   inherent	   uncertainty.	   Documents	  appear	  as	  liminal	  spaces;	  they	  are	  ‘mediations,	  their	  writers	  mediators	  between	  the	  …	  	  text	  of	  (the)	  law	  and	  the	  particular	  events	  of	  the	  world’	  (Messick	  1989:	  27);	  in	  short	  they	  are	  ‘fallible’	   (ibid:	   36).	  Kelly,	  writing	  on	   the	  use	  of	   fallible	   identity	  documents	   in	   an	   entirely	  different	  context	  (the	  second	  Palestinian	  intifada),	  found	  them	  to	  be	  ‘an	  unpredictable	  and	  unstable	  technique	  of	  governance,	  producing	  considerable	  anxiety	  for	  all	  those	  concerned’	  (2006:	  90).	  Drawing	  our	  attention	  to	  the	  processes	  by	  which	  documents	  are	  created	  and	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  they	  are	  used	  and	  interpreted,	  he	  found	  that:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
185	  This	  use	  of	  agency	  is	  to	  be	  distinguished	  from	  my	  use	  of	  it	  in	  this	  thesis,	  understood	  via	  Laidlaw.	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‘It	  is	  in	  the	  spaces	  created	  by	  the	  gaps	  in	  the	  law,	  rather	  than	  the	  law	  itself,	  that	  distinctions	  between	   Israelis	   and	   Palestinians	   are	   produced	   in	   everyday	   life	   [and	   that]	   suspicions	  therefore	  fill	  the	  gap	  between	  legal	  documents	  and	  their	  application’	  (ibid).	  
If	   these	   identity	   documents	   fail	   to	   provide	   certainty,	   it	   is	   also	   because	   they	   are	  being	   read	   in	   conjunction	  with	   bodies	   and	   appearances	   that	   are	   replete	  with	   their	   own	  duplicity.186	   In	   the	   process,	   certain	   prejudices	   are	   brought	   to	   bear	   and	   are	   reproduced	  with	  consequences	  for	  the	  individual	  endeavouring	  to	  access	  their	  rights.	  	  
As	   far	   as	   the	   final	   divorce	   judgement	   is	   concerned,	   the	   family	   judge	   must	   rule	  based	  on	  the	  case	  file	  alone,	  deprived	  of	  even	  the	  limited	  contextualisation	  provided	  when	  the	   litigants	  appeared	   in	  court	   in	  person	  for	   their	  reconciliation	  sessions	  (that	  may	  have	  been	  held	  by	  one	  of	  his	  colleagues).	  The	  judge	  is	  required	  to	  engage	  in	  the	  process	  I	  have	  called	   re-­‐contextualisation	   (chapter	   4)	   at	   a	   distance	   as	   he	   is	   confronted	  with	   ‘the	  world	  represented	  in	  the	  file’	  or,	   in	  Pottage’s	  words,	  the	  file	  as	  a	   ‘map	  of	  the	  world’	  (2004:	  21).	  This	  situation	  premised	  on	  the	  physical	  absence	  of	   litigants	  at	  the	  moment	  of	   judgement	  stands	   in	   stark	   contrast	   to	   the	   Moroccan	   system	   described	   by	   Rosen.	   Here,	   the	   qadi’s	  perceptions	   of	   ‘how	   people	   of	   the	   sort	   in	   front	   of	   him	   are	   expected	   by	   him	   to	   comport	  themselves’	   (2000:	  13)187	  are	  paramount	   to	   the	   judgement	  process	   in	  general	  and,	  more	  specifically,	   to	   his	   evaluation	   of	   the	   veracity	   of	   the	   documentary	   evidence	   that	   most	  frequently	   takes	   the	   form	   of	   witness	   statements.	   In	   this	   way,	   regimes	   of	   evidence	   are	  intimately	  connected	  with	  forms	  of	  sociality	  and	  perceptions	  of	  ethical	  personhood	  as	  the	  judge	   weighs	   up	   whom	   and	   whose	   evidence	   should	   be	   most	   trusted.	   Expressed	   in	  Lambek’s	   (2010)	   terms,	   the	   qadi	   combines	   judicial	   with	   judicious	   practice,	   exercising	  ordinary	  ethics	  in	  an	  extraordinary	  context.	  	  
Further	   detached	   from	   the	   contextualisation	   upon	   which	   moral	   judgement	   is	  contingent	   (Lambek	   2010),	   the	   Tunisian	   Family	   judge	   is,	   in	   the	   scope	   given	   to	   him	   for	  judicial	  discretion	   in	  the	  evaluation	  of	  harm	  and	  in	  the	  evaluation	  of	  evidence	   in	  divorce	  cases,	  nonetheless	  expected	  to	  combine	  judicious	  and	  judicial	  practice.188	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
186	  cf	  Bear	  on	  the	  duplicity	  of	  bodies	  and	  the	  uncertainties	  generated	  by	  the	  failure	  of	  documents	  to	  provide	  any	  
definitive	  proof	  of	  identity	  (2007a:	  208).	  
187	  My	  emphasis.	  
188	  Tunisian	  jurisprudence	  holds	  that	  the	  evaluation	  of	  evidence	  in	  divorce	  cases	  is	  left	  to	  judicial	  discretion	  (cf	  
Voorhoeve	  2012).	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What	  happens,	  then,	  when	  these	  fallible	  documents	  become	  the	  basis	  for	  both	  the	  judicial	   and	   the	   judicious	   practice	   that	   the	   judge	  must	   engage	   in	   as	   he	   rules	   on	   divorce	  cases?	  
‘Facts’,	  as	  Latour	  has	  suggested,	  and	  as	  Saida	  was	  slowly	  learning,	  ‘do	  not	  speak	  for	  themselves’	  (Latour	  2004:	  82).	  Only	  particular	  facts	  lend	  themselves	  to	  being	  woven	  into	  the	   	  ‘map’	   of	   the	   divorce	   file:	   those,	   which	   trigger	   the	   production	   of	   convincing,	   legally	  permissible	  evidence.	  	  This	  chapter	  looks	  at	  the	  types	  of	  evidence	  that	  are	  most	  convincing	  and	  that	  consequently	  constrain	  judicial	  discretion	  the	  most.	  	  
In	   the	  Tunisian	   context,	   rife	  with	   uncertainties,	  where	  Besma	   struggled	   to	   know	  whom	   to	   trust	   in	   the	   neighbourhood	   (chapter	   1)	   and	   where	   the	   judge	   shares	   similar	  concerns	   and	   suspicions	   even	   when	   the	   litigants	   are	   present	   in	   front	   of	   him	   in	   the	  reconciliation	   session	   (chapter	   4),	   which	   forms	   of	   evidence	   are	   most	   trusted?	   If	   some	  forms	   of	   evidence	   are	   more	   trusted	   than	   others,	   which	   moral	   criteria	   relating	   to	   good	  husbands	   and	   wives	   are	   reinforced	   by	   the	   most	   convincing	   forms	   of	   evidence	   in	   the	  practice	  of	  the	  law?	  
	  
MAKING	  EVIDENCE:	  LEGAL	  REQUIREMENTS	  
Evidence	  plays	  a	  central	  role	   in	  determining	  the	  type	  of	  divorce	   for	  which	  a	   litigant	  may	  file,	  notably	  to	  support	  claims	  that	  a	  litigant	  has	  suffered	  ‘harm’.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  divorce	  for	  harm,	  it	  must	  be	  proven	  in	  order	  for	  the	  divorce	  to	  be	  granted.	  ‘Harm’	  is	  also	  the	  basis	  for	  compensation	  payments	  both	   in	   cases	  of	  divorce	   for	  harm	  and	  divorce	  without	   grounds	  (that	   will	   be	   examined	   in	   more	   detail	   in	   chapter	   6).	   Crucially,	   these	   compensation	  payments	  do	  not	  always	  flow	  in	  the	  same	  direction;	  evidence	  is	  the	  weir	  that	  directs	  this	  flow.	  	  
A	  litigant	  requesting	  divorce	  for	  ‘harm’	  must	  prove	  the	  ‘harm’	  caused	  and	  can	  ask	  the	  husband	  or	  wife	  for	  compensation	  for	  this	  if	  successful;	  the	  settlement	  will	  be	  in	  his	  or	  her	   favour.	  A	   litigant	  requesting	  divorce	  without	  grounds	   is	  not	  required	   to	  provide	  any	  justification	   or	   evidence	   for	   their	   request.	   The	   litigant	   is,	   however,	   expected	   to	   pay	  compensation	  to	  their	  spouse,	  on	  whom	  they	  are	  effectively	  forcing	  an	  unwanted	  divorce;	  the	  financial	  settlement	  will	  be	  in	  their	  spouse’s	  favour.	  In	  practice,	  if	  a	  litigant	  is	  unable	  to	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prove	   the	  harm	  suffered	  with	   legal	  evidence,	  he	  or	  she	  may	  be	   forced	   to	  ask	   for	  divorce	  without	  grounds.	  In	  this	  case,	  it	  is	  in	  the	  interest	  of	  the	  litigant	  to	  attempt	  to	  persuade	  the	  court	   that	   his	   or	   her	   demand	   is	   really	   based	   on	   harm,	   in	   the	   hope	   of	   reducing	   the	  compensation,	  which	  must	  be	  paid	  to	  the	  other	  party.	  Therefore,	  both	  spouses	  frequently	  attempt	  to	  provide	  evidence	  to	  show	  that	  he	  or	  she	  has	  suffered	  the	  greatest	  harm	  due	  to	  the	   divorce	   in	   the	   hope	   of	   gaining	   a	   more	   favourable	   settlement;	   this	   is	   central	   in	  structuring	  the	  acrimonious	  game	  of	  ping-­‐pong	  that	  is	  played	  out	  between	  litigants	  in	  the	  files.	  	  
As	   I	   selected	   them	   from	   the	   shelf,	   the	   files	   themselves	   provided	   a	   visual	   clue,	  signalling	   things	   to	  me	  about	   the	  case	   inside.	  War-­‐torn,	  bulging	   files,	   thick	  with	  pages	  of	  contradicting	   evidence	   and	   correspondence,	   fast	   becoming	   tattered	   and	   bursting	   out	   of	  their	   yellow	   jackets,	   reliably	   announced	   the	   months	   or	   years	   of	   pain	   and	   heartache	  depicted	  inside.	  A	  thick	  file	  was	  generally	  a	  long	  and	  complicated	  one	  and	  was	  typically	  for	  harm,	   or	   potentially	   divorce	   without	   grounds;	   in	   contrast,	   files	   for	   mutual	   consent	  contained	   but	   the	   few	   essential	   sheets	   of	   documentation	   required	   and	   generally	   looked	  neat	  and	  new,	  having	  spent	  less	  time	  circulating	  between	  various	  court	  offices.	  	  
	  
Saida	  (2)	  
Saida	   had	   already	   been	   through	   two	   failed	   divorce	   cases,	   both	   initiated	   by	   her	  
husband.	   His	   first	   case,	   for	   harm,	   in	   which	   he	   accused	   her	   of	   being	   violent	   to	   his	  
mother,	  was	  rejected	  by	  the	  court	  due	  to	  lack	  of	  evidence.	  In	  the	  second	  case,	  he	  filed	  
for	  a	  divorce	  without	  grounds.	  This	   case	  was	   littered	  with	  accusations	  against	  her,	  
including	  adultery,	  as	  she	  had	  allegedly	  declared	  in	  public	  that	  he	  was	  not	  the	  father	  
of	   their	   son.	   She	   refuted	   this	   and	   began	   claiming	   substantial	   material	   and	   moral	  
damage	  payments,	  based	  on	  his	  generous	   income	  as	  the	  owner	  of	  his	  own	  business.	  
Unwilling	   to	   pay	   her	   any	   money,	   he	   dropped	   the	   case,	   telling	   the	   court	   that	   he	  
wanted	  to	  stay	  with	  his	  wife	  and	  son.	  In	  reality,	  neither	  spouse	  wished	  to	  remain	  in	  
the	  marriage.	  The	  main	  impact	  of	  this	  second	  reconciliation	  was	  for	  Saida	  to	  lose	  the	  
rent	  allowance	  that	  the	  court	  had	  allocated	  her	  during	  the	  divorce	  proceedings;	  the	  
‘reconciled’	  couple	  were	  assumed	  to	  have	  resumed	  married	  life	  under	  the	  same	  roof.	  
The	   rent	  allowance	  had	  been	  essential	   since	  her	   family	   lived	   far	   from	  Tunis,	  and	   it	  
was	  not	  an	  option	  for	  her	  to	  live	  with	  them,	  as	  divorcing	  women	  typically	  do.	  As	  they	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did	   not	   resume	  marital	   life,	   she	   was	   left	   living	   in	   highly	   precarious	   circumstances	  
with	  no	  fixed	  income	  to	  support	  herself.	  She	  was	  compelled	  to	  file	  a	  case	  to	  force	  him	  
to	  pay	  her	  maintenance.189	  	  
	  
Let	  us	  now	  focus	  on	  divorce	  for	  harm,190	  in	  which	  the	  entire	  case	  hangs	  upon	  the	  presence	  of	   legal	   evidence.	   We	   shall	   examine	   the	   form	   that	   this	   evidence	   can	   take	   and	   the	  procedures	  required	  to	  produce	  evidence	  that	   is	   legally	  valid	  and	  acts	  as	  a	  constraint	  on	  the	  judge’s	  discretion.	  
SOME	  KINDS	  OF	  EVIDENCE	  ARE	  MORE	  TRUSTWORTHY	  THAN	  OTHERS	  
	  ‘What	   the	   wife	   said	   contains	   no	   truth.	   The	   husband	   does	   carry	   out	   his	   marital	   duties	  according	   to	   custom	  and	  habit.	  Whoever	  alleges	  harm,	  must	  provide	  evidence	   for	   it.	  The	  current	   file	   is	   devoid	   of	   any	   proof	   of	   harm	   such	   as	   a	   penal	   case	   or	   final	   judgement.’	  	  (A	  husband’s	  lawyer	  writing	  in	  defence	  of	  his	  client	  in	  a	  divorce	  file	  after	  his	  wife	  filed	  for	  divorce	  for	  harm)	  
Tunisian	   law	   is	   strongly	   focussed	   on	   the	   ‘maktoub’,	   the	   documents,	   as	   opposed	   to	   oral	  forms	  of	  evidence,	  the	  divorce	   judgement	  being	  based	  exclusively	  on	  the	  written	  divorce	  file.	  It	  was	  these	  files	  that	  I	  was	  able	  to	  examine	  in	  the	  court	  office.	  It	  is	  the	  written	  file	  that	  will	   be	  passed	  on	   to	   the	  Court	   of	  Appeal	   and	   assessed	  by	   the	   judge’s	   colleagues,	   should	  either	  spouse	  appeal	  his	  decision.	  
This	  lawyer191	  sums	  up	  the	  key	  problems	  facing	  a	  litigant	  trying	  to	  file	  for	  divorce	  for	  harm;	  although	  all	  forms	  of	  legal	  evidence	  are	  theoretically	  permitted	  in	  divorce	  cases,	  jurisprudence	   holds	   that	   only	   final	   judgments	   can	   justify	   divorce	   for	   harm.	   These	   are,	  therefore,	  the	  ones	  that	  speak	  loudest	  to	  the	  judge	  and	  may	  restrict	  his	  judicial	  discretion	  more	  than	  others.	  Nonetheless,	  other	   forms	  of	  evidence,	  although	   less	  authoritative,	   find	  their	  way	  into	  divorce	  files	  and	  are	  worth	  brief	  consideration.	  
If	  the	  validity	  of	  evidence	  is	  connected	  with	  webs	  of	  sociality,	  it	  follows	  that	  given	  the	  increased	  illegibility	  of	  ethical	  personhood	  (chapter	  1),	  the	  use	  of	  witnessing	  (Wuerth	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
189	  This	  procedure	  is	  examined	  in	  more	  detail	  below.	  
190	  Chapter	  6	  discusses	  cases	  of	  divorce	  without	  grounds.	  
191	  It	  is	  not	  compulsory	  to	  use	  a	  lawyer	  in	  divorce	  cases.	  However,	  given	  the	  difficulties	  of	  evidence,	  lawyers	  were	  
frequently	  used,	  in	  particular	  for	  the	  more	  complex	  cases	  based	  on	  documentary	  evidence.	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1998;	  Mir-­‐Hosseini	   1993;	   Osanloo	   2009),	   including	   notarised	  witness	   statements	   of	   the	  kind	   that	   were	   so	   prevalent	   in	   Rosen’s	   Moroccan	   context	   (2000),	   were	   almost	   entirely	  absent	  in	  my	  Tunisian	  case	  files.	  Two	  or	  more	  witnesses	  may	  prepare	  a	  written	  statement	  in	   the	   court	   or	   in	   front	   of	   a	   notary.	   The	   Judge	   was	   aware	   of	   the	   difficulty	   of	   finding	  witnesses	  in	  personal	  status	  cases.	  Contemporary	  forms	  of	  sociality	  in	  the	  urban	  setting	  of	  Ben	   Arous	   do	   not	   lend	   themselves	   to	   witnesses	   being	   present	   during	   marital	   disputes.	  Furthermore,	  in	  Ben	  Ali’s	  dictatorship,	  although	  neighbours	  sometimes	  intervened	  to	  help	  resolve	  marital	  disputes,	  people	  were	  reluctant	   to	  become	   involved	  with	  a	  court	  case	  or	  issues	   involving	   the	  police.	  Consequently,	  witnesses	  were	   rarely	   forthcoming	  and	   it	  was	  unusual	  to	  find	  such	  evidence	  in	  divorce	  files.	  
Rather	  than	  appealing	  to	  the	  judge’s	  perceptions	  of	  ethical	  personhood	  and	  who	  is	  likely	  to	  tell	  the	  truth,	  the	  most	  authoritative	  evidence	  rests	  on	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  state	  itself.	   It	   is	  possible	  to	  echo	  Messick	   in	  noting	  that	  alongside	  changes	   in	  the	  nature	  of	   the	  Tunisian	  polity,	  ‘the	  weight	  of	  authority	  shifted	  from	  the	  notary	  to	  the	  state’	  (1989:	  34).	  
When	  I	  asked	  the	  Family	  Judge	  about	  ‘harm’	  and	  the	  acceptable	  means	  of	  proof,	  he	  echoed	   jurisprudence,	   telling	   me	   that	   there	   must	   always	   be	   something	   ‘final’:	   a	   final	  judgement	   which	   was	   no	   longer	   subject	   to	   appeal	   and	   which	   was	   not	   delivered	   in	   the	  absence	  of	  the	  defendant	  (implying	  a	  longer	  appeal	  period).	  The	  evidence	  he	  trusts	  most	  is	  that	  which	  bears	  the	  seal	  of	  approval	  of	  a	  state	  court	  and	  the	  guarantee	  that	  a	  fellow	  judge	  will	   have	   followed	   the	   appropriate	   procedures	   to	   validate	   that	   judgement.	   In	   practice,	  then,	  authority	  lies	  both	  in	  the	  author	  and	  in	  the	  procedures.	  
The	  Family	  Judge	  continued	  to	  explain	  that	  harm	  may	  be	  proven	  by	   ‘all	  means	  of	  proof’,	   all	   of	   which	   must	   be	   backed	   up	   in	   some	   way	   by	   the	   authority	   of	   the	   state.	  Declarations	   made	   in	   front	   of	   the	   judge	   and	   recorded	   (for	   instance,	   during	   the	  reconciliation	  sessions)	  are	  considered	  binding,	  although	  a	  majority	  of	  litigants	  appeared	  aware	  enough	  of	  this	  fact	  to	  avoid	  making	  incriminating	  statements	  in	  his	  presence.	  	  
A	   far	   more	   widespread	   form	   of	   evidence,	   prolific	   in	   the	   divorce	   files,	   was	   that	  authored	  by	  notaries.	  The	  trust	  placed	  in	  notaries	  (‘udul,	   ‘just	  men’)	  as	  expert	  witnesses,	  long	   present	   in	   the	   Maliki	   school	   of	   jurisprudence	   prevalent	   in	   North	   Africa,192	   is	   now	  predicated	  on	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  state;	  notaries	  are	  public	  officials,	  whose	  honesty	  must	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
192	  See	  Messick	  1989	  for	  fuller	  discussion	  of	  the	  use	  of	  notaries	  and	  written	  versus	  oral	  evidence	  in	  Islamic	  legal	  
traditions.	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not	  be	  doubted.193	  This	  evidence	  nonetheless	  has	  considerable	  limitations,	  as	  it	  is	  only	  able	  to	  say	  certain	  things;	  it	  can	  speak	  of	  specific	  facts	  (the	  furniture	  in	  the	  room	  was	  broken),	  but	   not	   of	   the	   all-­‐important	   authors	   or	   their	   intentions	   (the	   husband	   or	  wife	   broke	   the	  furniture	  in	  a	  fit	  of	  rage).	  
Finally,	  medical	  certificates,	  another	   frequent	   inclusion	   in	  the	  divorce	   files,	  suffer	  from	  similar	  weaknesses	  to	  those	  of	  statements	  by	  notaries.	  They	  can	  attest	  to	  the	  physical	  damage	  suffered,	  but	  do	  not	  identify	  the	  author	  of	  the	  violence.	  In	  addition,	  greater	  trust	  is	  placed	  in	  certificates	  issued	  by	  public	  doctors,	  as	  opposed	  to	  private	  doctors	  who	  are	  paid	  by	  their	  clients.	  Medical	  certificates	  are	  not	  without	  suspicion,	  thanks	  to	  the	  ‘creative’	  use	  of	   such	   evidence	   by	   some	   litigants.	   A	   lawyer	   told	  me	   about	   a	  woman	  who	   had	   suffered	  considerable	  injuries	  in	  a	  car	  accident.	  She	  acquired	  a	  medical	  certificate	  listing	  the	  bones	  broken	  and	  stitches	  needed	  and	  hid	  it	   in	  a	  drawer.	  Some	  months	  later,	  she	  had	  a	  serious	  dispute	  with	  her	  husband	  and	  used	  this	  medical	  certificate	  to	  try	  to	   file	   for	  a	  divorce	  for	  harm.	  In	  this	  case,	  her	  subterfuge	  was	  quickly	  unveiled	  but	  abusive	  acts	  such	  as	  this	  do	  not	  help	  the	   judge	  trust	   this	  kind	  of	  evidence.	  Also,	  as	  we	  will	  see	  below,	   it	   is	   the	  role	  of	   the	  penal	  judge,	  and	  not	  the	  family	  judge,	  to	  assess	  the	  evidence	  and	  rule	  on	  cases	  of	  domestic	  violence,	  thereby	  producing	  a	  penal	  judgement	  that	  could	  be	  used	  in	  a	  case	  of	  divorce	  for	  harm.	  194	  
	  
Saida	  (3)	  
Saida’s	  husband’s	  first	  divorce	  case	  for	  harm	  was	  rejected.	  The	  only	  evidence	  he	  had	  
against	  her	  was	  a	  judgement	  for	  violence	  that	  was	  not	  final	  since	  it	  had	  been	  ruled	  in	  
her	  absence.	  She	  had	  been	  sentenced	  to	  one	  month	   in	  prison	  for	  hitting	  his	  mother,	  
who	  had	  a	  medical	  certificate	  stating	  that	  she	  needed	  45	  days	  rest	  as	  a	  result	  of	  her	  
injuries.	  Saida	  vehemently	  denies	  this.	  	  
Saida	   received	   considerable	   moral	   and	   material	   support	   from	   various	   neighbours	  
who	  had	  become	  friends.	  As	  they	  provided	  tea,	  sympathy,	  a	  break	  from	  caring	  for	  her	  
boisterous	   toddler	   alone	   and	   the	   chance	   to	   earn	   some	  money	   doing	   odd	   jobs,	   they	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
193	  See	  Charfi	  for	  a	  detailed	  discussion	  of	  the	  use	  of	  evidence	  in	  civil	  law	  cases	  (1997:	  252-­‐256).	  
194	  In	  her	  study	  of	  Court	  of	  First	  Instance	  in	  Tunis	  (2008-­‐2009),	  Voorhoeve	  similarly	  found	  that	  judges	  were	  cautious	  
when	  considering	  evidence	  of	  domestic	  violence	  in	  cases	  of	  divorce	  for	  harm	  due	  to	  their	  suspicions	  about	  various	  
kinds	  of	  fraud	  (2012:205).	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witnessed	  her	  suffering	  and	  poor	  living	  conditions.	  It	  was	  never	  suggested,	  however,	  
that	   any	   of	   these	   people	   could	   be	   witnesses	   in	   her	   divorce	   case.	   To	   support	   her	  
current	  divorce	   case	   for	  harm,	   she	  had	  obtained	  a	   judgement	  against	  her	  husband	  
for	  domestic	  violence.	  He	  used	  to	  beat	  her,	   she	  told	  me.	  As	  she	  held	  her	  baby	   in	  her	  
arms	   to	   protect	   herself,	   he	   beat	   her	   around	   the	   head	   causing	   her	   headaches	   that	  
continue	  to	  this	  day.	  She	  believed	  that	  this	  was	  a	  final	  judgement.	  Her	  husband	  had	  
been	   sentenced	   to	   prison	   for	   six	  months,	   yet	   he	   never	  went	   to	   prison;	   the	   sentence	  
was	  commuted	  to	  a	  fine.	  Was	  this	  a	  ‘final	  judgement’	  as	  required	  by	  the	  judge?	  By	  the	  
time	  I	  left	  the	  field,	  the	  status	  of	  this	  evidence	  was	  still	  not	  clear,	  even	  though	  Saida	  
questioned	   multiple	   lawyers	   about	   it,	   sometimes	   in	   my	   presence.	   She	   appeared	  
convinced	  that	  her	  evidence	  would	  speak	  to	  the	  judge	  and	  she	  would	  find	  her	  rights.	  
	  
As	   opposed	   to	   the	   theoretical	   legal	   rule	   that	   ‘all	  means	   of	   proof’	   are	   accepted,	   a	  hierarchy	   of	   types	   of	   evidence	   emerges,	   which	   speak	   more	   or	   less	   persuasively	   to	   the	  judge,	  the	  most	  authoritative	  being	  those	  produced	  by	  the	  state.	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It	  follows	  from	  these	  uncertainties	  surrounding	  evidence	  that	  judges	  did	  not	  like	  cases	  of	  divorce	   for	   harm,	   which	   all	   too	   often	   end	   in	   rejection	   by	   the	   court	   due	   to	   a	   failure	   to	  provide	   convincing	   evidence.	   Of	   the	   51	   divorce	   files	   for	   harm	   that	   I	   examined,	   only	   16	  were	  accepted	  by	  the	  court,	  whereas	  20	  were	  rejected.195	  By	  comparison,	  of	  the	  81	  cases	  of	  divorce	  without	  grounds,	  only	  4	  were	  rejected	  (on	  procedural	  grounds).	  This	  section	  will	  explore	  which	  grounds	  underlie	  the	  successful	  and	  unsuccessful	  cases;	  in	  particular,	  it	  will	  highlight	  how	  these	  differ	  along	  gendered	  lines.	  Which	  grounds	  for	  divorce	  leave	  litigants	  in	   a	   stronger	   position	   with	   greater	   certainty	   as	   to	   the	   outcome	   of	   their	   divorce	   case?	  Which	   forms	   of	   harm	   can	   be	   backed	   up	   by	   the	  most	   authoritative	   final	   judgements?	   In	  other	  words,	  how	  is	  ‘harm’	  defined	  in	  law	  when	  we	  take	  the	  need	  to	  produce	  evidence	  into	  account?	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
195	  Of	  the	  remainder,	  6	  couples	  agreed	  to	  divorce	  by	  consent,	  6	  litigants	  changed	  the	  type	  of	  their	  divorce	  to	  divorce	  
without	  grounds	  and	  3	  couples	  reconciled.	  My	  sense	  is	  that	  these	  couples	  most	  likely	  reconciled	  as	  the	  litigant,	  like	  
Saida’s	  husband,	  was	  unwilling	  to	  change	  his	  demand	  to	  one	  for	  divorce	  without	  grounds	  (at	  the	  risk	  of	  paying	  
compensation)	  and	  as	  the	  couple	  were	  unable	  to	  agree	  to	  divorce	  by	  mutual	  consent.	  It	  would	  not	  be	  surprising	  if,	  
like	  Saida	  and	  her	  husband,	  these	  couples	  returned	  to	  the	  divorce	  court	  in	  the	  future.	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Article	   23’s	   subjectivity	   does	   not	   lend	   itself	   to	   the	   production	   of	   legally	   valid	  evidence.	  It	  is	  not	  surprising,	  then,	  that	  the	  key	  marital	  duties	  that	  tend	  to	  lead	  to	  divorce	  for	  harm	  are	  backed	  up	  by	  specific	  laws	  and	  procedures	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  legal	  code196	  that	  allow	  for	  the	  production	  of	  evidence.	  The	  authority	  attributed	  to	  the	  evidence	  produced	  in	  each	  case,	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  the	  judge	  is	  inclined	  to	  view	  that	  evidence	  with	  suspicion,	  is	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  procedures	  used	  to	  generate	  it.	  
The	  two	  main	  reciprocal	  duties	  viewed	  in	  this	  light	  are	  fidelity	  and	  the	  absence	  of	  violence,	  both	  of	  which	  are	  the	  subject	  of	  legislation	  in	  the	  penal	  code.	  However,	  Narjes,	  a	  lawyer	  who	   frequently	  worked	  on	  divorce	   cases,	   lamented	   that,	   other	   than	   catching	   the	  couple	  in	  flagrante	  delicto,	  adultery	  is	  particularly	  difficult	  to	  prove.	  The	  female	  body	  may	  end	  up	  providing	   this	  evidence	   in	   the	   form	  of	  pregnancy	  or	  childbirth;	  new	  DNA	   testing	  used	  to	  prove	  paternity	  also	  opens	  men	  up	  to	  being	  exposed	  as	  adulterers	  by	  the	  birth	  of	  a	  child.	  
Although	  both	   violence	   and	   adultery	  have	   the	  potential	   to	   produce	   authoritative	  forms	  of	  evidence,	  it	  remains	  to	  be	  seen	  whether	  litigants	  are	  able	  or	  willing	  to	  go	  through	  the	  procedures	  necessary	   to	  produce	   them.	  Equally,	  although	   these	  could	  be	  seen	  as	   the	  most	  definitive	  forms	  of	  harm,	  even	  when	  a	  final	  judgement	  has	  been	  produced,	  spaces	  for	  litigants	  to	  exercise	  different	  strategies	  are	  nonetheless	  opened	  up	  and	  may	  not	  lead	  to	  the	  results	  expected.	  
In	   considering	   the	   authority	   of	   evidence	   and	   how	   it	   shapes	   the	   strategies	   of	  litigants,	  there	  is	  a	  further	  dimension	  worthy	  of	  exploration,	  that	  of	  emotion.	  	  Bear’s	  work	  on	   railway	   archives	   in	   India	   signals	   a	   further	   dimension	   of	   documentary	   practices,	  highlighting	  the	  longings,	  desires	  and	  needs	  of	  her	  informants	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  feeling	  of	  uncertainty	   and	   anxiety	   produced	   by	   their	   fallible	   documents	   (2007a).	   Emotions	   of	   the	  litigants,	   of	   court	   staff	   and	   of	   the	   judge,	   often	   disappear	   in	   court-­‐based	   ethnographies,	  although	   work	   based	   outside	   the	   court	   has	   revealed	   these	   veiled	   sentiments	   and	   the	  strong	  emotions	  surrounding	  marriage	  and	  divorce	  (Abu	  Lughod	  1986:	  224-­‐227).	  	  
Strong	  emotions	  were	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  Ramzi’s	  story	  as	  told	  to	  me	  by	  a	  court	  clerk.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
196	  cf	  chapter	  4	  for	  a	  detailed	  discussion	  of	  the	  legal	  dispositions	  which	  play	  a	  role	  in	  defining	  ‘marital	  duties’	  and	  
‘harm’	  in	  divorce	  cases.	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   Ramzi	  
Ramzi	  had	  been	  married	  for	  20	  years	  and	  had	  three	  sons,	  when	  he	  discovered	  that	  he	  
suffered	  from	  a	  chronic	  illness.	  His	  doctor	  told	  him	  that	  this	  illness	  meant	  that	  he	  had	  
always	  been	  infertile.	  Surprised,	  he	  told	  the	  doctor	  that	  this	  was	  impossible	  as	  he	  had	  
several	   children.	   The	   doctor	   regretfully	   informed	   him	   that	   he	   could	   not	   be	   their	  
father.	   A	   DNA	   test	   confirmed	   the	   bad	   news	   and	   could	   have	   provided	   evidence	   to	  
prove	  his	  wife’s	   infidelity	  and	  to	  justify	  a	  divorce	  for	  harm.	  Court	  staff	  witnessed	  an	  
emotional,	   tear-­stained	  scene	   in	  which	  the	  children	  told	  him	  that	  they	   loved	  him	  as	  
the	   only	   father	   that	   they	   had	   ever	   known.	   The	   court	   clerks	   were	   impressed	   with	  
Ramzi’s	   capacity	   for	   forgiveness,	   since	  he	  decided	   to	   reconcile	  with	  his	  wife	   for	   the	  
sake	  of	  his	  family.	  
	  
Emotions	  play	  their	  part	  in	  a	  litigant’s	  reasoning	  and	  in	  determining	  whether	  they	  are	   able	   and	   willing	   to	   pursue	   a	   particular	   course	   of	   action,	   even	   with	   documentary	  evidence.	   Considering	   emotion	   in	   this	  way,	   in	   juxtaposition	   to	   evidence	   that	   frames	   but	  does	   not	   constrain	   actions,	   helps	   draw	   out	   the	   creativity	   of	   the	   human	   actors	   involved	  alongside	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  documents.	  	  
Litigants	   may	   use	   this	   creativity	   differently	   as	   their	   strategies	   are	   necessarily	  gendered.	  Their	  strategies	  are	   framed,	   if	  not	  determined,	  by	  the	   legal	  code	  that	  provides	  the	   most	   clarity	   and	   the	   clearest	   procedures	   for	   the	   production	   of	   legally	   permissible	  evidence	  to	  show	  a	  husband’s,	  rather	  than	  a	  wife’s,	  failure	  to	  perform	  his	  marital	  duties.	  
	  
DOCUMENTING	  BAD	  HUSBANDS:	  A	  HUSBAND’S	  DUTY	  TO	  PROVIDE	  MAINTENANCE	  
As	   discussed	   above,197	   a	   husband’s	   main	   marital	   duty	   is	   to	   provide	   for	   his	   wife	   and	  children	  (nafaqa).	  Various	  procedures	  are	  in	  place	  to	  ensure	  that	  a	  wife	  who	  is	  denied	  this	  vital	   living	  allowance	  can	  make	  a	  claim	  rapidly	   to	   the	  court	   to	   force	  her	  husband	  to	  pay.	  	  These	  cases	  take	  between	  2	  weeks	  and	  3	  months	  to	  reach	  a	  judgement.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
197	  See	  chapter	  4.	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Nafaqa	   cases	   are	   heard	   in	   the	   cantonal	   court,	   selected	   due	   to	   its	   accessibility	   to	  litigants;	   as	   a	   local	   court,	   the	   procedures	   are	   deemed	   easier,	   their	   cost	   is	   low	   and	   no	  lawyer	  is	  required.	  A	  case	  may	  be	  launched	  by	  the	  wife	  making	  a	  simple	  verbal	  complaint	  to	  the	  cantonal	  judge	  that	  she	  is	  lacking	  maintenance	  and	  showing	  her	  marriage	  contract	  to	  prove	  that	  she	  is	  married.	  
How	   does	   the	   court	   ascertain	   whether	   a	   husband	   is	   failing	   to	   provide	  maintenance?	   The	   court	   begins	   with	   the	   presumption	   that	   if	   a	   wife	   comes	   to	   ask	   for	  maintenance,	   then	   he	   is	   not	   providing	   for	   her.	   Her	   words	   are	   backed	   up	   by	   two	  procedures,	   although	   the	   burden	   of	   proof	   rests	   on	   the	   husband	   to	   demonstrate	   that	   he	  does	  pay.	  First,	  the	  cantonal	  judge	  can	  ask	  a	  social	  worker	  to	  visit	  the	  marital	  home	  and	  to	  provide	  what	  the	  judge	  called	  ‘real	  information’.	  Second,	  the	  husband	  will	  be	  summoned	  to	  a	  meeting	  with	  the	  judge,	  where	  he	  may	  also	  bring	  his	  pay	  slips	  or	  any	  other	  evidence	  of	  his	   financial	   resources	   such	   as	   tax	   returns,	   a	   second	   home	   or	   a	   pension.	   Some	   of	   these	  documents	  may	  prove	  elusive;	   for	   instance,	  many	  men	  are	  self-­‐employed	  and	  would	  not	  receive	   an	   official	   payslip.	   An	   absence	   of	   official	   documentation	   to	   prove	   the	   husband’s	  income	  is	  a	  frequent	  difficulty	  for	  these	  men	  and	  for	  the	  judge,	  who	  must	  take	  a	  decision	  about	  the	  appropriate	  level	  of	  maintenance	  payments	  that	  the	  husband	  will	  be	  required	  to	  pay.	  One	  judge	  explained:	  
‘The	  woman	  has	  all	  the	  rights.	  There	  is	  a	  presumption	  that	  he	  is	  guilty	  and	  he	  must	  prove	  the	  contrary.	  As	  for	  the	  wife,	  it	  is	  something	  negative	  –	  how	  could	  she	  prove	  he	  does	  not	  do	  something?	  She	  cannot	  prove	  that	  he	  does	  not	  pay.	  So	  a	  nafaqa	  case	  is	  easy	  for	  a	  woman.	  There	  is	  a	  90%	  guaranteed	  result.’	  
Many	   of	   the	   women	  who	   initiate	   these	   cases	   are	   in	   genuine	   need.	   However,	   an	  awareness	  of	  the	  ease	  of	  such	  a	  claim	  and	  that	  such	  a	  judgement	  can	  be	  used	  as	  evidence	  in	  divorce	  cases,	  leads	  some	  women	  to	  take	  out	  these	  cases	  and	  store	  the	  judgements	  ‘just	  in	  case’,	  to	  use	  as	  a	  weapon	  to	  pressurise	  their	  husband	  or	  to	  file	  for	  divorce	  in	  the	  future.	  Conversely,	   some	   women	   in	   genuine	   need	   refrain	   from	   taking	   their	   impoverished	  husbands	  to	  court.	  
What	   if	   the	   husband	   does	   not	   pay	   the	   amount	   awarded	   by	   the	   judge	   as	  maintenance?	  
Once	   a	   wife	   has	   a	   nafaqa	   judgement	   in	   hand,	   there	   are	   various	   procedures	  available	   to	   enforce	   the	   sentence.	   The	   one	   relevant	   here,	   evidence	   of	   which	   is	   used	   in	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divorce	   cases,	   is	   the	   penal	   sanction	   which	   men	   are	   subject	   to	   if	   they	   fail	   to	   pay	  maintenance	   for	   more	   than	   one	   month.198	   Repaying	   the	   debt	   to	   his	   wife	   releases	   a	  husband	  from	  his	  prison	  sentence,	  which	  may	  range	   from	  3	  months	  to	  1	  year.	  Crucial	   to	  the	  current	  argument,	  once	  a	  husband	  is	  in	  prison	  for	  failing	  in	  what	  could	  be	  seen	  as	  the	  ultimate	  male	   duty,	   various	   documents	   (judgement	   for	  nafaqa,	   judgement	   for	   failure	   to	  pay	   nafaqa)	   will	   have	   been	   produced	   that,	   stamped	   with	   the	   seal	   of	   the	   court	   and	   his	  colleague’s	   approval	   and	   prior	   investigation,	   speak	   very	   loudly	   indeed	   to	   the	   divorce	  judge.	  
IN	  THE	  FILES:	  DIVORCE	  FOR	  HARM	  INITIATED	  BY	  THE	  WIFE	  
Failure	   to	   pay	  nafaqa	   could	   be	   seen	   as	   directly,	   or	   indirectly,	   related	   to	   all	   the	   cases	   of	  divorce	  for	  harm	  in	  my	  sample.	  
It	  is	  no	  coincidence	  that	  all	  of	  the	  13	  successful	  cases	  of	  divorce	  for	  harm	  initiated	  by	  women	   included	   evidence	   of	   at	   least	   one	  other	   court	   case.	  Nine	   of	   these	   fulfilled	   the	  ideal	  of	  including	  a	  final	  judgement.	  In	  five	  cases	  the	  husband	  was	  in	  prison	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  divorce.	  A	  sixth	  husband	  would	  have	  been	  in	  prison	  for	  not	  paying	  nafaqa	  had	  he	  not	  been	   living	   in	   the	   US.	   Three	   husbands	  were	   in	   prison	   for	   crimes	   related	   to	   their	  wives	  (adultery,	  violence	  and	  failure	  to	  pay	  nafaqa).	  Four	  were	  in	  prison	  for	  crimes	  unrelated	  to	  their	   wives	   (sexual	   abuse	   of	   a	   minor,	   drugs-­‐related	   offences,	   bank-­‐robbery).	   The	   last	  husband	  attempted	  to	  defend	  himself	  by	  claiming	  that	  the	  bank	  had	  been	  harmed	  and	  not	  his	  wife,	  but	  the	  court	  was	  apparently	  unconvinced.	  In	  any	  case,	  an	  imprisoned	  husband	  is	  necessarily	  failing	  in	  his	  duty	  to	  provide	  nafaqa,	  itself	  grounds	  for	  divorce.	  
The	   remaining	   three	   successful	   cases	   included	   other	   court	   cases	   still	   in	   process.	  Strikingly	  all	  these	  cases	  involved	  domestic	  violence.	  In	  one	  instance,	  the	  husband,	  who	  a	  medical	   certificate	   stated	  was	  mentally	   ill,	   had	   allegedly	   attacked	   his	   wife	  with	   a	   knife.	  Although	   it	   is	   the	   purview	   of	   the	   penal	   judge,	   rather	   than	   the	   family	   judge,	   to	   rule	   on	  matters	  of	  domestic	  violence,	  in	  allowing	  the	  divorce	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  final	  judgement,	  it	  seems	  that	  the	  judge	  acted	  to	  remove	  these	  wives	  from	  immediate	  danger.	  
In	   all	   8	   unsuccessful	   cases	   for	   harm	   initiated	   by	   wives,	   final	   judgements,	   or	  evidence	  of	  any	  other	  court	   judgement,	  were	  absent.	  Several	  used	  medical	  certificates	  as	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
198	  PSC,	  Article	  53bis.	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evidence	  of	  domestic	  violence;	  sadly,	   it	   is	  simply	  not	  the	  role	  of	  the	  divorce	  judge	  to	  rule	  on	  what	  would	  be	  a	  matter	  for	  the	  penal	  court.	  	  
This	  picture	  of	  which	  pieces	  of	  evidence	  speak	  convincingly	  of	  a	  bad	  husband	  is	  in	  harmony	  with	  that	  painted	  by	  Souad,	  a	  female	  lawyer,	  experienced	  in	  defending	  battered	  wives.	   Although	   legal	   procedures	   are	   available	   to	   prove	   domestic	   violence,	   they	   are	   not	  always	  accessible	  or	  desirable.	  She	  was	  often	  forced	  to	  ask	  clients	  whether	  they	  preferred	  a	   long	  period	  of	  uncertainty	  with	  a	  violent	  husband	  or	  whether	  they	  would	  prefer	  to	  file	  for	  divorce	  quickly	  without	  grounds,	  at	  the	  risk	  of	  having	  to	  pay	  their	  husbands	  damages.	  Divorce	  without	  grounds	  is	  often	  the	  default	  divorce	  option	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  evidence.	  As	  taking	  the	  husband	  to	  court	  for	  violence	  could	  take	  between	  3	  and	  9	  months,	  many	  wives	  opted	   for	   the	   quicker	   choice.	   Souad	   explained	   that	   the	   procedures	   could	   be	   drawn	   out	  even	  longer	  if	  the	  husband	  was	  tried	  in	  his	  absence,	  entitling	  him	  to	  five	  years	  in	  which	  to	  appeal.	  Only	  after	  this	  could	  she	  use	  the	  judgement	  as	  evidence.	  Whilst	  we	  have	  seen	  in	  the	  above	  cases	  related	  to	  domestic	  violence	  where	  no	   final	   judgement	  was	  present	   that	   the	  court	  can	  be	  sympathetic,	  we	  do	  not	  know	  whether	  those	  decisions	  were	  later	  reversed	  in	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal.	  
	  
Saida	  (4)	  
As	   part	   of	   her	   arsenal	   of	   evidence	   against	   her	   husband,	   Saida	   has	   a	   judgement	  
against	  him	  for	  failure	  to	  pay	  nafaqa.	  However,	  she	  talks	  about	  this	  more	  in	  terms	  of	  
her	  relief	  that	  he	  is	  now	  forced	  to	  pay	  her,	  rather	  than	  the	  role	  this	  may	  play	  in	  her	  
divorce	  case.	  
About	   the	   same	   time	  as	   she	   filed	   for	  divorce	   for	  harm,	  her	  husband	  had	   initiated	  a	  
case	   for	   divorce	   without	   grounds.	   Since	   dropping	   his	   previous	   case	   for	   divorce	  
without	  grounds,	  he	  had	  found	  another	  woman	  and	  wanted	  to	  be	  free	  to	  pursue	  this	  
relationship.	  In	  addition,	  he	  had	  ‘sold’	  his	  business,	  which	  enabled	  him	  to	  claim	  that	  
he	  was	  now	  an	  employee	  earning	  a	  modest	  salary	  with	  fewer	  financial	  resources	  that	  
Saida	  could	  make	  claims	  on	  in	  the	  nafaqa	  or	  divorce	  cases.	  	  
Saida	  was	  advised	   to	  drop	  her	   case	   for	  harm	  due	   to	   the	  uncertainties	   surrounding	  
evidence	  and	  the	  likelihood	  of	  it	  being	  rejected	  by	  the	  court.	  In	  any	  case,	  if	  he	  divorces	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her	  without	  grounds	  she	  will	  be	  entitled	  to	  moral	  and	  material	  damages,	  just	  as	  she	  
would	  if	  she	  divorced	  him	  for	  harm.	  
Saida	   resisted	   resorting	   to	   this	   strategy	   of	   divorce	   without	   grounds,	   even	   where	  
evidence	   seemed	   to	   be	   present.	   She	  was	   anxious,	   having	   been	  hurt	   by	   her	   previous	  
experience;	  her	  husband	  had	  already	  dropped	  one	  case	  for	  divorce	  without	  grounds	  
to	   avoid	   paying	   her	   damages	   and	   could	   easily	   do	   it	   again.	   The	  most	   certain	   path	  
appeared	   to	   be	   to	   pursue	   her	   own	   divorce	   case	   on	   the	   strength	   of	   evidence	  which	  
would	  surely	  speak	  in	  her	  favour.	  
	  
Even	   when	   the	   strongest	   form	   of	   evidence	   was	   present,	   however,	   outcomes	  appeared	  uncertain	  and	  failed	  to	  satisfy	  the	  litigant:	  
	  
Naziha	  
Naziha,	  was	  also	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  a	  divorce	  when	  I	  met	  her.	  Herself	  a	  lawyer,	  she	  was	  
highly	   aware	   of	   the	   problems	   related	   to	   divorce	   for	   harm	   and,	   although	   she	   had	  
gained	   a	   judgement	   against	   her	   husband	   for	   domestic	   violence,	   she	   did	   everything	  
possible	   to	   push	   him	   to	   divorce	   her	   without	   grounds.	   This	   released	   her	   from	   the	  
burden	   of	   proof.	   It	   merely	   required	   her	   to	   attend	   court	   and	   claim	   she	   wanted	   to	  
remain	  in	  her	  miserable,	  violent	  marriage	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  their	  baby	  daughter;	  if	  she	  
had	  shown	  her	  desire	  to	  divorce,	  the	  couple	  would	  have	  divorced	  by	  mutual	  consent	  
and	  she	  would	  lose	  her	  rights.	  Her	  plan	  apparently	  worked	  in	  her	  favour.	  However,	  as	  
I	  was	  leaving,	  she	  was	  taking	  the	  divorce	  settlement	  to	  appeal;	  the	  damages	  awarded	  
to	  her	  could	  not	  compensate	  for	  all	  she	  had	  suffered	  during	  her	  marriage.	  Although	  
she	  was	  relieved	  to	  be	  free,	  justice	  remained	  elusive.	  
	  
DOCUMENTING	  BAD	  WIVES:	  A	  WIFE’S	  DUTY	  TO	  ‘COHABIT’	  
	  ‘The	  counterpart	  of	  maintenance	  is	  the	  wife’s	  cohabitation.’	  (A	  judge)	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Marriage	  is	  premised	  on	  the	  reciprocity	  of	  rights	  and	  duties.	  Although	  the	  legal	  code	  refers	  to	   the	   consummation	   of	   the	  marriage	   as	   the	   condition	   for	   the	  wife	   to	   receive	  nafaqa,199	  current	   legal	   practice	   is	   represented	   by	   the	   above	   judge,	   who	   sees	   cohabitation	   as	   its	  counterpart.200	  As	  we	  saw,	  jurisprudence	  underlines	  that	  the	  wife	  can	  only	  be	  accused	  of	  abandoning	  the	  marital	  home	  if	  she	  has	  left	  with	  no	  justification	  and	  that	  the	  court	  must	  examine	  the	  reasons	  why	  she	  left.201	  The	  Family	  Judge	  told	  me	  that	  he	  would	  always	  look	  at	  the	  ‘reasons’	  why	  she	  left;	  the	  absence	  must	  be	  proven	  and	  ‘without	  justification’.	  	  Only	  then	  is	  a	  wife	  deemed	  guilty	  of	  nushuz.202	  
It	   is	   this	   latter	   point	   –	   the	   absence	   of	   justification	   –	   that	   makes	   the	   difficult	  procedures	   of	   proving	   nushuz	   close	   to	   impossible.	   There	   are,	   nonetheless,	   some	   legal	  means	  available	  to	  a	  husband	  whose	  wife	  has	  abandoned	  the	  marital	  home.	  
If	  a	  wife	  has	  left	  the	  marital	  home,	  a	  husband	  may	  make	  an	  official	  demand	  for	  her	  to	  return	  via	  a	  notary.	  The	  wife	  is	  informed	  that	  if	  she	  fails	  to	  return	  she	  will	  be	  guilty	  of	  
nushuz	  and	  her	  husband	  will	  be	  entitled	  to	  divorce	  for	  harm.	  A	  notary	  may	  also	  be	  brought	  to	  the	  marital	  home	  to	  certify	  the	  wife’s	  absence.	  As	  one	  judge	  told	  me,	  however,	  he	  would	  only	  accept	  a	  divorce	  case	  based	  on	  nushuz	   if	   the	  wife	   told	  him	  herself	   that	   she	  had	   left	  home	  for	  no	  reason,	  even	  if	  a	  notary’s	  report	  had	  witnessed	  her	  absence.	  This	  is	  due	  to	  the	  potential	   for	  abuse	   in	   the	  production	  of	   this	  kind	  of	  evidence.	  An	  unscrupulous	  husband	  may	  deliberately	  arrange	  for	  the	  notary	  to	  visit	  during	  a	  justified	  absence,	  when	  she	  is	  out	  shopping	  or	  working.	   Crucially,	   the	  notary	   cannot	   attest	   to	   the	   reasons	   for	   her	   absence.	  Wives	  may	  have	  been	  thrown	  out	  of	  the	  marital	  home	  by	  their	  husbands	  or	  compelled	  to	  leave	  due	  to	  violence	  or	  lack	  of	  maintenance.	  In	  nearly	  all	  the	  cases	  I	  observed,	  the	  wife	  did	  not	   appear	   to	   be	   required	   to	   back	   up	   her	   justification	  with	   evidence;	   the	   benefit	   of	   the	  doubt	  seemed	  to	  rest	  with	  the	  wife.	  	  
Although	   many	   documents	   are	   produced	   via	   these	   procedures	   (a	   notarized	  request	  to	  return	  to	  the	  marital	  home,	  the	  wife’s	  notarized	  response	  to	  this	  request),	  they	  fail	   to	   speak	   of	   the	   all-­‐important	   lack	   of	   justification	   for	   the	   wife’s	   absence	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
199	  PSC,	  Article	  38.	  Interestingly,	  it	  is	  the	  consummation	  of	  the	  marriage	  and	  not	  the	  legal	  act	  of	  marriage	  (signing	  
the	  marriage	  contract)	  that	  counts.	  
200	  See	  chapter	  4.	  
201	  Decision	  no.	  20425,	  7/12/88.	  
202	  By	  comparison	  in	  Iran,	  as	  described	  by	  Osanloo,	  the	  burden	  of	  proof	  rests	  on	  the	  wife	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  she	  is	  
not	  at	  fault	  (2009:	  139).	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consequently,	   at	   best,	   whisper	   softly	   in	   the	   ear	   of	   the	   divorce	   judge.	   In	   the	   words	   of	   a	  former	  litigant,	  whose	  ex-­‐wife	  had	  sent	  him	  to	  prison	  for	  failing	  to	  pay	  nafaqa:	  
‘There	  should	  be	  a	  law	  to	  send	  wives	  to	  prison	  if	  they	  do	  not	  do	  their	  duty	  …	  The	  law	  seems	  to	  believe	  the	  words	  of	  women	  more	  than	  the	  words	  of	  men.’	  
IN	  THE	  FILES:	  DIVORCE	  FOR	  HARM	  INITIATED	  BY	  THE	  HUSBAND	  
Testimony	  to	  these	  ambiguities	  and	  potential	  for	  manipulation	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  were	  only	   three	   successful	   cases	   of	   divorce	   for	   harm	   initiated	   by	   husbands.	   In	   contrast,	   nine	  cases	   for	   harm	   initiated	   by	  men	  were	   rejected	   by	   the	   court;	   six	   of	   these	  were	   based	   on	  
nushuz.	  
All	   three	   successful	   cases	   were	   also	   based	   on	   the	   wife	   having	   abandoned	   the	  marital	   home.	   In	   two	   of	   these	   cases	   the	   wives	   were	   entirely	   absent	   and	   did	   not	  communicate	  with	  the	  court	  at	  all	  during	  the	  case.	  In	  one	  case,	  the	  husband	  claimed	  that	  not	  even	  her	  parents	  knew	  where	  she	  was.	  In	  the	  other,	  she	  had	  allegedly	  left	  home	  only	  10	  days	  after	  the	  marriage	  was	  consummated.	  
The	  judgement	  of	  the	  third	  successful	  case	  surprised	  me,	   in	  that	   its	  evidence	  and	  arguments	   echoed	   those	   found	   in	   those,	  which	  had	  been	   rejected.	  	   The	  next	   section	  will	  explore	  this	  case	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  order	  to	  elucidate	  how	  different	  litigants	  may	  formulate	  different	  strategies	  based	  on	  the	  same	  evidence,	  with	  very	  different	  outcomes.	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TWO	  CONTRASTING	  CASES	  BASED	  ON	  ‘NUSHUZ’	  
	  
Mohammed	  and	  Ahlam:	  	  
Divorce	  for	  harm	  initiated	  by	  the	  husband	  
Mohammed	  had	  filed	  for	  divorce	  for	  harm	  and	  argued,	  via	  his	  lawyer,	  that	  his	  wife,	  
Ahlam,	  was	  failing	  in	  her	  duty	  to	  cohabit	  with	  him,	  citing	  article	  23.	  As	  evidence,	  he	  
provided	  a	  report	  prepared	  by	  two	  notaries	  who	  went	  to	  see	  Ahlam	  in	  her	  father’s	  
house	  and	  delivered	  his	  request	  for	  her	  to	  return	  to	  the	  marital	  home.	  Their	  report	  
recorded	  Ahlam’s	  claim:	  she	  left	  as	  she	  was	  sworn	  at	  and	  beaten	  by	  her	  husband.	  Two	  
such	  ‘demands	  to	  return	  to	  the	  marital	  home’	  were	  included	  in	  the	  file.	  
Ahlam’s	  lawyer	  asked	  the	  court	  to	  reject	  his	  request	  for	  divorce.	  Her	  husband	  had	  
suffered	  no	  harm.	  	  Ahlam	  abandoned	  the	  marital	  home	  under	  duress	  and	  not	  of	  her	  
own	  accord.	  As	  evidence,	  the	  lawyer	  drew	  on	  a	  statement	  Ahlam	  had	  made	  to	  the	  
judge	  to	  that	  effect	  during	  the	  reconciliation	  session	  and	  which	  was	  recorded	  by	  the	  
judge.	  Rather,	  it	  was	  Ahlam	  who	  had	  suffered	  harm,	  as	  evidenced	  by	  two	  cases	  filed	  
against	  her	  husband	  for	  violence,	  but	  which	  she	  had	  subsequently	  dropped.	  She	  
claimed	  that	  she	  had	  decided	  to	  tolerate	  this	  treatment	  to	  protect	  their	  young	  family.	  
In	  spite	  of	  the	  doubt	  over	  the	  wife’s	  motives	  for	  leaving	  the	  marital	  home,	  the	  court	  
decided	  to	  approve	  the	  divorce.	  That	  Mohammed	  had	  claimed	  only	  a	  symbolic	  
millime	  in	  compensation	  from	  his	  wife	  may	  have	  helped	  to	  convince	  the	  court	  to	  
allow	  the	  divorce	  in	  this	  case.	  
	  
Adel	  and	  Ahlem:	  	  
Divorce	  without	  grounds	  initiated	  by	  the	  husband	  
Adel,	  likewise,	  backed	  up	  his	  divorce	  case	  using	  two	  ‘demands	  to	  return	  to	  the	  
marital	  home’;	  however,	  unlike	  Mohammed,	  he	  had	  decided	  to	  file	  for	  divorce	  
without	  grounds.	  The	  judge	  cannot	  refuse	  this	  kind	  of	  divorce;	  what	  is	  at	  stake	  here	  is	  
how	  much	  compensation	  Adel	  will	  have	  to	  pay	  his	  wife.	  His	  case	  is	  unusual	  in	  making	  
explicit	  the	  suspicions	  and	  manipulations	  that	  implicitly	  underlie	  so	  many	  cases,	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adding	  to	  the	  general	  atmosphere	  of	  anxiety	  surrounding	  divorce	  cases.	  His	  strategy	  
aimed	  to	  minimise	  the	  compensation	  payments	  and	  to	  weave	  his	  somewhat	  shaky	  
evidence	  into	  an	  eloquent	  narrative	  in	  order	  to	  convince	  the	  judge.	  
Adel’s	  lawyer	  made	  it	  clear	  to	  the	  court	  that	  he	  was	  asking	  for	  a	  divorce	  without	  
grounds	  in	  the	  best	  interests	  of	  his	  children	  and	  ‘in	  respect	  of	  family	  relations’	  and	  
not	  because	  he	  was	  lacking	  the	  evidence	  he	  would	  need	  to	  ask	  for	  divorce	  for	  harm.	  
As	  evidence,	  he	  also	  referred	  to	  statements	  made	  by	  his	  wife	  during	  their	  
reconciliation	  sessions	  and	  to	  the	  cantonal	  judge	  during	  a	  case	  she	  had	  brought	  
against	  him	  for	  nafaqa,	  but	  later	  dropped.	  In	  these,	  she	  had	  allegedly	  confessed	  to	  
leaving	  the	  marital	  home	  of	  her	  own	  accord.	  
In	  addition,	  he	  levelled	  a	  further	  accusation	  against	  her,	  which	  has	  legal	  
consequences.	  She	  violated	  his	  right	  to	  visit	  his	  children	  by	  taking	  them	  away	  from	  
their	  usual	  address	  on	  the	  day	  of	  Aïd	  el-­Kebir	  (a	  Muslim	  celebration).	  He	  provided	  a	  
notary’s	  report	  witnessing	  their	  absence	  from	  her	  father’s	  address,	  which,	  in	  the	  
words	  of	  the	  lawyer,	  ‘shows	  the	  wife’s	  intention	  to	  punish	  the	  husband	  and	  prevent	  
him	  from	  seeing	  his	  children	  by	  misleading	  him	  that	  they	  were	  at	  the	  house	  they	  were	  
usually	  staying	  in.’	  
Ahlem’s	  lawyer	  shed	  a	  different	  light	  on	  this	  evidence.	  She	  described	  how	  Ahlem’s	  
hopes	  for	  a	  happy	  marriage	  had	  been	  dashed	  as	  her	  husband	  humiliated	  her	  and	  
subjected	  her	  to	  continued	  aggression.	  First,	  her	  alleged	  confession	  that	  she	  had	  left	  
the	  marital	  home	  was	  made	  under	  pressure	  from	  her	  husband	  and	  from	  her	  desire	  to	  
continue	  married	  life	  (for	  social	  and	  financial	  reasons);	  she	  dropped	  her	  nafaqa	  case	  
because	  he	  promised	  to	  drop	  his	  divorce	  case.	  This	  left	  her	  in	  a	  precarious	  position,	  
living	  in	  her	  parent’s	  house	  with	  her	  three	  children	  and	  no	  income	  of	  her	  own,	  
supported	  only	  by	  her	  father’s	  pension.	  
Her	  lawyer	  concluded	  that,	  as	  the	  husband’s	  request	  for	  a	  divorce	  was	  not	  justified,	  
there	  was	  no	  nushuz	  and	  Ahlem	  should	  be	  entitled	  to	  generous	  compensation.	  She	  
then	  replied	  to	  the	  allegation	  regarding	  the	  children:	  
‘The	  wife	  contacted	  her	  husband	  by	  phone	  to	  inform	  him	  that	  they	  would	  be	  spending	  
the	  holiday	  in	  her	  father’s	  house	  in	  Tozeur,203	  taking	  the	  children	  with	  her.	  He	  gave	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
203	  A	  town	  in	  Southern	  Tunisia	  7	  hours’	  drive	  from	  the	  capital.	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his	  permission	  for	  this,	  as	  he	  could	  then	  weaken	  her	  by	  filing	  a	  complaint	  against	  her	  
later	  on.	  He	  is	  the	  one	  who	  really	  humiliated	  his	  wife.	  It	  should	  be	  clear	  to	  the	  judge	  
that	  not	  only	  did	  the	  husband	  not	  really	  want	  to	  reconcile	  with	  his	  wife,	  but	  he	  also	  
wanted	  to	  send	  her	  to	  prison	  so	  that	  custody	  of	  the	  children	  would	  be	  taken	  away	  
from	  her.	  All	  this	  means	  that	  our	  above	  demands	  should	  be	  granted	  to	  my	  client.’	  	  
It	  is	  of	  note	  that	  it	  would	  be	  in	  her	  husband’s	  best	  interest	  to	  gain	  custody	  of	  the	  
children.	  This	  would	  allow	  him	  to	  break	  any	  remaining	  financial	  ties	  with	  his	  wife,	  as	  
he	  would	  no	  longer	  have	  to	  provide	  her	  with	  their	  nafaqa	  or	  housing.	  In	  this	  case,	  as	  
he	  had	  moved	  away	  from	  the	  capital,	  the	  incentive	  seemed	  stronger	  still.	  	  
The	  court	  granted	  quite	  generous	  compensation	  to	  the	  wife,	  who	  was	  awarded	  5000	  
dinars	  in	  moral	  damages	  	  -­	  10	  times	  her	  husband’s	  monthly	  salary	  -­	  and	  a	  monthly	  
pension	  of	  100	  dinars	  following	  the	  divorce.	  
Ahlem	  and	  her	  lawyer	  succeeded	  in	  casting	  doubt	  on	  her	  husband’s	  ethical	  
personhood	  by	  making	  Adel	  come	  across	  as	  being	  dishonest.	  From	  that	  point	  
onwards,	  his	  evidence	  was	  silenced;	  this	  was	  possible	  because	  his	  evidence	  was	  of	  a	  
kind	  that	  did	  not	  require	  the	  judge	  to	  listen	  and	  that	  did	  not	  tie	  him	  to	  a	  particular	  




A	  focus	  on	  documentary	  practice,	  how	  people	  respond	  to	  documents	  and	  use	  and	  interpret	  them,	  suggests	  how	  the	  legal	  and	  the	  ethical	  coalesce	  in	  the	  practice	  of	  the	  law.	  If	  the	  court	  is	  a	  factory	  for	  reassembling	  the	  moral,	  it	  is	  via	  these	  documentary	  practices	  that	  the	  legal	  and	  the	  moral	  are	  articulated.	  It	  is	  left	  to	  the	  judge	  to	  re-­‐contextualise	  the	  peculiar	  ethical	  space	  of	  the	  file,	  haunted	  by	  his	  own	  suspicions.	  	  
‘Facts	  do	  not	  speak	  for	  themselves’	  (Latour	  2004:	  82);	  some	  translate	  better	  than	  others	  via	   the	  procedures	  available	  and	   in	   light	  of	   the	  ruses	  demonstrated	  above,	  not	  all	  documents	   are	   able	   to	   speak	  with	   the	   same	   conviction.	   Only	   limited	   kinds	   of	   evidence,	  final	   judgements,	  are	  accepted	   in	  practice	   in	  cases	  of	  divorce	  for	  harm.	  Final	   judgements	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shout	   loudly	   and	   clearly	   to	   the	   judge.	   Demands	   to	   return	   to	   the	  marital	   home	  whisper	  softly	  at	  best	  and	  may	  be	  treated	  with	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  suspicion.	  	  
This	   preference	   for	   evidence	   that	   has	   already	   been	   validated	   by	   the	   state	   via	   its	  courts	   appears	   to	   be	   a	   response	   to	   the	   de-­‐contextualisation	   of	   the	   court	   as	   an	   ethical	  space.	  Distanced	  from	  the	  litigants	  and	  clues	  as	  to	  whom	  to	  trust,	  the	  judge	  places	  his	  trust	  in	   the	   veracity	   of	   judgements	   previously	   issued	   and	   countenanced	   by	   the	   state.	  Consequently,	  judicial	  discretion	  is	  limited	  and	  documentary	  evidence	  plays	  a	  leading	  role	  in	  determining	  whether	  the	  divorce	  for	  harm	  will	  be	  granted.	  	  
The	  construction	  of	  evidence,	  like	  these	  personal	  narratives,	  is	  woven	  around	  the	  legal	   expectations	   of	   husbands	   and	  wives	  which	   are,	   in	   practice,	   found	   to	   be	   gendered;	  particular	  masculine	  and	  feminine	  forms	  of	  ethical	  personhood	  are	  called	  into	  play	  in	  the	  court	  as	  litigants	  strive	  to	  turn	  their	  spouse	  into	  a	  ‘bad’	  husband	  or	  wife	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  judge.	   A	   husband’s	   failure	   to	   pay	   nafaqa	   leads	   more	   readily	   to	   legally	   authoritative	  evidence	   than	  does	  nushuz,	  making	  opportunities	   to	  divorce	   for	  harm	  more	   available	   to	  wives	   than	  to	  husbands.	  Whilst	   the	  case	  material	  suggests	   this	   is	  also	   true	   in	  practice	  as	  well	  as	  in	  theory,	  the	  canvas	  against	  which	  these	  family	  sagas	  play	  out	  cannot	  be	  forgotten.	  As	  has	  been	  seen,	  various	  social	  and	  material	  constraints	  play	  their	  own	  role	  in	  a	  litigant’s	  ability	  to	  follow	  the	  necessary	  procedures	  in	  order	  to	  produce	  certain	  pieces	  of	  evidence.	  On	  this	  level	  too,	  litigants’	  experiences	  of	  divorce	  bifurcate	  along	  gendered	  lines.	  In	  these	  spaces	   created	   by	   silences	   in	   the	   law,	   not	   only	   is	   a	   great	   deal	   of	   uncertainty	   produced,	  categories	  of	  ‘good’	  and	  ‘bad’	  husbands	  and	  wives	  are	  also	  deployed,	  with	  the	  implications	  this	  can	  have	  for	  the	  divorce	  settlement.	  
Whilst	   this	   superficially	  may	   seem	   to	   benefit	  wives	  who	   have	   (relatively)	   easier	  access	   to	   divorce	   for	   harm,	   ‘traditional’	  marital	   roles	   are	   simultaneously	   reproduced	   as	  these	  wives	  are	  required	  to	  project	  a	  particular	  image	  of	  themselves	  and	  of	  their	  husbands	  in	  order	  to	  increase	  their	  chances	  of	  being	  granted	  a	  divorce.	  
These	  precise	   legal	  dispositions	  and	  procedures,	  backed	  up	  by	   the	  evidence	   they	  allow	   litigants	   to	   produce,	   resonate	   with	   the	   widely	   shared	   moral	   ideals	   surrounding	  marriage	  and	  appear	  to	  be	  mutually	  reinforcing;	  this	  movement	  of	  mutual	  reinforcement	  is	  backed	  up	  again	  by	  the	  legal	  code’s	  reference	  to	  custom	  and	  habit.	  This	  connection	  that	  ties	  the	  law	  to	  ordinary	  ethics,	  as	  expressed	  by	  the	  need	  to	  practice	  the	  law	  in	  the	  context	  of	  these	  moral	  ideals,	  leads	  to	  a	  first	  move	  of	  homogenisation	  of	  these	  norms	  at	  a	  national	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level.	   The	   use	   of	   documentary	   evidence	   in	   cases	   of	   divorce	   for	   harm	   underlines	   these	  gendered	   ideals	   as	   the	   place	   where	   there	   is	   most	   certainty	   and	   agreement	   as	   law	   and	  morality	  work	  side	  by	  side.	  
Subsequent	   forms	   of	   evidence	   are	   shrouded	   by	   a	   sense	   of	   uncertainty.	   Partly	  because	  of	  the	  de-­‐contextualisation	  and	  distancing	  of	  the	  paper	  file,	  different	  judges	  may	  assess	   the	   same	   evidence	   differently,	   as	   in	   the	   cases	   of	   Mohammed	   and	   Adel,	   whilst	  remaining	  within	  the	  bounds	  of	  the	  law.	  Each	  litigant	  (and	  their	  spouse)	  chose	  a	  different	  strategy	  –	  with	  more	  or	   less	  success	  –	  yet	   in	  each	  case	   this	  was	  shaped	  by	   the	  presence	  and	  quality	  of	  the	  documentary	  evidence	  available.	  	  
Just	  as	  the	  judge	  finds	  it	  difficult	  to	  tell	  whom	  to	  trust,	  it	  is	  not	  easy	  for	  litigants	  like	  Saida	  to	  know	  whether	  their	  evidence	  will	  be	  trusted.	  The	  morality	  and	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  state	  is	  at	  stake	  as	  it	  seemed	  that,	  in	  her	  eyes,	  the	  state	  via	  its	  legal	  institution	  could	  not	  be	  trusted	  to	  deliver	  the	  justice	  she	  sought:	  
	  
Saida	  (5)	  
Although	   the	   gendered	   structure	   of	   divorce	   would	   seem	   to	   play	   in	   her	   favour,	   my	  
concerns	  for	  her	  grew	  with	  our	  friendship.	  The	  strength	  of	  the	  evidence	  (‘maktoub’),	  
on	  which	   her	   desire	   to	   divorce	   for	   harm	  was	   pinned,	  was	   unclear.	  Nonetheless	   she	  
clung	  to	  her	  documents,	  sometimes	  literally,	  carrying	  the	  copies	  she	  obsessively	  made	  
with	  her	  each	   time	  she	  went	   to	  court.	   I	   left	  before	  her	   judgement	  and	  do	  not	  know	  
whether	   she	   found	   the	   justice	   she	   was	   seeking.	   At	   our	   last	   meeting,	   I	   found	   her	  
anxious	   and	   tense	   and	   sensed	   that	   her	   hopes	   of	   finding	   justice	   through	   the	   legal	  
system	  were	   fading.	   ‘In	  any	  case’,	   she	  sighed,	  comforting	  herself	   that	  her	   fate	   lay	   in	  
the	  hands	  of	  a	  greater,	  benevolent	  power,	  ‘it	  is	  all	  ‘maktoub’	  (pre-­destined,	  written	  by	  
God).’	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CHAPTER	  6	  -­	  	  
‘MAKTOUB’	  (2):	  DOCUMENTED	  DIVORCE	  	  
-­	  CUSTOMIZED	  ARGUMENTS	  AND	  THE	  COST	  OF	  DIVORCE	  
	  
Leila	  (1)	  
	  ‘It	  was	  maktoub,’	   Leila	   tells	  me,	   describing	   how	   she	   could	   not	   find	   the	   courage	   to	  
back	  out	  of	  her	  marriage	  to	  a	  man	  she	  had	  already	  realized	  was	  incompatible	  with	  
her.	  His	  father	  had	  encouraged	  (or	  perhaps	  set	  up)	  their	  marriage,	  proud	  that	  his	  son	  
would	  marry	  a	  well-­educated	  doctor	   like	  himself.	  At	   just	  under	  30	  years	  of	  age,	  she	  
had	   felt	   the	   clock	   ticking.	   He	   came	   from	   a	   professional	   family,	   working	   as	   a	   bank	  
manager.	  Perhaps	  his	  father	  could	  even	  help	  her	  in	  her	  career.	  	  
I	  met	  Leila	   in	  court	  after	  nearly	   five	  years	  of	  marriage,	   the	  birth	  of	   their	  son	  and	  a	  
year	  of	  divorce	  proceedings.	  A	  petite	  woman,	  her	  elegant	  dress	  and	  carefully	  applied	  
make-­up	  and	  highlights	  reflected	  her	  professional	  standing.	  She	  had	  done	  everything	  
to	  avoid	  divorce.	  She	  had	  tried	  to	  reconcile	  with	  him	  even	  after	  arguments	  turned	  to	  
violence	  and	  she	  had	  felt	  compelled	  to	  return	  to	  the	  safety	  of	  her	  parent’s	  home	  with	  
her	  son.	  The	  thought	  of	  her	  husband,	  who	  weighed	  over	  twice	  as	  much	  as	  her,	  hitting	  
her	  was	   intolerable	   to	  me.	   The	   time	   she	   did	   not	   try	   to	  make	   peace,	   he	   asked	   for	   a	  
divorce.	  
They	  both	  realized	  that	  the	  marriage	  was	  not	  working.	  Both	  wanted	  it	  to	  end.	  Both	  
also	   had	   privileged	   access	   to	   legal	   knowledge;	   her	   sister	   and	   his	   brother	   were	  
lawyers.	   He	   wanted	   to	   divorce	   by	   mutual	   consent.	   She	   firmly	   refused	   this	   option,	  
disbelieving	  his	  claim	  that	  this	  was	  purely	  in	  the	  best	  interest	  of	  their	  child.	  She	  could	  
not	  accept	  him	  walking	  away	  without	  paying	  her	  damages.	  She	  felt	  insulted	  and	  that	  
her	  husband	  and	  his	   family	  wanted	  to	   ‘deny	  her	  her	  rights.’	   ‘I	  am	  not	  materialistic,’	  
she	  was	  quick	  to	  add.	  But	   ‘the	   law	  is	   in	  my	  favour,	  so	  why	  not	  use	   it?’	  Although	  she	  
had	  a	  case	   in	  process	  against	  her	  husband	   for	  violence,	   she	  did	  not	  want	   to	   file	   for	  
divorce	   for	  harm;	   this	  would	  mean	  waiting	  until	  her	  husband’s	   lawyer	  brother	  had	  
taken	  the	  case	  through	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal.	  The	  option	  that	  remained,	  therefore,	  was	  
to	  ensure	  that	  her	  husband	  asked	  for	  divorce	  without	  grounds.	  As	  both	  of	  them	  knew,	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Leila	   was	   fortunate	   that	   her	   sister	   was	   a	   lawyer.	   She	   was	   immediately	   disabused	   of	   a	  misconception	  shared	  by	  many	  a	  litigant	  meeting	  their	  lawyer	  for	  the	  first	  time:	  that	  he	  or	  she	  had	  been	  harmed	  and	  would	  be	  able	  to	  file	  for	  a	  divorce	  for	  harm.	  My	  interviews	  with	  lawyers	  revealed	  that	   litigants	  were	  often	  unaware	  of	   the	  kinds	  of	  evidence	  required	  for	  divorce	   for	  harm	  and	  were	  disappointed	  that	  this	  kind	  of	  divorce	  appeared	  as	  elusive	  as	  the	  proof	   they	  were	  unable	   to	  provide.	  Rather,	   like	  Leila,	   they	  were	  advised	  of	  different	  strategies	   that	   could	   be	   followed	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   such	   evidence.	   Asma,	   a	   lawyer	  who	  worked	  frequently	  on	  divorce	  cases	  summed	  up	  the	  options.	  The	  litigant	  could	  either	  file	  for	   a	  divorce	   for	  harm	   that	  was	   likely	   to	  be	   refused,	   or	   file	   for	  divorce	  without	   grounds	  that	   is	   likely	   to	   be	   quicker.	   She	   knew	   that	   as	   litigants	   like	   Leila	   strive	   to	   obtain	   their	  ‘rights’,	  compensation	  and	  some	  form	  of	  justice	  (she	  could	  not	  let	  her	  husband	  get	  off	  ‘scot	  free’),	  seemingly	  unlikely	  strategies	  could	  be	  the	  most	  powerful.	  
This	   chapter	   explores	   cases	   structured	   around	   the	   absence	   of	   legally	   convincing	  evidence,	  204	  cases	  of	  divorce	  without	  grounds	  in	  which	  the	  narratives	  and	  arguments	  put	  forward	  by	  lawyers	  take	  centre	  stage.	  It	  draws	  on	  a	  reading	  of	  case	  files	  relating	  to	  divorce	  without	   grounds,	   in	   particular	   the	   petitions	   that	   fill	   their	   pages	   set	   in	   the	   context	   of	  interviews	  carried	  out	  with	  lawyers,	  litigants	  and	  judges.	  We	  will	  see	  how	  the	  structure	  of	  the	   law	   leads	   to	   the	   projection	   of	   particular	   forms	   of	   gendered,	   ethical	   personhood	  conducive	   to	   achieving	   the	  desired	   legal	   end,	   a	   favourable	   divorce	   settlement.	   The	   texts	  presented	   in	   this	   chapter	   are	   my	   translations	   of	   petitions	   I	   copied	   by	   hand	   from	   the	  divorce	  files,	  the	  originals	  being	  written	  in	  Modern	  Standard	  Arabic.	  
Whilst	  the	  use	  of	  a	  lawyer	  is	  not	  compulsory	  in	  personal	  status	  cases,	  one	  or	  both	  parties	  did	  employ	  a	  lawyer	  in	  the	  majority	  of	  cases.	  An	  equivalent	  of	  the	  petition	  writers	  seen	   in	   the	   film	  Divorce	   Iranian	  Style205	   did	  exist,	   although	  not	  many	   litigants	   seemed	   to	  use	  their	  services.	  Nora,	  the	  petition	  writer	  located	  in	  a	  small	  photocopy	  shop	  opposite	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
204	  See	  chapter	  5.	  
205	  Longinotto	  &	  Mir-­‐Hosseini	  1998.	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court,	  told	  me	  that	  anyone	  who	  could	  afford	  to	  do	  so	  would	  use	  a	  lawyer;	  the	  modest	  fee	  of	  10	  dinars	   that	  she	  charged	  to	  word	  process	   the	  summons	  used	  to	   initiate	  a	  divorce	  case	  paled	  into	   insignificance	  compared	  with	   lawyers’	   fees	  that	  could	  range	  between	  400	  and	  1000	   dinars.206	   She	   described	   those	  who	   came	   to	   her	   as	   being	  mostly	  women	   (many	   of	  whom,	  she	  noted,	  looked	  very	  poor,	  even	  if	  their	  husband	  earned	  a	  good	  salary)	  and	  of	  a	  ‘low	  social	   level.’	  She	  did	  not	  have	  any	   legal	   training,	  although	  she	  was	   familiar	  with	   the	  appropriate	   format	   and	   language	   to	   use	   in	   order	   to	   present	   petitions	   to	   the	   court	   and	  knew	   how	   to	   word	   process	   a	   document.	   (Not	   all	   litigants	   had	   access	   to	   a	   computer).	  Lawyers,	  nonetheless,	  were	   the	  authors	  of	   the	  bulk	  of	   the	  petitions	   found	   in	   the	  divorce	  files	  and	  are	  one	  of	  the	  main	  protagonists	  in	  this	  chapter.	  
The	  previous	  chapter	  examined	  how	  the	  documentary	  basis	  of	   the	  Tunisian	   legal	  regime	   contributes	   to	   the	   way	   in	   which	   the	   moral	   is	   reassembled	   by	   considering	   the	  difficulties	   involved	   in	   evaluating	   evidence	   at	   a	   distance.	   Isolated	   from	   the	   context	   in	  which	  evidence	   is	  produced,	   the	   judge	  has	  difficulties	   in	  exercising	  his	   judicious	  practice	  and	  knowing	  whom	   to	   trust;	   this	   leads	   to	   a	   focus	  on	   specific	   kinds	  of	   legally	   convincing	  evidence.	  
Judicious	  and	  judicial	  practices	  are	  merged	  once	  again	  as	  petitions	  are	  created	  and	  interpreted	  and	  form	  the	  foundation	  of	  the	  divorce	  judgement.	  The	  subject	  being	  judged,	  morally	   and	   legally,	   however,	   is	   the	   act	  of	   filing	   for	  divorce	   itself	   and,	   consequently,	   the	  ethical	  personhood	  of	  the	  litigant	  filing	  for	  divorce.	  As	  my	  informants	  frequently	  told	  me,	  divorce	   is	   the	  most	   hated	   by	  God	   of	   all	   permitted	   things	   and	   should	   not	   be	   undertaken	  lightly.	  Is	  the	  divorce	  really	   ‘without	  grounds’?	  Is	  the	  divorce	  justified?	  Was	  the	  litigant	  a	  good	   husband	   or	   wife	   who	   was	   compelled	   to	   file	   for	   divorce	   for	   reasons	   beyond	   their	  control?	  
First,	   this	   chapter	   will	   consider	   the	   dynamic	   between	   the	   authors	   of	   these	  documents,	   the	   lawyers,	   and	   their	   intended	   audience:	   the	   judge	   who,	   in	   these	   cases	   of	  divorce	   without	   grounds,	   has	   even	   greater	   scope	   in	   which	   to	   exercise	   his	   judicial	  discretion.	   Second,	   the	   chapter	   will	   discuss	   what	   is	   at	   stake	   in	   these	   cases	   of	   divorce	  without	  grounds:	   the	  cost	  of	  divorce,	   that	   it	   is	   impossible	   to	  measure	   in	  purely	   financial	  terms.	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  Lawyers’	  fees	  were	  charged	  per	  case	  rather	  than	  on	  an	  hourly	  basis.	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  ‘The	  wife	  aims	  with	  this	  (argument)	  to	  appear	  as	  an	  innocent,	  powerless	  victim	  in	  front	  of	  the	  judge	  to	  influence	  the	  judge	  and	  to	  gain	  the	  court’s	  pity.’	  (A	  husband’s	  lawyer	  defends	  his	  client	  in	  a	  case	  for	  divorce	  without	  grounds)	  
	  
Leila	  (2)	  
After	   the	   reconciliation	   phase	   is	   over,	   Leila	   explained,	   the	   lawyers	   present	   their	  
arguments	  in	  writing	  in	  the	  divorce	  file.	  Her	  sister	  based	  her	  demand	  on	  the	  financial	  
situation	  of	  her	  husband,	  a	  bank	  manager	  with	  a	  generous	   income.	  Then,	  he	  would	  
claim	   that	   he	   is	   poor	   and	   she	  would	   say	   that	   he	   is	   lying	   and	   has	   other	   sources	   of	  
income.	  In	  her	  case,	  she	  asks	  for	  a	  rent	  allowance	  (as	  custodian	  of	  their	  child)	  and	  a	  
lump	  sum	   in	  material	  damages;	  as	   she	  earns	  a	  good	   income	  as	  a	  doctor,	   she	   is	  not	  
entitled	  to	  receive	  monthly	  payments	  for	  material	  damages.	  She	  also	  asks	  for	  moral	  
damages	  and	  for	  the	  return	  of	  her	  ‘trousseau’.	  ‘He	  is	  a	  thief’,	  she	  told	  me.	  Her	  mother	  
started	  buying	  things	  for	  her	  ‘trousseau’	  when	  she	  was	  6	  years’	  old;	  as	  receipts	  were	  
not	  kept,	  there	  is	  no	  means	  of	  proving	  what	  she	  owns.	  Instead,	  she	  made	  her	  husband	  
swear	   an	   oath	   that	   this	   property	   was	   his,	   the	   last	   resort,	   once	   all	   other	  modes	   of	  
evidence	  have	  been	  exhausted.	  This	  was	  extremely	  important	  to	  her.	  ‘He	  is	  a	  Muslim.	  
Even	  those	  who	  are	  not	  practising	  believe	  in	  God.	  He	  will	  have	  to	  swear	  in	  a	  mosque	  
on	  the	  Koran.’	  He	  would	  get	  her	  possessions,	  but	  for	  this	  he	  would	  have	  to	  lie	  in	  front	  
of	  God.	   ‘I	  know	  atheists	  who	  say	  that	  bad	  things	  happen	  to	  those	  who	  lie	  in	  front	  of	  
God.’	   For	   her	   it	   is	   a	   matter	   of	   principle;	   she	   would	   rather	   not	   see	   her	   belongings	  
again	  as	  they	  harbour	  bad	  memories.	  
Her	  husband	  also	  failed	  to	  pay	  the	  nafaqa	  that	  was	  due	  to	  her	  son.	  She	  did	  take	  him	  
to	  court	  for	  ‘failure	  to	  pay	  nafaqa’	  and	  he	  was	  sentenced	  to	  one	  year	  in	  prison.	  (The	  
judgement	  is	  not	  final	  as	  he	  could	  still	  appeal	  this	  case	  completed	  in	  his	  absence).	  In	  
any	   case,	   the	   interest	   of	   this	   law	   is	   to	   get	   him	   to	   pay,	   rather	   than	   to	   send	   him	   to	  
prison.	  ‘If	  he	  is	  in	  prison,	  he	  will	  not	  work	  and	  then	  how	  will	  he	  pay	  for	  my	  son?’	  she	  
stresses.	  She	  adds	   that,	   ‘he	  will	  pay	   for	   this	   later’,	  alluding	  to	   the	  divine	  retribution	  
that	  her	  husband	  will	  face	  for	  failing	  to	  take	  proper	  care	  of	  his	  son.	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Having	   established	   her	   decision	   not	   to	   divorce	   for	   harm	   (although	   she	   nonetheless	  pursued	  her	  husband	   in	  court	   for	  violence	  and	  non-­‐payment	  of	  nafaqa),	   at	   the	  centre	  of	  Leila’s	   case	   is	   a	   desire	   to	   establish	   her	   husband	   as	   a	   poor	   husband	   and	   father,	   as	   an	  untrustworthy	  individual	  of	  bad	  moral	  character	  and	  herself	  as	  the	  innocent	  victim	  of	  his	  actions;	  there	  is	  great	  power	  in	  appearing	  powerless.	  He	  is	  a	  liar	  and	  a	  thief,	  whilst	  she	  has	  patiently	  sought	  to	  sustain	  a	  violent	  and	  abusive	  marriage	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  her	  child.	  That	  there	  can	  be	  great	  power	  in	  holding	  the	  space	  of	  the	  victim	  is	  suggested	  in	  the	  many	  cases	  that	  follow	  a	  similar	  dynamic	  using	  almost	  poetic	  language	  to	  depict	  the	  sacrifices	  of	  one	  spouse	   against	   the	   failings	   of	   the	   other.	   ‘Good’	   husbands	   and	  wives	   are	   constructed	   on	  behalf	   of	   litigants	   in	   the	   accounts	   crafted	   for	   them	   by	   their	   legal	   experts,	   weaving	   into	  them	  a	  sense	  of	  morality	  that	  is	  nonetheless	  framed	  and	  structured	  by	  the	  dispositions	  of	  the	  legal	  code.	  
If	   documents	   are	   fallible	   and	   ‘harbouring	   within	   a	   separation	   and	   a	   threat	   of	  falsehood’	  (Messick	  1993:	  213),	  this	  threat	  is	  all	  the	  greater	  in	  the	  files	  for	  divorce	  without	  grounds,	   given	   the	   absence	   of	   legally	   convincing	   evidence.	   The	   documents	   filling	   these	  files	  may	   include	   some	  of	   the	  weaker	   forms	  of	   evidence,	   but	   are	   reliant	  on	   the	   fantastic	  sagas207	  written	  by	  lawyers.	  As	  a	  writer,	  the	  lawyer	  ‘mediates	  both	  the	  reproduction	  of	  the	  law	  and	  the	  incorporation	  of	  the	  world	  …	  He	  must	  be	  both	  a	  specialist	  in	  this	  area	  of	  sharia	  drafting	   (in	   this	   case	  modern	  Tunisian	   law)	   and	   intimately	   conversant	  with	   the	  affairs	  of	  society’	   (ibid:	   227).	   To	   understand	   the	   categories	   of	   ‘good’	   and	   ‘bad’	   spouses	   that	   are	  revealed	  in	  these	  files	  demands,	  therefore,	  that	  lawyers	  and	  the	  judge	  step	  out	  of	  the	  pages	  of	  the	  file	  into	  the	  moral,	  social	  world.	  	  
These	   accounts	   are	   only	   comprehensible	  when	   situated	  within	   a	  wider	   frame	   of	  reference,	   a	   hegemonic	   and	   authoritative	   version	   of	   morality	   –	   replete	   with	   normative	  ideals	  of	  gendered	  roles	  –	   that	   is	   reinforced	  and	  reproduced	   in	   the	  court.208	   In	   this	  way,	  ‘custom’,	  having	  been	  explicitly	  evoked	  in	  the	  legal	  code,209	  permeates	  the	  files	  and	  enters	  the	   court	  via	   the	   locus	  of	   the	   lawyers	  and	   the	   judge.	   In	   the	  work	  of	   the	   court,	   as	   ethical	  criteria	  that	  may	  ordinarily	  be	  implicit	  must	  be	  made	  increasingly	  explicit,	  categories	  are	  given	   meaning	   and	   ethical	   personhood	   is	   subject	   to	   judgement.	   Consequently,	   divorce	  cases	  provide	  a	  window	   through	  which	   judgement,	   understood	  as	  both	  moral	   and	   legal,	  can	  be	  observed.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
207	  I	  do	  want	  to	  suggest	  the	  fictional	  and	  creative	  nature	  of	  these	  documents.	  
208	  cf	  the	  process	  of	  re-­‐contextualisation	  described	  in	  chapter	  4.	  
209	  PSC,	  Article	  23.	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In	  the	  pages	  of	   these	  divorce	   files,	   in	  which	  the	  morality	  of	   the	   litigants	   is	  placed	  under	  scrutiny,	  the	  morality	  of	  the	  state	  is	  simultaneously	  at	  stake.	  	  
As	  WT	  Murphy	   found	  elsewhere,	  an	  ethical	  space	  opens	  up	   in	   the	   law	  that	   is	  de-­‐contextualized,	   cut	   off	   from	   the	   scene	   of	   action,	   but	   that	   nonetheless	   constitutes	   ‘an	  institutionalized	   systemic	   form	   for	   debating	   what	   are	   by	   definition	   largely	   matters	   of	  public	  morality’	  (1997:	  202),	  potentially	  becoming	  the	   ‘conscience	  of	  society’	  (ibid:	  209).	  One	  premise	  of	  such	  an	  ethical	  space	  is	  the	  critical	  potential	  and	  possibility	  for	  scrutinizing	  prejudices	  as	  ethically	  engaged	   lawyers	  and	   judges	  are	  responsible	  only	   to	   the	   law	   itself	  (ibid:	   206-­‐210).	   In	   the	   Tunisian	   Family	   Court,	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   the	   state’s	   attempts	   to	  reinforce	  a	  particular	  version	  of	  gendered,	  public	  morality,	  and	  operating	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  Ben	  Ali’s	  dictatorship,	  the	  illusion	  of	  detachment	  is	  very	  finely	  veiled	  at	  best.	  	  If	  the	  law	  is	  seen	  as	  the	  conscience	  of	  the	  state,	  the	  precise	  way	  in	  which	  this	  law	  operates	  as	  an	  ethical	  space	  and	  contributes	  to	  a	  broader	  process	  of	  moral	  reassembly	  is	  key	  to	  the	  state’s	  moral	  legitimacy.	  	  
That	  the	  ability	  to	  comprehend	  the	  files	  rests	  on	  specific	  forms	  of	  social	  knowledge	  was	  suggested	  to	  me	  by	  the	  Family	   Judge	  himself	  when	  he	  defined	   ‘custom	  and	  habit’	  as	  ‘things	  that	  everybody	  knows’,	  adding	  that	  he	  ‘needs	  to	  know	  the	  psychological	  and	  social	  situation	  of	  the	  people.’	  As	  we	  have	  seen,210	  this	  need	  to	  know	  the	  people	  is	  frustratingly	  elusive	   to	   the	   judge	   in	   the	   files.	   He	   would	   undoubtedly	   have	   empathized	   with	   Latour’s	  hypothetical	  scientific	  researcher’s	  frustrations	  surrounding	  the	  use	  of	  legal	  documents:	  
	  ‘Let’s	  put	  the	  file	  to	  one	  side	  and	  go	  and	  see	  what’s	  happening	  for	  ourselves,	  let’s	  do	  some	  fieldwork,	  question	  the	  witnesses,	  forget	  the	  pathetic	  arguments	  of	  the	  lawyer,	  and	  escape	  from	   the	   straight-­‐jacket	   of	   this	   paper	   world,	   which	   is	   unable	   to	   capture	   reality’	  	  (2004:	  101).	  
My	   Family	   Judge’s	   sense	   that	   the	   files	   were	   unable	   to	   capture	   reality	   was	  confounded	  by	  his	  awareness	  of	  the	  ruses	  that	  are	  not	  seldom	  referred	  to	  in	  their	  pages.	  Operating	  within	   this	   interpretative	   space,	  mired	   by	   these	   uncertainties,	   his	   freedom	  of	  decision	  is	  also	  a	  burden.	  Underlining	  his	  own	  moral	  implication	  with	  his	  work,	  the	  Family	  Judge	  expressed	  the	  desire	  to	  meet	  all	  the	  litigants	  in	  person.	  In	  this	  way,	  he	  hoped	  to	  see	  what	  was	  happening	  for	  himself,	  although	  the	  idea	  of	  doing	  his	  own	  fieldwork	  and	  calling	  witnesses	   himself	   remained	   a	   practical	   impossibility	   due	   to	   overstretched	   resources.	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Although	  it	  is	  hard	  for	  the	  judge	  to	  tell	  whom	  to	  trust	  even	  when	  the	  litigants	  are	  present	  in	  front	  of	  him,211	  he	  had	  decided	  to	  start	  doing	  this,	  via	  the	  reconciliation	  sessions,	  just	  as	  my	   fieldwork	  was	   coming	   to	   a	   close.	   In	   the	  meantime,	   as	   in	   the	   legal	   code,	   the	   divorce	  judgement	  was	  ostensibly	  made	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  paper	  file	  alone.	  	  
A	   second	   constraint	   shapes	   the	   judge’s	   freedom	   in	   making	   decisions;	   the	  disembodied	  court	  in	  the	  above	  quote	  whose	  pity	  litigants	  are	  trying	  to	  win	  is	  a	  reality	  as	  the	  file	  may	  be	  reviewed	  in	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal.	  His	  judgements	  must	  hold	  up	  to	  scrutiny	  and,	   therefore,	   be	   comprehensible	   from	   within	   both	   the	   legal	   framework	   and	   the	  commonly	  shared	  moral	  framework	  that	  tends	  towards	  consensus	  at	  the	  national	  level,	  as	  shifting	   patterns	   of	   sociality	   reshape	   the	  morality	   of	   the	   city.	   The	   ‘everybody’	   in	   ‘things	  everybody	  knows’	  could	  be	  presumed	  to	  be	  Tunisian,	  rather	  than	  Kerkenni	  or	  Beji,	  traces	  of	  these	  regional	  identities	  being	  difficult	  to	  locate	  in	  the	  divorce	  files.	  Local	  knowledge	  is	  of	  limited	  use	  if	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  locate	  the	  litigants.	  
The	   documentary	   basis	   of	   divorce	   judgements	   and	   the	   high	   level	   of	   judicial	  discretion	  created	  uncertainty	  and	  anxiety	   for	   judges	  and	  also	   for	   lawyers.	  When	  talking	  about	   the	   secrets	   of	   success	   in	   cases	   of	   divorce	  without	   grounds,	  Asma	   and	  Ahlam,	   two	  lawyers	   working	   on	   divorce	   cases,	   concluded,	   ‘it	   depends	   on	   whether	   the	   judge	   is	  convinced.’	  Specifically,	  it	  depends	  on	  whether	  the	  judge	  is	  convinced	  that	  the	  petitioner	  is	  justified	   in	   filing	   for	  divorce,	  or	  whether	   the	  divorce	  really	   is	   ‘without	  grounds.’	   It	   is	   the	  lawyers	  who	   create	   the	  paper	  world	   of	   the	  divorce	   file	   as	   they	   translate	  whatever	   their	  clients	  may	  have	  told	  them	  (and	  that	  they	  may	  or	  may	  not	  have	  believed)	  into	  arguments	  that	   are	   presumed	   to	   be	   legally	   and	  morally	   appealing	   to	   the	   judge.	   If	   the	   law	   is	   a	   de-­‐contextualised	   ethical	   space	   (WT	  Murphy	  1997:	   206),	   it	   is	   the	   lawyers	  who	  provide	   the	  limited	  context	  that	  is	  available	  and	  this	  serves	  as	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  judge’s	  decision	  and	  his	  assessment	   as	   to	   the	   good	   or	   bad	   ethical	   personhood	   of	   the	   litigants.	   Consequently,	  lawyers	   play	   a	   vital	   role	   in	   reinforcing	   particular	   forms	   of	   ethical	   personhood	   that	   are	  constructed	  in	  these	  files.	  
What	   form,	   then,	   does	   this	   straightjacket	   take?	   Which	   kinds	   of	   arguments	   and	  descriptions	  are	  deployed	  to	  raise	   the	   judge’s	  pity,	  as	   they	  evoke	  a	  shared	   framework	  of	  morality?	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
211	  Chapter	  4.	  
	   197	  
FADEL	  AND	  FATIMA’S	  FILE:	  DIVORCE	  WITHOUT	  GROUNDS	  INITIATED	  BY	  THE	  HUSBAND	  
Fadel	   and	   Fatima	   had	   been	  married	   for	   nearly	   15	   years.	   They	   had	   no	   children	   and	   the	  divorce	  case	  took	  only	  around	  4	  months.	  Fatima,	  aged	  37,	  was	  11	  years	  younger	  than	  her	  husband.	   She	   had	   no	   profession,	   was	   officially	   unemployed	   (as	   proven	   by	   a	   certificate	  provided	  in	  the	  file)	  and	  claimed	  to	  have	  no	  future	  prospect	  of	  work.	  Fadel	  apparently	  had	  a	   respectable	   income,	   although	   I	   could	   find	   no	   clear	   evidence	   of	   this	   in	   the	   file.	   Several	  pieces	  of	  medical	  evidence	  related	  to	  the	  couple’s	  lack	  of	  children	  with	  dates	  ranging	  from	  1996	  to	  2000:	  an	  ultrasound	  scan	  of	  her	  uterus,	  blood	  test	  results,	  two	  prescriptions	  for	  a	  sperm	  analysis,	  scans	  of	  the	  husband’s	  testicles	  and	  sperm	  analysis	  results;	  on	  one	  of	  these	  the	  words	  ‘low	  sperm	  count’	  had	  been	  underlined	  by	  hand	  in	  red	  pen.	  	  
These	   apparently	   contentious	   issues	   surrounding	   infertility	   are	   buried	   in	   the	  initial	  summons.	  Fadel’s	  lawyer	  explains	  why	  he	  is	  asking	  for	  divorce:	  
	  ‘Marital	   life	  deteriorated	  between	  the	  two	  parties	  due	  to	  the	  wife’s	   irresponsible	  actions.	  She	   neglected	   him	   and	   her	   duties	   in	   the	   home	   and	   does	   not	   fulfil	   her	   marital	   duties	  towards	   him.	   (Here	   I	   understand	   their	   sexual	   relationship).	   My	   client	   has	   been	   strongly	  harmed	  by	  her	  actions.	  He	  asks	  for	  divorce	  without	  grounds.’	  
Typical	  of	  petitions	  in	  these	  cases,	  the	  lawyer	  attempts	  to	  establish	  harm	  from	  the	  outset,	  arguing	  that	  the	  litigant	  is	  not	  really	  divorcing	   ‘without	  grounds.’	  Asma,	  a	   lawyer,	  explained	   that	   she	   would	   begin	   petitions	   on	   behalf	   of	   a	   husband	   divorcing	   without	  grounds	  by	  establishing	   the	   ‘conditions’	  of	   the	  marriage	  and	  showing	   that	  he	  was	  not	  at	  fault.	  ‘Was	  the	  guy	  a	  good	  husband?	  Was	  he	  a	  responsible	  husband?	  What	  did	  she	  do?	  For	  instance,	  was	  he	  ill	  with	  diabetes	  and	  she	  was	  always	  insulting	  him.	  So	  he	  is	  really	  getting	  divorced	   ‘by	  obligation’,	  out	  of	  respect	  for	  the	  children,	  to	  avoid	  problems.	  He	  has	  to	  ask	  for	  divorce,	  as	   it	   is	   impossible	   to	  continue	  the	  marriage.’	   In	  essence,	  she	  would	  establish	  her	  client	  as	  the	  good	  husband	  and	  his	  wife	  as	  a	  bad	  wife.	  
Asma	   explained	   how	   lawyers	   defend	   their	   clients	   from	   having	   to	   pay	   moral	  damages	  in	  cases	  of	  divorce	  without	  grounds.	  She	  would	  argue	  that	  the	  wife	  had	  no	  right	  to	  moral	  damages,	  as	  she	  was	  the	  one	  who	  pushed	  her	  husband	  to	  divorce.	  Underlining	  the	  important	   role	   of	   judicial	   discretion,	  Asma	  explained	  how	   in	   these	   cases:	   ‘It	   depends	  on	  whether	   the	   judge	   is	   convinced	   that	   the	  woman	  deserves	   financial	   compensation	  or	  not,’	  (my	   emphasis).	   If	   unsure,	   she	   would	   ask	   the	   judge	   to	   take	   the	   husbandʼs	   financial	  situation	   into	   account.	   Again,	   whether	   the	   wife	   ‘deserves’	   compensation	   depends	   on	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whether	   she	   is	   seen	   to	   suffer	   harm	   or	   to	   have	   caused	   harm;	   this	   is	   contingent	   on	   her	  ethical	   personhood,	   whether	   she	   is	   established	   as	   a	   good	   wife	   or,	   as	   Fadel’s	   lawyer	  suggests,	  an	  ‘irresponsible’	  wife	  who	  has	  ‘neglected	  her	  duties.’	  The	  construction	  of	  ethical	  personhood	  is	   linguistically	   linked	  with	  the	   legal	  code	  as	  the	   lawyer	  refers	  to	   ‘harm’	  and	  ‘marital	   duties’	   even	   though	   article	   23	   (where	   both	   these	   terms	   are	   mentioned)	   is	   not	  referred	   to	   explicitly.	   The	   language	   selected	   by	   the	   lawyer	   creates	   a	   linguistic	   bridge	  between	  the	  law	  and	  morality,	  creating	  arguments	  that	  are	  at	  once	  moral	  and	  legal.	  
As	  the	  case	  progressed,	  Fatima’s	  lawyer	  responded	  with	  a	  lengthy	  letter	  in	  which	  she	  sought	  to	  establish	  that	  Fatima	  had	  suffered	  the	  most	  ‘harm’	  in	  their	  marriage	  as	  the	  basis	  for	  her	  elevated	  claim	  for	  compensation.	  212	  	  As	  she	  did	  not	  work,	  they	  were	  entitled	  to	  argue	  for	  her	  to	  receive	  material	  compensation	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  monthly	  allowance:	  
‘The	  husband’s	  act	  of	  filing	  for	  divorce	  without	  grounds	  is	  an	  abusive	  use	  of	  his	  right	  and	  as	  such	   causes	   strong	   harm	   to	   the	   defendant,	   who	   is	   accustomed	   to	   marital	   life	   and	   its	  material	  and	  moral	  advantages,	  and	  [she	  will	  consequently	  be	  harmed]	  by	  the	  [divorce].	  
In	  addition	  to	  this,	   the	  wife’s	  understanding	  of	   the	   institution	  of	  marriage	   is	   that	   it	   is	  not	  simply	  a	  game,	  in	  which	  an	  individual	  fulfils	  his	  own	  desires	  whilst	  showing	  no	  interest	  in	  the	  values	  of	   intimacy,	  self	  sacrifice	  and	  denial	  …	  She	  is	  the	  one	  who	  was	  troubled	  by	  life	  with	  him	  under	  one	   roof.	   She	  was	  deprived	  of	   the	  pleasures	  of	  motherhood	  whereas	  his	  only	  desire	  …	  is	  to	  satisfy	  his	  animal	  desires	  throwing	  her	  into	  the	  condition	  of	  a	  divorced	  woman	  without	  her	  being	  the	  guilty	  party.	  
When	  the	  legislator	  gave	  each	  spouse	  the	  right	  to	  end	  the	  marital	  relationship	  unilaterally	  (divorce	  without	  grounds)	  it	   is	  clear	  that	  this	  path	  was	  legislated	  to	  maintain	  the	  right	  to	  choose	  to	  continue	  in	  married	  life	  amicably	  or	  to	  be	  free.	  However,	  much	  of	  what	  happens	  is	  contrary	  to	  this	  when	  it	  is	  used	  abusively	  to	  serve	  a	  hidden	  agenda	  –	  such	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	   the	   husband	   –	   and	   perhaps	  what	   encourages	   all	   this	   is	  …	   	   the	   symbolic	   nature	   of	   the	  compensation,	  which	  is	  awarded	  on	  occasions	  of	  divorce.’	  
Both	  the	  content	  and	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  language	  used	  in	  this	  account	  are	  designed	  to	  draw	  in	  the	  judge	  and	  win	  his	  pity.	  The	  arguments	  have	  been	  ‘customized’,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	   they	   are	   targeted	   at	   an	   imagined	   (or	   perhaps	   known)	   judge,	   who	   will	   uphold	   the	  moral	  order	  and	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  rest	  on	  his	  understanding	  of	  custom,	  the	  morality	  of	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  These	  cases	  have	  been	  abridged	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  thesis.	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the	   city	   which	   forms	   his	   jurisdiction.	   213	   	   As	   one	   lawyer	   put	   it,	   ‘it	   is	   enough	   to	   make	  allusions.’	  What,	  then,	  do	  the	  lawyers	  allude	  to	  in	  their	  petitions?	  
As	  regional	  identity	  is	  becoming	  less	  visible,	  the	  judge	  is	  appealed	  to	  as	  Tunisian.	  He	   is	   expected	   to	   understand	   how	   difficult	   life	   will	   be	   for	   Fatima	   and	   what	   she	   has	  sacrificed	   for	  her	  marriage.	   Implicit	   in	   the	  text	   is	  a	  particular	  understanding	  of	  marriage	  and	  of	  divorce	   and	  how	   this	  will	   affect	   a	  woman	  more	  negatively	   than	  a	  man.	   Fatima	   is	  portrayed	   as	   a	   victim,	  who	   has	   sacrificed	  much,	   including	   the	   possibility	   of	   becoming	   a	  mother	   (literally	   underlined	   in	   the	   text),	   one	   of	   the	   main	   purposes	   of	   marriage	   for	   a	  woman.	  
Fatima’s	  lawyer	  begins	  by	  stating	  that	  the	  husband’s	  act	  of	  filing	  for	  divorce	  is	  not	  only	  unjustified	  but	  also	  ‘abusive.’	  Asma	  explained	  that	  the	  relatively	  frequent	  references	  to	  the	  ‘abuse’	  of	  the	  right	  to	  divorce	  (recalling	  that	  the	  judge	  cannot	  prevent	  a	  litigant	  from	  divorcing	  without	  grounds)	  relate	  to	  a	  disposition	  in	  the	  COC	  (Code	  des	  Obligations	  et	  des	  Contrats)	   that	   states	   that	   a	   person	   who	   exercises	   his	   right	   should	   not	   cause	   ‘harm’	   to	  another	   party.	   This	   is	   a	   disposition	   that	   is	   used	   to	   argue	   for	   increased	   compensation	  payments	  in	  cases	  of	  divorce	  without	  grounds.	  
Whilst	  this	  legal	  reference	  provides	  additional	  weight	  to	  the	  argument,	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  this	  petition	  lies	  a	  debate	  surrounding	  the	  morality	  of	  marriage	  and	  the	  morality	  of	  the	  state.	  The	  lawyer	  evokes	  some	  of	  the	  higher	  values	  such	  as	  self-­‐sacrifice	  and	  the	  desire	  to	  create	  a	  family	  that	  her	  client,	  the	  ‘good	  wife’,	  associates	  with	  the	  institution	  of	  marriage.	  Her	  ‘bad	  husband’	  is	  depicted	  as	  selfish	  and	  interested	  only	  in	  his	  own	  carnal	  pleasure.	  	  
The	  lawyer	  highlights	  how	  it	  is	  unfair	  that	  the	  wife	  will	  gain	  the	  undesirable	  status	  of	  a	  divorced	  woman	  through	  no	  fault	  of	  her	  own.	  This	  indicates	  a	  ‘cost’	  of	  divorce	  that	  is	  paid	   unequally	   by	   women,	   as	   divorced	   men	   do	   not	   suffer	   from	   negative	   stereotypes	  related	  to	  their	  status	  to	  the	  same	  extent.214	  In	  several	  other	  case	  files,	  this	  same	  point	  was	  framed	  as	  a	  ‘cultural’	  argument,	  such	  as	  by	  one	  lawyer	  (arguing	  for	  a	  wife’s	  right	  to	  receive	  compensation	   payments	   in	   a	   case	   of	   divorce	  without	   grounds)	  who	  wrote	   that,	   ‘we	   are	  living	  in	  an	  Arab	  society	  with	  the	  mentalities	  of	  Arab	  men.’	  When	  I	  asked	  Wassim,	  a	  male	  lawyer	  who	  worked	  on	  divorce	  cases,	  about	  this	  he	  explained	  that	  ‘Arab	  mentalities’	  shun	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
213	  The	  lawyers	  who	  frequently	  work	  at	  this	  court	  may	  well	  get	  to	  know	  the	  judge	  and	  the	  way	  he	  reacts	  to	  different	  
arguments.	  They	  are,	  therefore,	  writing	  to	  him	  as	  a	  depersonified	  office	  (as	  the	  case	  may	  be	  handed	  up	  to	  Appeal	  to	  
unknown	  judges)	  and	  to	  him	  (or	  her)	  personally.	  
214	  The	  reader	  will	  recall	  the	  negative	  image	  of	  divorced	  women	  as	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  2.	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divorced	  women,	  who	  would	  be	  in	  a	  more	  difficult	  situation	  than	  their	  ex-­‐husbands	  after	  the	  divorce.	  He	  contrasted	   this	   situation	   to	  Europe,	  where,	   in	  his	  view,	   ‘people	  are	  open	  (minded)	   in	   regards	   to	   divorce	   and	   it	   is	   easier	   for	   a	   divorced	  woman	   to	   re-­‐marry.’	   The	  divorce	   files,	   therefore,	   become	   a	   space	   in	   which	   these	   mentalities	   and	   their	   related	  ‘cultural’	  identity	  are	  reinforced	  and	  defined,	  as	  they	  form	  the	  basis	  of	  arguments	  that	  are	  expected	  to	  appeal	  to	  the	  judge.	  
These	  arguments	  can	  also	  be	  read	  as	  a	  debate	  on	  the	  kind	  of	  values	  that	  the	  state	  is	  expected	  to	  uphold.	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  public	  judicial	  decisions	  analysed	  by	  Bowen	  (1998)	  that	  provided	  a	  format	  in	  which	  judges	  strove	  to	   legitimise	  the	  reformed	  personal	  status	  laws,	   this	   is	   a	   debate	   with	   public	   implications	   taking	   place	   in	   relative	   secrecy	   in	   these	  confidential	   divorce	   files.	   In	   theory,	   only	   the	   lawyers,	   litigants	   and	   judges	   concerned	   (in	  the	  Court	  of	  First	   Instance	  and	  potentially	   the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  or	  Cassation)	  would	  read	  the	  file.	  Nonetheless,	  morality	  is	  present	  and	  reassembled	  in	  the	  sheets	  of	  the	  divorce	  files.	  In	   this	   particular	   file,	   the	   lawyer	   explicitly	   refers	   to	   the	   presumed	   intention	   of	   the	  legislator	   that	   is	   depicted	   as	   being	   coherent	   with	   the	   Islamic	   injunction	   to	   choose	   to	  remain	  in	  married	  life	  with	  kindness	  or	  to	  be	  free.215	  She	  incites	  the	  judge	  to	  ensure	  that	  law	  is	  practised	  in	  harmony	  with	  this	  specifically	  Islamic	  version	  of	  morality	  and	  with	  an	  Islamic	  vision	  of	  ethical	  personhood	  in	  which	  husbands	  and	  wives	  act	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  Prophet’s	  advice.	  The	  judge	  is	  clearly	  being	  appealed	  to	  as	  a	  Muslim	  and	  as	  guardian	  of	  the	   state’s	   legitimacy	   in	   that,	   through	   his	   decision,	   the	   state	   may	   be	   seen	   to	   uphold	   a	  particular	  Islamic,	   ‘Arab’	  moral	  conception	  of	  marital	  values.	  Specifically,	  the	  legal	  device	  at	  the	  judge’s	  disposal	  that	  he	  police	  the	  ‘abuse’	  of	  divorce	  law	  by	  bad	  husbands	  or	  wives	  -­‐	  if	   he	   is	   convinced	   -­‐	   through	   the	   compensation	   payment	   payable	   to	   the	   defendant,	   the	  evaluation	   of	   which	   is	   left	   to	   his	   discretion.	   Fatima’s	   lawyer	   continues	   explicitly	  implicating	  the	  judge	  with	  a	  reference	  to	  judicial	  discretion:	  
‘Compensation	  for	  material	  damages.	  	  
Jurisprudence	  has	  remained	  constant	  that	  the	  value	  of	  compensation	  awarded	  is	  left	  to	  the	  judge’s	   discretion.216	   This	   is	   the	   evaluation	   of	   the	   harm	   caused	   by	   the	   breakdown	  of	   the	  marriage	  by	  one	  of	   the	  spouses.	  The	  elements	  of	   the	  valuation	  consist	  of	   the	  standard	  of	  living	  to	  which	  she	  was	  accustomed	  in	  marital	  life	  –	  given	  the	  particular	  conditions	  of	  each	  party	   such	   as	   the	   age	   and	   length	   of	   marriage,	   their	   having	   had	   children	   and	   also	   the	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  The	  reader	  may	  recall	  that	  the	  judge	  also	  referred	  to	  this	  injunction	  during	  a	  reconciliation	  session	  (chapter	  4).	  
216	  PSC,	  Article	  31.	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material	   situation	   of	   the	   spouses,	   including	   the	   husband’s	   income	   and	   the	   wife’s	  employment	  and	  the	  standard	  of	  living	  she	  is	  accustomed	  to.217	  
These	  elements	  give	  hope.	  The	  situation	  of	   the	   two	   litigants	  entitles	   the	  wife	   to	  ask	   for	  a	  monthly	  pension	  of	  300	  dinars	  considering	  the	  respectable	  income	  of	  the	  husband	  and,	  in	  addition,	  that	  he	  does	  not	  need	  to	  take	  care	  of	  family	  expenses	  as	  he	  is	  infertile	  ...	  The	  wife	  is	  unemployed,	  as	  is	  made	  clear	  by	  the	  attached	  certificate.	  Her	  level	  of	  studies	  is	  low	  and	  her	   chances	  of	   remarriage	   remain	  unlikely,	   unless	  God	   is	  merciful.	  Divorce	  will	   have	   the	  effect	  of	  leaving	  her	  without	  income	  and	  without	  work	  to	  assure	  her	  needs	  and	  without	  a	  level	   of	   studies.	   She	   has	   been	   unemployed	   throughout	   her	   marriage	   thanks	   to	   her	  husband’s	   respectable	   income	   and	   considering	   the	   duration	   of	   the	  marriage	  we	   ask	   the	  judge	  to	  rule	  a	  monthly	  pension	  of	  300	  dinars	  in	  material	  damages.	  
Compensation	  for	  moral	  damages.	  
It	  is	  enough	  to	  make	  allusion	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  wife	  has	  given	  up	  the	  flower	  of	  her	  youth	  working	  for	  this	  husband	  for	  a	  period	  of	  nearly	  14	  years.	  She	  has	  sacrificed	  what	   is	  most	  dear	  to	  every	  woman	  in	  the	  marital	  relationship	  and	  that	  is	  motherhood,	  especially	  as	  she	  is	  able	  to	  have	  children	  as	  made	  clear	  by	  the	  attached	  medical	  ultrasounds	  and	  certificates.	  And	   with	   this	   proof	   that	   the	   husband	   is	   unable	   to	   have	   children,	   after	   having	   satisfied	  himself,	  he	  spat	  her	  out	  like	  a	  pip.	  	  
There	   is	  no	  doubt	   that	  divorce	  will	   leave	  her	  with	   feelings	  of	  deep	  sadness,	   loss	  of	  social	  status	   and	   psychological	   damage,	   considering	   that	   …	   society	   looks	   down	   on	   divorced	  women	   and	   is	   unforgiving	  …	   	   in	   spite	   of	   their	   sacrifice	   and	   victimhood	   and	   their	   having	  destroyed	  their	  lives	  in	  the	  service	  of	  others	  and	  the	  ensuing	  psychological	  affects.	  
On	   this	   basis,	   she	   asks	   the	   court	   to	   grant	   her	   fair	   compensation	   to	   help	   overcome	   this	  failure	   in	  her	   family	   life	   and	   to	  help	  her	   forget	  her	  pain	  of	  no	   less	   than	  30,000	  dinars	   in	  moral	  damages.’	  
Fatima’s	  lawyer	  finally	  mentions	  the	  pieces	  of	  medical	  evidence	  in	  the	  file	  relating	  to	  the	  couple’s	  inability	  to	  have	  children.	  Infertility	  is	  in	  itself	  a	  socially	  acceptable	  ground	  for	  divorce	  given	  that	  most	  people	  marry	  in	  order	  to	  start	  a	  family.	  In	  this	  case,	  however,	  the	   issue	   is	   raised	   to	  show	  the	  availability	  of	  Fadel’s	  salary	  and	   to	  demonstrate	  Fatima’s	  patience	   as	   a	   good	  wife	  who	   tolerated	   this	   situation	  and	  abandoned	  her	  own	  dreams	  of	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  Underlining	  in	  the	  original.	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motherhood.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   this	   argument	   reinforces	   the	   value	   and	   purpose	   of	  marriage	  as	  the	  foundation	  for	  a	  family.	  	  	  
Although	   the	   lawyer	   has	   literally	   underlined	   the	   factors	   that	   jurisprudence	  suggests	   are	   to	   be	   used	   when	   evaluating	   compensation	   payments,	   her	   arguments	   are	  oriented	   to	   the	   emotional	   and	   psychological	   impact	   of	   divorce	   as	  much	   as	   the	  material	  situation	   of	   each	   spouse.	   Again,	   she	   reinforces	   a	   particular	   conception	   of	   ethical	  personhood,	  the	  good	  wife	  as	  patient	  and	  suffering	  in	  silence.	  In	  this	  emotional	  appeal	  to	  the	   judge,	  we	  are	   told	   that	   the	  wife	   is	   a	   ‘victim’	   and	  will	   suffer	   sadness	   and	  pain.	   She	   is	  subjected	   to	   a	   change	   in	   status	   that	   has	   implications	   beyond	   her	   control	   and	   that	   will	  persist	  long	  after	  the	  divorce.	  Her	  religiosity	  is	  also	  suggested	  as	  (according	  to	  her	  lawyer)	  she	  places	  her	  destiny	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  a	  higher	  power	  who	  may	  be	  merciful	  to	  her;	  in	  other	  words	   (to	   reuse	   my	   pun	   from	   the	   previous	   chapter)	   her	   future	   and	   fate	   are	   ‘maktoub’	  (written	  by	  God)	  rather	  than	  ‘maktoub’	  (determined	  by	  the	  documents	  of	  the	  divorce	  file).	  	  	  
The	   good	   wife	   depicted	   in	   many	   of	   these	   files	   finds	   power	   in	   her	   apparent	  powerlessness.	   Her	   predicament	   (as	   depicted	   by	   her	   lawyer	   and	   understood	   via	   my	  ethnographic	   work	   in	   the	   neighbourhood)	   speaks	   to	   a	   notion	   of	   agency	   as	   defined	   by	  Laidlaw	  (2010).	  Her	  agency	  is	  defined	  at	  once	  by	  her	  relatedness	  (to	  her	  husband,	  kin	  and	  those	   in	   her	   neighbourhood	   where	   she	   may	   be	   subject	   to	   stigmatisation	   as	   a	   divorced	  woman)	  and	  by	  her	  responsibilities	  (she	  may	  be	  believed	  to	  be	  accountable	  for	  the	  divorce	  and/	  or	  for	  her	  childlessness	  whether	  the	  situation	  is	  of	  her	  own	  making	  or	  not).	  	  	  
The	   response	   of	   the	   husband’s	   lawyer,	   although	   not	   without	   its	   own	   poetic	  flourish,	  is	  far	  shorter:	  	  	  
‘The	   wife	   remarked	   that	   she	   gave	   up	   the	   flower	   of	   her	   youth	   working	   for	   her	   husband	  although	   she	   did	   not	   have	   children	   and	   that	   her	   recompense	   for	   this	   was	   a	   civil	   case.	  Contrary	   to	  what	   she	   stated,	  my	  client	  maintains	   that	   it	  was	  because	  of	   their	   inability	   to	  have	  children	  that	  marital	  life	  became	  impossible.	  She	  pushed	  my	  client	  to	  ask	  for	  divorce	  without	  grounds	  in	  order	  to	  be	  able	  to	  claim	  compensation.	  	  
In	  reality,	  the	  husband’s	  material	  conditions	  are	  average	  and	  are	  not	  what	  the	  wife	  claims.	  The	  demands	  presented	  by	  her	  are	  excessive	  and	  we	  ask	  for	  the	  monthly	  allowance	  to	  be	  50	  dinars	  and	  the	  moral	  damages	  to	  be	  1,000	  dinars.’	  
Fadel’s	   lawyer	   cannot	   offer	   to	   pay	   no	   compensation;	   the	   law	   states	   that	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compensation	   is	   payable.218	   Therefore,	   he	   is	   obliged	   to	   reply	   by	   making	   his	   own	  proposition	  about	  a	  more	  modest	  sum	  to	  be	  ruled.	  Whilst	  highlighting	  his	  client’s	  material	  inability	  to	  pay,	  the	  thrust	  of	  the	  argument	  is	  to	  cast	  a	  shadow	  of	  doubt	  on	  the	  wife’s	  good	  intentions.	   Intentionality,	   or	   the	   perception	   of	   someone’s	   intentionality,	   becomes	   a	   key	  criterion	  through	  which	  their	  ethical	  personhood	  is	  assessed.	  
Their	  marriage	  was	  brought	  to	  a	  close,	  whilst	  maintaining	  financial	  links	  between	  them	   in	   the	   form	  of	   a	  monthly	  pension	  of	   70	  dinars.	   In	   addition,	   he	  must	   pay	  her	  4000	  dinars	   in	  moral	   compensation	  and	  200	  dinars	   in	   legal	   costs.	   (The	   table	   further	  below219	  will	   help	   to	   put	   this	   settlement	   into	   perspective).	   It	  would	   be	   impossible	   for	   anyone	   to	  survive	  on	  70	  dinars	  per	  month,	   let	  alone	   living	   independently.	  (It	  would	  cost	  about	  this	  much	   to	   rent	   very	   basic	   accommodation	   indeed).	   The	   relatively	   generous	   moral	  compensation	  will	  contribute	  to	  the	  wife’s	  material	  survival	  in	  times	  to	  come.	  
Did	  Fatima	  ‘win’	  this	  case?	  It	  is	  possible	  to	  assume	  that	  she	  was	  not	  satisfied	  with	  the	  outcome	  as	  both	  spouses	  were	   taking	   the	  case	   to	   the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	   to	  dispute	   the	  financial	  settlement.	  
Was	  the	  judge	  persuaded	  by	  the	  pieces	  of	  medical	  evidence?	  Was	  he	  won	  over	  by	  the	   emotional	   pleas	   and	   depictions	   of	   her	   suffering?	   This	   information	   also	   lies	  frustratingly	  out	  of	  my	  reach.	  What	  is	  clear,	  is	  that	  Fatima’s	  lawyer	  believed	  that	  the	  best	  way	   to	   place	   his	   client	   in	   a	   position	   of	   power	   was	   to	   make	   her	   seem	   as	   powerless	   as	  possible,	   as	   the	  good	  wife	  who	   is	  patient	  and	  a	  victim.	  The	  opposing	   lawyer’s	  pleas	   that	  she	  has	  bad	  intentions	  reinforce	  the	  impression	  that	  there	  are	  advantages	  in	  divorce	  cases	  for	  those	  who	  are	  able	  to	  correspond	  to	  particular	  ethical	  types.	  
	  
THE	  COST	  OF	  DIVORCE	  
	  ‘Any	   compensation	   is	   symbolic	   and	   it	   is	   impossible	   to	   compensate	   for	  moral	   and	   social	  suffering.’	  (Lawyer	  in	  correspondence	  to	  the	  court,	  19432)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
218	  There	  were	  cases	  of	  divorce	  without	  grounds	  initiated	  by	  women,	  where	  no	  compensation	  was	  ruled	  in	  cases	  
where	  the	  wife	  had	  no	  employment	  or	  other	  source	  of	  income.	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Leila	  (3)	  
Leila	   looked	   increasingly	   fragile	  and	  tired	  and	  had	  started	   taking	  anti-­depressants.	  
‘If	  I	  had	  been	  happy,	  I	  would	  never	  have	  divorced,	  ‘Leila	  confided.	  ‘For	  men	  it	  is	  easier.	  
He	   may	   divorce	   her,	   even	   if	   he	   loves	   her.	   The	   man	   takes	   no	   responsibility	   for	   the	  
children.	  The	  only	  impact	  for	  him	  is	  a	  financial	  one.	  It	  is	  much	  harder	  for	  the	  wife	  to	  
rebuild	  her	   life	  after	   the	  divorce,	   especially	   if	   she	  has	   children.’	   (Although	   she	  adds	  
that	  Tunisia	  is	  ‘advanced’	  in	  these	  matters	  compared	  to	  other	  Arab	  countries,	  which	  
are	  ‘nearly	  archaic’).	   ‘It	  is	  very	  hard	  for	  women,’	  she	  continues	  ‘as	  men	  equate	  good	  
morals	  with	  virginity.	   ‘She	   is	  not	  a	  virgin.	  She	  will	   sleep	  with	  anyone.’	  The	  divorced	  
woman	  has	  nothing	  to	  lose.’	  She	  feels	  that	  she	  bears	  all	  the	  consequences	  of	  divorce:	  
material,	   moral	   and	   psychological.	   Her	   husband	   was	   rebuilding	   himself	   (quite	  
literally	   with	   cosmetic	   surgery	   to	   end	   his	   battle	   with	   obesity).	   He	   had	   also	   found	  
another	   woman,	   posting	   romantic	   pictures	   of	   himself	   with	   her	   on	   the	   Internet	  
although	  they	  were	  still	  officially	  married.	  (He	  did	  not	  know	  that	  Leila	  could	  use	  the	  
Internet).	   Leila	   at	   least	   wanted	   some	   financial	   compensation	   for	   all	   she	   had	   been	  
through.	  ‘I	  feel	  as	  if	  he	  has	  defeated	  me,’	  she	  sighs.	  
	  
Leila’s	  story	  at	  once	  expresses	  the	  hope	  that	  financial	  compensation	  can	  make	  up	  for	  her	  suffering	  and	  a	  sense	  of	  futility	  that	  any	  amount	  of	  money	  could	  make	  her	  feel	  better.	  Like	  Fatima’s	   lawyer,	  who	   spoke	   of	   sadness	   and	   social	   stigmatisation	   as	  much	   as	   the	   loss	   of	  material	   support	   following	   divorce,	   she	   shows	   us	   the	   fallacy	   of	   considering	   the	   ‘cost’	   of	  divorce	  in	  purely	  financial	  terms.	  	  
Above,	  I	  suggested	  that	  compensation	  payments	  play	  a	  role	  in	  creating	  a	  sense	  of	  legitimacy	  for	  the	  state,	  as	  the	  judge,	  via	  his	  ruling,	  reinforces	  particular	  notions	  of	  ethical	  personhood	   associated	   with	   being	   a	   good	   husband	   or	   wife.	   Consequently,	   as	   Leila’s	  situation	   suggests,	   the	   compensation	   payments	   need	   to	   be	   considered	   from	   within	   a	  broader	   context	   in	   terms	   of	  what	   is	   being	   compensated	   for	   and	  which	   values	   are	   being	  reinforced	   in	   the	   process.	   Strathern,	   in	   a	   different	   setting,	   has	   highlighted	   the	   role	   that	  compensation	   payments	   can	   play	   in	   the	   ‘management	   of	   emotions’	   questioning	   the	  ‘capacity	  of	  wealth	  to	  make	  people’s	  feelings	  ‘good’’:	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‘So-­‐called	  reparation	  for	  loss	  suffered	  is	  also	  a	  registration,	  a	  measurement	  of	  loss	  inflicted.	  It	  does	  not	  necessarily	  cancel	  out	  the	  loss;	  it	  inevitably	  draws	  attention	  to	  it’	  (1985:	  125).	  
Such	  payment	  can	  inflame	  as	  well	  as	  soothe,	  she	  continues,	  ‘precisely	  because	  of	  its	  symbolic	   qualities,	   as	   standing	   for	   persons	   and	   the	   relations	   between	   them’	   (ibid:	   125).	  Litigants	   look	   to	   these	   payments,	   to	   their	   divorce	   settlement,	   for	   a	   sense	   of	   justice,	   for	  recognition	   of	   the	   suffering	   they	   have	   experienced	   as	   a	   result	   of	   their	   divorce,	  reaffirmation	  of	  themselves	  as	  good	  husbands	  or	  wives	  and	  confirmation	  of	  their	  spouse’s	  failings.	  In	  the	  Tunisian	  case,	  as	  the	  arguments	  of	  Fatima’s	  lawyer	  suggest,	  these	  payments	  also	  say	  something	  about	   the	  relationship	  between	  persons	  and	  the	  state.	  Compensation	  payments,	  therefore,	  play	  an	  indirect	  role	  in	  legitimising	  the	  state	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  they	  concurrently	  create,	  or	  fail	  to	  create,	  a	  sense	  of	  justice	  from	  the	  litigants’	  perspective.	  
Strathern’s	   analysis	   points	   to	   the	   bitterness	   of	   the	   struggles	   underlying	   the	  detailed	   arguments,	   which	   fill	   the	   divorce	   files.	   Just	   as	   flows	   of	   property	   are	   related	   to	  differently	  by	  men	  and	  women	  outside	  the	  court,	  so	  too	  are	  they	  in	  divorce	  cases.	  	  
These	  gendered	  differences	  are	  written	  into	  the	  legal	  code.	  In	  requiring	  men	  to	  pay	  material	  damages,	   in	   light	  of	   their	   continued	   legal	   role	  as	  head	  of	   the	   family	   (Article	  23,	  PSC),	   the	   law	   allows	   for	   men	   and	   women	   to	   ‘pay	   for’	   divorce	   in	   different	   ways.	   The	  compensation	  structure	  reflects	  a	  gendered	  division	  of	   labour,	  written	  into	  the	  PSC,220	   in	  which	  husbands	  are	  providers	  and	  wives	  are	  entitled	  to	  maintenance.	  In	  divorcing	  without	  grounds,	  a	  wife	   is	  effectively	   ‘paying	  a	  price’	   in	  releasing	  her	  husband	   from	  the	  material	  burden	   of	  maintaining	   her	   and	   losing	   her	   source	   of	   sustenance.	   A	   further	   implication	   is	  that	   a	  wife	   is	   deemed	   less	   likely	   to	   hold	   a	   salary	   from	  which	   a	   judge	   could	   award	   such	  compensation	  payments.	  
With	   this	   in	  mind,	   it	   is	   interesting	   to	   look	   at	   a	   summary	   of	   moral	   and	  material	  compensation	  payments221	  awarded	  in	  cases	  of	  divorce	  without	  grounds	  in	  my	  sample	  of	  files:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
220	  Notably,	  articles	  23	  and	  38	  (on	  nafaqa,	  maintenance).	  
221	  These	  payments	  may	  be	  subject	  to	  revision	  if	  taken	  to	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal.	  My	  analysis	  is	  restricted	  to	  decisions	  
taken	  at	  the	  Court	  of	  First	  Instance.	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Divorce	  Without	  
Grounds	  
	   Initiated	  by	  
the	  Wife	  	  
Initiated	  by	  
the	  Husband	  
	   Total	  number	  of	  cases	   23	   52	  
Number	  of	  cases	  where	  
damages	  awarded	  
11	   39	  
Average	  awarded222	   1,809	   6,872	  
Range	   500-­10,000	   1,000-­30,000	  
Moral	  Damages	  
Average	  as	  multiplication	  
of	  monthly	  salary	  (n=11)	  
x	  4	   x	  12	  
Average	  awarded	   n/a	   6,450	  
Range	   	   1,000-­20,000	  
Material	  Damages	  
as	  Lump	  Sum	  (n=20)	  
Average	  as	  multiplication	  
of	  monthly	  salary	  
	   x	  8	  
Average	  awarded	   n/a	   100	  




Average	  as	  proportion	  of	  
monthly	  salary	  (n=11)	  
	   20%	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
222	  All	  amounts	  in	  dinars.	  1	  Tunisian	  Dinar	  =	  approx	  £0.44	  in	  2008	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Men	  frequently	  pay	  a	  greater	  financial	  cost	  for	  divorce,	  both	  in	  absolute	  terms	  and	  when	   their	   relatively	   higher	   incomes	   are	   taken	   into	   account,	   an	   impression	   that	   is	  exacerbated	   if	  we	  recall	   that	  women	  need	  only	  pay	   their	  husbands	  moral	  compensation.	  However,	  this	  reading	  obscures	  the	  invisible,	  emotional,	  psychological	  and	  social	  costs	  of	  divorce,	   the	  burden	  of	  which	   is	  often	  most	  strongly	   felt	  by	  women,	  as	  noted	  above.	  That	  divorce	  is	  harder	  for	  women	  is	  an	  accepted	  social	  fact	  often	  evoked	  in	  the	  divorce	  files	  and	  understood	   by	   the	   judge.	   (Although,	   this	   is	   not	   to	   say	   that	   men	   experience	   no	  psychological	  or	  social	  consequences	  when	  they	  divorce,	   such	  as	   the	  distance	   from	  their	  children	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  7).	  
In	  this	  light,	  how	  is	  compensation	  assessed?	  What	  is	  being	  compensated	  for?	  The	  legal	  code	  (article	  31)	  provides	  a	  guideline	  only	  for	  the	  material	  damages	  owed	  to	  women,	  to	   be	   evaluated	   and	   jurisprudence	   has	   contributed	   further	   criteria	   to	   this	   (length	   of	  marriage,	   material	   situation	   of	   the	   spouses,	   wife’s	   employment),	   as	   Fatima’s	   lawyer	  explained	  above.	  	  
Whilst	   the	   benchmarks	   that	   are	   set	   for	   the	   evaluation	   of	  material	   damages	  may	  appear	  more	  measurable,	   how	   are	   these	  weighed	   up	   in	   light	   of	   the	   respective	   financial	  situations	  of	   the	   litigants?	  How	  is	   this	  set	  against	   the	   ‘moral’	   ‘harm’	  suffered?	  Whilst	   the	  judgement	  sessions	  in	  which	  judges	  convened	  to	  decide	  on	  these	  matters	  remained	  elusive	  to	   me,	   insight	   into	   the	   strategies	   of	   litigants	   and	   lawyers	   –	   and	   the	   kind	   of	   argument	  believed	  to	  be	  persuasive	  to	  the	  judge	  –	  can	  be	  gleaned	  from	  the	  pages	  of	  the	  files;	  these	  customized	  arguments	  are	  enlisted	  in	  a	  battle	  over	  material	  resources	  that	  is	  also	  a	  battle	  for	  justice.	  
SELMA	  AND	  OMAR’S	  FILE:	  DIVORCE	  WITHOUT	  GROUNDS	  INITIATED	  BY	  THE	  HUSBAND	  	  
Selma	  and	  Omar	  are	  both	  49	  years	  old.	  They	  have	  been	  married	  for	  14	  years	  and	  have	  one	  son.	  Omar	  was	  previously	  married	  and	  had	  three	  children	  by	  his	  first	  wife.	  He	  has	  a	  good	  job,	  earning	  500	  dinars	  as	  a	  civil	  servant,	  whilst	  Selma	  does	  not	  work.	  
Two	  pieces	  of	  evidence	  are	  provided.	  One	  is	  a	  copy	  of	  a	  letter	  written	  by	  the	  wife	  to	  the	  cantonal	  court	  requesting	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  nafaqa	  he	  must	  pay	  her	  and	  her	  son	  due	  to	  the	  rising	  cost	  of	  living;	  this	  refers	  to	  an	  original	  nafaqa	  case	  from	  2002.	  The	  second	  is	  a	  copy	  of	   a	   letter	   from	  his	   ex-­‐wife	   to	   the	   cantonal	   court	   requesting	  nafaqa	   for	   their	   three	  children.	  These	  documents	  imply	  that	  Omar	  has	  been	  less	  than	  a	  good	  husband	  and	  father	  and	  that	  he	  has	  failed	  to	  provide	  for	  his	  children	  of	  his	  own	  volition.	  
	   208	  
The	  document	  summarizing	  the	  first	  reconciliation	  session	  reveals	  that	  the	  couple	  separated	   long	   ago.	   Both	   reside	   in	   Ben	   Arous;	   she	   in	   the	   seaside	   resort	  where	   she	  was	  born	   and	   he	   in	   a	   rural	   village	   where	   she	   refuses	   to	   live.	   She	   also	   claims	   that	   he	   has	   a	  mistress	  with	  whom	  he	  has	  had	  two	  children.	  The	  husband	  stated	  merely	  that	  he	  wants	  a	  divorce.	  The	  initial	  summons	  paints	  the	  reasons	  for	  divorce	  in	  strong,	  but	  vague,	  terms:	  
‘The	  marital	  relationship	  deteriorated	  …	  in	  view	  of	  the	  wife’s	  intentional	  failure	  to	  cohabit	  
(musakina)	   with	   her	   husband	   leaving	   him	   in	   a	   state	   of	   neglect.	   She	   rejected	   everything	  sacred	   in	   marital	   life	   and	   …	   the	   importance	   of	   trust	   in	   marriage	   and	   that	   constitutes	  cohabitation	  (mu’ashara).	  	  
The	  husband	  was	  harmed	  by	  the	  actions	  of	  his	  wife	  and	  asks	  for	  divorce	  without	  grounds.’	  
It	  is	  noteworthy	  that	  the	  first	  reference	  to	  cohabitation	  implies	  that	  he	  is	  accusing	  his	  wife	  of	  nushuz,	  whilst	  the	  second	  reference	  to	  cohabitation	  hints	  at	  the	  couple’s	  sexual	  relationship.	  (As	  nushuz	   involves	  the	  unjustified	  refusal	  to	  cohabit,	  the	  word	  ‘intentional’	  is	  key	  in	  building	  this	  argument).	  The	  case	  follows	  the	  familiar	  pattern	  of	  claiming	  that	  the	  divorce	   is	   really	   based	   on	   harm	   caused	   by	   the	   wife’s	   actions	   rather	   than	   being	   truly	  without	   grounds.	   In	   the	   following	   correspondence,	   Selma’s	   lawyer	   tries	   to	   discredit	   the	  moral	   standing	  of	   the	  husband,	   revealing	  his	  manipulative	  use	  of	   the	   law	   to	  play	   games	  with	  his	  wife:	  
‘In	   the	   letter	   opening	   this	   case,	   the	  husband	  pleads	   that	   his	   demand	   for	  divorce	  without	  grounds	  …	  is	  based	  on	  the	  wife’s	  actions.	  
Before	   looking	   at	   the	   foundations	   of	   this	   claim,	   we	   draw	   the	   judge’s	   attention	   to	   the	  husband’s	   ruse	   of	  manipulating	  his	  wife	   through	  his	   desire	   to	   abusively	  make	  use	   of	   his	  right	  to	  ask	  for	  divorce.	  This	  is	  supported	  by	  his	  case	  for	  divorce	  for	  harm	  presented	  to	  this	  court	  as	  case	  no.	  x	  which	  ended	  in	  reconciliation	  at	  his	  request	  on	  16/6/06,	  	  influenced	  by	  his	  certainty	  as	  to	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  case	  for	  divorce	  for	  harm	  and	  lack	  of	  evidence	  of	  harm.	  All	  of	  this	  pushed	  the	  wife	  to	  initiate	  a	  case	  for	  divorce	  for	  harm	  …	  presented	  to	  this	  court.	  The	  husband	  changed	  his	  case	  to	  one	  for	  divorce	  without	  grounds,	  which	  encouraged	  the	  wife	   to	  drop	  her	   case,	  due	   to	  her	  husband’s	  desire	   to	  divorce	  without	  grounds.	  Then	   the	  husband	  changed	  his	  case	  of	  divorce	  without	  grounds	  to	  divorce	  for	  harm	  done	  by	  the	  wife	  and	  with	  this	  we	  return	  to	  the	  starting	  point.	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It	  is	  clear	  …	  that	  the	  husband’s	  ruse	  intended	  to	  torment	  his	  wife	  leaves	  her	  in	  limbo,	  as	  if	  she	   were	   neither	   married	   nor	   divorced	   …	  We	   draw	   the	   judge’s	   attention	   to	   my	   client’s	  desire	  to	  continue	  her	  married	  life	  with	  the	  husband.	  
If	  the	  husband	  persists	  in	  his	  demand,	  she	  is	  entitled	  to	  compensation.	  
As	  a	  result	  of	  the	  divorce,	  she	  will	  be	  materially	  affected,	  especially	  as	  she	  does	  not	  work	  and	  is	  advancing	  in	  age	  and	  has	  been	  accustomed	  to	  a	  good	  standard	  of	  living	  throughout	  marital	   life	  with	  the	  prospering	  of	   the	  husband’s	  career,	  as	  he	   is	  an	  employee	   in	   the	  civil	  service.	   These	   conditions	   lead	   to	   compensation	   for	  material	   damages	   of	   300	   dinars	   per	  month.	  	  
Ruling	  divorce	  without	  grounds	  will	  cause	  serious	  harm	  to	  the	  wife	  including	  sadness	  and	  psychological	  pain,	  given	  the	   length	  of	   the	  marriage,	  close	  to	  14	  years,	  her	  advancing	  age	  and	  reduced	  chances	  of	  remarriage.	  This	  results	  in	  compensation	  for	  moral	  damages	  of	  no	  less	  than	  30,000	  dinars.’	  
That	  divorce	   files	  may	  be	  riddled	  with	  ruses	  underlines	   the	   fallible	  nature	  of	   the	  documents	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   which	   the	   judge	   must	   assess	   the	   litigant’s	   act	   of	   filing	   for	  divorce.	   The	   litigant’s	   ethical	   personhood	   is	   central	   to	   the	   construction	  of	   intention	   and	  the	  assessment	  of	  who	   is	  being	  caused	  the	  most	  harm	  by	   the	  divorce	  and,	  consequently,	  who	  merits	  compensation.	  	  
Selma’s	  lawyer	  echoes	  Fatima’s	  lawyer	  in	  establishing	  that	  Omar’s	  divorce	  case	  is	  dishonest	   and	   manipulative	   in	   an	   attempt	   to	   establish	   him	   immediately	   as	   an	  untrustworthy	  person	   in	   front	  of	   the	   judge.	  The	  presence	  of	  various	  cases	   for	  nafaqa,	   as	  well	  as	  for	  adultery,	  suggest	  that	  he	  is	  a	  bad	  husband	  and	  father	  who	  has	  failed	  to	  take	  on	  his	   responsibilities	   to	   his	   family	   of	   his	   own	   accord.	   Selma’s	   lawyer	   is	   also	   following	   the	  familiar	   strategy	   of	   making	   exaggerated	   demands	   that	   are	   clearly	   unrealistic	   (as	   will	  become	  clear	  below);	  this	  is	  done	  in	  the	  spirit	  of	  ‘it	  is	  worth	  a	  try’.	  In	  addition,	  if	  the	  case	  goes	  to	  appeal,	  the	  appeal	  court	  can	  never	  award	  more	  than	  the	  amount	  of	  compensation	  requested	   in	   the	   initial	   file.	  Therefore,	   the	   lawyer	   is	   setting	   a	  maximum	  cap	   rather	   than	  stating	  the	  amount	  of	  damages	  he	  or	  she	  actually	  believes	  the	  client	  may	  receive.	  
The	  reader	  less	  accustomed	  to	  perusing	  these	  files	  may	  wonder	  how	  credible	  the	  wife’s	   claims	   are	   that	   she	  wishes	   to	   remain	   in	   the	  marriage	   given	  her	  past	   divorce	   case	  against	  her	  husband,	  the	  fact	  that	  she	  refuses	  to	  live	  with	  him	  and	  her	  court	  case	  against	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him	  for	  adultery.223	  The	  structure	  of	  the	  divorce	  case,	  however,	  requires	  her	  to	  make	  this	  claim	  if	  she	  is	  to	  gain	  access	  to	  her	  rights.	  (Agreeing	  would	  mean	  that	  they	  would	  divorce	  by	  mutual	  consent	  with	  no	  compensation	  payments).	  Her	  tolerance	  of	  his	  wrongdoing	   is	  an	  element	  of	  her	  performance	  as	   the	   ‘good’	  wife,	  who	   is	  patient	  and	  rejects	  divorce	   for	  the	  sake	  of	  the	  family.	  	  
This	  fact,	  however,	  pales	  into	  insignificance	  in	  face	  of	  the	  surprising	  way	  that	  the	  Omar’s	  lawyer	  seeks	  to	  defend	  him:	  
‘My	  client	  has	  asked	  for	  divorce	  without	  grounds	  and	  his	  wife	  has	  registered	  her	  demand	  for	  moral	  and	  material	  damages	  …	  The	  husband	  is	  the	  only	  one	  who	  has	  suffered	  harm	  …	  His	  wife	  refused	  to	  reside	  with	  him	  in	  (name	  of	  village),	  after	  they	  were	  obliged	  to	  live	  with	  his	   aged	  parents.	   The	  husband	   lived	   alone	   for	  many	   years,	  which	   forced	  him	   to	   form	  an	  adulterous	  relationship	  with	  another	  woman.	  	  
Therefore,	  my	  client	  filed	  for	  divorce	  for	  harm,	  but	  this	  was	  rejected	  due	  to	  the	  inability	  of	  the	  husband	  to	  prove	  this	  harm.	  He	  decided	  to	  put	  an	  end	  to	   this	  marital	  relationship	  by	  asking	  for	  divorce	  without	  grounds.	  
The	  first	  person	  harmed	  is	  the	  husband,	  who	  faces	  two	  problems	  due	  to	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  wife,	  which	  are	  contrary	  to	  sharia	  and	  custom.	  	  
The	  first	  ...	  is	  the	  excessive	  amount	  demanded.	  The	  other	  element	  we	  bring	  to	  attention	  is	  the	  material	  situation	  of	  the	  husband.	  
The	  wife	  stated	  that	  her	  husband’s	  material	  capacity	  is	  affluent	  and	  allows	  him	  to	  pay	  the	  amount	   of	   money	   demanded.	   This	   payment	   is	   completely	   unrealistic	   as	   he	   earns	   500	  dinars	  per	  month	  and	  has	  compulsory,	  monthly	  expenses,	  notably:	  
-­‐Paying	  nafaqa	  of	  150	  dinars	  to	  the	  children	  of	  his	  divorced,	  first	  wife.	  
-­‐Paying	  nafaqa	  of	  145	  dinars	  to	  his	  wife	  and	  children.	  
-­‐Costs	  of	  his	  medication	  for	  heart	  disease.	  
The	  amount	  demanded	  is	  excessive	  and	  something	  the	  husband	  is	  unable	  to	  pay.’	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Initially,	   it	  may	  appear	  surprising,	   to	  say	   the	   least,	   that	   the	  husband	  confesses	   to	  the	   penal	   offence	   of	   adultery	   in	   his	   lawyer’s	   correspondence	   and	   this	   in	   the	   same	  paragraph	  in	  which	  it	  is	  claimed	  that	  he	  was	  the	  only	  one	  to	  suffer.	  The	  wife’s	  failings	  are	  not	   outlined	   in	   detail.	   In	   this	   sense,	   the	   lawyer’s	   argument	   is	   ‘customized’.	   Custom	  performs	  its	  role,	  being	  supportive	  of,	  if	  not	  identical	  to,	  sharia.	  There	  is	  no	  need	  to	  specify	  what	  the	  charges	  are	  against	  the	  wife.	  Custom	  does	  this	  work	  for	  him;	  the	  wrongdoing	  is	  meant	  to	  be	  understood	  implicitly.	  We	  are	  supposed	  to	  fill	  in	  the	  gaps	  and	  make	  our	  own	  links	  with	  her	  failure	  to	  cohabit	  (both	  literally	  and	  sexually).	  
The	   husband’s	   complaint	   that	   his	   marriage	   is	   lacking	   sex	   is	   implicit	   in	   the	  references	   to	   an	   absence	   of	   ‘cohabitation’	   in	   the	   initial	   summons.	   This	   argument	   also	  reflects	   attitudes	   to	   sex	   in	   the	   city	   that	   the	   judge	   is	   assumed	   to	   understand	   and	   be	  sympathetic	   to;	  marriage	   is	   the	   appropriate	   setting	   for	   sex	   and	   one	   of	   the	   core	  marital	  duties	  is	  for	  each	  party	  to	  satisfy	  the	  other.	  It	  is	  his	  wife	  who	  has	  failed	  in	  her	  marital	  duty	  to	  satisfy	  her	  husband,	  rather	  than	  the	  husband	  who	  has	  failed	  in	  his	  duty	  to	  be	  faithful	  to	  her.	  	  
This	  attitude	  to	  the	  sexual	  dynamics	  of	  marriage	  resonated	  with	  opinions	  I	  heard	  in	  Morouj.	  In	  practice,	  however,	  women	  were	  expected	  to	  be	  more	  patient	  than	  men	  if	  the	  sexual	   relationship	  were	   lacking.	  Besma,	   for	   instance,	   regretted	   that	  polygamy	  had	  been	  banned	  as	  men	  with	  wives	  who	  had	  lost	  interest	  in	  sex	  were	  ‘forced’	  to	  divorce	  in	  order	  to	  take	  a	  second,	  younger	  wife	  to	  satisfy	  their	  needs.	  (She	  did	  concede	  that	  it	  was	  preferable	  for	  men	  too	  to	  be	  patient).	  This	  argument	  nonetheless	  speaks	  to	  sexual	  dilemmas	  now	  that	  taking	  a	  second	  wife	  is	  not	  an	  option	  whilst	  marriage	  remains	  the	  only	  acceptable	  context	  for	  sex.	  	  
Whilst	  ruling	  on	  this	  divorce	  case,	  the	  judge	  is	  being	  asked	  to	  take	  a	  stance	  in	  this	  controversy	  that	  speaks	  to	  broader	  issues	  concerning	  sexuality	  and	  the	  morality	  of	  the	  PSC	  that	   banned	   polygamy	   and	   creates	   the	   framework	   for	   this	   debate.224	  Whilst	   the	   judge’s	  opinion	  remains	  opaque	  in	  the	  final	  judgment	  (although	  he	  seems	  to	  side	  with	  Selma),	  the	  practice	   of	   the	   law	   nonetheless	   requires	   him	   to	   think	   about	   these	   issues	   and	   draws	   his	  own	  opinions	  on	  the	  matter	  into	  his	  judicial	  practice.	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Omar’s	   material	   situation	   is	   the	   more	   predictable	   part	   of	   this	   argument.	   His	  unlikely	  confession	  combined	  with	  the	  drawn	  out	  litigation	  involving	  several	  divorce	  cases	  may	  have	  been	   instrumental	   in	  determining	   the	  relatively	  generous	  settlement.	  He	  must	  pay	  her	  6000	  dinars	  in	  moral	  compensation,	  along	  with	  80	  dinars	  per	  month	  in	  material	  compensation,	  145	  dinars	  nafaqa	  for	  their	  son	  and	  100	  dinars	  in	  rent	  allowance.	  Whilst	  80	  dinars	  does	  not	  seem	  a	  lot,	  Omar	  will	  not	  be	  left	  with	  very	  much	  of	  his	  salary	  after	  all	  his	  obligations	  to	  his	  ex-­‐wives	  and	  children	  are	  taken	  care	  of.	  Again,	  it	  can	  be	  presumed	  that	  neither	  litigant	  found	  their	  satisfaction	  in	  the	  settlement;	  both	  parties	  were	  taking	  the	  case	  to	  appeal.	  
	  
CONCLUSION	  
Earlier	   in	   the	   thesis	   (chapter	   3),	   I	   discussed	   how	   rather	   than	   being	   a	   separate,	   de-­‐contextualised	   ethical	   space	   of	   the	   kind	   described	   by	   WT	   Murphy	   (1997),	   the	   PSC	  demands	  a	  second	  moment	  of	  re-­‐contextualisation.	  The	  individuals	  who	  work	  in	  the	  court	  provide	  human	  bridges	  articulating	  legal	  practice	  with	  the	  neighbourhood	  and	  the	  moral	  ideals	  dominant	  there.	  By	  making	  judicial	  discretion	  central	  to	  the	  practice	  of	  divorce	  law	  in	   the	   interpretation	  of	  key	   legal	   categories	   (harm,	  marital	  duties)	  and	   the	  evaluation	  of	  documentary	   evidence	   (chapter	   5),	   the	   judge	   is	   required	   to	   engage	   in	   this	   labour	   of	   re-­‐contextualisation,	  uniting	  judicious	  and	  judicial	  practice	  in	  order	  to	  carry	  out	  his	  work.	  	  
This	   chapter	   has	   discussed	   how	   this	   process	   of	   re-­‐contextualisation	   operates	   in	  regard	  to	  compensation	  payments.	  These	  divorce	  petitions	  show	  how	  lawyers	  play	  a	  role	  in	  defining	  what	  legal	  categories,	  such	  as	  ‘harm’,	  come	  to	  mean	  in	  practice.	  They	  engage	  in	  their	   own	   form	  of	   judicious	  practice	   as	   they	  write	  petitions	  presenting	   information	   that	  they	  believe	  will	  appeal	  both	  legally	  and	  morally	  to	  the	  judge.	  
Lawyers	  were	  unanimous	  about	  the	  ‘massive,	  discretionary	  power’	  held	  by	  judges	  in	   divorce,	   especially	   in	   cases	   for	   divorce	   without	   grounds,	   where	   the	   interpretative	  spaces	  are	  at	  their	  greatest.	  As	  one	  lawyer	  told	  me,	  ‘the	  judge	  must	  respect	  and	  base	  their	  decision	  on	  what	  is	  in	  the	  documents	  and	  not	  be	  carried	  away	  by	  sentiments,	  for	  instance	  if	  he	  sees	  a	  woman	  crying	  …	  they	  must	  balance	  the	  human	  side	  and	  the	  documents.’	  This	  lawyer	   seems	   to	   forget	   the	   human	   side	   that	   is	   necessarily	   present	   in	   the	   documents.	   In	  allowing	  the	  judge	  space	  for	  interpretation,	  his	  sentiments	  –	  or	  morals	  –	  are	  inextricably	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called	   into	   the	   judgement	  process,	  as	   the	  nexus	  between	  the	  court	   files	  and	  the	  complex	  moral	   and	  material	  world	   that	   lies	  beyond.	  Without	   this	  process	  of	   re-­‐contextualisation,	  no	  understanding	  of	  the	  files	  would	  be	  possible.	  
In	   these	   cases,	   something	   more	   appears	   to	   be	   at	   stake	   than	   the	   settlement	   of	  individual	   divorces,	   important	   as	   this	   is	   to	   the	   litigants.	   They	   seem	   to	   entail	   a	   broader	  enforcement	   of	   morality,	   a	   shared	   moral	   code	   that	   appears	   to	   be	   increasingly	  homogenized	   on	   a	   national	   level	   premised	   on	   an	   Islamic	   version	   of	  morality	   that	   takes	  precedence	   as	   signs	   of	   regional	   identity	   are	   increasingly	   elusive.	   At	   the	   distance	   of	   the	  paper	   file,	   the	   anonymous	   litigants	   and	   the	   anonymous	   judge	   are	   assumed	   to	   share	   a	  Tunisian,	  Muslim	  identity.	  	  
For	   the	   state,	   divorce	   also	   has	   a	   ‘cost’	   of	   an	   intangible	   kind	   as	   its	   own	   self-­‐conscious	  Muslim	  identity	  and	  morality	   is	  placed	  under	  scrutiny.	  These	  cases	  provide	  an	  opportunity	   for	   the	   state	   –	   via	   its	   legal	   officers	   and	   procedures	   –	   to	   police	   a	   particular,	  authoritative	   version	   of	  morality,	   reinforcing	   it	   in	   the	   process.	   Compensation	   payments	  play	   a	   symbolic	   role	   in	   this	   process,	   as	   a	   subjective	  measuring	   stick	   that	   hints	   at	  which	  values	   and	   virtues	   are	   being	   upheld	   by	   the	   state.	   As	   we	   have	   seen,	   this	   process	   is	  inherently	  gendered	  as	  different	  virtues	  are	  applied	  in	  the	  assessment	  of	  what	  constitutes	  a	  ‘bad’	  husband	  or	  a	  ‘bad’	  wife.	  	  It	  is	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  state	  that	  is	  at	  stake	  as	  litigants	  like	  Leila	  struggle	  to	  find	  justice	  in	  their	  divorce	  settlement.	  
Different	   forms	   of	   uncertainty	   emerge	   from	   the	   silences	   in	   the	   legal	   code,	   in	  particular	   its	   failure	   to	   define	   ‘marital	   duties’	   and	   ‘harm’:	   the	   uncertainty	   of	   the	   judge	  pursuing	  his	  work	  on	  the	  basis	  of	   fallible	  documents.	  The	  uncertainty	  of	   litigants,	  whose	  divorce	   settlement	   is	   contingent	   on	   winning	   the	   pity	   of	   the	   judge,	   being	   depicted	  successfully	  in	  the	  files	  as	  a	  good	  ethical	  person,	  a	  good	  husband	  or	  wife.	  And	  finally,	  the	  uncertainty	  as	  to	  whether	  the	  strong	  emotions	  associated	  with	  divorce	  (and	  physical	  and	  material	  suffering)	  –	  explicitly	  referred	  to	  in	  the	  files	  –	  can	  be	  assuaged	  with	  any	  amount	  of	  moral	  compensation.	  Will	  justice	  be	  felt	  to	  have	  been	  done	  in	  rewarding	  the	  litigant	  who	  appeared	  to	  best	  uphold	  that	  which	  is	  expected	  of	  them	  by	  the	  shared	  sense	  of	  morality?	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Leila	  (4)	  
Although	  she	  had	  done	  everything	  to	  put	  herself	  in	  a	  position	  of	  power,	  I	  found	  Leila	  
increasingly	  disillusioned.	  She	  was,	   ‘disappointed,	  worried.	   I	  do	  not	  really	  believe	   in	  
justice,	  even	  the	  justice	  of	  God.	  It	  is	  inadmissible	  to	  ruin	  someone’s	  life	  and	  then	  live	  
happily	   in	   love	   in	   a	   new	   relationship.’	   The	  main	   things	   she	   gained	   in	   divorce	  were	  
‘freedom’	  and	  she	  ‘saves	  her	  child.’	  I	  asked	  about	  her	  hopes	  for	  the	  future.	  She	  would	  
consider	  remarriage	  one	  day,	  but	  insisted	  she	  would	  remain	  financially	  independent.	  
She	  would	  look	  for	  a	  man	  who	  accepts	  her	  son,	  ‘a	  man	  in	  the	  truest	  sense	  of	  the	  word	  
…	  who	   is	  a	   son	  of	  a	  good	   family,	  with	  origins,	  well-­brought	  up,	  polite,	  who	  you	  can	  
count	  on,	  who	  does	  not	   lie,	  understands	  responsibility,	   is	  ambitious	  and	  who	  values	  
his	  wife	  at	  home.’	  She	  divorced	  shortly	  after	  I	  left	  the	  field	  and	  told	  me	  that	  she	  was	  
appealing	   the	   amount	   of	   damages.	   (She	   did	   not	   tell	   me	   how	   much	   this	   was).	  	  
Although	  she	  insisted	  that	  the	  Tunisian	  legal	  system	  is	  good	  	  -­	  ‘Tunisian	  women	  have	  
more	  rights	  in	  some	  ways	  than	  French	  women’	  –	  the	  problem	  lies	  in	  ‘practice’.	  ‘There	  
is	  no	  justice.’	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CHAPTER	  7	  –	  	  
DISLOCATED	  FAMILIES:	  THE	  REAL	  COST	  OF	  DIVORCE	  
	  
Neji,	  The	  Representative	  of	  Children	  in	  Danger,	  	  
Court	  of	  First	  Instance	  in	  Ben	  Arous.	  
Working	  closely	  with	  the	  Family	  Judge,	  Neji	  intervenes	  to	  protect	  children	  who	  have	  
been	   abandoned	   by	   their	   parents	   or	   who	   find	   themselves	   in	   precarious	  
circumstances.	   He	   divides	   these	   broadly	   into	   two	   groups:	   children	   of	   divorce	   and	  
children	   of	   ‘single	  mothers’	   (born	   out	   of	  wedlock).	   The	   repercussions	   of	   divorce	   on	  
children,	  he	   tells	  me,	  are	  as	   follows.	  First	   there	  are	   ‘psychological	  and	  behavioural’	  
problems.	   Children	   fail	   at	   school,	   being	  more	   likely	   to	   repeat	   years	   since	   they	   are	  
‘psychologically	   absent’	   as	   a	   result	   of	   neglect.	   Second,	   they	   are	   likely	   to	   become	  
‘delinquents’.	  For	  girls,	  this	  implies	  immoral	  sexual	  conduct.	  Boys	  may	  turn	  to	  drink	  
or	  organized	  crime.	  
He	  reminds	  me	  of	  a	  case	  we	  witnessed	  together,	  when	  I	  observed	  one	  of	   the	  weekly	  
sessions	  with	  the	  Family	  Judge	  where	  the	  court	  endeavours	  to	  find	  solutions	  for	  these	  
children	   in	   danger.	   The	   case	   is	   easy	   to	   recall.	   A	   shabbily	   dressed	   boy	   of	   17	   was	  
brought	  in	  with	  his	  mother,	  a	  lady	  in	  her	  forties.	  The	  family	  judge	  had	  unusually	  (as	  
we	   will	   see	   below)	   given	   custody	   to	   the	   child’s	   father	   as	   neither	   the	   mother	   nor	  
grandmother	  wanted	  it.	  
The	  mother	  claims	  that	  she	  has	  nowhere	  to	  live	  and	  spends	  her	  time	  moving	  between	  
the	  homes	  of	   two	  of	  her	  uncles.	  Now	  her	  son	   is	  a	   ‘young	  man’	  he	   is	  not	  welcome.225	  
Instead	  he	  sleeps	  in	  a	  garage.	  His	  circumstances	  have	  recently	  improved	  as	  he	  is	  now	  
able	  to	  sleep	  in	  a	  car,	  as	  opposed	  to	  stretching	  out	  across	  two	  chairs.	  The	  court	  clerk	  
interjects	  that	  his	  father	  must	  take	  his	  responsibility.	  Is	  the	  father	  paying	  nafaqa,	  the	  
judge	  inquires?	  The	  son	  responds	  that	  he	  has	  no	  money	  and	  that	  the	  garage	  belongs	  
to	  a	  neighbour.	  The	  clerk	  comments	  that	  they	  had	  previously	  tried	  to	  force	  the	  father	  
to	  help,	  but	  that	  the	  house	  belonged	  to	  his	  father’s	  mother	  and	  she	  refused	  to	  give	  her	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
225	  Presumably	  his	  uncles	  have	  daughters.	  It	  is	  inappropriate	  for	  the	  boy	  to	  live	  with	  his	  female	  cousins	  who	  are	  
permitted	  to	  him	  in	  marriage.	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grandson	  a	   room	   in	   the	  house.226	  The	   judge	  appeals	   to	   the	  mother:	   ‘Why	  don’t	   you	  
take	  your	  son	  and	  we	  will	   force	  his	   father	  to	  pay	  a	  rent	  allowance?’	  She	   is	   insistent	  
that	  he	  would	  fail	  to	  pay,	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  judge’s	  promise	  that	  he	  would	  risk	  going	  to	  
prison.	   ‘How	  do	  you	   see	   the	   solution,’	  he	  asks.	   ‘You	  don’t	  want	   to	   sacrifice	   yourself.	  
Each	  wants	  to	  live	  his	  own	  life.’	  The	  mother	  insists	  on	  her	  ex-­husband’s	  failure	  to	  pay	  
her	  rent.	  	  The	  judge	  turns	  to	  the	  boy:	  
‘I	  will	   give	   you	  advice.	  You	  have	   to	   live	  by	  yourself	  now.	  We	  are	  going	   to	  help	  you.	  
Neither	   your	   mum	   nor	   your	   dad	   want	   to	   sacrifice	   themselves.	   Next	   time	   we	   will	  
discuss	  with	  your	  dad	  how	  he	  can	  give	  you	  nafaqa	  and	  a	  rent	  allowance.	   If	  he	  does	  
not	  pay	  he	  will	  go	  to	  prison.	  But	  this	  is	  not	  enough.	  If	  you	  want	  to	  succeed	  in	  life…	  I	  
hope	  God	  will	  help	  you.	  This	  is	  within	  your	  power.’	  
He	   instructs	   the	  mother,	  who	   is	   trying	  to	   talk,	   to	  be	  silent	  and	  orders	  Neji	   to	   find	  a	  
safe	   place	   for	   the	   boy	   to	   live	   and	   to	   arrange	   for	   him	   to	   be	   paid	  nafaqa	   and	   rent	  
allowances.	  After	  the	  litigants	  leave,	  he	  sadly	  concludes	  that	  ‘each	  wants	  to	  live	  their	  
own	   life.	   The	   son	   is	   old	   enough	   to	   make	   problems	   for	   his	   mother.’	   His	   moving	  
performance,	  he	  confides	   to	  me	   later	  on,	  was	  aimed	  at	   the	  mother,	   rather	   than	  the	  
boy.	  It	  was	  his	  attempt	  to	  pull	  on	  the	  maternal	  heartstrings	  to	  ensure	  a	  better	  future	  
for	  the	  boy	  accompanied	  by	  at	  least	  one	  of	  his	  parents.	  
	  
INTRODUCTION	  
Although	  Neji	   had	  more	   exposure	   than	  most	   to	   children	   in	   danger,	   his	   concerns	  about	   the	  consequences	  of	  divorce	  were	  broadly	  shared	  by	  my	   informants	   in	  and	  out	  of	  court	   and	  were	   the	   subject	   of	   concerned	   public	   debates	   on	   the	   topic.	  Many	  would	   have	  shared	  Karima,	   the	   court	   clerk’s,	   sentiment	   that	   ‘children	   are	   the	   victims’	  when	  parents	  divorce.	  No	  matter	  how	  bad	  the	  circumstances,	  she	  could	  not	  imagine	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  divorce	  could	  be	  a	  preferable	  solution.	  Not	  only	  did	  divorce	  lead	  to	  the	  moral	  decadence	  of	  the	  family	  but	  also,	  by	  producing	  potentially	  immoral	  children,	  it	  was	  feared	  that	  divorce	  would	  lead	  to	  the	  moral	  decay	  of	  society.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
226	  The	  clerk	  comments	  on	  these	  earlier	  developments	  to	  aid	  the	  judge,	  a	  temporary	  substitute	  for	  the	  Family	  Judge	  
who	  is	  unfamiliar	  with	  the	  details.	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These	   concerns	   reflect	   a	   shift	   in	   state	   discourse	   from	  women’s	   rights	   towards	   a	  focus	   on	   children’s	   rights.	   Tunisia’s	   National	   Office	   of	   the	   Family	   and	   Population	   had	  compiled	  a	  detailed	  bibliography	  on	  ‘The	  Children	  of	  Divorce:	  An	  Adolescent	  and	  a	  Single	  Parent’	  in	  2004,	  including	  a	  selection	  of	  press	  articles	  with	  alarming	  titles	  such	  as	  ‘Divorce	  in	  Tunis	  …	  Dangerous	  for	  Children,’	  (Essabah,	  31/12/2000)	  or	  ‘Children	  of	  Divorce:	  Risks	  for	   their	   School	   Life’	   (Science	   Plus,	   October	   2002).	   The	   same	   office	   held	   a	   conference	   in	  May	   2008	   entitled	   ‘Breaking	   Up	   without	   Breaking	   Everything’227,	   where	   the	   impact	   of	  divorce	  on	  children	  was	  the	  dominant	  theme.	  Indeed,	  one	  judge	  told	  me	  that	  he	  had	  asked	  to	  be	  taken	  off	  divorce	  cases.	  He	  used	  to	  find	  himself	  lying	  awake	  at	  night	  thinking	  about	  the	   cases	   he	   had	   seen;	   he	   did	   not	   want	   to	   take	   decisions,	   in	   his	   words,	   to	   ‘break	   up	   a	  family.’	  
At	   the	   same	   conference,	   a	   female	   lawyer	   highlighted	   a	   statistic	   in	   a	   previous	  presentation	   that	   32%	   of	   fathers	   abandoned	   their	   children	   after	   divorce228,	   and	  commented	  ‘divorce	  is	  first	  pronounced	  between	  the	  father	  and	  his	  children.’	  This	  reflects	  the	  norm	  in	  Tunisia	  for	  custody	  to	  be	  awarded	  to	  the	  child’s	  mother	  in	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  cases.	  In	  Mir-­‐Hosseini’s	  comparative	  study	  of	  Iran	  and	  Morocco,	  custody	  appears	  as	  a	  key	  feature	  that	  distinguishes	  between	  these	  two	  divorce	  regimes.	  In	  Iran,	  custody	  is	  typically	  awarded	   to	   the	   father,	   in	   contrast	   with	   Morocco	   where	   mothers	   usually	   gain	   custody,	  leading	  to	  differences	  in	  family	  organization	  post-­‐divorce	  and	  in	  a	  woman’s	  willingness	  to	  file	   for	   divorce	   –	   in	   particular	   in	   Iran	  where	   this	  mostly	   entails	   the	   loss	   of	   her	   children	  (1993:	   160).	   Tunisia	   broadly	   follows	   the	   Moroccan	   pattern	   and	   public,	   moral	   concerns	  about	   divorce	   are	   related	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   children	   remain	  with	   their	  mothers.	   This	   fact	  means	   that	   strengthening	   children’s	   rights	   leads	   to	   an	   improvement	   in	   the	   rights	   of	   the	  divorced	   mother.	   It	   also	   leads	   to	   a	   moral	   paradox	   whereby	   a	   divorced	   woman	   is	  necessarily	  viewed	  as	  being	   immoral,229	  yet	  as	  a	  mother,	   she	  remains	   the	  best	  person	  to	  raise	  her	  child.	  Decisions	  and	  discourses	  surrounding	  custody	  become	  a	  process	  through	  which	   the	   moral	   is	   being	   reassembled	   as	   couples	   battle	   over	   and	   judges	   rule	   on	   this	  essential	  issue.	  It	  is	  a	  legal	  battleground	  in	  which,	  as	  we	  shall	  see,	  highly	  gendered	  moral	  criteria	  are	  used	  as	  weapons.	  
Once	  again,	  what	  is	  at	  stake	  in	  these	  custody	  battles	  has	  implications	  both	  for	  the	  couple	  and	  family	  concerned	  and	  for	  the	  state	  as	  it	  strives	  to	  reinforce	  its	  moral	  legitimacy	  in	  and	  through	  this	  contentious	  domain	  of	  law.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
227	  Translation	  from	  French,	  ‘Rompre	  sans	  tout	  Casser’.	  Curiously	  most	  of	  this	  was	  held	  in	  French	  rather	  than	  Arabic.	  
228	  2000	  study	  by	  Moncef	  Chebbi	  based	  on	  national	  survey	  of	  500	  divorces.	  	  
229	  See	  chapter	  2.	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In	  addition	  to	  holding	  conferences,	  the	  state	  has	  also	  been	  active	  in	  reinforcing	  its	  legislation	   in	   favour	   of	   children	   (and	   consequently	   in	   favour	   of	   their	   mothers).	   During	  fieldwork,	  in	  March	  2008,	  a	  new	  law	  was	  introduced	  to	  guarantee	  housing	  for	  a	  child	  and	  his	  or	  her	  custodian.	  This	  reform	  prevents	  a	  father	  selling	  the	  house	  he	  owns,	  if	  designated	  for	  his	  child	  and	  the	  child’s	  custodian.	  Equally,	  a	  penal	  sanction	  was	  applied	  in	  the	  event	  of	  non-­‐payment	  of	   the	  rent	  allowance	  owed	  to	   the	  custodian	  (similar	   to	   the	  penal	  sanction	  that	   applies	   to	   the	   non-­‐payment	   of	   nafaqa).	   This	   move	   responded	   to	   attempts	   by	  unscrupulous	  husbands	  to	  abuse	   loopholes	   in	  the	   law	  and	  was	  warmly	  welcomed	  by	  the	  female	  Family	  Judge	  as	  ‘security	  for	  the	  children’.	  ‘There	  are	  people,	  who	  sell	  their	  houses!’	  she	  remarked.	  	  
There	  were	  indications	  that	  the	  reformed	  legal	  framework	  appeared	  to	  be	  shaping	  custody	  disputes	  which	   occurred	  during	   the	   divorce	   cases.	   The	   impact	   of	   these	   reforms	  and	   the	   legal	   structure	   of	   custody	   (outlined	   below)	   appear	   to	   strengthen	   the	   material	  connections	  which	  bind	  a	  child’s	  father	  to	  the	  person	  with	  custody,	  most	  often	  his	  ex-­‐wife.	  Hardly	   a	   desirable	   state	   of	   affairs,	   they	   appear	   to	   create	   an	   increased	   incentive	   for	   the	  father	   to	   fight	   for	  custody	   in	  an	  attempt	   to	  sever	   these	   links.	  Custody	  disputes,	  although	  rare	   in	   the	   files,	   can	   be	   broadly	   grouped	   into	   three	   categories:	   those	   where	   the	   father	  seeks	  custody	  in	  order	  to	  cut	  off	  links	  with	  his	  ex-­‐wife;	  those	  where	  the	  mother	  is	  deemed	  morally	   unsuitable	   to	   have	   custody;	   and	   those	   where	   the	   mother	   lives	   abroad	   and	   the	  battle	   aims	   to	   keep	   the	   children	   close	   to	   their	   father	   on	   national	   soil.	   In	   the	   process,	  performances	  of	  ethical	  personhood,	  documentary	  evidence	  and	   judicial	  discretion	  again	  come	  into	  play	  as	  the	  court	  decides	  on	  this	  most	  significant	  consequence	  of	  divorce.	  
The	   discussion	   below	   is	   constrained	   by	   the	   nature	   of	   my	   data;	   other	   than	   one	  opportunity	  to	  observe	  a	  private	  session	  on	   ‘children	  in	  danger’,	  all	  my	  data	  comes	  from	  divorce	   cases,	   interviews	   and	   participant	   observation.	   I	   did	   not	   follow	   the	   custody	  disputes	  that	  took	  place	  separately	  in	  the	  Personal	  Status	  Office	  under	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  same	  Family	  Judge,	  as	  this	  was	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  my	  permitted	  research	  (to	  focus	  exclusively	   on	   divorce).	   The	   court	   file	   material	   here,	   therefore,	   is	   limited	   to	   custody	  disputes	   taking	  place	  within	  the	  divorce	   files.	  A	   few	  examples	  of	  custody	  cases	   that	   took	  place	   before	   or	   after	   divorce	   were	   provided	   via	   interviews	   with	   litigants	   and	   lawyers.	  Nevertheless,	   given	   the	   central	   importance	   of	   custody	   in	   divorce	   settlements,	   let	   us	   see	  what	  emerges	  from	  this	  limited	  material.	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First,	   this	  chapter	  explores	  the	  appreciation	  of	  the	   ‘best	   interest’	  of	   the	  child	  that	  the	  judge	  plays	  an	  active	  role	  in	  defining,	  or,	  in	  other	  words,	  when	  custody	  is	  not	  awarded	  to	  a	  ‘bad’	  mother.	  Again,	  the	  judge	  must	  engage	  in	  his	  work	  of	  re-­‐contextualisation,	  uniting	  judicious	  and	  judicial	  practice.	  Once	  again,	  the	  structure	  of	  documentary	  evidence	  plays	  its	  role	   in	  this	   legal	  construction	  of	   ‘bad’	  mothers.	  Next,	  custody,	  or	   the	   loss	  of	  custody,	  and	  the	   financial	   arrangements	   surrounding	   custody	   will	   be	   seen	   to	   be	   a	   further	   ‘cost’	   of	  divorce	  experienced	  differently	  by	  men	  and	  women.	  Lastly,	  the	  chapter	  closes	  with	  cases	  of	   marriages	   with	   an	   international	   dimension	   and	   in	   which	   morality	   intertwines	   with	  national	  and	  religious	  identity.	  These	  cases	  suggest	  a	  further	  way	  in	  which	  the	  practice	  of	  the	  law	  is	  bound	  up	  with	  broader	  processes	  of	  reassembling	  the	  moral	  on	  a	  national	  scale.	  
	  
GENDERING	  PARENTAL	  DUTIES:	  THE	  LEGAL	  FRAMEWORK	  
Custody	   (hadana230)	   is	   defined	   in	   the	   PSC	   as	   ‘bringing	   up	   the	   child	   and	   ensuring	   its	  protection	  in	  its	  abode’.231	  Since	  1966,	  custody	  has	  been	  left	  to	  the	  discretion	  of	  the	  judge	  according	  to	  the	  ‘best	  interest	  of	  the	  child.’232	  This	  is	  another	  open	  norm	  that,	  like	  ‘custom	  and	  habit’,	  leaves	  the	  judge	  considerable	  scope	  for	  interpretation.	  However,	  just	  as	  specific	  legal	   dispositions	   lead	   to	   the	   gendering	   of	  marital	   duties,	   dispositions	   of	   the	   legal	   code	  constrain	   the	   judge	   in	  his	  decision-­‐making,	   since	   the	   code	   includes	  detailed	  –	   if	   in	   some	  instances	   highly	   subjective	   –	   requirements	   that	   the	   person	  with	   custody	  must	   satisfy.	   A	  legal	  article	  is	  dedicated	  entirely	  to	  this	  topic	  stating	  that:	  	  
	  ‘The	   person	   awarded	   custody	  must	   be	   over	   the	   age	   of	  majority,	   of	   sound	  mind,	   honest,	  capable	  of	   satisfying	   the	  child’s	  needs	  and	   free	   from	  any	  contagious	  disease.	   If	  a	  man,	  he	  must	  have	  at	  his	  disposal	  a	  woman	  who	  can	  carry	  out	  the	  duties	  related	  to	  custody	  ...	   If	  a	  woman,	   she	  must	   be	   unmarried,	   unless	   the	   judge	   considers	   that	   this	   is	   against	   the	   best	  interest	  of	  the	  child...’233	  (my	  emphasis)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
230	  Mir-­‐Hosseini	  defines	  hadana	  in	  the	  Maliki	  Moroccan	  context	  as	  ‘nurturing,	  nursing	  or	  raising,	  (and	  this)	  
determines	  who	  looks	  after	  the	  children	  and	  where	  they	  reside.’	  In	  contrast,	  guardianship	  (wilaya)	  ‘literally	  means	  
power,	  authority	  and	  supervision	  over	  the	  child’s	  upbringing	  and	  education,	  making	  sure	  that	  the	  child	  is	  brought	  
up	  as	  a	  Muslim;	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  providing	  maintenance	  for	  the	  child.	  It	  has	  a	  distinctly	  patriarchal	  character:	  it	  
is	  the	  father’s	  right	  and	  duty.’	  (1993:146).	  
231	  PSC,	  Article	  54.	  
232	  PSC,	  Article	  67.	  It	  is	  of	  note	  that	  if	  one	  parent	  dies,	  custody	  is	  automatically	  awarded	  to	  the	  surviving	  parent.	  
233	  PSC,	  Article	  58	  (my	  translation).	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In	   spite	   of	   opening	   with	   gender-­‐neutral	   language	   (‘the	   person’),	   article	   58	   is	  explicit	  that	  the	  task	  of	  caring	  for	  a	  child	  is	  an	  essentially	  feminine	  one,	  echoing	  dominant	  social	  understandings	  of	  parenthood.	  The	  legal	  code	  also	  explicitly	  draws	  the	  evaluation	  of	  a	  woman’s	   ethical	   personhood	   into	   the	   practice	   of	   the	   law;	   a	  woman	  worthy	   of	   holding	  custody	  must	  be	  ‘honest’.	  If	  custody	  is	  contested,	  her	  ethical	  personhood	  may	  be	  brought	  under	   scrutiny.	   The	   legal	   code	   requires	   the	   judge	   to	   engage	   in	   the	   work	   of	   re-­‐contextualisation	  as	  he	  is	  faced	  once	  again	  with	  the	  difficult	  question	  of	  knowing	  whom	  to	  trust	  at	  the	  double	  distance	  of	  the	  courthouse	  and	  the	  case	  file.	  
	  
MAKING	  ‘BAD’	  MOTHERS:	  ABSENT	  MOTHERS	  
Whilst	  we	  shall	  see	  below	  that	  the	  male	  prerogative	  of	  ‘control’	  (guardianship)	  is	  shifting	  in	   the	   contemporary	   legal	   code,	   a	   statistical	   view	   of	   custody	   in	   my	   sample	   of	   files	  corroborates	  the	  notion	  that	  children	  belong	  with	  their	  mother.	  When	  I	  spoke	  to	  the	  male	  Family	   Judge	   about	   how	   he	   evaluated	   the	   best	   interest	   of	   the	   child,	   he	   told	  me	   that	   he	  considered	   that	   young	   children	   are	   best	   off	   with	   their	   mother,	   as	   ‘mothers	   are	   always	  more	   attentive’.	   The	   figures	   from	   my	   sample	   confirm	   that	   he	   and	   his	   predecessor	  consistently	  ruled	  in	  this	  way.	  	  
Custody	  Awarded	  to:	   Number	  of	  Cases	  
Wife	   83	  
Husband	   5	  
Wife	  Has	  Daughter,	  Husband	  Has	  Son	   2	  
Wife	  Has	  Son,	  Husband	  Has	  Daughter	   1	  
Total	   91234	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
234	  My	  total	  sample	  of	  cases	  was	  much	  larger;	  only	  cases	  involving	  minor	  children	  required	  a	  decision	  on	  custody.	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Whilst	  statistically	   insignificant,	   the	  cases	  where	   the	  dominant	  norm	  was	  broken	  and	   children	  were	   taken	   from	   their	  mother,	   assume	   their	   own	   significance	   due	   to	   their	  exceptional	   nature.	   In	   which	   cases	   does	   the	   judge	   feel	   obliged	   to	   break	   with	   the	   social	  ideal	  and	  remove	  children	  from	  their	  mother?	  Which	  mothers	  are	  so	   ‘bad’	   that	   they	   lose	  custody	   of	   their	   children?	   Which	   criteria	   are	   assumed	   to	   resonate	   with	   the	   judge	   as	  lawyers	  and	  litigants	  try	  to	  persuade	  him	  to	  go	  against	  the	  norm	  and	  attribute	  custody	  to	  the	  father?	  	  
Although	  the	  following	  case	  resulted	  in	  custody	  being	  awarded	  to	  the	  father	  due	  to	  the	  mother’s	  work	   abroad,	   the	   arguments	   used	   appeal	   to	   shared	   values	   concerning	   the	  importance	   of	   the	   mother’s	   role	   in	   bringing	   up	   her	   children	   and	   the	   qualities	   that	   she	  alone	  can	  bring:	  
CASE	  FILE:	  MERIEM	  AND	  MUNIR.	  FATHER	  WINS	  CUSTODY	  AS	  THE	  MOTHER	  WORKS	  ABROAD	  
Meriem	  had	  filed	  for	  divorce	  without	  grounds.	  As	  I	  left	  the	  court	  her	  case	  was	  being	  sent	  to	  the	   Court	   of	   Appeal.	   In	   her	   submission,	   Meriem	   explained	   that	   after	   a	   relatively	   long	  period	  of	  marriage,	  they	  had	  agreed	  that	  she	  would	  go	  to	  work	  in	  Qatar	  as	  a	  nurse	  with	  the	  aim	  of	   improving	   the	  material	   conditions	   for	   their	   family.	   From	   this	   point	   onwards,	   her	  husband	   caused	   her	   problems.	   She	   attempted	   to	   reconcile	  with	   her	   husband	   ‘to	   protect	  family	  relations	  and	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  small	  children’,	  but	  this	  proved	  impossible	  in	  light	  of	  her	  husband’s	  behaviour	  towards	  her.	  	  
Their	  reconciliation	  sessions	  revealed	  various	  disputes	  between	  the	  couple	  and	  his	  family.	   She	   accused	   her	   mother-­‐in-­‐law	   (with	   whom	   her	   husband	   lived)	   of	   trying	   to	  requisition	  the	  house	  they	  built	  using	  her	  wages	  (one	  floor	  of	  a	  villa	  above	  the	  mother-­‐in-­‐law’s	  house),	  although	  her	  husband	  denied	  this.	  (The	  file	  includes	  details	  of	  the	  bank	  loan	  taken	  out	   in	  her	  name).	   She	  accused	  his	   family	  of	  poisoning	  her	   children	  against	  her,	   as	  they	  refused	  to	  speak	  to	  her	  on	  the	  phone	  and	  she	  only	  saw	  them	  once	  during	  her	  last	  visit	  home.	   She	   claimed	   that	   her	   husband	   consented	   to	   her	   travelling	   abroad	   to	  work;	   since	  Qatar	   is	  an	   ‘Arab	  country’	  –	  as	   the	  court	  clerk	  explained	  to	  me	  –	  she	  would	  need	  official	  permission	  from	  her	  husband	  to	  work	  there.	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Meriem’s	  lawyer	  made	  a	  detailed	  plea	  for	  custody	  to	  be	  returned	  to	  her	  in	  the	  best	  interest	  of	  the	  children,	  showing	  her	  to	  be	  an	  excellent	  wife	  who	  had	  gone	  beyond	  the	  call	  of	  duty	  as	  a	  concerned	  mother:	  
‘The	  marital	   relationship	   lasted	   for	   a	   relatively	   long	   time	  during	  which	  my	  client	  was	  an	  exemplary	  wife.	  She	  carried	  out	  her	  duties	  according	  to	  custom	  and	  habit	  and	  collaborated	  in	   managing	   the	   affairs	   of	   the	   family	   …	   especially	   maintenance	   (nafaqa)	   …	   which	   was	  placed	  on	  her	  shoulders,	  the	  good	  upbringing	  of	  the	  children235	  and	  the	  expenses	  for	  their	  needs.	  
[In	  spite	  of	  the	  husband’s	  ruses	  and	  those	  of	  his	  mother	  who	  tried	  to	  confiscate	  the	  marital	  home	  that	  she	  paid	  for]236	  she	  made	  a	  personal	  effort	  to	  maintain	  family	  relations	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  the	  children	  
[Seven	  years	   ago	   she	   accepted	   to	  work	   in	  Qatar	   to	   improve	   the	  material	   situation	  of	   the	  family	   and	   to	   fund	   the	   building	   of	   a	   home.	   Her	   husband	   did	   not	   contradict	   her	   in	   this	  decision,	  although	  he	  later	  claimed	  that	  she	  went	  without	  his	  agreement.]	  
[When	  she	  went	  to	  Qatar]	  she	  reassured	  herself	  that	  the	  children	  would	  be	  in	  his	  care	  and	  that	  of	  his	  mother.	  [Although	  she	  made	  every	  effort	  to	  maintain	  contact	  with	  her	  children,	  she	   was	   alarmed	   that	   her	   children	   started	   avoiding	   her	   phone	   calls.	   Later	   it	   became	  impossible	   for	   her	   to	   speak	   to	   them,	   leaving	   her	   in	   a	   difficult	   psychological	   position].	  Concerned	  for	  their	  welfare,	  she	  asked	  her	  family	  to	  visit	  the	  children,	  but	  her	  husband	  and	  his	   family	   forbade	   them	   from	   doing	   so	   …	   She	   returned	   to	   national	   soil	   for	   the	   holidays	  hoping	  to	  see	  her	  children,	  but	  they	  were	  under	  the	  [influence	  of]	  her	  husband’s	  bad	  words	  about	  her.	  Considering	  their	  young	  age	  and	  the	  ease	  of	  influencing	  them	  this	  prevented	  her	  from	  seeing	  them.	  He	  had	  claimed	  that	  she	  left	  them	  and	  travelled	  and	  they	  did	  not	  want	  to	  see	  her	  or	  speak	  to	  her	  or	  speak	  to	  anyone	  in	  her	  family.	  The	  husband	  is	  the	  one	  who	  made	  the	  wife	  suffer	  the	  consequences	  of	  these	  words	  throughout	  her	  holiday	  in	  Tunisia.	  	  
In	  spite	  of	  the	  husband’s	  bad	  behaviour,	  my	  client	  continued	  in	  her	  efforts	  to	  protect	  …	  the	  children	  …	  to	  spare	  (them)	  from	  the	  breakdown	  of	  the	  family.	  My	  client	  became	  convinced	  that	   it	   was	   pointless	   to	   continue	   marital	   life	   in	   light	   of	   all	   the	   disputes	   created	   by	   the	  husband	  and	  his	  continuing	  to	  forbid	  her	  to	  see	  her	  young	  children.	  Therefore,	  she	  decided	  to	  divorce	  by	  unilateral	  desire	  (without	  grounds)	  and	  started	  a	  civil	  case	  hoping	  for	  justice	  giving	   her	   custody	   of	   her	   children.	   If	   the	   judge	   cannot	   decide	   this,	   given	   that	   she	  works	  outside	   Tunisia,	   then	   she	   asks	   that	   he	   please	   award	   custody	   to	   her	  mother	  who	   lives	   in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
235	  The	  language	  used	  here	  echoes	  that	  of	  article	  23	  relating	  to	  marital	  duties.	  	  
236	  Bracketed	  sections	  of	  text	  are	  my	  abridgement,	  retaining	  key	  points	  only.	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Tunis,	   especially	   as	   the	   Court	   of	   Cassation	   in	   their	   decision	   no.	   8603	   3/7/1973	   decided	  that	  ‘the	  court	  has	  the	  right	  to	  award	  custody	  to	  the	  grandmother,	  if	  it	  is	  in	  the	  best	  interest	  of	   the	   children	   and	   the	   father	   cannot	   refuse	   this	   decision	   unless	   he	   has	   evidence	  concerning	  her	  health’.	  	  
The	  husband	  filed	  a	  demand	  to	  the	  Family	  Judge	  for	  custody	  to	  be	  awarded	  to	  him,	  given	  the	  wife’s	  work	  and	  travel	  outside	  Tunisia	  and	  his	  claim	  that	  she	  neglected	  to	  see	  them.	  	  
The	  wife,	  who	  cohabited	  with	  the	  husband	  for	  a	  relatively	   long	  time,	  notes	  that	  his	  social	  and	   material	   situation	   and	   the	   psychological	   climate	   was	   [bad	   for]	   the	   children.	   Her	  husband	  was	  not	  an	  exemplary	  father,	  protecting	  the	  best	  interest	  of	  his	  children;	  notably	  he	   failed	   to	   care	   for	   them	   and	   left	   this	   burden	   on	   his	   wife	   all	   the	   time	   that	   she	   was	   in	  Tunisia	  …	  
Custody,	  according	  to	  article	  57,	  PSC,	  is	  intended	  to	  protect	  the	  children	  …	  from	  harm	  and	  [assure]	  their	  moral	  and	  physical	  upbringing.	  
The	   factor	   expressed	   in	   awarding	   custody	   is	   the	   interest	   of	   the	   children	   and	   not	   the	  interest	  of	  the	  adult	  having	  custody,	  as	  has	  remained	  constant	  in	  jurisprudence.	  	  
The	  criteria	  for	  the	  person	  who	  has	  custody	  are:	  their	  ability	  to	  carry	  out	  the	  duties	  for	  the	  children,	  their	  being	  in	  good	  moral	  shape	  and	  in	  good	  health.237	  
The	   mother	   is	   entitled	   to	   custody	   and	   cannot	   be	   refused	   it	   as	   she	   knows	   about	   the	  upbringing	  of	  children	  and	  has	  the	  virtue	  of	  patience	  in	  a	  way	  that	  a	  man	  does	  not	  and	  she	  has	  time	  and	  affection	  …	  which	  no-­‐one	  else	  can	  offer	  among	  the	  relatives	  of	  the	  children.	  	  
Her	  mother	  …	   fulfils	   the	   conditions	   stated	   in	   article	  58,	  PSC	   for	   awarding	   custody	  of	   the	  children.	   In	   addition,	   awarding	   custody	   to	   the	   maternal	   grandmother	   would	   provide	   a	  healthy	   climate	   for	   their	   upbringing	   and	   the	   wife,	   their	   mother,	   would	   take	   continued	  responsibility	  for	  their	  care	  and	  duties,	  when	  she	  is	  not	  absent	  abroad.	  
Her	   husband	   left	   the	   children	   in	   his	   mother’s	   care	   (neglecting	   his)	   responsibility.	   In	  addition,	   they	   were	   left	   in	   relatively	   bad	  material	   conditions,	   demonstrating	   the	   lack	   of	  moral	  character	  required	  of	  the	  person	  who	  has	  custody.	  [Her	  husband	  was	  thrown	  out	  of	  his	   job	  due	   to	   a	   crime	   related	   to	  money.	  We	  note	   that	   the	  wife	   also	   suffered	   [theft	   from	  him]	   as	   he	   appropriated	   all	   of	   the	   sums	   of	  money	   sent	   by	  my	   client’s	  mother	  when	  my	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
237	  This	  echoes	  the	  PSC	  verbatim.	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client	  was	   living	   in	  his	  parent’s	  house].	  He	   forbade	   the	  children	   to	   see	   their	  mother.	  The	  father	  …	  failed	  to	  provide	  a	  healthy	  climate	  suited	  to	  a	  good,	  balanced	  upbringing.	  
My	   client	   asks	   the	   judge	   …	   to	   rule	   for	   a	   social	   investigation	   to	   stop	   the	   children	   being	  placed	   in	   psychological	   conditions,	   such	   as	   those	   with	   the	   paternal	   grandmother.	   In	  addition,	  this	  makes	  it	  clear	  that	  the	  situation	  of	  the	  wife	  allows	  her	  to	  do	  the	  best	  for	  the	  children	   with	   their	   maternal	   grandmother	   and	   would	   give	   them	   the	   best	   and	   most	  balanced	  upbringing.	  Awarding	  custody	  to	  the	  wife	  is	  an	  expression	  of	  the	  best	  interests	  
of	  the	  children.’	  (emphasis	  in	  the	  original)	  
This	  petition	  is	  almost	  entirely	  constructed	  around	  the	  moral	  criteria	  required	  of	  a	  person	  worthy	  of	  being	  awarded	  custody.	  Frequent	  references	  to	  the	  ‘best	  interests	  of	  the	  children’	  build	  a	  linguistic	  bridge	  with	  the	  legal	  code,	  coupled	  with	  direct	  references	  to	  the	  legal	  code	  and	  jurisprudence.	  	  
Meriem	  is	  portrayed	  as	  a	  patient	  wife	  who	  has	  been	  tolerant	  of	  the	  bad	  treatment	  she	  has	  suffered	  from	  her	  husband	  and	  his	  family	  and	  who	  has	  made	  sacrifices	  in	  order	  to	  protect	   her	   children.	   Her	   husband	   is	   depicted	   as	   someone	   who	   is	   dishonest	   and	   a	   bad	  father	  who	  neglects	  his	  children.	  The	  material	  struggles	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  Meriem	  has	  been	  working	  to	  provide	  for	  the	  family	  also	  point	  to	  her	  husband’s	  failure	  to	  fulfil	  his	  male	  role.	  
Various	   devices	   are	   employed	   to	   show	   the	   immoral	   character	   of	   the	   children’s	  father,	  whether	  his	  mistreatment	  of	  them	  in	  preventing	  them	  from	  seeing	  their	  mother	  or	  the	  accusation	  of	  theft;	  he	  is	  portrayed	  as	  being	  dishonest	  (‘honesty’	  being	  a	  requirement	  for	   the	   person	  who	   is	   awarded	   custody	   according	   to	   the	   legal	   code).	   The	   accusation	   of	  theft	   is	  supported	  by	  a	  witness	  statement	  from	  Meriem’s	  mother,	  who	  claims	  that	  Munir	  has	  stolen	  money	  from	  her	  on	  several	  occasions.	  The	  outcome	  of	  the	  case	  implies	  that	  this	  document	   –	   that	   apparently	   never	   lead	   to	   a	   criminal	   prosecution	   –	   only	   held	   limited	  authority.	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  legally	  permissible	  evidence,	  the	  onus	  lies	  on	  the	  narrative	  to	  convince	  the	  judge.	  	  
Equally,	  the	  moral	  standing	  of	  the	  children’s	  paternal	  grandmother,	  who	  would	  be	  taking	   care	   of	   them,	   is	   made	   to	   appear	   dubious.	   Neither	   their	   father	   nor	   paternal	  grandmother	   is	  suited	  to	   the	  crucial	  role	  of	  custodian	  according	  to	   the	  moral	  criteria	  set	  out	  by	  the	  law	  itself.	  Meriem’s	  lawyer	  is	  able	  to	  position	  her	  as	  following	  the	  spirit	  of	  the	  law	   that	   intends	   to	   protect	   children	   and	   to	   ensure	   that	   they	   are	   raised	   ‘in	   good	  moral	  shape.’	  The	  lawyer	  also	  draws	  upon	  the	  essential	  qualities	  of	  a	  mother	  that	  make	  her	  the	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person	  best	   suited	   to	   care	   for	  her	   children;	   the	  assumption	   is	   that	   this	   attitude	   towards	  motherhood	  will	   be	   one	   that	   is	   a	   received	   social	   norm	   shared	   by	   a	  majority	   of	   people,	  including	  the	  judge.	  
Although	  he	  rests	  his	  claim	  on	  the	  inescapable	  fact	  that	  Meriem	  is	  absent,	  working	  abroad,	  Munir’s	  lawyer	  nonetheless	  seeks	  to	  discredit	  Meriem	  morally,	  as	  both	  a	  bad	  wife	  and	  a	  bad	  mother:	  
‘The	  marital	   relationship	   deteriorated	   between	   the	   two	  parties	   due	   to	   the	   actions	   of	   the	  wife:	  her	  neglect	  of	  her	  marital	  duties	  and	  her	  absence	   from	   the	  national	   soil	   to	  work	   in	  Qatar	  until	  the	  present	  time	  without	  her	  husband’s	  permission	  and	  leaving	  the	  children	  in	  his	   custody.	  He	   has	   been	   the	   one	  who	  has	   looked	   after	  …	   them	  and	  has	   supported	   their	  studies	  for	  the	  last	  five	  years	  …	  	  
His	  wife	  filed	  for	  divorce	  without	  grounds.	  My	  client	  refuses	  divorce.	  He	  wishes	  to	  continue	  marital	   life	   and	   try	   to	   overcome	   their	   problems	   considering	   the	   best	   interest	   of	   their	  children	  so	   that	   they	  can	   live	   in	  a	   stable	  and	  balanced	   family.	   In	  her	  demand	   for	  divorce	  without	  grounds,	  she	  has	  caused	  harm	  to	  the	  husband,	  who	  has	  the	  right	  to	  compensation	  for	  moral	  harm	  done.	  (He	  asks	  for	  40	  000	  dinars	  in	  moral	  damages).	  
Concerning	   the	   custody	   of	   the	   children,	   my	   client	   wishes	   this	   to	   be	   ruled	   as	   in	   the	  temporary	   decision	   which	   awarded	   custody	   to	   him,	   especially	   as	   the	   wife	   lives	   outside	  national	  soil	  and	  will	  continue	  to	  stay	  there.’	  	  
Perhaps	  Meriem’s	  willingness	  to	  work	  abroad,	  leaving	  her	  children	  behind,	  makes	  her	   de	   facto	   a	   bad	  mother.	  Munir	  was	   awarded	   custody	   and	   also	   2000	   dinars	   in	  moral	  damages.	   This	   amount	   appears	   reasonable	   given	   that	   Meriem	   earns	   1300	   dinars	   per	  month	  in	  her	  work	  in	  Qatar,	  compared	  to	  Munir’s	  modest	  salary	  of	  400	  dinars.	  
Although	   the	   wife’s	   lawyer’s	   extensive	   narrative	   failed	   to	   achieve	   its	   ends,	   it	  nonetheless	  displays	  the	  values	  assumed	  to	  be	  shared	  by	  litigant,	  lawyer	  and	  judge.	  In	  the	  event,	   coupled	   with	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   children	   appear	   accustomed	   to	   living	   with	   their	  father,	   it	  seems	  that	  the	  mother’s	  physical	  absence	  was	  insurmountable.	  In	  taking	  on	  the	  masculine	   role	   of	   providing	   for	   her	   family,	   she	   has	   inadvertently	   foregone	   the	   feminine	  role	  of	  caring	  for	  her	  children.	  
The	   nature	   of	   the	   arguments	   used	   in	   these	   petitions	   points	   to	   the	  way	   in	  which	  custody	  disputes	  are	  drawn	  into	  broader	  processes	  of	  reassembling	  the	  moral	  by	  the	  text	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of	   the	   law	   that	  makes	  moral	   criteria	   relevant	   to	   judicial	  decision-­‐making.	  Moral	   criteria,	  the	   essential	   nature	   of	   mothers	   and,	   hence,	   the	   gendered	   nature	   of	   parental	   duties	   are	  being	   contested	   and	   reinforced	   within	   the	   pages	   of	   these	   files.	   Material	   tensions	  encountered	  in	  Morouj,	  where	  we	  saw	  that	  ideal	  marital	  roles	  are	  increasingly	  difficult	  to	  fulfil	  are	  being	  played	  out	  here:	  Can	  Meriem	  be	  a	  ‘good’	  mother	  whilst	  absent	  in	  order	  to	  fulfil	  the	  essentially	  male	  role	  of	  main	  breadwinner?	  
	  
MAKING	  ‘BAD’	  MOTHERS:	  UNFIT	  MOTHERS	  
Whilst	   the	  previous	  case	   is	  understandable	   in	   light	  of	   the	  mother’s	  physical	  absence,	   the	  question	   remains	   as	   to	   when	   the	   judge	   actively	   goes	   against	   the	   norm	   and	   removes	  children	  from	  a	  mother	  who	  is	  present.	  In	  these	  cases,	  documentary	  evidence	  plays	  a	  role	  in	  making	  ‘bad’	  mothers	  and	  determining	  which	  mothers	  are	  able	  to	  keep	  custody	  of	  their	  children.	  
One	   tragic	   case	   serves	   to	   illustrate	   some	   of	   the	   extreme	   circumstances	   in	  which	  children	  are	  removed	  from	  the	  custody	  of	  their	  mother.	  After	  a	  period	  of	  tension	  in	  their	  marriage,	   the	   wife	   had	   snapped	   and	   ominously	   threatened	   that	   she	   would	   avenge	   her	  husband’s	   control	   over	   her	   behaviour.	   The	   next	   day	   the	   husband	   received	   a	   frightened	  phone	   call	   from	   his	   10-­‐year-­‐old	   daughter.	   She,	   her	   4-­‐year	   old	   sister	   and	   mother	   were	  vomiting	  blood	  and	   losing	  consciousness.	  They	  had	   ingested	  strong	  bleach	  used	   to	  clean	  toilets	  fed	  to	  them	  by	  their	  mother	  mixed	  up	  with	  some	  yoghurt.	  By	  the	  time	  the	  husband	  arrived	  and	  rushed	  his	  family	  to	  hospital	  it	  was	  too	  late	  to	  save	  the	  little	  girl.	  The	  mother	  survived	  her	  own	  attempted	  suicide	  and	  was	  sent	   to	  prison	   for	  murdering	  her	  youngest	  daughter.	   (The	   murder	   case	   would	   have	   produced	   documentary	   evidence	   of	   the	   wife’s	  conviction	  and	  presence	  in	  prison	  that	  would	  have	  been	  very	  convincing	  to	  the	  judge).	  	  
This	   is	   perhaps	   an	   extreme	   example	   of	   the	   male	   Family	   Judge’s	   criteria	   for	  allocating	  custody:	  ‘If	  there	  is	  something	  proven	  against	  the	  mother,	  something	  moral	  like	  adultery	  (zina),	  then	  I	  give	  custody	  to	  the	  father	  automatically’	  (my	  emphasis).	  Documents	  take	  on	  a	  further	   important	  role	  testifying	  to	  the	  moral	  capacity	  of	  the	  wife	  to	  be	  a	  good	  mother	  and	  shape	  the	  judge’s	  decision	  concerning	  custody.	  In	  addition,	  in	  these	  cases,	  the	  Family	  Judge	  would	  not	  always	  demand	  that	  the	  father	  has	  a	  woman	  with	  him	  to	  take	  care	  of	  the	  children.	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The	  lone	  case	  file	  cited	  in	  the	  chart	  earlier,	  which	  saw	  custody	  divided	  between	  the	  parents,	  with	   the	   son	   remaining	  with	  his	  mother	   and	   the	  daughter	  with	  her	   father,	  was	  based	  on	  the	  mother’s	  proven	  adultery.	  This	  case	  can	  be	  read	  in	  light	  of	  popular	  fears	  that	  daughters	   of	   divorce	   will	   fall	   into	   immoral	   sexual	   behaviour.	   Although	   the	   father	   had	  asked	  for	  custody	  of	  both	  children,	  the	  couple	  and	  judge	  had	  reached	  this	  agreement.	  One	  of	   the	   five	   cases	   in	   which	   the	   father	   alone	   won	   custody	   was	   also	   based	   on	   the	   wife’s	  adultery:	  
CASE	  FILE	  OF	  ZEINEB	  AND	  FERID:	  FATHER	  WINS	  CUSTODY	  DUE	  TO	  WIFE’S	  ADULTERY238	  
As	  I	  began	  reading	  this	  case,	  one	  of	  the	  clerks	  mentioned	  that	  this	  was	  not	  the	  first	   time	  that	  Zeineb	  and	  Ferid	  had	  appeared	  in	  the	  divorce	  court;	  he	  had	  previously	  filed	  a	  case	  for	  divorce	   for	  harm	  that	  had	  been	  rejected	  at	  appeal.	  On	  this	  occasion,	  Zeineb	  had	   filed	   for	  divorce	   for	   harm,	   but	   later	   changed	   her	   request	   to	   divorce	   without	   grounds.	   Given	   the	  improbability	  of	  being	  awarded	  divorce	  for	  harm	  on	  these	  grounds	  (a	  situation	  her	  lawyer	  must	   have	   been	   aware	   of),	   the	   summons	  which	   launched	   the	   present	   case	   can	   be	   read	  retrospectively	  as	  a	  justification	  of	  the	  adultery	  of	  which	  she	  is	  later	  found	  guilty:	  
	  ‘Summons.	  
The	  marital	  relationship	  deteriorated	  between	  the	  two	  parties	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  husband’s	  bad	   treatment	   of	   his	   wife,	   his	   neglect	   of	   her	   and	   his	   violence	   towards	   her.	   The	   most	  important	  of	  these	  …	  	  is	  his	  refusal	  of	  marital	  cohabitation239	  …	  	  
This	   refusal	   continued	   for	   a	   period	   of	   years	   and	   she	   was	   patient	   …	   with	   the	   goal	   of	  protecting	  her	  family	  and	  children,	  but	  this	  caused	  her	  serious	  physical,	  material	  and	  moral	  damage.	  She	  started	  suffering	   from	  nervous	   illness	  and	  heart	  disease	  and	   is	   in	   treatment	  for	   this.	   There	   is	   no	   doubt	   that	   the	   clearest	   of	   the	   marital	   duties	   are	   cohabitation	   and	  sexual	   relationships.	   The	   Tunisian	   legislator	   did	   not	   recognise	   the	   marriage	   contract	  without	  considering	  the	  natural	  obligations,	  which	  are	  the	  sexual	  relationships.	  These	  are	  compulsory	  and	  not	   carrying	  out	   this	   relationship	   for	   a	  period	  of	  many	  years	   causes	   the	  marital	   relationship	   to	   be	   unstable	   and	   represents	   a	   proven	   form	   of	   harm	   and	   is	  something,	  which	  the	  wife	  is	  entitled	  to.	  
The	  Court	  of	  Cassation	  has	  made	  it	  clear,	  in	  many	  decisions	  concerning	  this	  matter,	  …	  that	  this	  is	  the	  wife’s	  right	  and	  entitles	  her	  to	  ask	  for	  divorce	  for	  harm.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
238	  This	  file	  has	  been	  abridged.	  
239	  Mu’ashara	  zawjia	  clearly	  denotes	  their	  (lack	  of)	  sexual	  relationship.	  When	  a	  husband	  accuses	  his	  wife	  of	  not	  
cohabiting	  mu’ashara	  and	  musakina	  are	  both	  used.	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Among	   the	   decisions	   of	   the	   Court	   of	   Appeal	   published	   in	   this	   respect	   is	   the	   civil	   appeal	  judgement	  published	  by	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  in	  Sousse	  (decision	  2876,	  30/4/77	  published	  by	  Court	  of	  Cassation	  in	  1999	  page	  168),	  which	  specified	  the	  following:	  
‘The	  husband’s	  continual	  refusal	  of	  marital	  cohabitation	  for	  many	  months	  and	  the	  neglect	  of	  her	  need	  for	  cohabitation	  and	  the	  absence	  of	  his	  desire	  to	  have	  sexual	  relations	  with	  her	  in	   the	  natural	  way	  …	  causes	  harm	  to	   the	  wife	  and	  entitles	   the	  wife	   to	  ask	   for	  divorce	   for	  harm	  ...	  He	  abstained	  from	  intercourse	  with	  her	  without	  a	  valid	  pretext.’	  
There	   is	   no	   doubt	   that	   what	   the	   wife	   has	   suffered	   for	   years	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   lack	   of	  
cohabitation	  constitutes	  proven	  harm	  …	  This	  matter	  has	  caused	  her	  chronic	  illness,	  heart	  disease,	   in	   spite	   of	   her	   young	   age	   as	   a	   result	   of	   her	   suffering	   from	   the	   neglect	   of	   her	  husband	  and	  especially	  due	   to	  what	  has	  been	  mentioned	  above.	  The	  harm	   is	  proven	  and	  consequently	  she	  requests	  compensation	  for	  moral	  and	  material	  harm.	  
My	   client	   is	   asking	   for	   divorce	   for	   harm	   for	   the	   first	   time	   after	   consummation	   and	  compensation	   for	   moral	   and	   material	   harm.	   She	   wants	   custody	   of	   the	   children	   and	  maintenance	  for	  herself	  of	  500	  dinars	  per	  month.	  She	  wants	  to	  stay	  in	  the	  marital	  home	  as	  the	  person	  who	  has	  custody.’	  (emphasis	  in	  the	  original)	  
Zeineb’s	   lawyer	   builds	   on	   this	   argument,	   and	   a	   temporary	   decision	   concerning	  custody	  made	  by	  the	  judge	  in	  their	  first	  reconciliation	  session,	  to	  present	  a	  demand	  for	  a	  decision	   to	   be	   made	   concerning	   nafaqa	   for	   the	   children	   and	   their	   living	   arrangements.	  Again	  making	  reference	  to	  the	  wife’s	  weak	  health	  and	  heart	  problems,	  the	   lawyer	  claims	  that	  Ferid	  ‘threw	  her	  out	  of	  the	  house	  and	  kept	  the	  children	  from	  her	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  
any	   legal	   procedures	   forbidding	   him	   from	   doing	   this.’	   (emphasis	   in	   the	   original).	  Zeineb,	   therefore,	  makes	  a	  claim	   for	  200	  dinars	   in	  nafaqa	   for	  each	  of	   their	   two	  children,	  based	   on	   her	   husband’s	   salary	   of	   1000	   dinars.	   She	   also	  wants	   to	   remain	   in	   the	  marital	  home	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   her	   having	   been	   awarded	   custody	   in	   the	   reconciliation	   session.	  Ferid’s	  lawyer’s	  belligerent	  response	  hints	  at	  the	  extent	  of	  their	  marital	  breakdown:	  
‘2.	  Demand	  for	  the	  repeal	  of	  the	  temporary	  decisions:	  
The	  Family	  Judge	  made	  a	  decision	  concerning	  custody.	  My	  client	  has	  been	  maintaining	  his	  family.	  In	  spite	  of	  this,	  the	  wife	  exploited	  this	  judgement	  to	  ask	  for	  nafaqa	  for	  her	  and	  the	  children	  of	  300	  dinars	  in	  the	  Cantonal	  Court	  of	  Hammam	  Lif.	  
The	  wife	  manages	  to	  retain	  custody	  although	  she	  is	  not	  healthy	  for	  the	  children	  due	  to	  her	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neglect	  of	  them	  and	  her	  perpetually	  attacking	  them.	  She	  does	  this	  to	  punish	  her	  husband,	  in	  spite	  of	  him	  providing	  for	  the	  costs	  of	  the	  family	  and	  the	  many	  loans	  relating	  to	  the	  marital	  home.’	  
At	  all	  three	  reconciliation	  sessions	  Zeineb	  repeated	  her	  demand	  for	  divorce	  based	  on	  his	  failure	  to	  sleep	  with	  her	  and	  the	  heart	  problems	  she	  suffers	  as	  a	  result.	  He	  repeated	  that	  she	  is	  lying	  and	  that	  he	  wants	  to	  remain	  in	  the	  marriage.	  (The	  reader	  will	  note	  that	  he	  previously	   filed	   for	   divorce	   for	   harm	   himself	   and	   is	   accusing	   her	   of	   adultery;	   this	   is	   a	  necessary	   statement	   to	   justify	   his	   claim	   for	   moral	   compensation	   and	   to	   avoid	   the	   case	  being	   changed	   to	   divorce	   by	   consent).240	   In	   support	   of	   his	   charges	   of	   adultery,	   various	  pieces	  of	  evidence	  are	  included.	  First,	  the	  husband	  filed	  a	  case	  against	  her	  for	  adultery.	  The	  report	  relating	  to	  this	  case	  reads	  as	  follows:	  
‘(Her	  husband)	  claims	  that	  she	  has	  a	  relationship	  with	  another	  man,	  who	  is	  also	  married,	  as	  proven	  by	  the	  telephone	  bills	  with	  calls	   to	  his	  number.	  She	  has	  a	  dubious	  relationship	  with	  this	  man	  who	  has	  a	  Mercedes.	  	  The	  husband	  said	  he	  saw	  him	  waiting	  for	  her	  outside	  the	  house.	  Their	  son	  said,	  ‘there	  is	  Uncle	  x’s	  car’.	  Sometimes	  the	  husband	  follows	  them	  and	  when	   they	   see	   him	   they	   change	   direction.	   The	   moral	   police	   brigade	   saw	   her	   go	   to	   his	  house.’	  
A	   second	   investigative	   report	   pertaining	   to	   the	   adultery	   of	   the	   wife	   is	   also	  attached,	  along	  with	  pages	  of	  the	  detailed	  telephone	  bills	  mentioned	  above.	  All	  of	  this	  lead	  to	  the	  court	  awarding	  the	  father	  custody	  of	  the	  children	  and	  the	  most	  generous	  payout	  of	  moral	  damages	  (10,000	  dinars	  –	  based	  on	  his	  wife’s	  high	  salary	  of	  700	  dinars	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  subjective	  evaluation	  of	  the	  harm	  suffered)	  of	  all	  the	  husbands	  in	  my	  sample.	  
In	   this	   case,	   the	   authority	   of	   documentary	   evidence	  produced	   and	   countenanced	  by	   the	   state	   played	   a	   leading	   role	   in	   achieving	   a	   divorce	   settlement	   that	   is	   highly	  favourable	   to	   the	  cheated	  husband.	  The	  clarity	  of	   the	  penal	  code	   that	   sanctions	  adultery	  sets	   the	   scene	   for	   the	   judge	   to	   be	   convinced	   of	   the	   accusation.	   The	   legal	   procedures	  produced	   documents	   relating	   to	   this	   crime	   that	   hold	   enough	   authority	   to	   justify	   the	  judge’s	  decision.	  The	  presence	  of	   legally	  permissible	  evidence,	  as	   in	   the	  cases	  of	  divorce	  for	   ‘harm’,	   does	   not	   in	   itself	   relieve	   the	   judge	   of	   his	   need	   to	   engage	   in	   a	   process	   of	  interpretation.	   The	   judge	   serves	   as	   a	   moral	   ‘bridge’	   between	   these	   legal	   facts	   and	   the	  particular	  circumstances	  of	  the	  individual	  case	  concluding	  that	  it	  is	  in	  the	  ‘best	  interest’	  of	  the	  children	  for	  them	  to	  be	  raised	  away	  from	  their	  adulterous	  mother.	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  See	  litigant’s	  strategies	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  discussed	  in	  chapter	  4.	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(THE	  LOSS	  OF)	  CUSTODY	  AS	  A	  COST	  OF	  DIVORCE	  
	  
Saida	  
Saida	  (whom	  we	  met	   in	  chapters	  3	  and	  5)	  had	  been	  subject	   to	  various	  attempts	  by	  
her	  husband	  to	  cheat	  her	  out	  of	  her	  rights.	  Her	  greatest	  fear	  of	  all	  would	  have	  been	  to	  
lose	  custody	  of	  her	  son;	  this	  thought	  alone	  brings	  tears	  to	  her	  eyes.	  She	  had	  already	  
renounced	  moving	  closer	  to	  her	  family	  who	  live	  8	  hours	  drive	  away	  from	  the	  capital	  
where	  her	  husband	  lives	  for	  fear	  of	  losing	  custody	  due	  to	  failing	  to	  respect	  his	  visiting	  
rights.	  She	  does	  not	  dare	  to	  travel	  to	  visit	  her	  parents	  alone	  and	  leave	  her	  son	  with	  
her	   husband.	   She	   refers	   back	   to	   the	   case,	   which	   her	   husband	   filed	   against	   her,	  
accusing	  her	  of	  violence	  against	  his	  mother.	  ‘The	  law	  was	  with	  me,’	  she	  notes,	  as	  his	  
case	   for	   divorce	   for	   harm	  was	   rejected	   for	   lack	   of	   evidence.	   Her	   husband’s	   aim	   in	  
bringing	  this	  case,	  she	  insists,	  was	  to	  try	  to	  get	  custody	  of	  their	  child	  so	  that	  he	  would	  
no	  longer	  have	  to	  pay	  her	  nafaqa	  and	  a	  rent	  allowance.	  Saida	  told	  me	  about	  the	  new	  
amendment	   to	   the	   law	   passed	   in	   March	   2008.	   Her	   husband	   had	   sold	   the	   marital	  
home	  whilst	   she	  was	   in	   the	  process	  of	   filing	  a	   case	   for	  housing	   for	  herself	  and	  her	  
son.	   ‘If	  a	  man	  has	  a	  house’,	   she	  explains,	   ‘it	  must	  be	  placed	  at	  the	  disposition	  of	   the	  
person	  who	  has	  custody	  of	  his	  children.’	  If	  the	  judgement	  had	  been	  passed,	  his	  selling	  
the	  house	  from	  under	  her	  feet	  would	  have	  entailed	  a	  prison	  sentence.	  
	  
As	  in	  Saida’s	  case,	  the	  child	  necessarily	  creates	  a	  lasting	  bond	  between	  its	  parents,	  frequently	  constraining	  them	  to	   live	  close	  together	  even	  after	  they	  have	  separated.	   In	  all	  cases,	   the	  parent	  who	  does	  not	  have	   custody	   is	   automatically241	   awarded	  visiting	   rights,	  with	   or	   without	   the	   right	   to	   take	   the	   child	   out	   of	   their	   home,	   at	   fixed	   times	   (usually	  Sundays	  and	  national/religious	  holidays	   from	  9am	   to	  6pm).	  The	   legal	   code	   states	   that	   a	  mother	  or	  father	  with	  visiting	  rights	  cannot	  be	  prevented	  from	  exercising	  this	  right.242	  As	  for	  Mehdi’s	  wife	   (below),	   this	  article	  has	  additional	   implications	   for	   the	  residence	  of	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
241	  For	  obvious	  reasons,	  the	  main	  exception	  to	  this	  is	  if	  the	  parent	  is	  in	  prison.	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  PSC,	  Article	  66.	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person	  with	  custody;	  moving	  away	  from	  the	  parent	  with	  visiting	  rights	  can	  open	  them	  up	  to	  legal	  action	  and	  the	  risk	  of	  losing	  custody	  of	  the	  child.	  
The	  material	   implications	  of	  being	  granted	   custody	  also	   serve	   to	   create	   a	   lasting	  bond	  between	  the	  divorced	  couple,	  assuming	  that	  the	  mother	  has	  been	  awarded	  custody.	  The	  father	  must	  provide	  accommodation	  for	  the	  child	  and	  the	  person	  holding	  custody	  of	  the	  child,	  if	  they	  do	  not	  have	  accommodation	  of	  their	  own.	  This	  is	  reinforced	  with	  a	  penal	  sanction	  in	  the	  event	  of	  non-­‐payment.	  He	  must	  also	  provide	  for	  the	  child,	  if	  the	  child	  does	  not	  have	  property	  of	  his	  own.243	  In	  addition,	  the	  law	  provides	  for	  the	  person	  with	  custody	  to	  receive	  a	  ‘salary’244	  for	  ‘doing	  the	  washing,	  the	  preparation	  of	  foods	  and	  other	  services	  according	   to	  habit	   (‘urf)’.245	  As	  a	   result,	   the	   legal	   structure	  of	   custody	  means	   that	   a	  wife	  retaining	   custody	   of	   the	   children	   after	   a	   divorce	   maintains	   considerable	   material	   links	  with	  her	  ex-­‐husband,	  at	   least	  until	   the	  children	  have	  reached	   the	  age	  of	  majority.	  As	   the	  opening	  vignette	  to	  this	  chapter	  suggests,	  this	  situation	  may	  prove	  disadvantageous	  to	  all	  parties	  concerned.	  Several	  cases	  echo	  Saida’s,	  indicating	  a	  growing	  awareness	  of	  the	  new	  law	  and	  its	  implications.	  
	  
Malika	  
Malika’s	  divorce	  began	  with	  a	  bang;	  a	  shock	  that	  she	  believes	  was	  a	  direct	  result	  of	  
the	  new	  law	  leaving	  the	  house	  to	  the	  wife	  who	  has	  custody.	  Returning	  from	  a	  short	  
business	  trip	  to	  France,	  she	  discovered	  that	  her	  husband	  had	  taken	  a	  cheap	  house	  in	  
a	  poor	  neighbourhood	  not	   far	   from	  where	   they	  had	   lived	  and	  had	  relocated	  all	  her	  
belongings	  there.	  She	  filed	  a	  demand	  at	  the	  court	  and	  went	  with	  a	  notary	  to	  recover	  
some	  belongings	  for	  herself	  and	  her	  daughters.	  As	  they	  jointly	  owned	  the	  floor	  of	  the	  
pleasant	  villa	  which	  constituted	  the	  usual	  marital	  home,	  he	  was,	  in	  her	  view,	  afraid	  of	  
losing	   this	   if	   they	   divorced.	   He	   was	   attempting,	   therefore,	   to	   relocate	   the	   marital	  
home	  to	  the	  cheaper,	  unpleasant	  residence	  she	  had	  been	  surprised	  to	  find	  him	  in	  on	  
her	  return	  from	  abroad.	  	  
	  ‘I	   resisted,’	   she	   tells	  me.	   She	   remained	   in	   the	   former	  marital	   home,	   even	   though	   it	  
was	  empty,	  refusing	  to	  move	  to	  the	  other	  house.	  However,	  their	  floor	  of	  the	  villa	  was	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  PSC,	  Article	  56.	  
244	  ujra,	  salaire,	  PSC,	  Article	  65.	  
245	  PSC,	  Article	  65.	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directly	   above	   his	  mother-­in-­law,	  who	   cut	   off	   the	   gas	   and	  water	   supplies	   to	   try	   to	  
force	   her	   to	   leave.	   Malika	   bought	   some	   candles	   and	   a	   small	   heater	   that	   used	   gas	  
bottles.	   They	   had	   to	   go	   without	   television.	   It	   was	   the	   end	   of	   winter	   and	   still	   cold.	  
‘They	   made	   us	   live	   in	   precarious	   conditions,’	   she	   laments.	   As	   she	   persisted	   in	   the	  
marital	   home,	   her	   husband’s	   family	   soldered	   closed	   the	   gate	   that	   lead	   from	   the	  
garden	  into	  the	  street.	  She	  had	  to	  call	  the	  emergency	  services	  to	  be	  able	  to	  take	  the	  
children	  to	  school.	  Finally,	  her	  husband’s	  family	  ‘kidnapped’	  the	  children	  as	  they	  left	  
school.	   She	   had	   to	   carry	   out	   legal	   procedures	   to	   get	   them	   back.	   ‘It	   is	   my	   right.	   I	  
should	  not	  need	  to	  do	  this,’	  she	  says.	  
The	   Family	   judge	   intervened	   and	   helped	   them	   reach	   an	   agreement	   to	   divorce	   by	  
mutual	   consent.246	   Her	   husband,	   a	   well-­off	   senior	   manager,	   would	   contribute	   300	  
dinars	   in	  rent	  allowance	  and	  350	  dinars	   in	  nafaqa	   for	  the	  children	  and	  would	  have	  
visiting	   rights,	  whilst	   she	  maintained	   custody.	  Malika	  had	  mixed	   feelings	  about	   the	  
justice	   system.	   The	   only	   positive	   aspect	   of	   the	   divorce	   process	   for	   her	  was	   to	   ‘have	  
had	  the	  intelligence	  to	  find	  a	  compromise	  and	  stop	  the	  haemorrhage.’	  	  
	  
It	  is	  of	  note	  that	  the	  serious	  problems	  and	  manipulation	  Malika	  suffered	  in	  the	  run	  up	   to	   her	   divorce	  would	   have	   been	   entirely	   invisible	   in	   her	   divorce	   file;	   as	   they	   finally	  divorced	  by	  mutual	  consent	  there	  would	  have	  been	  no	  need	  to	  refer	  to	  any	  of	  these	  events	  (although	  the	  judge	  was	  aware	  of	  what	  had	  happened).	  	  
	  
Khaled	  
Not	  all	  husbands	  are	  prepared	  to	  stoop	  to	  these	  levels	  in	  order	  to	  sever	  the	  material	  
ties	  with	  their	  ex-­wives,	  even	  if	  conscious	  of	  the	  possibility	  of	  doing	  so.	  Khaled,	  in	  his	  
mid	   30s	   with	   one	   young	   son,	   divorcing	   his	   wife	   without	   grounds,	   provides	   some	  
insight	  into	  why	  so	  few	  men	  seem	  to	  fight	  for	  custody.	  He	  perceived	  it	  as	  natural	  for	  
his	  son	  to	  go	  with	  his	  mother.	  He	  could,	  he	  explained,	  have	  found	  a	  ‘dishonest’	  way	  of	  
gaining	   custody,	   by	   getting	   fake	   papers	   claiming	   his	  wife	  was	   a	   ‘prostitute’	   (likely	  
meaning	   she	   had	   committed	   adultery),	   but	   he	   did	   not	   want	   to	   level	   this	   kind	   of	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accusation	  against	  his	  son’s	  mother.	  In	  our	  final	  meeting,	  Khaled	  told	  me	  that	  he	  was	  
trying	   to	   insist	   that	  his	  wife	   remain	   living	   in	   ‘the	  marital	  home’,	  a	  house	  owned	  by	  
him	  adjoining	  his	  parent’s	  house,	  with	  whom	  she	  had	  had	  substantial	  disputes.	  This	  
was	  a	  thinly	  veiled	  act	  of	  revenge	  as	  he	  knew	  that	  his	  wife	  wanted	  to	  move	  back	  to	  
her	  home	  town,	  a	  few	  hours’	  drive	  away,	  to	  be	  close	  to	  her	  family	  and	  friends;	  a	  legal	  
commitment	   to	   live	   in	   his	   house	   would	   prevent	   her	   from	  moving	   away	   under	   the	  
threat	  of	  contravening	  her	  husband’s	  visiting	  rights	  and	  losing	  custody.	  
	  
Just	  as	  convincing	  the	  judge	  that	  your	  spouse	  is	  a	  ‘bad’	  husband	  or	  wife	  can	  lead	  to	  a	   financially	   favourable	   divorce	   settlement,	   the	   material	   flows	   surrounding	   custody	  disputes	  are	  articulated	  with	  performances	  of	  good	  or	  bad	  ethical	  personhood.	  A	  husband	  may	  ‘lose’	  the	  marital	  home	  and	  remain	  indebted	  to	  the	  custodian	  of	  his	  children.	  A	  wife	  may	  lose	  her	  children,	  if	  she	  is	  deemed	  unfit	  or	  unable	  to	  care	  for	  them	  as	  a	  mother	  should,	  or	   remain	   dependent	   on	   a	   man	   with	   whom	   she	   is	   no	   longer	   married.	   These	   ‘costs’	   of	  divorce	   are	   experienced	   and	   felt	   differently	   by	  men	   and	   by	  women	   as	   both	  marital	   and	  parental	  duties	  are	  strongly	  gendered.	  
	  
INTEREST	  OF	  THE	  CHILD	  
In	  a	  few	  cases,	  the	  judgement	  appeared	  to	  be	  based	  simply	  on	  the	  preference	  of	  the	  child	  or	  children.	  Occasionally,	  the	  judge	  would	  draw	  on	  the	  opinion	  of	  experts	  (social	  workers)	  who	  see	  what	  the	  children	  want	  and	  what	  kind	  of	  conditions	  they	  live	  in	  and	  whether	  the	  father	  has	  a	  woman	  who	  agrees	  to	  look	  after	  them.	  	  
CASE	  FILE:	  IN	  WHICH	  THE	  JUDGE	  FOLLOWS	  THE	  CHILD’S	  WISHES	  
One	  of	  the	  cases	  where	  the	  son	  was	  in	  the	  custody	  of	  his	  father	  was	  decided	  according	  to	  the	  son’s	  wishes.	  He	  had	   fabricated	   fabulous	   tales	  of	  abuse	  at	   the	  hand’s	  of	  his	  maternal	  grandmother	  and	  uncle,	  who,	  in	  his	  words,	  ‘imprisoned	  him	  and	  tied	  him	  up	  with	  a	  belt	  to	  a	   chair’	   in	   the	  garage	  and	   laughed	  at	  him	   for	  being	  afraid	  of	   the	  mice	  and	  beetles.	   ‘Why	  don’t	   you	   kill	   them,	   you	   are	   a	   strong	   man?’	   his	   grandmother	   would	   taunt	   him.	   He	  answered	  that	  ‘he	  was	  barefooted	  and	  had	  no	  shoes	  to	  kill	  them	  with’	  and	  replied,	  ‘should	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I	   lick	  them	  with	  my	  tongue?’	  As	  proof	  of	  his	   love	  for	  his	  father,	  he	  told	  the	  social	  worker	  that	  he	  wanted	  to	  become	  a	  pilot	  so	  that	  he	  could	  take	  him	  on	  the	  Hajj	  to	  Mecca.	  	  
The	   social	   worker	   remarked	   to	   the	   judge	   that	   ‘the	   boy	   has	   a	   very	   strong	  imagination’;	  the	  allegations	  did	  not	  hold	  up	  to	  verification.	  Nonetheless,	  the	  boy’s	  words	  bore	  witness	  to	  his	  desire	  to	  stay	  with	  his	  father.	  In	  addition,	  the	  social	  worker	  confirmed	  that	   the	   father’s	  unmarried	  younger	  sister,	  who	  was	  used	  to	  caring	   for	   the	  children,	  was	  willing	  to	  maintain	  this	  role	  and	  dedicate	  her	  life	  to	  them.	  The	  boy	  successfully	  persuaded	  the	  court	  to	  rule	  in	  accordance	  with	  his	  wishes.	  His	  sister	  stayed	  with	  their	  mother.	  	  
A	  second	  case	  similar	  to	  this,	  in	  which	  custody	  was	  divided,	  served	  to	  formalise	  an	  existing	  arrangement	  whereby	   the	   son	  had	  been	   living	  with	  his	   father	  and	   the	  daughter	  with	  her	  mother	  after	  their	  separation.	  	  
Unable	   to	   see	   into	   the	   home	   himself,	   the	   judge	   appears	   to	   place	   his	   trust	   in	   an	  expert	  who	  has	  had	  the	  opportunity	  to	  witness	  the	  intimate	  space	  of	  the	  family	  home.	  The	  boy’s	   performance	   to	   persuade	   the	   court	   nonetheless	   has	   moral	   undertones.	   He	   was	  placed	   in	   the	   hands	   of	   someone	   portrayed	   as	   a	   loving,	   caring	   young	   woman	   willing	   to	  sacrifice	  herself	  for	  the	  boy	  as	  opposed	  to	  being	  left	  with	  family	  members	  he	  described	  as	  being	  cruel	  and	  violent.	  Even	  where	  the	  state	  does	  intervene	  in	  such	  an	  intimate	  domain	  of	  life,	  emotions	  and	  preference	  retain	  a	  place	  and	  may	  play	  a	  crucial	  role	  in	  the	  judgement	  process.	  
	  
INTERNATIONAL	  CASES:	  POLITICS	  OF	  IDENTITY	  AND	  THE	  PATRILINE	  
	  ‘Why	  doesn’t	  she	  just	  forget	  her	  son	  and	  go	  back	  to	  her	  country?’	  (Besma,	  commenting	  on	  an	  Algerian	  woman	  with	  a	  baby	  son	  being	  divorced	  by	  her	  husband)	  
Besma’s	  comment	  hints	  at	   the	  moral	  stakes	   in	  what	   I	  will	   refer	   to	  as	   international	  cases	  that	   involve	   one	   spouse	   coming	   from,	   or	   residing	   outside,	   Tunisia	   and	   the	   complex	  relationship	  between	  religion,	  (national)	  identity	  and	  morality.	  Like	  Kerkenni	  identity,	  all	  forms	   of	   identity,	   an	   essence	   derived	   from	  belonging	   to	   a	   place,247	   are	   inherited	   via	   the	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patriline,	   pointing	   to	   the	   patrilineal	   foundation	   of	   the	   nation	   (even	   if	   by	   law	   Tunisian	  mothers	  may	  also	  pass	  their	  nationality	  on	  to	  their	  children).	  
Several	  other	  legal	  articles	  are	  critical	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  custody	  in	  relation	  to	  religion	  and	  place	  of	  residence.	  The	   first	  upholds	  the	  commonly	  held	  belief	   that	   identity,	  including	   religious	   identity	   (or	   regional	   identity)	   is	   passed	   down	   to	   the	   child	   via	   the	  patriline.	  Besma’s	  seemingly	  cruel	  comment	  highlights	  the	  importance	  of	  this	  connection	  between	  father	  and	  child,	  as	  well	  the	  negative	  views	  of	  divorced	  women.	  It	  did	  not	  matter	  to	  Besma	  that	  Tunisia	  and	  Algeria	  share	  the	  same	  religion	  and	  that	  the	  Algerian	  woman	  is	  a	  Muslim.	  Nor	  did	  it	  matter	  that	  she	  and	  her	  son	  had	  suffered	  violence	  during	  her	  marriage	  or	  that	  her	  husband	  was	  divorcing	  her.	  	  	  
According	  to	  the	  legal	  code,	  if	  the	  person	  with	  custody	  is	  of	  a	  different	  religion	  to	  the	  father	  of	  the	  child,	  they	  may	  only	  exercise	  the	  right	  of	  custody	  until	  the	  child	  is	  5	  years	  old	  or	  unless	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  to	  fear	  that	  the	  child	  will	  be	  brought	  up	  in	  a	  religion	  that	  is	  not	  that	  of	  his	  father;	  this	  article	  does	  not	  apply,	  however,	  if	  custody	  is	  held	  by	  the	  child’s	  mother.248	   It	   is	   reasonable	   to	   assume	   that	   this	   exclusion	   became	   necessary	   due	   to	   the	  existence	   of	  mixed	  marriages	   between	   Tunisian	  men	   and	   non-­‐Tunisian	  women.	   For	   the	  latter,	  article	  61	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  more	  problematic;	  custody	  is	  lost	  if	  the	  person	  with	  custody	  
changes249	  their	  residence	  to	  a	  distance	  which	  renders	  the	  child’s	  guardian	  unable	  to	  fulfil	  his	  duties	  to	  his	  ward.	  Crucially,	  however,	  the	  law	  remains	  flexible,	  the	  best	  interest	  of	  the	  child	   remaining	   key.	   If	   deemed	   necessary	   to	   avoid	   causing	   harm	   to	   the	   child,	   the	   judge	  may	  award	  certain	  rights	  of	  guardianship	  to	  a	  mother	  who	  has	  custody,	  if	  the	  guardian	  is	  unable,	  or	  neglects,	  to	  fulfil	  his	  duty,	  is	  absent	  or	  impossible	  to	  locate.	  Leila	  (who	  we	  met	  in	  chapter	  6)	  explained	  that	  she	  was	  able	  to	  take	  decisions	  on	  schooling	  for	  her	  son	  and	  his	  circumcision;	  his	  father	  remained	  ‘guardian’	  (wali)	  and	  as	  such	  responsible	  for	  managing	  the	  child’s	  property,	  although	  these	  decisions	  must	  be	  agreed	  upon	  by	  the	  judge,	  who	  will	  rule	   in	   the	   best	   interest	   of	   the	   child.	   Consequently,	   it	   is	   of	   note	   that	   a	   father	  who	   loses	  custody	   may	   also	   find	   himself	   losing	   elements	   of	   the	   male	   prerogative	   to	   hold	  guardianship	  over	  his	  child.	  	  
Sometimes	   fathers	   can	   go	   to	   great	   lengths	   to	   reclaim	   their	   children	   who	   have	  moved	   abroad.	   Although	   Sabr	   did	   not	   gain	   custody	   via	   the	   courts,	   the	   legal	   system	   did	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  Article	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  This	  word	  is	  significant:	  the	  situation	  is	  different	  if	  the	  mother’s	  place	  of	  residence	  is	  established	  as	  being	  abroad	  
when	  custody	  is	  ruled.	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validate	   his	   claim	  once	   he	   had	   obtained	   custody	   via	   his	   own	  means,	   notably	   so	   that	   his	  children,	  as	  Tunisians,	  would	  remain	  and	  grow	  up	  in	  Tunisia:	  
	  
Sabr	  
Sabr,	   a	   businessman	   in	   his	   late	   40s,	   had	   married	   his	   childhood	   sweetheart.	   ‘Love	  
makes	  you	  blind,’	  he	  lamented,	  referring	  to	  the	  differences	  in	  ‘custom’	  between	  their	  
two	   families,	   that	   he	   believes	   eventually	   lead	   to	   their	   divorce.	   She	   had	   been	   partly	  
raised	   in	   France	   and	   came	   from	   an	   ‘open’	   family,	   who	   ‘live	   like	   the	   French.’	   His	  
‘Tunisian,	  Muslim	  family’	  was	  more	  modest.	   	  Their	  marital	  problems	  escalated	  after	  
her	   father	  died	  and	   there	  was	  noone	   left	  who	  could	   ‘bring	  her	  back	   to	   the	   straight	  
and	  narrow.’	  He	   proved	  unable	   to	   control	   his	  wife.	   She	   began	   to	   visit	   a	  woman	  he	  
describes	  as	  a	  ‘whore’,	  ‘who	  everybody	  knew	  smoked	  cannabis’	  and	  who	  was	  leading	  
her	  astray.	  Under	  her	  bad	  influence,	  his	  wife	  accused	  him	  of	  attempted	  murder.	  When	  
the	  police	  came	  to	  arrest	  him	  at	  his	  father’s	  house,	  they	  recognized	  him	  and	  could	  not	  
believe	  that	  such	  a	  reputable	  citizen	  was	  the	  person	  they	  were	  supposed	  to	  arrest.	  
The	   public	   humiliation	   caused	   by	   her	   inappropriate	   behaviour	   led	   him	   to	   file	   for	  
divorce.	   They	   agreed	   to	   divorce	   by	   consent,	   although	   she	   drew	   out	   the	   case	   for	   as	  
long	  as	  possible.	  They	  finally	  divorced	  on	  15/6/2000.	  He	  reels	  off	  the	  date	  as	   if	   it	   is	  
engraved	  in	  his	  memory.	  
After	   the	  divorce,	  his	  wife	  enrolled	   the	  children	   in	   school	   in	  Paris	  and	   sent	   them	  to	  
live	  with	  her	  sister.	  He	  missed	  them	  terribly	  and	  cried	  after	  speaking	  to	  them	  on	  the	  
phone.	  He	  devised	  a	  plan.	  He	  moved	  to	  Paris	  and	  then	  brought	  the	  children	  back	  to	  
Tunisia	  with	  him	  ‘for	  the	  holidays.’	  He	  then	  petitioned	  the	  court	  to	  forbid	  his	  children	  
from	  leaving	  the	  country.	  He	  added	  that	  he	  believed	  that	  his	  wife	  wanted	  rid	  of	  them;	  
children	  need	  their	   father	  more	  than	  their	  mother.	  He	  realized	   later	  that	  he	  should	  
have	  immediately	  informed	  the	  court	  that	  the	  children	  were	  with	  him	  to	  prevent	  his	  
wife	   from	   filing	   a	   case	   against	   him	   for	   unpaid	  nafaqa.	   Fortunately,	   she	   did	   not	   do	  
this.	  	  
Back	   in	   Tunisia,	   he	   moved	   to	   a	   new	   neighbourhood	   for	   a	   fresh	   start.	   ‘I	   dedicated	  
myself	  to	  my	  children,’	  he	  said.	  ‘I	  was	  the	  father	  and	  the	  mother	  at	  the	  same	  time.’	  His	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recompense	  was	  his	   children’s	   love.	  He	  allowed	  himself	   few	  other	  pleasures,	  merely	  
occasional	   fishing	   trips.	   He	   renounced	   remarriage	   for	   fear	   that	   his	   children	  would	  
feel	  neglected,	  although	  he	  added	   that	   it	  was	  not	   easy	   for	  a	  man	   to	   stay	  alone;	  his	  
‘needs’	  remained	  unfulfilled.	  
People	  are	  constantly	  surprised	  that	  he	  cares	  for	  his	  children	  alone.	  ‘Maybe	  I	  am	  the	  
only	   case!’	   he	   exclaimed.	   It	   was	   hard	   for	   him	   to	   adapt	   and	   learn	   chores	   he	   was	  
unused	  to	  doing.	  He	  even	  cooks	  and	  has	   learned	  to	  plait	  his	  daughter’s	  hair.	   It	  was	  
not	   easy	   to	   accompany	   his	   daughter	   through	   the	   onset	   of	   puberty.	   Now,	   he	   is	   her	  
confidant	   for	   matters	   of	   the	   heart	   and	   she	   is	   extremely	   proud	   of	   her	   father	   who	  
‘sacrificed	   himself’	   for	   them.	   Sabr	   remains	   his	   own	   confidant	   too,	   releasing	   the	  
painful	  feelings	  he	  still	  harbours	  in	  letters	  that	  he	  does	  not	  send.	  
	  
Perhaps	  there	  are	  two	  morals	  that	  can	  be	  drawn	  from	  Sabr’s	  story.	  The	  first	  is	  that	  divorce	  marks	  both	  an	  ending	  and	  a	  beginning.	  As	   this	  new	  phase	  unfolds,	   the	   situation	  continues	   to	   evolve.	   That	  which	   has	   been	   gained	  may	   be	   lost;	   that	  which	   has	   been	   lost,	  regained.	  Forms	  of	  anxiety	  and	  uncertainty	  are	  produced	  which	  endure	  once	  the	  divorce	  case	   is	   officially	   over.	   In	   this	   case,	   although	   Sabr’s	   wife	   had	   custody,	   he	   could	   use	   his	  position	  as	  guardian	  and	  find	  support	  in	  the	  legal	  system	  to	  bring	  his	  children	  back	  to	  their	  country	   of	   origin.	   The	   second	  moral	   is	   that	   Sabr	  weaves	  his	   narrative	   about	  his	   divorce	  and	   plot	   to	   regain	   custody	   of	   his	   children	   around	   his	   and	   his	   wife’s	   respective	   ethical	  personhood.	  The	  image	  he	  presents	  of	  himself	  as	  a	  devoted	  father,	  a	  good,	  morally	  sound	  citizen,	  contrasts	  entirely	  with	  the	  image	  he	  presents	  of	  his	  wife	  as	  an	  unfit	  mother.	  
Sabr	  was	  not	  the	  only	  father	  I	  heard	  about	  who	  had	  repatriated	  his	  children	  from	  abroad.	   Another	   such	   case	   had	   required	   the	   intervention	   of	   the	   foreign	   (Western,	   non-­‐Muslim)	  wife’s	  embassy.	  Her	  ex-­‐husband	  had	  brought	  the	  children	  to	  Tunisia	  to	  spend	  the	  summer	  with	   their	  grandparents.	  She	   then	   travelled	   to	  Tunisia	   to	   take	   them	  back	   to	  her	  home	   country,	   where	   they	   had	   been	   resident.	   She	   found	   herself	   blocked	   at	   the	   airport,	  unable	  to	  leave	  Tunisian	  soil.	  In	  spite	  of	  a	  Tunisian	  court	  order	  allowing	  her	  to	  travel	  with	  the	  children,	  the	  police	  officer	  at	  the	  airport	  told	  her	  that	  the	  children	  were	  Tunisian	  and	  should	   remain	   in	   Tunisia.	   She	   spent	   some	   time	   living	   in	   her	   embassy	  with	   the	   children	  before	  the	  situation	  was	  resolved	  via	  diplomatic	  channels.	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The	  moral,	   as	  well	   as	   identity	   (which	   carries	   its	  own	  sense	  of	  morality,	   as	   it	   can	  serve	  as	  an	  indicator	  of	  good	  ethical	  personhood,	  such	  as	  in	  being	  ‘Kerkenni’	  or	  ‘Muslim’)	  is	   being	   reassembled	   in	   yet	   another	   way	   as	   decisions	   are	   taken	   concerning	   in	   which	  country,	  and	  with	  which	  parent,	  children	  should	  be	  raised.	  This	  returns	  us	  to	  the	  concerns	  with	   which	   this	   chapter	   began,	   expressed	   by	   Neji	   but	   shared	   by	   many,	   that	   the	   moral	  fabric	   of	   society	   is	   being	   eroded	   as	   divorce	   means	   that	   children	   are,	   with	   increasing	  frequency,	  being	  brought	  up	  in	  broken	  families.	  
	  
CONCLUSION	  
Custody	   disputes	   are	   bound	   up	   in	   multiple	   ways	   with	   the	   process	   of	   reassembling	   the	  moral.	  
Firstly,	  custody	  highlights	  some	  of	  the	  moral	  issues	  surrounding	  debates	  that	  fuel	  public	   concerns	   surrounding	   divorce.	   When	   a	   couple	   divorce,	   the	   (nuclear)	   family,	  perceived	  as	   the	  building	  block	  on	  which	  society	  and	   its	  moral	  equilibrium	   is	   founded	  –	  and	   the	   nature	   of	   which	   is	   experiencing	   change	   in	   the	   urbanised	   setting	   of	   the	  neighbourhood250	  -­‐	  is	  inevitably	  broken.	  The	  judge	  has	  no	  choice	  but	  to	  break	  up	  a	  family	  as	   he	   rules	   a	   divorce.	   As	   seen	   in	   the	   first	   case	   in	   this	   chapter,	   this	   damage	   may	   be	  irreversible.	   Both	   parents	   lacked	   the	   moral	   courage	   (and	   the	   material	   resources)	   to	  ‘sacrifice	  themselves’	  for	  their	  son	  and	  his	  fate	  is	  left	  to	  Neji,	  the	  Family	  Judge	  and	  the	  legal	  system.	  
Secondly,	  the	  text	  of	  the	  law	  –	  the	  use	  of	  the	  open	  norm	  ‘best	  interest	  of	  the	  child’	  and	  the	  requirement	  for	  the	  person	  awarded	  custody	  to	  be	   ‘honest’	  –	  turns	  the	  case	  files	  into	  a	   forum	  where	   the	  moral	   criteria	   relating	   to	  good	  mothers	  and	   fathers	  are	  debated	  and	   reinforced.	   The	   judge	   is	   again	   asked	   to	   engage	   in	   the	   onerous	   task	   of	   re-­‐contextualisation	   that	   is	   required	   to	   make	   the	   individual	   cases	   comprehensible	   and	   to	  make	   a	   judgement	   possible.	   The	   case	   files	   become	   a	   forum	   where	   both	   marital	   and	  parental	   duties,	   and	   the	   gendered	   forms	   of	   ethical	   personhood	   they	   imply,	   are	   debated	  and	  contested.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
250	  See	  chapter	  1.	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A	  litigant’s	  potential	  to	  use	  (or	  abuse)	  the	  law	  is	  largely	  contingent	  on	  their	  ability	  to	   project	   the	   appropriate	   ethical	   personhood	   and	   to	   provide	   convincing	   documentary	  evidence	  of	  the	  spouse’s	   immorality.	  Rather	  than	  explaining	  the	  dramas	  and	  sagas	  of	  the	  courthouse	   by	   referring	   to	   a	   ‘moral’	   explanation	   to	   be	   implicitly	   understood,	  morality	   –	  what	   it	   is	   that	   makes	   someone	   a	   good	   mother	   or	   father,	   a	   good	   husband	   or	   wife	   –	   is	  constantly	  being	  renegotiated	  and	  reconfigured	  within	  the	  courtroom,	  an	  institution	  that	  itself	  is	  located	  in	  the	  complex	  social	  networks	  that	  spiral	  outwards	  engulfing	  increasingly	  difficult	  material	  realties.	  
Thirdly,	   custody	   (or	   more	   precisely	   the	   loss	   of	   custody	   and	   the	   financial	  arrangements	  surrounding	  custody)	  as	  the	  ‘cost’	  of	  divorce	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  double-­‐edged	  sword	   experienced	   differently	   by	   men	   and	   by	   women.	   For	   both	   men	   and	   women,	   any	  ‘agency’	   they	  may	  have	  within	   these	  disputes	  can	  be	  best	  understood	  by	  seeing	   them	  as	  related	  and	  responsible,	  to	  echo	  Laidlaw’s	  terms	  (2010),	  rather	  than	  docile	  or	  empowered.	  Unlike	   the	   situation	   for	   Iranian	  women,251	  Tunisian	  women	   face	  barriers	   other	   than	   the	  potential	   loss	   of	   their	   children	   that	   may	   deter	   them	   from	   divorcing.252	   	   Even	   as	   the	  marriage	  in	  its	  legally	  accepted	  form	  is	  broken,	  material	  ties	  remain.	  As	  Chekir,	  a	  Tunisian	  feminist	  professor	  of	   law,	  has	   argued	   the	   improved	   rights	  of	   children	  and	  of	   the	  person	  awarded	   custody	  mean	   that	   ex-­‐wives	   (as	   those	  most	   frequently	   awarded	   custody)	  may	  remain	  materially	   dependent	   on	   someone	   to	  whom	   they	   are	   no	   longer	  married	   (1996).	  Their	   freedom	   to	   remarry	   is	   also	   curtailed	   by	   the	   fear	   of	   potentially	   losing	   custody,	  contingent	   on	  whether	   their	   ex-­‐husband	  decides	   to	   file	   a	   complaint	   and	  what	   the	   judge	  will	  rule	  in	  light	  of	  the	  ‘best	  interests	  of	  their	  children.’	  
In	   this	   sense,	  we	  could	   find	  a	  parallel	   situation	   to	   that	   found	  by	  Mir-­‐Hosseini	   (in	  very	  different	  legal	  circumstances)	  in	  Iran,	  where	  ‘women’s	  motherly	  duties	  are	  also	  in	  the	  domain	  of	  male	  control’	  even	  after	  their	  marriage	  has	  ended	  (1993:	  147).	  Yet,	  this	  would	  seem	   to	   ignore	   the	   role	   of	   the	   state	   and	   its	   laws	   and	   representatives.	   The	   husbands	  mentioned	   above	   who	   sought	   custody	   to	   avoid	   being	   indebted	   to	   their	   ex-­‐wives	   or	   to	  avoid	   ‘losing’	  the	  marital	  home,	   in	  particular	  following	  the	  recent	  legal	  reforms	  that	  hold	  them	  more	   strongly	   accountable,	   shed	   a	   new	   light	   on	   the	   dynamics	   of	   this	   post-­‐marital	  relationship.	  The	  state	  may	   intervene	  on	  either	  side;	  Sabr	  realized	  that	  his	  ex-­‐wife	  could	  have	  prosecuted	  him	  for	  the	  non-­‐payment	  of	  nafaqa.	   	  The	  nature	  of	  ‘male	  control’	  and	  its	  (lack	  of)	  power	  appears	  to	  be	  reconfigured	  when	  subject	  to	  policing	  by	  the	  state.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
251	  Read	  via	  the	  work	  of	  Mir-­‐Hosseini	  and	  Hoodfar.	  
252	  Chapters	  1	  and	  2.	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Finally,	   custody	  disputes	  also	  provide	  a	   forum	   for	  debates	   surrounding	   the	  most	  appropriate	  context	  in	  which	  children	  should	  be	  brought	  up.	  In	  the	  international	  cases,	  the	  norm	   of	   children	   remaining	   with	   their	   mother	   could	   be	   overridden	   by	   the	   stronger	  imperative	   for	   children	   to	   be	   raised	   where	   they	   belong,	   in	   their	   (father’s)	   country	   of	  origin,	  where	  they	  will	  be	  raised	  according	  to	  their	  (father’s)	  religion.	  
As	   divorce	   cases	   and	   custody	   disputes	   cannot	   be	   resolved	   whilst	   keeping	   the	  marital	   family	   intact,	   the	   moral	   fabric	   of	   society	   is	   seen	   to	   be	   increasingly	   eroded	   as	  children	  are	   raised	   in	  broken	   families;	   fears	  abound	  about	  children	  being	  raised	  outside	  the	  appropriate	  setting	  of	  the	  nuclear	  family	  -­‐	  complete	  with	  a	  mother	  and	  a	  father	  	  -­‐	  that	  appears	   as	   the	   necessary	   condition	   for	   the	   reproduction	   of	   good	   forms	   of	   ethical	  personhood	  in	  the	  next	  generation.	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CONCLUSION	  -­	  	  
(EXTRA)ORDINARY	  ETHICS:	  ETHICAL	  THEORY	  AS	  LEGAL	  PRACTICE	  
	  
May	  2007,	  Ministry	  of	  Statistics	  
Thanks	  to	  a	  mutual	  acquaintance,	  I	  found	  myself	  in	  the	  Tunisian	  Ministry	  of	  Statistics	  
where	   I	  was	   told	   I	  would	  be	   furnished	  with	  data	   that	   could	  be	  useful	   for	  my	   study.	  
The	   kind	   civil	   servant	   who	   received	  me	   there	   seemed	   rather	  more	   sceptical	   about	  
whether	   I	   should	  trust	   the	  statistics	  being	  produced.	  He	  showed	  me	  a	  pyramid	  that	  
depicted	   the	   population	   by	   age	   according	   to	   gender.	   ‘Doesn’t	   it	   look	   rather	   too	  
symmetrical?’	   he	   asked	  me	   rhetorically.	   Rumours	   had	   been	   spreading	   about	   there	  
being	   too	   many	   young	   women	   of	   marriageable	   age	   compared	   with	   young	   men,	   a	  
topic	   that	   was	   the	   subject	   of	   some	   moral	   concern.	   How	   could	   these	   women	   find	  
husbands,	   in	   particular	   given	   the	   illegality	   of	   polygamy?	   If	   these	  women	   could	   not	  
find	   husbands,	   would	   it	   lead	   to	   sexually	   loose	   behaviour	   and	   children	   born	   out	   of	  
wedlock?	   The	   implication	   was	   that	   any	   troubling	   gender	   asymmetry	   that	   had	   the	  
potential	  to	  cause	  problems	  for	  the	  state	  had	  been	  ironed	  out	  of	  the	  statistics	  before	  
they	  were	  released	  to	  the	  public.	  I	  left	  with	  some	  population	  statistics	  and	  the	  sense	  
that	   the	   official	   divorce	   rate	   was	   more	   likely	   to	   represent	   the	   political	   stakes	  
underlying	  family	  law,	  rather	  than	  giving	  me	  any	  notion	  of	  the	  prevalence	  of	  divorce	  
in	  Tunisia.	  	  
	  
It	  is	  not	  surprising	  that	  statistics	  may	  have	  been	  less	  than	  accurate	  in	  a	  dictatorship	  such	  as	   Ben	   Ali’s.	   It	   is,	   however,	   revealing	   that	   such	   care	   was	   taken	   to	   monitor	   the	   public	  acceptability	  of	  statistics	  pertaining	  to	  family	  law	  in	  this	  oppressive	  regime.253	  	  Family	  law	  –	  in	  particular	  the	  state’s	  ‘advanced’	  position	  on	  women’s	  rights	  reflected	  in	  that	  law	  –	  had	  become	   the	   cornerstone	   legitimising	   Ben	   Ali’s	   corrupt	   regime	   at	   home	   and	   abroad.	  Bourguiba	  and	  then	  Ben	  Ali	  had	  self-­‐consciously	  made	  women’s	  rights	  into	  a	  foundational	  issue	   of	   the	   nation-­‐state	   and	   a	   source	   of	   the	   state’s	   identity	   promoting	   an	   enlightened,	  Islamic	   version	   of	   personal	   status	   laws	   (Bourguiba	   1956).	   Ben	   Ali	   continued	   to	   use	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
253	  Voorhoeve	  also	  discusses	  the	  state	  censorship	  of	  allegedly	  high	  divorce	  statistics	  (2011:99-­‐101).	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women’s	  rights	  as	  a	  symbol	  of	  his	  continuity	  with	  Bourguiba	  to	  lend	  legitimacy	  to	  his	  rule	  following	   the	   bloodless	   coup	   that	   enabled	   him	   to	   come	   to	   power.	   This	   use	   of	   state	  discourse	   surrounding	   women’s	   rights	   to	   gain	   legitimacy	   raised	   the	   political	   stakes	  surrounding	  family	  law	  and	  turned	  divorce	  statistics	  into	  a	  political	  weapon.254	  
These	  statistics	  were	  in	  a	  sense	  the	  public	  face	  of	  the	  regime’s	  own	  performance	  as	  far	  as	  family	  law	  was	  concerned;	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  state	  to	  police	  marital	  and	  kin	  relations	  and	  to	  guarantee	  the	  upkeep	  of	  morality	  –	  both	  public	  and	  private-­‐	  in	  a	  way	  perceived	  to	  be	   coherent	   with	   its	   self-­‐identification	   as	   Islamic.	   Rumours	   about	   the	   (perceived)	   high	  divorce	   rate255	   (see	   introduction)	   expressed	   fears	   that	   changes	   in	   the	   family	   due	   to	  changes	  in	  women’s	  rights	  (due	  to	  divorce)	  would	  lead	  to	  broken	  families,	  broken	  morals	  and	  social	  decadence.	  Like	  smoke	  and	  mirrors,	  by	  manipulating	  statistics,	  the	  state	  could	  maintain	  the	  illusion	  of	  its	  own	  legitimacy	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  its	  citizens.	  The	  many	  comments	  I	  heard	   about	   peoples’	   concerns	   about	   divorce	   and	   the	   impression	   that	   Tunisia	   had	   an	  extremely	  high	  divorce	  rate	  (‘Guiness	  book!’	  as	  Besma	  told	  me)	  confirmed	  that	  the	  state’s	  legitimacy	   was	   but	   an	   illusion.	   Nonetheless	   it	   was	   one	   that	   had	   to	   be	   preciously	  maintained	  for	  the	  regime	  to	  continue.	  
	  
INTRODUCTION	  
The	   brief	   vignette	   above	   hints	   at	   the	   extraordinary	   circumstances	   in	   which	   ethical	   life	  unfolded	  both	  in	  and	  outside	  the	  divorce	  court.	  As	  I	  went	  about	  my	  research,	  the	  smiling	  face	  of	  Ben	  Ali	   looked	  down	  at	  me,	   right	  hand	  placed	  deferentially	  over	  his	  heart,	   in	   the	  familiar	  omnipresent	  portrait	  that	  was	  hung	  on	  the	  wall	  of	  the	  office	  in	  the	  court,	  as	  it	  was	  in	  most	  of	   the	  other	  public	  places	   I	  visited.	  His	  presence	  was	  a	  constant	  reminder	  of	   the	  paradox	  that	  a	  regime	  broadly	  perceived	  to	  be	  morally	  corrupt	  advanced	  itself	  as	  a	  moral	  and	  religious	  guardian.	  256	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
254	  Cf	  Introduction.	  
255	  	  See	  introduction.	  
256	  The	  illegal	  activities	  of	  those	  close	  to	  the	  President,	  notably	  his	  wife	  and	  her	  relations,	  were	  well	  known	  at	  the	  
time	  of	  fieldwork.	  At	  the	  same	  time	  that	  members	  of	  her	  family	  were	  essentially	  accused	  of	  stealing	  from	  Tunisian	  
banks	  (for	  instance	  by	  taking	  loans	  that	  would	  never	  be	  repaid)	  and	  were	  increasingly	  flaunting	  their	  wealth	  (most	  
of	  my	  Tunisian	  friends	  were	  aware	  that	  Leila’s	  son	  owned	  a	  Hummer	  –	  a	  car	  not	  commercially	  available	  in	  Tunisia-­‐	  
painted	  in	  the	  flashy	  colours	  of	  his	  football	  team).	  My	  informants	  of	  all	  social	  classes	  complained	  about	  the	  
increased	  costs	  of	  living	  and	  difficulties	  in	  making	  ends	  meet.	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This	   thesis	   began	   as	   an	   attempt	   to	   explore	   peoples’	   experiences	   of	   the	   personal	  status	  laws	  that	  lie	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  political	  project	  that	  claimed	  to	  extend	  ‘equal’	  rights	  in	  divorce	  to	  both	  women	  and	  men.	  Would	  the	  law	  support	  ‘gender	  equality’	  in	  practice	  or	  would	   it	   uphold	   claims	  by	   secular	   feminists	   such	  as	  Hafidha	  Chekir	   (1996)	   that	   the	  PSC	  perpetuates	   gender	   inequality	   and	   patriarchal	   values?	   More	   specifically,	   I	   wanted	   to	  explore	  how	  key	  legal	  concepts	  	  -­‐	  notably	  ‘marital	  duties’	  and	  ‘harm’	  –	  were	  interpreted	  in	  legal	   practice.	  What	   happened	   in	   these	   interpretative	   spaces?	  Which	   values	  were	   being	  reinforced?	  
In	  answering	  these	  questions	  we	  have	  examined	  the	  specific	  processes	  and	  means	  through	  which	  the	  law	  is	  articulated	  with	  ethics.	  In	  this	  sense,	  it	  is	  a	  study	  of	  how	  ethical	  theory	  (Goodale	  2006)	  operates	  in	  both	  the	  ordinary	  circumstances	  of	  the	  neighbourhood	  and	   in	   the	   extraordinary	   circumstances	   of	   a	   court	   in	   an	   oppressive	   state.	   Rather	   than	  perceiving	   ‘morality’	   as	   an	   a	   prioiri	   cateogory	   and	   object	   of	   analysis,	   I	   have	   sought	   to	  follow	   Latour	   (2005)	   by	   approaching	   ‘morality’	   as	   that	   which	   is	   being	   reassembled	   via	  legal	  and	  social	  practices.	  
Like	  Lambek,	  I	  have	  found	  judgement	  to	  be	  ‘more	  appropriate	  than	  either	  freedom	  or	  convention	  as	  the	  fulcrum	  of	  everyday	  ethics’	  (2010:	  26).	  If	  judgement	  is	  central	  to	  both	  ordinary	  and	  extraordinary	  ethics,	  it	  is	  because	  judicious	  practice	  is	  both	  a	  marker	  of,	  and	  is	   premised	   on,	   ethical	   personhood.	   It	   is	   also	   the	   culmination	   of	   judicious	   practice	   and	  judicial	  practice	  in	  the	  person	  of	  the	  judge	  that	  makes	  ethics	  –	  in	  particular	  conceptions	  of	  ethical	   personhood	   and	   the	   moral	   criteria	   or	   virtues	   that	   constitute	   ‘good’	   (or	   ‘bad’)	  husbands	   or	  wives	   –	   central	   to	   the	   practice	   of	   divorce	   law.	   The	   legal	   code	   requires	   the	  judge	  to	  exercise	  discretion	  and	  makes	  these	  criteria	  central	  to	  the	  practice	  of	  the	  law,	  in	  particular,	  as	  the	  inclusion	  of	  open	  norms	  (‘harm’,	  ‘marital	  duties’	  and	  ‘the	  best	  interest	  of	  the	  children’)	  allows	  him	  further	  scope	  for	  interpretation.	  	  The	  centrality	  of	  judgement	  to	  ethics,	  and	  of	  ethics	  to	  the	  law,	  can	  then	  be	  seen	  to	  be	  written	  into	  the	  law	  itself.	  
In	  conclusion,	  I	  will	  build	  on	  the	  ethnographic	  descriptions	  of	  extraordinary	  ethics	  in	   the	   previous	   chapters	   in	   order	   to	   delve	   deeper	   into	   the	   process	   that	   I	   describe	   as	  dislocation	   that	   characterises	   life	   in	   Morouj,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   practice	   of	   the	   divorce	   law.	  Here,	  I	  aim	  to	  draw	  out	  the	  broader	  consequences	  of	  this	  process	  of	  dislocation	  in	  light	  of	  the	  state’s	  ‘feminist’	  project	  that	  reformed	  family	  law	  in	  order	  to	  ‘advance’	  women’s	  rights	  as	  one	  of	  the	  pillars	  of	  its	  legitimacy.	  In	  the	  process,	  I	  will	  speak	  to	  a	  central	  issue	  that	  is	  inherent	   in	   the	  paradox	  of	   a	   corrupt	   state	   striving	   to	  present	   itself	   as	  a	  moral	   guardian:	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fears	  surrounding	  a	  mismatch	  between	  interiority	  and	  exteriority	  –	  that	  appearances	  may	  not	  be	  all	  that	  they	  seem.	  	  
	  
RELATIONAL	  RIGHTS	  
Joseph’s	  elaboration	  of	  ‘patriarchal	  connectivity’	  in	  Lebanon	  provides	  one	  example	  of	  how	  personhood	   is	   defined	   via	   relatedness	   and	   how	   citizenship	   is	   defined	   via	   the	   family	  (1997).	  She	  links	  this	  concept	  with	  a	  ‘relational’	  understanding	  of	  rights	  where	  ‘you	  have	  rights	  as	  you	  are	   invested	   in	  relationships’	   (ibid:	  85).	   In	  her	  Lebanese	  case,	   Joseph	   finds	  that	  ‘one	  comes	  to	  have	  rights	  by	  having	  relationships	  with	  people	  who	  have	  access	  to	  the	  desired	  resources	  and	  privileges’	  (ibid:	  86).	  	  
In	   Tunis,	   it	   can	   also	   be	   said	   that	   connections	   of	   a	   personal	   nature	   are	   always	  helpful;	  personal	  knowledge	  comes	  with	  the	  assurance	  of	  ethical	  personhood	  and	  a	  person	  can	  more	  readily	  be	  accepted	  as	  trustworthy,	  when	  they	  can	  be	  judged	  on	  their	   ‘essence’	  or	   origin.	   Relationships	   formed	   in	   the	   neighbourhood	   can	   play	   this	   role,	   as	   well	   as	   kin	  relations,	   whether	   patriarchal	   or	   otherwise.	   The	   webs	   of	   relationships	   that	   play	   an	  important	   role	   in	   the	   lives	   of	   those	   like	   Besma	   would	   be	   ill-­‐defined	   as	   patriarchal	   and	  encompass	   new	   friendships	   as	   well	   as	   old	   (chapter	   one).	   My	   good	   fortune	   in	   being	  introduced	  to	  Karima	  in	  the	  neighbourhood,	  who	  helped	  me	  to	  gain	  access	  to	  the	  court,	  is	  a	  case	  in	  point.	  	  
Rights	   in	  Tunisia	  are	   ‘relational’	   in	  a	  different	   sense	   to	   the	  one	  meant	  by	   Joseph.	  Responsibilities	   flow	   from	   these	   relationships	   as	   well	   as	   rights.	   Access	   to	   rights	   is	  facilitated	   for	   those	   who	   are	   seen	   to	   carry	   out	   their	   responsibilities	   and	   who	   are	  consequently	  seen	  as	  taking	  those	  relationships	  into	  account.	  Taking	  marriage	  as	  one	  such	  relationship,	  divorce	  law	  brings	  these	  responsibilities	  sharply	  into	  focus;	  in	  the	  context	  of	  legal	  practice,	  marital	  duties	  –	  or	  the	  failure	  to	  fulfil	  them	  -­‐	  must	  be	  talked	  about	  explicitly.	  	  In	  order	  to	  receive	  one’s	  rights	   in	  marriage	  or	   in	  divorce,	  a	  spouse	  must	  be	  seen	  to	  fulfil	  their	   responsibilities.	  Thus	   ethical	  personhood	   in	  Tunisia	  has	  been	   seen	   to	  be	   relational	  and	  responsible.	  
In	   court,	   most	   relationships	   	   -­‐	   not	   the	   least	   the	   one	   between	   the	   judge	   and	   the	  litigants	   –	   were	   constructed	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   performance,	   as	   the	   size	   of	   the	   court’s	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jurisdiction	  meant	  that	  the	  citizens	  entered	  the	  court	  mostly	  as	  unknown	  entities.	  Rights	  are	   also	   ‘relational’	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   being	   based	   on	   an	   individual’s	   ability	   to	   build	   a	  relationship	   rapidly	   with	   someone	   who	   is	   unknown	   and	   inspire	   their	   trust	   via	   their	  performance.	  Judicious	  practice	  is	  central	  to	  this	  process,	  as	  individuals	  must	  judge	  how	  to	  shape	   their	   performance	   appropriately	   in	   anticipation	   of	   how	   it	   will	   be	   judged.	   In	  Lambek’s	   words,	   ‘how,	   when	   and	   whether	   people	   act	   is	   a	   product	   of	   their	   exercise	   of	  judgement	   to	   fit	   the	   circumstances,	   an	   exercise	   that	   is	   in	   turn	   related	   to	   character,	  acquired	  dispositions	   and	  accumulated	  wisdom’	   (2010:	  55).	   In	   this	  way,	   ordinary	   ethics	  (ibid:	  53)	  entered	  the	  practice	  of	  the	  law	  as	  it	  shaped	  the	  relationships	  formed	  in	  the	  court	  office	  (chapter	  3),	  just	  as	  it	  shaped	  life	  in	  the	  neighbourhood	  (chapter	  1).	  
Rights	   are	   ‘relational’	   in	   a	   further	   sense	   in	   that	   accessing	   rights	   in	   court	   is	  contingent	   on	   the	   ligitant’s	   embeddedness	   in	   relationships	   –	   kinship	   and	   friendship	   	   -­‐	  outside	   the	   court	   that	  may	   have	   supported	   them	   and	   enabled	   them	   to	   take	   the	   difficult	  step	  into	  the	  courthouse	  to	  initiate	  a	  divorce	  case.	  As	  we	  saw,	  for	  instance,	  Saida	  (chapter	  5)	   was	  materially	   supported	   by	   her	   brother	   (although	   he	   lived	   far	   away)	   and	   received	  more	   immediate	   help	   from	   her	   friends	   and	   neighbours	   in	   Morouj,	   whether	   in	   terms	   of	  moral	  support,	  advice,	  or	  help	  with	  childcare.	  In	  contrast,	  Nour	  did	  not	  file	  for	  divorce,	  in	  spite	  of	  her	  desire	  to	  escape	  her	  violent	  husband	  and	  despite	  her	  earning	  her	  own	  living,	  in	  order	  to	  save	  face	  for	  her	  family,	  who	  had	  played	  a	  role	  in	  arranging	  the	  marriage.	  	  
The	  relationship	  between	  citizenship	  and	  kinship	  plays	  out	  differently,	   therefore,	  when	   compared	   with	   Joseph’s	   study	   of	   Lebanon,	   where	   ‘citizenship	   law	   codified	   kin	  control	  and	  disenfranchised	  women’	  (2000:	  109).	  In	  Morouj,	  kin	  networks	  remained	  a	  key	  source	   of	   support	   in	   times	   of	   trouble,	   although	   as	   we	   saw	   residence	   patterns	   may	  overcome	   a	   preference	   for	   patriline	   (chapters	   1	   and	   2)	   and	   patrilocal	   residence	   is	   not	  always	   possible	   or	   desirable.	   Consequently,	   people	   only	   turn	   to	   the	   state	   once	   other	  avenues	  have	  been	  exhausted	  (to	  petition	   for	  nafaqa,	   for	   instance,	  or	   to	   file	   for	  divorce).	  This	  may	  entail	  the	  state	  enforcing	  the	  kind	  of	  kin	  contract	  of	  care	  and	  control	  described	  by	  Joseph,	  for	  instance,	  by	  making	  husbands	  pay	  nafaqa	  (or	  punishing	  them	  when	  they	  fail	  to	  do	  so).	  Rather	  than	  reinforcing	  patriarchal	  power,	  for	  those	  who	  enter	  the	  legal	  system,	  male	   control	   becomes	   subject	   to	   policing	   by	   the	   state	   and	   is	   open	   to	   being	   either	  sanctioned	  or	  punished	  by	  state	  power.	  	  	  
At	   the	   same	   time,	   changes	   in	   the	   legal	   code	   emphasised	   male	   duties	   whilst	  apparently	   eroding	   areas	   in	  which	  men	   (as	   husbands	   or	   fathers)	   traditionally	   exercised	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power.257	   In	   the	  divorce	  court,	   therefore,	  men	  as	   ‘bad’	  husbands	  are	  being	  disciplined	  as	  part	  of	  the	  state’s	  oppression.	  Anas,	  a	  well-­‐educated	  man	  in	  his	  30s	  studying	  for	  a	  doctoral	  degree	   in	   literature	   (and	  who	  was	  unmarried	  due	   to	   the	  difficulties	   he	  had	   in	  making	   a	  living	  that	  made	  him	  doubt	  he	  could	  support	  a	   family),	  was	  conscious	  of	   the	  state’s	  hold	  over	  men	   and	  quoted	   Foucault	   to	  me:	   ‘power	   is	   everywhere,’	   he	   told	  me.	   ‘If	  men	   are	   in	  trouble	   at	   home,	   they	   will	   not	   make	   trouble	   elsewhere.’	   As	   we	   have	   seen,	   a	   man	   may	  become	  a	  ‘bad’	  husband	  for	  (usually	  financial)	  reasons	  beyond	  his	  control	  and	  be	  subject	  to	   discipline	   by	   the	   state.	   Family	   law	   appears	   –	   and	   was	   sometimes	   perceived	   -­‐	   as	   a	  disciplinary	  technique	  of	  an	  oppressive	  regime.	  	  
	  
ENGENDERING	  RIGHTS	  
If	   both	   men	   and	   women	   experience	   policing	   by	   the	   state	   in	   personal	   status	  matters,	   it	   is	   because	   of	   the	   requirement	   that	   both	  men	   and	  women	   file	   for	   divorce	   in	  court.	  This	  is	  one	  of	  the	  key	  ways	  in	  which	  Tunisian	  divorce	  law	  differs	  from	  that	  in	  other	  Muslim	   countries.	   Osanloo,	   writing	   on	   divorce	   in	   Iran,	   describes	   how	   the	   litigants’	  experiences	  of	  divorce	  are	  gendered;	  women	  must	  convince	  the	   judge	  of	  their	  husband’s	  failings,	   whilst	   men	   only	   appear	   as	   respondents	   and	   ‘require	   little	   knowledge	   of	  procedures	  and	  the	  law’	  (2009:	  194).	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  in	  Tunis	  both	  men	  and	  women	  may	  file	   for	   divorce	   and	   both	  men	   and	  women	  may	   appear	   in	   court	   as	   the	   respondent.	   The	  gendering	   of	   divorce	   in	   Tunis	   occurs	   along	   different	   lines	   as	   both	   the	   positions	   of	  petitioner	  or	  respondent	  lead	  litigants	  to	  enact	  the	  ‘ideal’	  husband	  or	  wife.	  	  
Osanloo	   wrote	   of	   the	   ‘multiple	   subjectivities’	   of	   the	   women	   who	   attended	   the	  Iranian	   family	   court	   she	   studied	   and	   argued	   that	   her	   informant’s	   ‘subjectivities	   as	  autonomous	  rights	  bearer	  and	  Muslim	  woman’	  were	  ‘simultaneously	  sanctioned’	  by	  Iran’s	  family	  court	  system	  (2009:	  193).	  In	  a	  sense,	  Tunisia’s	  personal	  status	  code	  also	  provides	  for	   the	   coexistence	   in	   the	   family	   court	   of	  what	   could	   be	   termed	   ‘multiple	   subjectivities’	  (that	   I	  have	  preferred	   to	  discuss	   in	   terms	  of	  ethical	  personhood).	  Both	  men	  and	  women	  can	   exercise	   their	   right	   to	   file	   for	   divorce	   unilaterally,	   whilst	   –	   in	   practice	   –	   the	   law	  requires	  them	  to	  embody	  ideal	  notions	  of	  Islamic,	  ethical	  personhood	  in	  order	  to	  claim	  the	  rights	   that	   result	   from	   a	   divorce,	   whether	   compensation	   payments	   or	   custody	   of	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
257	  For	  instance,	  woman’s	  right	  to	  file	  for	  divorce	  independently.	  The	  1993	  reforms	  removed	  the	  reference	  to	  the	  
wife’s	  duty	  of	  obedience	  from	  article	  23.	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children.	   I	   argue	   that	   this	   uneasy	   attempt	   at	   the	   cohabitation	   of	   conflicting	   notions	   of	  ethical	  personhood	  leads	  to	  tensions	  in	  the	  practice	  of	  the	  law	  and	  contributes	  to	  a	  sense	  that	  the	  state’s	  moral	   legitimacy	  should	  be	  questioned.	  These	  contradictions	  are	  brought	  into	   view	   by	   attending	   to	   the	   assumptions	   that	   lie	   behind	   the	   legal	   terms	   as	   they	   are	  interpreted	  in	  practice	  (Strathern	  2004;	  Mahmood	  2005).	  
At	  first,	  the	  act	  of	  filing	  for	  divorce	   	  -­‐	   in	  particular	  filing	  for	  divorce	  unilaterally	  –	  could	  appear	  to	  be	  an	   independent	  gesture	  of	  an	  autonomous	  citizen.	  However,	   far	   from	  being	  an	  autonomous	  act,	  an	  individual’s	  decision	  to	  file	  for	  divorce	  is	  dependent	  on	  their	  relationships	  and	  responsibilities	  (chapter	  2).	  It	  is	  in	  itself	  a	  marker	  of	  the	  litigant’s	  ethical	  personhood	  as	  filing	  for	  divorce	  is	  an	  act	  that	  demonstrates	  moral	  judgement;	  a	  wife	  may	  be	  judged	  to	  be	  lacking	  in	   ‘patience’	  or	  as	   ‘failing	  to	  sacrifice	  herself’	   for	  the	  family	  if	  she	  files	   for	   divorce.	   As	   we	   saw,	   the	   situation	   may	   not	   be	   easier	   for	   men	   in	   some	  circumstances.	  	  	  
The	  key	  difference	  between	  men	  and	  women	  being	  underlined	  here	  is	  the	  capacity	  for	  moral	   judgment.	  Whereas	   it	  may	  be	  appropriate	   for	  a	  man	  to	   file	   for	  divorce	  (and	   in	  the	  religion	   it	  was	  a	  male	  prerogative	   to	   terminate	  a	  marriage	  unilaterally),	   in	   the	  social	  imaginary,	  a	  good	  wife	  does	  not	  file	  for	  divorce.	  A	  woman’s	  presence	  in	  court	  as	  petitioner	  appears	   almost	   as	   a	   contradiction	   in	   terms.	   Consequently,	  men	   and	  women	   inhabit	   the	  contradictory	   notions	   of	   ethical	   personhood	   implied	   in	   the	   law	   in	   different	   ways,	  contributing	  to	  a	  sense	  that	  the	  law	  does	  not	  conform	  to	  the	  Islamic,	  moral	  standards	  that	  many	  of	  my	  informants	  would	  like	  it	  to.	  
The	  ethical	  personhood	  of	  the	  litigant	  appearing	  in	  the	  divorce	  court	  is,	  therefore,	  marked	   by	   a	   double	   contradiction.	   In	   order	   to	   file	   for	   divorce,	   an	   individual	   must	   step	  outside	  those	  relationships	  and	  responsibilities	  to	  some	  extent.	  A	  litigant	  appears	  in	  court	  as	   an	   ‘autonomous	   rights	  bearer’	   (Osanloo	  2009:	  193).	  And	  yet,	  he	  or	   she	  must	  perform	  precisely	  those	  relationships	  and	  responsibilities	  to	  attain	  a	  favourable	  divorce	  settlement	  once	  the	  case	  has	  reached	  court.	  Through	  litigants’	  performances	  during	  the	  reconciliation	  sessions	   or	   through	   the	   narratives	   woven	   by	   lawyers,	   a	   surprising	   level	   of	   consistency	  emerged	  in	  the	  moral	  criteria	  that	  people	  sought	  to	  put	  forward	  to	  establish	  themselves	  as	  the	  ideal	  husband	  or	  wife.	  	  
Divorce	   law	   appears	   to	   recognise	   the	   tension	   between	   the	   idea	   of	   an	   atomised	  rights-­‐bearing	   citizen	   and	   a	   related,	   responsible	   ethical	   person	   by	   attributing	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compensation	   payments	   to	   the	   respondent	   in	   a	   unilateral	   divorce.	   Accessing	   this	   legal	  right	   to	   compensation	   is,	   in	   turn,	   contingent	  on	  persuading	   the	   court	   that	  he	  or	   she	  has	  done	  no	  ‘harm’	  and	  has	  fulfilled	  his	  or	  her	  ‘marital	  duties’.	  The	  focus	  remains	  on	  reciprocal	  obligations	  even	  as	  the	  marriage	  is	  being	  legally	  broken	  apart	  (Strathern,	  1985).	  
These	   performances	   of	   ideal	   marital	   roles,	   whether	   presented	   by	   persons	  (chapters	  3	  &	  4)	  or	  petitions	  (chapters	  5,	  6	  &	  7),	  frequently	  stood	  in	  contradiction	  with	  the	  realities	  of	  marriage	  (chapters	  1	  &	  2).	  In	  this	  sense	  the	  court	  served	  as	  a	  magnifying	  glass	  for	   the	   marital	   tensions	   found	   in	   the	   neighbourhood,	   where	   working	   wives,	   whose	  incomes	   were	   indispensable,	   were	   described	   as	   ‘helping’	   their	   husbands	   (chapter	   2).	  Performances,	   like	   smoke	   and	   mirrors,	   strove	   to	   keep	   up	   the	   appearance	   of	   an	   ideal	  marriage	  in	  circumstances	  that	  were	  often	  far	  from	  ideal.	  	  
Tensions	  between	   the	  real	  and	   the	   ideal	   lead	   to	  a	  second	  contradiction.	  This	   is	  a	  contradiction	  between	   interior	  dispositions	  and	  external	  appearances	   that	   is	   inherent	   in	  the	  way	  ethical	  personhood	  has	  come	  to	  be	  read	  as	  performance	  by	  its	  interpreters;	  it	  is	  a	  form	   of	   personhood	   that	   I	   will	   describe	   as	   ‘dis-­‐located’	   and	   that	   was	   a	   source	   of	  uncertainty	  and	  anxiety	  in	  the	  neighbourhood	  and	  court	  alike.	  
	  
DISLOCATED	  LIVES:	  ETHICAL	  PERSONHOOD	  
The	  family	  judge	  shared	  the	  frustrations	  of	  the	  reconciliation	  judge	  who	  found	  it	  difficult	  to	  locate	  the	  litigants.258	  	  He	  told	  me	  that	  ‘people	  wear	  masks,’	  and	  that	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  tell	  
who	   people	   are	   these	   days.	   Performances	   (like	   bodies)	  may	   be	   duplicitous	   (Kelly	   2006;	  Bear	  2007a)	  and,	  consequently,	  it	  is	  has	  become	  harder	  to	  know	  whom	  to	  trust.	  Exercising	  judgement,	   moral	   or	   legal,	   is	   treacherous	   when	   the	   only	   basis	   available	   from	   which	   to	  reach	  that	  judgement	  is	  fluid	  and	  cannot	  be	  trusted.259	  
The	   family	   court,	   in	   highlighting	   the	   way	   in	   which	   the	   performance	   of	   ethical	  personhood	  leads	  to	  uncertainty,	  serves	  as	  a	  microcosm	  for	  shifts	  that	  were	  encountered	  in	   the	   neighbourhood	   where	   relationships	   were	   equally	   tainted	   with	   ambiguity	   and	  distrust.	  One	   of	   the	   reasons	  why	   the	   inhabitants	   of	  Morouj	   found	   it	   difficult	   to	   navigate	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
258	  Chapter	  4.	  
259	  Cf	  Kelly	  on	  fears	  of	  dissimulation	  that	  mark	  the	  British	  asylum	  process,	  in	  particular	  suspicions	  as	  to	  the	  
intentions	  of	  the	  claimants	  (2012).	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this	  new	  neighbourhood	  was	  because	  the	  traditional	  indicators	  of	  ethical	  personhood	  –	  a	  person’s	   origin	   or	   essence	   –	  were	   either	   unknown,	   difficult	   to	   read	   or	   could	   be	   hidden	  (chapter	  1).	  The	  instability	  of	  performance	  has	  been	  well	  recognised	  in	  the	  anthropology	  of	   gender.	   According	   to	  Morris,	   performance	   ‘derives	   its	   compulsive	   force	   from	   the	   fact	  that	  people	  mistake	   the	  acts	   for	   the	  essence	  and	  …	  come	  to	  believe	   they	  are	  mandatory’	  (1995:	  573).	  On	  the	  contrary,	  my	  informants	  were	  highly	  conscious	  that	  the	  acts	  were	  not	  the	  essence	  and	  that	  this	  generated	  a	  high	  level	  of	  uncertainty	  and	  anxiety	  for	  those	  in	  the	  neighbourhood,	   just	   as	   it	   did	   for	   the	   Family	   Judge.	   Performance,	   then,	   creates	   the	  possibility	  of	  falsity,	  as	  the	  couple	  in	  their	  reconciliation	  session	  demonstrated.	  
In	   Egypt,	   Mahmood	   explored	   how	   the	   relationship	   between	   interiority	   and	  exteriority	   works	   to	   shape	   the	   ethical	   personhood	   of	   women	   in	   the	   Muslim	   mosque	  movement	   (2005:	   157).	   In	   her	   words,	   ‘the	   mosque	   participants	   do	   not	   understand	   the	  body	  as	  a	  sign	  of	  the	  self’s	  interiority	  but	  as	  a	  means	  of	  developing	  the	  self’s	  potentiality’	  (ibid:	   166);	   by	   acting	   shy,	   her	   informant	   felt	   that	   she	   would	   become	   shy.	   Performance	  begins	  with	  the	  intention	  to	  train	  the	  self	  by	  enacting	  virtues	  physically.	  
Rather	   than	   the	   transformation	   of	   the	   self,	   in	   Tunis,	   performance	   appears	   to	   be	  oriented	  towards	  cultivating	  social	  relationships	  and	  towards	  maintaining	  the	  impression	  of	  morality	  in	  an	  atmosphere	  marked	  by	  the	  fear	  of	  moral	  breakdown.	  And	  in	  the	  case	  of	  divorce	   law,	   performances	   are	   oriented	   towards	   achieving	   a	   legal	   result.	   The	   intention	  may	   be	   to	   dissimulate,	   to	   project	   the	   appearance	   of	   modesty	   or	   piety,	   rather	   than	   to	  necessarily	  cultivate	  these	  virtues	  in	  the	  self.	  Just	  as	  people	  have	  literally	  been	  dislocated	  from	   their	   places	   of	   origin	   as	   new	   neighbourhoods	   like	   Morouj	   are	   formed,	   ethical	  personhood	   has	   become	   dislocated;	   the	   exterior	   is	   no	   longer	   perceived	   to	   be	   a	   ‘true’	  reflection	   of	   the	   inward	   disposition,	   of	   whether	   someone	   is	   believed	   to	   be	   a	   ‘’good’	   or	  	  ‘bad’	  person.	  Unlike	  the	  claims	  of	  Mahmood’s	  informants,	  who	  shaped	  their	  performance	  with	   the	   goal	   of	   shaping	   their	   interior	   in	   order	   to	   cultivate	   religious	   virtues	   such	   as	  shyness,	  in	  Tunis	  the	  performance	  of	  ethical	  personhood	  appeared	  often	  as	  an	  protective	  mask,	  used	  sometimes	  pragmatically,	   to	   facilitate	   social	   relations.	  This	  dislocation	  of	   the	  self	   contributed	   towards	   generating	   the	   strong	   sense	   of	   uncertainty	   and	   anxiety	   felt	   by	  many	  of	  my	  informants.	  
Mahmood’s	   work	   is	   also	   of	   interest	   for	   the	   insight	   it	   provides	   into	   the	   place	   of	  intention	   in	   the	   shaping	   of	   ethical	   personhood.	   She	   also	   attends	   to	   the	   ‘ends	   towards	  which	   (an	   action)	  was	   aimed	   and	   the	   terms	   of	   being,	   affectivity	   and	   responsibility	   that	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constituted	   the	   grammar	  of	   (her	   informant’s)	   actions’	   (ibid:	   182).	  Attending	   to	   ‘ends’	   or	  goals	  of	  actions	  draws	  attention	  to	  the	  place	  of	  intentionality	  in	  ethical	  practice,	  seemingly	  providing	  a	  contrast	  with	  Laidlaw’s	  definition	  of	  agency	  that	  highlights	  responsibility	  for	  actions	  that	  may	  be	  beyond	  the	  control	  of	  the	  individual	  in	  question.	  	  
Thinking	  about	  the	  place	  of	  intentionality	  in	  moral	  accountability	  contributes	  to	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  gendering	  of	  Tunisian	  divorce	  law.	  In	  legal	  practice,	  the	  law	  applies	  different	  accounts	  of	  human	  action	  to	  men	  and	  to	  women	  as	  the	   judge	  assesses	  who	  has	  caused	   the	   most	   ‘harm’.	   A	   ‘bad’	   husband	   is	   one	   who	   is	   unable	   to	   maintain	   his	   family	  whatever	  his	  intention	  and	  even	  if	  this	  inability	  is	  due	  to	  circumstances	  beyond	  his	  control	  such	   as	   unemployment.	   It	   is	   relatively	   easy	   to	   provide	   legal	   proof	   of	   this	   failure	   to	   pay	  (chapter	  5)	  and	  the	  judge	  can	  rule	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  legal	  document	  that	  can	  be	  trusted.	  By	  contrast,	  a	  wife	   is	  only	  guilty	  of	   failing	   to	  cohabit	   (‘nushuz’),	   if	   she	   intentionally	   (without	  justification)	   leaves	   the	  marital	  home.	   Jurisprudence	  states	   that	   the	   judge	  must	   take	  her	  intention	  into	  account	  in	  reaching	  judgement.	  Notably,	  it	  is	  close	  to	  impossible	  to	  prove	  an	  intention	   by	   legal	   means	   and	   the	   judgement	   is	   likely	   to	   be	   overshadowed	   by	   doubt	  (chapter	  5).	   	   In	  the	  practice	  of	  the	  law,	  in	  relation	  to	  these	  key	  marital	  duties,	  the	  ethical	  personhood	  of	  men	   is	   judged	  on	  a	  different	  basis	   to	   that	  of	  women,	   implying	  a	  different	  model	  of	  human	  action;	  this	  differentiation	  is,	   in	  part,	  a	  product	  of	  the	   legal	  code,	  whose	  precise	  dispositions	  lead	  to	  the	  gendering	  of	  evidence.	  A	  wife	   is	  not	  held	  accountable	  for	  things	  beyond	  her	  control	  (domestic	  violence,	  other	  factors	  that	  could	  have	  compelled	  her	  to	  leave	  the	  marital	  home),	  whereas	  a	  man	  may	  be	  held	  accountable	  for	  things	  beyond	  his	  own	  volition	  (the	  harsh	  economic	  climate,	  difficult	  economic	  circumstances).	   In	  turn	  this	  leads	  to	  the	  sense	  that	  divorce	   law	   ‘favours’	  women’s	  rights,	  as	   it	  appears	  to	  police	   ‘bad’	  husbands	  more	  vehemently	  and	  effectively	  than	  ‘bad’	  wives.	  	  
In	   this	   way,	   ethical	   personhood	   is	   linked	   with	   perceptions	   of	   justice:	   access	   to	  justice	   –	   to	   a	   favourable	   divorce	   settlement	   –	   is	   contingent	   on	   the	   ability	   to	   display	  appropriate	  forms	  of	  ethical	  personhood	  that,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  are	  highly	  gendered.	  Legal	  ambiguities	  –	  silences	  in	  the	  law	  leaving	  decisions	  to	  judicial	  discretion,	  the	  limitations	  of	  what	  can	  be	  proven	  with	  legally	  acceptable	  evidence	  –	  combine	  with	  ethical	  ambiguities	  –	  the	  shifting	  basis	  of	  ethical	  personhood,	  the	  difficulties	  of	  being	  a	  good	  husband	  or	  wife	  in	  the	   contemporary	   social	   and	  economic	   climate	  –	   to	  generate	  a	   sense	  of	  uncertainty	   that	  dominates	   the	  practice	  of	  divorce	   law.	  Central	   to	   this	  uncertainty	   is	   the	  question	  of	   if	  or	  when	  justice	  can	  be	  done.	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THE	  COURT	  AS	  ETHICAL	  SPACE	  
The	  state’s	  legitimacy	  in	  relation	  to	  personal	  status	  law	  was	  frequently	  debated	  in	  terms	  of	  gender	  equality	  and	  women’s	  rights.	  The	   tension	   found	   in	   the	   law	  between	   the	  different	  notions	   of	   personhood	   can	   be	   further	   analysed	   along	   gender	   lines	   and	   reveals	   peoples’	  concerns	  about	  the	  right	  of	  women	  to	  divorce	  unilaterally.	  The	  fear	  was	  that	  the	  right	  to	  divorce	  unilaterally	  discouraged	  women	  from	  being	  ‘patient’	  and	  tended	  towards	  breaking	  up	   families.	   My	   husband	   told	   me	   about	   a	   conversation	   he	   had	   with	   a	   young,	   female	  Tunisian	  colleague	  about	  my	  research.	  He	  explained	  to	  her	  how	  Tunisian	  law	  was	  seen	  to	  be	  avant-­‐garde	  in	  its	  protection	  of	  women	  by	  allowing	  them	  to	  file	  for	  divorce	  in	  order	  to	  escape	   from	   violent	   marriages.	   His	   colleague	   had	   never	   seen	   Tunisian	   law	   in	   terms	   of	  protecting	   women;	   she	   thought	   of	   the	   law	   in	   terms	   of	   women	   abusing	   their	   right	   to	  divorce	   in	   order	   to	   pressurise	   or	   blackmail	   their	   husbands,	   or	   in	   an	   attempt	   to	   gain	  materially	  in	  a	  divorce	  settlement.	  	  
Writing	   on	   Lebanon,	   where	   family	   law	   is	   left	   in	   the	   domain	   of	   religious	   courts,	  Joseph	  found	  that	  the	  ‘state	  has	  created	  non-­‐homogenous	  legal	  conditions	  for	  its	  citizens,	  making	   for	   a	   direct	   conflict	   with	   the	   constitutional	   codes	   asserting	   equality	   among	  citizens’	  (1997:	  82).	  She	  added	  that	  this	  ‘throws	  matters	  into	  the	  domain	  of	  non-­‐negotiable	  sacred	  religion	  and	   into	  the	  hands	  of	  patriarchal	  religious	  clerks’	   (ibid:	  82).	  As	  a	  unified,	  codified	   personal	   status	   code,	   Tunisian	   family	   law	   differs	   strongly	   from	   the	   Lebanese	  situation.	  Although	  the	  experience	  of	  Tunisian	  divorce	  law	  is	  highly	  gendered	  in	  practice,	  and	   although	   the	   reference	   to	   ‘custom	   and	   habit’	   defining	   the	   legal	   category	   of	   ‘marital	  duties’	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  reinforce	  ‘patriarchal’	  values	  as	  secular	  feminists	  have	  feared,	  this	   category	   also	   wrote	   some	   fluidity	   into	   legal	   practice.	   The	   interpreters	   were	   not	  ‘patriarchal	   religious	   clerics’,	   but	   secular,	   state	   judges	   –	   both	   male	   and	   female.260	   The	  ability	  of	  the	  law	  to	  uphold	  the	  constitutional	  promise	  of	  ‘equality’	  261	  lies	  in	  the	  process	  I	  have	   referred	   to	   as	   re-­‐contextualisation,	   characterised	   both	   by	   fluidity	   and	  unpredictability,	  which,	  as	  we	  saw,	  generated	  a	  high	   level	  of	  uncertainty	  and	  anxiety	   for	  litigants	  and	  legal	  practitioners	  alike.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
260	  See	  Voorhoeve	  (2012)	  on	  casuistry	  in	  judicial	  decision-­‐making.	  For	  instance,	  a	  young,	  male	  judge	  who	  cited	  
international	  conventions	  to	  justify	  decisions	  in	  favour	  of	  children	  born	  out	  of	  wedlock	  –	  another	  subject	  of	  moral	  
debate	  in	  Tunisia.	  	  
261	  This	  reference	  to	  gender	  ‘equality’	  in	  the	  constitution	  has	  been	  the	  subject	  of	  much	  public	  debate	  since	  the	  
revolution,	  including	  an	  attempt	  to	  replace	  this	  mention	  of	  equality	  with	  ‘complementarity’	  between	  men	  and	  
women.	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This	  need	  for	  recontextualisation	  stems	  from	  the	  provision	  in	  the	  law	  that	  requires	  the	   family	   judge	   to	   act	   as	   interpreter.	   It	   also	   stems	   from	   the	   various	   processes	   of	  dislocation	  I	  have	  described:	  that	  of	  the	  court	  from	  the	  neighbourhood	  due	  to	  the	  size	  of	  the	  court’s	   jurisdiction;	   the	  dislocated	  criteria	   for	  ethical	  personhood;	  and	  the	  additional	  layer	  of	  distancing	  created	  by	  the	  documentary	  basis	  of	  the	  legal	  regime.	  All	  of	  these	  bases	  for	   judicial	   practice	   are,	   as	   Messick	   has	   written	   of	   documents,	   fallible	   and	   require	   the	  judge	   to	   engage	   in	   judicious	   practice.	   It	   is	   through	   these	   means	   (documents,	  performances)	   and	   processes	   (recontextualisation)	   that	   categories	   such	   as	   ‘harm’	   are	  ascribed	   meaning.	   Consequently,	   the	   law	   is	   contingent	   on	   ordinary	   ethics	   and	   legal	  practice	   is	   affected	   by	   the	  mixity,	   fears	   of	   immorality	   and	   the	   dis-­‐location	   of	   the	   social	  fabric	  observed	  in	  the	  neighbourhood.	  	  
In	   the	   courthouse,	   ordinary	   ethics	   becomes	   extraordinary	   ethics,	   as	   the	   court	   is	  imbued	  with	  the	  power	  of	  an	  oppressive	  state,	  one	  that	   is	  not	  readily	  trusted	  and	  that	   is	  known	  to	  be	  corrupt.	  The	  court	  appears	  to	  some	  extent	  to	  be	  a	  ‘conscience	  of	  society’	  (WT	  Murphy	  1997:	  199)	  a	  decontextualised	  ethical	  space	  in	  which	  issues	  of	  public	  morality	  are	  nonetheless	  debated	  and	  particular	  moral	  criteria	  are	  reinforced	  or	  redefined.	  However,	  in	  contrast	   to	   the	   kind	   of	   court	   described	   in	   Murphy’s	   work,	   characterised	   by	   its	  decontextualisation	  and	  detachment	  from	  politics,	  the	  Tunisian	  court	  as	  an	  ethical	  space	  is	  defined	  by	  its	  connections:	  via	  the	  work	  of	  recontextualisation	  that	  must	  be	  carried	  out	  in	  order	  for	  the	  law	  to	  function	  (chapters	  4	  and	  6)	  and	  by	  the	  intimate	  connections	  between	  the	  law	  and	  the	  state	  of	  which	  it	  is	  an	  instrument	  (chapter	  4).	  
Kelly	  (2006),	  Bear	  (2007a)	  and	  WT	  Murphy	  (1997)	  have	  explored	  (from	  different	  angles)	  how	  prejudices	   are	   reproduced	  by	   the	  work	  of	   interpretation	  within	   the	   law.	   In	  Kelly’s	   Palestinian	   context,	   for	   instance,	   prejudices	   were	   reproduced	   as	   Israeli	   soldiers	  exercised	   their	   judgement	   based	   on	   the	   duplicitous	   Palestinians	   under	   scrutiny.	   The	  generation	  of	  prejudice	  appears	  to	  be	  connected	  with	  the	  exercise	  of	  judicious	  practice	  on	  a	   basis	   that	   cannot	   be	   trusted.	   In	   the	   Tunisian	   case,	   I	   argue	   that	   the	   way	   people	  experienced	   and	   imagined	   ethical	   personhood	   provided	   the	   shaky	   foundation	   for	   both	  judicious	  and	  judicial	  practice;	   it	   is	  on	  this	  basis	  that	  prejudices	  were	  reproduced	  within	  the	  practice	  of	  divorce	  law.	  	  
In	  the	  case	  of	  Tunisian	  divorce	  law,	  inequalities	  were	  most	  pronounced	  where	  the	  legal	   code	   provided	   some	   clarity.	   In	   contrast,	   judicial	   discretion	   could	   lead	   to	   more	  flexibility	   as	   the	   judge	   responded	   to	   the	   challenges	   of	   contemporary	   marriage.	   The	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relationship	   between	   legal	   and	   social	   categories	  was	   generally	   characterised	   by	   fluidity,	  rather	   than	   fixity,	   allowing	   for	   legal	   practice	   to	   reflect	   the	   ambiguities	   found	   in	   the	  neighbourhood.	   Furthermore,	   the	   judge’s	   scope	   for	   being	   forgiving	   in	   the	   light	   of	   these	  tensions	   was	   curtailed	   by	   the	   clarity	   of	   legal	   dispositions	   that	   were	   incontrovertible	  concerning	   specific	  marital	   duties.	   This	   fluidity	  was	  most	   apparent	   in	   the	   reconciliation	  sessions,	  which	  became	  a	  forum	  where	  –	  in	  this	  strangely	  public	  yet	  confidential	  setting	  –moral	  criteria	  were	  debated,	  contested	  and	  reinforced	  (chapter	  4).	  	  
What	   are	   the	   implications	   of	   such	   extraordinary	   ethics	   for	   the	   state-­‐citizen	  relationship?	   Do	   citizens	   feel	   that	   the	   state	   provides	   justice?	   Does	   the	   state	   appear	   to	  uphold	  the	  values	  that	  its	  citizens	  expect	  it	  to	  uphold?	  	  
Studying	   divorce	   law	   in	   Tunisia	   from	   the	   dual	   perspectives	   of	   the	   court	   and	   the	  neighbourhood	  reveals	  how	  legal	  practice	   is	   intertwined	  with	  morality	  and	  made	  part	  of	  the	  law	  by	  the	  wording	  of	  the	  legal	  code	  (its	  reference	  to	  ‘custom	  and	  habit’).	  The	  potential	  for	  casuistry	  that	  stems	  from	  the	  open	  norms	  contained	  in	  the	  personal	  status	  code	  is	  ripe	  with	  uncertainty	   (Voorhoeve	  2011).	  Citizens	   felt	   they	  could	  not	   trust	   the	   law	   to	  provide	  justice.	  For	  those	  who	  did	  feel	  well	  serviced	  by	  the	  legal	  system,	  this	  sentiment	  stemmed	  from	  their	  personal	  contact	  with	  the	  judge	  or	  court	  staff	  (chapter	  3).	  Like	  Caroline	  White’s	  informants	  (in	  a	  UK	  immigration	  court),	  Malika’s	  positive	  experience262	  rested	  on	  finding	  ‘a	   good	   judge	   on	   a	   good	   day’	   (2012).	   Even	   those	   litigants	  who	   felt	   they	   had	   convincing	  documentary	   evidence	  were	  unclear	   about	  whether	   they	  would	   find	   justice	   (chapter	   5).	  	  As	   their	   violent,	   abusive	  marriages	  were	  drawing	   to	  a	   close,	   Saida	  and	  Leila	   (chapter	  5)	  ultimately	  left	  the	  question	  of	  justice	  to	  a	  higher	  power.	  Leila	  had	  forced	  her	  husband	  to	  lie	  under	  oath	  about	  possessions	  that	  he	  claimed	  to	  be	  his	  and	  that	  she	  knew	  were	  hers.	  An	  all-­‐knowing	  God,	  able	  to	  see	  who	  is	  telling	  the	  truth,	  would	  deliver	  divine	  justice.	  Faith	  was	  placed	  in	  ‘maktoub’	  (fate,	  that	  which	  is	  written	  by	  God),	  rather	  than	  ‘maktoub’	  (documents,	  documentary	  evidence),	  leaving	  to	  a	  higher	  power	  the	  consequences	  of	  things	  beyond	  an	  individual’s	  control.	   ‘Maktoub’	   in	  the	  former	  sense,	  appeared	  as	  a	  key	  coping	  mechanism	  that	  helped	  individuals	  deal	  with	  the	  uncertainties	  and	  anxieties	  surrounding	  their	  divorce	  cases	  and	  judgements.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
262	  Cf	  chapter	  6.	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CONCLUSION:	  SMOKE	  AND	  MIRRORS	  
The	  family	   law	  court	  becomes	  an	  ethical	  space	  through	  which	  public	  morality	   is	  debated	  and	   in	   which	   the	   state	   too	   is	   under	   trial.	   Its	   legitimacy	   as	   self-­‐proclaimed	   guardian	   of	  Islamic	   and	  moral	   values	   is	   being	   judged	   by	   its	   citizens	   (chapter	   4),	   as	   the	   state	   in	   its	  officials	   judges	   the	   citizens	   (in)ability	   to	   perform	   as	   the	   ideal	   husband	   or	   wife.	   If	   this	  legitimacy	   is	   shaky	   it	   is	   because	   of	   the	   double	   contradictions	   inherent	   in	   this	   form	   of	  ethical	   personhood:	   the	   paradox	   that	   the	   state	   seems	   to	   provide	   legal	   rights	   to	   rights-­‐bearing	  citizens,	  whilst	  simultaneously	  demanding	  that	  citizens	  display	  a	  notion	  of	  ethical	  personhood	  that	  has	  a	  very	  different	  kind	  of	  architecture	   in	  order	  to	  access	  these	  rights.	  The	   state’s	   legitimacy	   is	   also	   formed	   of	   smoke	   and	   mirrors	   in	   that,	   ironically,	   it	   is	   the	  mirror	   of	   the	   performances	   enacted	   by	   the	   citizens	   themselves.	   As	   they	   judge	   the	   state,	  they	   are	   simultaneously	   judging	   their	   own	   (in)ability	   to	   live	   up	   to	   the	   responsible	   and	  relational	   form	  of	   ethical	   personhood	   required	   of	   them	   in	   the	  divorce	   court	   (chapter	   4)	  and	  expected	  of	  them	  outside	  it	  (chapter	  1).	  	  
In	   the	   divorce	   courts,	   ethical	   personhood	   and	   moral	   criteria	   are	   subject	   to	  continuous	  judgement.	  The	  permanent,	  essential	  nature	  of	  these	  religious-­‐moral	  values	  is	  at	  stake	  as	  they	  must	  be	  questioned	  and	  interrogated	  –	  for	  their	  relevance	  and	  validity	  in	  light	  of	  contemporary	  social	  and	  economic	  changes	  –	  as	  the	   judge	  reaches	  a	  verdict	  on	  a	  divorce	   case.	   In	   the	   corridors	   of	   the	   court,	   in	   the	   office,	   behind	   the	   closed	   doors	   of	   the	  judge’s	  office,	  in	  the	  confidential	  pages	  of	  the	  divorce	  files	  –	  through	  the	  performances	  and	  narratives	  constructed	  by	  litigants	  and	  lawyers	  (and	  in	  the	  judge’s	  responses	  to	  these),	  in	  these	  intimate,	  yet	  politically	  charged	  spaces	  within	  the	  domain	  of	  the	  state	  and	  overseen	  by	  the	  state’s	  officials	  –	  the	  moral	  is	  reassembled.	  
The	  answer	  to	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  the	  divorce	  law	  tends	  to	  reinforce	  ‘gender	  equality’	   or	   ‘patriarchal	   values’	   is	   inherently	   unstable	   and	   fluid,	   subject	   to	   the	   dynamic	  performances	   and	   processes	   through	   which	   the	   moral	   fabric	   is	   continually	   rewoven	  through	  the	  practice	  of	  the	  law.	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